mbedtls/docs/architecture/testing/driver-interface-test-strategy.md
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 4575d230bf Add a note on hits usefulness
And fix a typo while at it.

Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
2024-04-15 10:54:49 +02:00

29 KiB

Mbed TLS driver interface test strategy

This document describes the test strategy for the driver interfaces in Mbed TLS. Mbed TLS has interfaces for secure element drivers, accelerator drivers and entropy drivers. This document is about testing Mbed TLS itself; testing drivers is out of scope.

The driver interfaces are standardized through PSA Cryptography functional specifications.

Secure element driver interface testing

Secure element driver interfaces

Opaque driver interface

The unified driver interface supports both transparent drivers (for accelerators) and opaque drivers (for secure elements).

Drivers exposing this interface need to be registered at compile time by declaring their JSON description file.

Dynamic secure element driver interface

The dynamic secure element driver interface (SE interface for short) is defined by psa/crypto_se_driver.h. This is an interface between Mbed TLS and one or more third-party drivers.

The SE interface consists of one function provided by Mbed TLS (psa_register_se_driver) and many functions that drivers must implement. To make a driver usable by Mbed TLS, the initialization code must call psa_register_se_driver with a structure that describes the driver. The structure mostly contains function pointers, pointing to the driver's methods. All calls to a driver function are triggered by a call to a PSA crypto API function.

SE driver interface unit tests

This section describes unit tests that must be implemented to validate the secure element driver interface. Note that a test case may cover multiple requirements; for example a “good case” test can validate that the proper function is called, that it receives the expected inputs and that it produces the expected outputs.

Many SE driver interface unit tests could be covered by running the existing API tests with a key in a secure element.

SE driver registration

This applies to dynamic drivers only.

  • Test psa_register_se_driver with valid and with invalid arguments.
  • Make at least one failing call to psa_register_se_driver followed by a successful call.
  • Make at least one test that successfully registers the maximum number of drivers and fails to register one more.

Dispatch to SE driver

For each API function that can lead to a driver call (more precisely, for each driver method call site, but this is practically equivalent):

  • Make at least one test with a key in a secure element that checks that the driver method is called. A few API functions involve multiple driver methods; these should validate that all the expected driver methods are called.
  • Make at least one test with a key that is not in a secure element that checks that the driver method is not called.
  • Make at least one test with a key in a secure element with a driver that does not have the requisite method (i.e. the method pointer is NULL) but has the substructure containing that method, and check that the return value is PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED.
  • Make at least one test with a key in a secure element with a driver that does not have the substructure containing that method (i.e. the pointer to the substructure is NULL), and check that the return value is PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED.
  • At least one test should register multiple drivers with a key in each driver and check that the expected driver is called. This does not need to be done for all operations (use a white-box approach to determine if operations may use different code paths to choose the driver).
  • At least one test should register the same driver structure with multiple lifetime values and check that the driver receives the expected lifetime value.

Some methods only make sense as a group (for example a driver that provides the MAC methods must provide all or none). In those cases, test with all of them null and none of them null.

SE driver inputs

For each API function that can lead to a driver call (more precisely, for each driver method call site, but this is practically equivalent):

  • Wherever the specification guarantees parameters that satisfy certain preconditions, check these preconditions whenever practical.
  • If the API function can take parameters that are invalid and must not reach the driver, call the API function with such parameters and verify that the driver method is not called.
  • Check that the expected inputs reach the driver. This may be implicit in a test that checks the outputs if the only realistic way to obtain the correct outputs is to start from the expected inputs (as is often the case for cryptographic material, but not for metadata).

SE driver outputs

For each API function that leads to a driver call, call it with parameters that cause a driver to be invoked and check how Mbed TLS handles the outputs.

  • Correct outputs.
  • Incorrect outputs such as an invalid output length.
  • Expected errors (e.g. PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE from a signature verification method).
  • Unexpected errors. At least test that if the driver returns PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR, this is propagated correctly.

Key creation functions invoke multiple methods and need more complex error handling:

  • Check the consequence of errors detected at each stage (slot number allocation or validation, key creation method, storage accesses).
  • Check that the storage ends up in the expected state. At least make sure that no intermediate file remains after a failure.

Persistence of SE keys

The following tests must be performed at least one for each key creation method (import, generate, ...).

  • Test that keys in a secure element survive psa_close_key(); psa_open_key().
  • Test that keys in a secure element survive mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); psa_crypto_init().
  • Test that the driver's persistent data survives mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); psa_crypto_init().
  • Test that psa_destroy_key() does not leave any trace of the key.

