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mbedtls/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
Ronald Cron a9bdc8fbb8 Improve tls13-support.md 
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
2024-03-15 15:52:04 +01:00

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TLS 1.3 support
===============
Overview
--------
Mbed TLS provides an implementation of the TLS 1.3 protocol. The TLS 1.3 support
may be enabled using the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 configuration option.
Support description
-------------------
- Overview
- Mbed TLS implements both the client and the server side of the TLS 1.3
protocol.
- Mbed TLS supports ECDHE key establishment.
- Mbed TLS supports DHE key establishment.
- Mbed TLS supports pre-shared keys for key establishment, pre-shared keys
provisioned externally as well as provisioned via the ticket mechanism.
- Mbed TLS supports session resumption via the ticket mechanism.
- Mbed TLS supports sending and receiving early data (0-RTT data).
- Supported cipher suites: depends on the library configuration. Potentially
all of them:
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 and TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256.
- Supported ClientHello extensions:
| Extension | Support |
| ---------------------------- | ------- |
| server_name | YES |
| max_fragment_length | no |
| status_request | no |
| supported_groups | YES |
| signature_algorithms | YES |
| use_srtp | no |
| heartbeat | no |
| alpn | YES |
| signed_certificate_timestamp | no |
| client_certificate_type | no |
| server_certificate_type | no |
| padding | no |
| key_share | YES |
| pre_shared_key | YES |
| psk_key_exchange_modes | YES |
| early_data | YES |
| cookie | no |
| supported_versions | YES |
| certificate_authorities | no |
| post_handshake_auth | no |
| signature_algorithms_cert | no |
- Supported groups: depends on the library configuration.
Potentially all ECDHE groups:
secp256r1, x25519, secp384r1, x448 and secp521r1.
Potentially all DHE groups:
ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144 and ffdhe8192.
- Supported signature algorithms (both for certificates and CertificateVerify):
depends on the library configuration.
Potentially:
ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256, ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384, ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pkcs1_sha384, rsa_pkcs1_sha512, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 and rsa_pss_rsae_sha512.
Note that in absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise
rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 and ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 are
mandatory (see section 9.1 of the specification).
- Supported versions:
- TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 with version negotiation on client and server side.
- TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 can be enabled in the build independently of each
other.
- Compatibility with existing SSL/TLS build options:
The TLS 1.3 implementation is compatible with nearly all TLS 1.2
configuration options in the sense that when enabling TLS 1.3 in the library
there is rarely any need to modify the configuration from that used for
TLS 1.2. There are two exceptions though: the TLS 1.3 implementation requires
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE, so these options
must be enabled.
Most of the Mbed TLS SSL/TLS related options are not supported or not
applicable to the TLS 1.3 implementation:
| Mbed TLS configuration option | Support |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------- |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES | yes |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE | no (1) |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH | no |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS | yes |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION | yes |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH | no |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE | no |
| MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED | no |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED | n/a (2) |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED | n/a |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C | no (1) |
| MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO | yes |
(1) These options must remain in their default state of enabled.
(2) See the TLS 1.3 specific build options section below.
- TLS 1.3 specific build options:
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE enables the support for middlebox
compatibility mode as defined in section D.4 of RFC 8446.
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED enables the support for
the PSK key exchange mode as defined by RFC 8446. If it is the only key
exchange mode enabled, the TLS 1.3 implementation does not contain any code
related to key exchange protocols, certificates and signatures.
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED enables the
support for the ephemeral key exchange mode. If it is the only key exchange
mode enabled, the TLS 1.3 implementation does not contain any code related
to PSK based key exchange. The ephemeral key exchange mode requires at least
one of the key exchange protocol allowed by the TLS 1.3 specification, the
parsing and validation of x509 certificates and at least one signature
algorithm allowed by the TLS 1.3 specification for signature computing and
verification.
- MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED enables the
support for the PSK ephemeral key exchange mode. If it is the only key
exchange mode enabled, the TLS 1.3 implementation does not contain any code
related to certificates and signatures. The PSK ephemeral key exchange
mode requires at least one of the key exchange protocol allowed by the
TLS 1.3 specification.
Coding rules checklist for TLS 1.3
----------------------------------
The following coding rules are aimed to be a checklist for TLS 1.3 upstreaming
work to reduce review rounds and the number of comments in each round. They
come along (do NOT replace) the project coding rules
(https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/development/mbedtls-coding-standards). They have been
established and discussed following the review of #4882 that was the
PR upstreaming the first part of TLS 1.3 ClientHello writing code.
TLS 1.3 specific coding rules:
- TLS 1.3 specific C modules, headers, static functions names are prefixed
with `ssl_tls13_`. The same applies to structures and types that are
internal to C modules.
- TLS 1.3 specific exported functions, structures and types are
prefixed with `mbedtls_ssl_tls13_`.
- Use TLS1_3 in TLS 1.3 specific macros.
- The names of macros and variables related to a field or structure in the
TLS 1.3 specification should contain as far as possible the field name as
it is in the specification. If the field name is "too long" and we prefer
to introduce some kind of abbreviation of it, use the same abbreviation
everywhere in the code.
Example 1: #define CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32, macro for the length of the
`random` field of the ClientHello message.
Example 2 (consistent abbreviation): `mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext()`
and `MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG`, `sig_alg` standing for
`signature_algorithms`.
- Regarding vectors that are represented by a length followed by their value
in the data exchanged between servers and clients:
- Use `<vector name>_len` for the name of a variable used to compute the
length in bytes of the vector, where <vector name> is the name of the
vector as defined in the TLS 1.3 specification.
- Use `p_<vector_name>_len` for the name of a variable intended to hold
the address of the first byte of the vector length.
- Use `<vector_name>` for the name of a variable intended to hold the
address of the first byte of the vector value.
- Use `<vector_name>_end` for the name of a variable intended to hold
the address of the first byte past the vector value.
Those idioms should lower the risk of mis-using one of the address in place
of another one which could potentially lead to some nasty issues.
Example: `cipher_suites` vector of ClientHello in
`ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_cipher_suites()`
```
size_t cipher_suites_len;
unsigned char *p_cipher_suites_len;
unsigned char *cipher_suites;
```
- Where applicable, use:
- the macros to extract a byte from a multi-byte integer MBEDTLS_BYTE_{0-8}.
- the macros to write in memory in big-endian order a multi-byte integer
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE.
- the macros to read from memory a multi-byte integer in big-endian order
MBEDTLS_GET_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE.
- the macro to check for space when writing into an output buffer
`MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR`.
- the macro to check for data when reading from an input buffer
`MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR`.
The three first types, MBEDTLS_BYTE_{0-8}, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE
and MBEDTLS_GET_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE improve the readability of the code and
reduce the