Resilience for SE drivers

Creating or removing a key in a secure element involves multiple storage modifications (M1, ..., Mn). If the operation is interrupted by a reset at any point, it must be either rolled back or completed.

  • For each potential interruption point (before M1, between M1 and M2, ..., after Mn), call mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(); psa_crypto_init() at that point and check that this either rolls back or completes the operation that was started.
  • This must be done for each key creation method and for key destruction.
  • This must be done for each possible flow, including error cases (e.g. a key creation that fails midway due to OUT_OF_MEMORY).
  • The recovery during psa_crypto_init can itself be interrupted. Test those interruptions too.
  • Two things need to be tested: the key that is being created or destroyed, and the driver's persistent storage.
  • Check both that the storage has the expected content (this can be done by e.g. using a key that is supposed to be present) and does not have any unexpected content (for keys, this can be done by checking that psa_open_key fails with PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST).

This requires instrumenting the storage implementation, either to force it to fail at each point or to record successive storage states and replay each of them. Each psa_its_xxx function call is assumed to be atomic.

SE driver system tests

Real-world use case

We must have at least one driver that is close to real-world conditions:

  • With its own source tree.
  • Running on actual hardware.
  • Run the full driver validation test suite (which does not yet exist).
  • Run at least one test application (e.g. the Mbed OS TLS example).

This requirement shall be fulfilled by the Microchip ATECC508A driver.

Complete driver

We should have at least one driver that covers the whole interface:

  • With its own source tree.
  • Implementing all the methods.
  • Run the full driver validation test suite (which does not yet exist).

A PKCS#11 driver would be a good candidate. It would be useful as part of our product offering.

Unified driver interface testing

The unified driver interface defines interfaces for accelerators.

Test requirements

Requirements for transparent driver testing

Every cryptographic mechanism for which a transparent driver interface exists (key creation, cryptographic operations, …) must be exercised in at least one build. The test must verify that the driver code is called.

Requirements for fallback

The driver interface includes a fallback mechanism so that a driver can reject a request at runtime and let another driver handle the request. For each entry point, there must be at least three test runs with two or more drivers available with driver A configured to fall back to driver B, with one run where A returns PSA_SUCCESS, one where A returns PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED and B is invoked, and one where A returns a different error and B is not invoked.

Test drivers

We have test drivers that are enabled by PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST (not present in the usual config files, must be defined on the command line or in a custom config file). Those test drivers are implemented in tests/src/drivers/*.c and their API is declared in tests/include/test/drivers/*.h.

We have two test driver registered: mbedtls_test_opaque_driver and mbedtls_test_transparent_driver. These are described in scripts/data_files/driver_jsons/mbedtls_test_xxx_driver.json (as much as our JSON support currently allows). Each of the drivers can potentially implement support for several mechanism; conversely, each of the file mentioned in the previous paragraph can potentially contribute to both the opaque and the transparent test driver.

Each entry point is instrumented to record the number of hits for each part of the driver (same division as the files) and the status of the last call. It is also possible to force the next call to return a specified status, and sometimes more things can be forced: see the various mbedtls_test_driver_XXX_hooks_t structures declared by each driver (and subsections below).

The drivers can use one of two back-ends:

  • internal: this requires the built-in implementation to be present.
  • libtestdriver1: this allows the built-in implementation to be omitted from the build.

Historical note: internal was initially the only back-end; then support for libtestdriver1 was added gradually. Support for libtestdriver1 is now complete (see following sub-sections), so we could remove internal now. Note it's useful to have builds with both a driver and the built-in, in order to test fallback to built-in, which is currently done only with internal, but this can be achieved with libtestdriver1 just as well.

Note on instrumentation: originally, when only the internal backend was available, hits were how we knew that the driver was called, as opposed to directly calling the built-in code. With libtestdriver1, we can check that by ensuring that the built-in code is not present, so if the operation gives the correct result, only a driver call can have calculated that result. So, nowadays there is low value in checking the hit count. There is still some value for hit counts, e.g. checking that we don't call a multipart entry point when we intended to call the one-shot entry point, but it's limited.

Note: our test drivers tend to provide all possible entry points (with a few exceptions that may not be intentional, see the next sections). However, in some cases, when an entry point is not available, the core is supposed to implement it using other entry points, for example:

  • mac_verify may use mac_compute if the driver does no provide verify;
  • for things that have both one-shot and multi-part API, the driver can provide only the multi-part entry points, and the core is supposed to implement one-shot on top of it (but still call the one-shot entry points when they're available);
  • sign/verify_message can be implemented on top of sign/verify_hash for some algorithms;
  • (not sure if the list is exhaustive).

Ideally, we'd want build options for the test drivers so that we can test with different combinations of entry points present, and make sure the core behaves appropriately when some entry points are absent but other entry points allow implementing the operation. This will remain hard to test until we have proper support for JSON-defined drivers with auto-generation of dispatch code. (The MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_xxx macros we currently use are not expressive enough to specify which entry points are supported for a given mechanism.)

Our implementation of PSA Crypto is structured in a way that the built-in implementation of each operation follows the driver API, see ../architecture/psa-crypto-implementation-structure.md. This makes implementing the test drivers very easy: each entry point has a corresponding mbedtls_psa_xxx() function that it can call as its implementation - with the libtestdriver1 back-end the function is called libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_xxx() instead.

A nice consequence of that strategy is that when an entry point has test-driver support, most of the time, it automatically works for all algorithms and key types supported by the library. (The exception being when the driver needs to call a different function for different key types, as is the case with some asymmetric key management operations.) (Note: it's still useful to test drivers in configurations with partial algorithm support, and that can still be done by configuring libtestdriver1 and the main library as desired.)

The renaming process for libtestdriver1 is implemented as a few Perl regexes applied to a copy of the library code, see the libtestdriver1.a target in tests/Makefile. Another modification that's done to this copy is appending tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h to psa/crypto_config.h. This file reverses the ACCEL/BUILTIN macros so that libtestdriver1 includes as built-in what the main libmbedcrypto.a will have accelerated; see that file's initial comment for details. See also helper_libtestdriver1_ functions and the preceding comment in all.sh for how libtestdriver is used in practice.

This general framework needs specific code for each family of operations. At a given point in time, not all operations have the same level of support. The following sub-sections describe the status of the test driver support, mostly following the structure and order of sections 9.6 and 10.2 to 10.10 of the PSA Crypto standard as that is also a natural division for implementing test drivers (that's how the code is divided into files).

Key management

The following entry points are declared in test/drivers/key_management.h:

  • "init" (transparent and opaque)
  • "generate_key" (transparent and opaque)
  • "export_public_key" (transparent and opaque)
  • "import_key" (transparent and opaque)
  • "export_key" (opaque only)
  • "get_builtin_key" (opaque only)
  • "copy_key" (opaque only)

The transparent driver fully implements the declared entry points, and can use any backend: internal or libtestdriver1.

The opaque's driver implementation status is as follows:

  • "generate_key": not implemented, always returns NOT_SUPPORTED.
  • "export_public_key": implemented only for ECC and RSA keys, both backends.
  • "import_key": implemented except for DH keys, both backends.
  • "export_key": implemented for built-in keys (ECC and AES), and for non-builtin keys except DH keys. (Backend not relevant.)
  • "get_builtin_key": implemented - provisioned keys: AES-128 and ECC secp2456r1. (Backend not relevant.)
  • "copy_key": implemented - emulates a SE without storage. (Backend not relevant.)

Note: the "init" entry point is not part of the "key management" family, but listed here as it's declared and implemented in the same file. With the transparent driver and the libtestdriver1 backend, it calls libtestdriver1_psa_crypto_init(), which partially but not fully ensures that this entry point is called before other entry points in the test drivers. With the opaque driver, this entry point just does nothing an returns success.

The following entry points are defined by the driver interface but missing from our test drivers:

  • "allocate_key", "destroy_key": this is for opaque drivers that store the key material internally.

Note: the instrumentation also allows forcing the output and its length.

Message digests (Hashes)

The following entry points are declared (transparent only):

  • "hash_compute"
  • "hash_setup"
  • "hash_clone"
  • "hash_update"
  • "hash_finish"
  • "hash_abort"

The transparent driver fully implements the declared entry points, and can use any backend: internal or libtestdriver1.

This familly is not part of the opaque driver as it doesn't use keys.

Message authentication codes (MAC)

The following entry points are declared (transparent and opaque):

  • "mac_compute"
  • "mac_sign_setup"
  • "mac_verify_setup"
  • "mac_update"
  • "mac_sign_finish"
  • "mac_verify_finish"
  • "mac_abort"

The transparent driver fully implements the declared entry points, and can use any backend: internal or libtestdriver1.

The opaque driver only implements the instrumentation but not the actual operations: entry points will always return NOT_SUPPORTED, unless another status is forced.

The following entry points are not implemented:

  • mac_verify: this mostly makes sense for opaque drivers; the core will fall back to using "mac_compute" if this is not implemented. So, perhaps ideally we should test both with "mac_verify" implemented and with it not implemented? Anyway, we have a test gap here.

Unauthenticated ciphers

The following entry points are declared (transparent and opaque):

  • "cipher_encrypt"
  • "cipher_decrypt"
  • "cipher_encrypt_setup"
  • "cipher_decrypt_setup"
  • "cipher_set_iv"
  • "cipher_update"
  • "cipher_finish"
  • "cipher_abort"

The transparent driver fully implements the declared entry points, and can use any backend: internal or libtestdriver1.

The opaque driver is not implemented at all, neither instumentation nor the operation: entry points always return NOT_SUPPORTED.

Note: the instrumentation also allows forcing a specific output and output length.

Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)

The following entry points are declared (transparent only):

  • "aead_encrypt"
  • "aead_decrypt"
  • "aead_encrypt_setup"
  • "aead_decrypt_setup"
  • "aead_set_nonce"
  • "aead_set_lengths"
  • "aead_update_ad"
  • "aead_update"
  • "aead_finish"
  • "aead_verify"
  • "aead_abort"

The transparent driver fully implements the declared entry points, and can use any backend: internal or libtestdriver1.

The opaque driver does not implement or even declare entry points for this family.

Note: the instrumentation records the number of hits per entry point, not just the total number of hits for this family.

Key derivation

Not covered at all by the test drivers.

That's a test gap which reflects a feature gap: the driver interface does define a key derivation family of entry points, but we don't currently implement that part of the driver interface, see #5488 and related issues.

Asymmetric signature

The following entry points are declared (transparent and opaque):

  • "sign_message"
  • "verify_message"
  • "sign_hash"
  • "verify_hash"

The transparent driver fully implements the declared entry points, and can use any backend: internal or libtestdriver1.

The opaque driver is not implemented at all, neither instumentation nor the operation: entry points always return NOT_SUPPORTED.

Note: the instrumentation also allows forcing a specific output and output length, and has two instance of the hooks structure: one for sign, the other for verify.

Note: when a driver implements only the "xxx_hash" entry points, the core is supposed to implement the psa_xxx_message() functions by computing the hash itself before calling the "xxx_hash" entry point. Since the test driver does implement the "xxx_message" entry point, it's not exercising that part of the core's expected behaviour.

Asymmetric encryption

The following entry points are declared (transparent and opaque):

  • "asymmetric_encrypt"
  • "asymmetric_decrypt"

The transparent driver fully implements the declared entry points, and can use any backend: internal or libtestdriver1.

The opaque driver implements the declared entry points, and can use any backend: internal or libtestdriver1. However it does not implement the instrumentation (hits, forced output/status), as this was not an immediate priority.

Note: the instrumentation also allows forcing a specific output and output length.

Key agreement

The following entry points are declared (transparent and opaque):

  • "key_agreement"

The transparent driver fully implements the declared entry points, and can use any backend: internal or libtestdriver1.

The opaque driver is not implemented at all, neither instumentation nor the operation: entry points always return NOT_SUPPORTED.

Note: the instrumentation also allows forcing a specific output and output length.

Other cryptographic services (Random number generation)

Not covered at all by the test drivers.

The driver interface defines a "get_entropy" entry point, as well as a "Random generation" family of entry points. None of those are currently implemented in the library. Part of it will be planned for 4.0, see #8150.

PAKE extension

The following entry points are declared (transparent only):

  • "pake_setup"
  • "pake_output"
  • "pake_input"
  • "pake_get_implicit_key"
  • "pake_abort"

Note: the instrumentation records hits per entry point and allows forcing the output and its length, as well as forcing the status of setup independently from the others.

The transparent driver fully implements the declared entry points, and can use any backend: internal or libtestdriver1.

The opaque driver does not implement or even declare entry points for this family.

Driver wrapper test suite

We have a test suite dedicated to driver dispatch, which takes advantage of the instrumentation in the test drivers described in the previous section, in order to check that drivers are called when they're supposed to, and that the core behaves as expected when they return errors (in particular, that we fall back to the built-in implementation when the driver returns NOT_SUPPORTED).

This is test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers, which is maintained manually (that is, the test cases in the .data files are not auto-generated). The entire test suite depends on the test drivers being enabled (PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST), which is not the case in the default or full config.

The test suite is focused on driver usage (mostly by checking the expected number of hits) but also does some validation of the results: for deterministic algorithms, known-answers tests are used, and for the rest, some consistency checks are done (more or less detailled depending on the algorithm and build configuration).

Configurations coverage

The driver wrappers test suite has cases that expect both the driver and the built-in to be present, and also cases that expect the driver to be present but not the built-in. As such, it's impossible for a single configuration to run all test cases, and we need at least two: driver+built-in, and driver-only.

  • The driver+built-in case is covered by test_psa_crypto_drivers in all.sh. This covers all areas (key types and algs) at once.
  • The driver-only case is split into multiple all.sh components whose names start with test_psa_crypto_config_accel; we have one or more component per area, see below.

Here's a summary of driver-only coverage, grouped by families of key types.

Hash (key types: none)

  • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hash: all algs, default config, no parity testing.
  • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hash_use_psa: all algs, full config, with parity testing.

HMAC (key type: HMAC)

  • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hmac: all algs, full config except a few exclusions (PKCS5, PKCS7, HMAC-DRBG, legacy HKDF, deterministic ECDSA), with parity testing.

Cipher, AEAD and CMAC (key types: DES, AES, ARIA, CHACHA20, CAMELLIA):

  • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_cipher_aead_cmac: all key types and algs, full config with a few exclusions (NIST-KW), with parity testing.
  • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_des: only DES (with all algs), full config, no parity testing.
  • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_aead: only AEAD algs (with all relevant key types), full config, no parity testing.

Key derivation (key types: DERIVE, RAW_DATA, PASSWORD, PEPPER, PASSWORD_HASH):

  • No testing as we don't have driver support yet (see previous section).

RSA (key types: RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx, RSA_PUBLIC_KEY):

  • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_rsa_crypto: all 4 algs (encryption & signature, v1.5 & v2.1), config crypto_full, with parity testing excluding PK.

DH (key types: DH_KEY_PAIR_xxx, DH_PUBLIC_KEY):

  • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ffdh: all key types and algs, full config, with parity testing.
  • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_ffdh_no_bignum: with also bignum removed.

ECC (key types: ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx, ECC_PUBLIC_KEY):

  • Single algorithm accelerated (both key types, all curves):
    • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecdh: default config, no parity testing.
    • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecdsa: default config, no parity testing.
    • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_pake: full config, no parity testing.
  • All key types, algs and curves accelerated (full config with exceptions, with parity testing):
    • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_ecp_light_only: ECP_C mostly disabled
    • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_no_ecp_at_all: ECP_C fully disabled
    • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_no_bignum: BIGNUM_C disabled (DH disabled)
    • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_ffdh_no_bignum: BIGNUM_C disabled (DH accelerated)
  • Other - all algs accelerated but only some algs/curves (full config with exceptions, no parity testing):
    • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_some_key_types
    • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_non_weierstrass_curves
    • test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_weierstrass_curves

Note: analyze_outcomes.py provides a list of test cases that are not executed in any configuration tested on the CI. We're missing driver-only HMAC testing, but no test is flagged as never executed there; this reveals we don't have "fallback not available" cases for MAC, see #8565.

Test case coverage

Since test_suite_psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.data is maintained manually, we need to make sure it exercises all the cases that need to be tested. In the future, this file should be generated in order to ensure exhaustiveness.

In the meantime, one way to observe (lack of) completeness is to look at line coverage in test driver implementaitons - this doesn't reveal all gaps, but it does reveal cases where we thought about something when writing the test driver, but not when writing test functions/data.

Key management:

  • mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key() is not tested with RSA keys.
  • mbedtls_test_transparent_import_key() is not tested with DH keys.
  • mbedtls_test_opaque_import_key() is not tested with unstructured keys nor with RSA keys (nor DH keys since that's not implemented).
  • mbedtls_test_opaque_export_key() is not tested with non-built-in keys.
  • mbedtls_test_transparent_export_public_key() is not tested with RSA or DH keys.
  • mbedtls_test_opaque_export_public_key() is not tested with non-built-in keys.
  • mbedtls_test_opaque_copy_key() is not tested at all.

Hash:

  • mbedtls_test_transparent_hash_finish() is not tested with a forced status.

MAC:

  • The following are not tested with a forced status:
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_sign_setup()
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_setup()
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_update()
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_verify_finish()
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_mac_abort()
  • No opaque entry point is tested (they're not implemented either).

Cipher:

  • The following are not tested with a forced status nor with a forced output:
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_encrypt()
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_cipher_finish()
  • No opaque entry point is tested (they're not implemented either).

AEAD:

  • The following are not tested with a forced status:
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_nonce()
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_set_lengths()
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update_ad()
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_update()
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_finish()
    • mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_verify()
  • mbedtls_test_transparent_aead_verify() is not tested with an invalid tag (though it might be in another test suite).

Signature:

  • sign_hash() is not tested with RSA-PSS
  • No opaque entry point is tested (they're not implemented either).

Key agreement:

  • mbedtls_test_transparent_key_agreement() is not tested with FFDH.
  • No opaque entry point is tested (they're not implemented either).

PAKE:

  • All lines are covered.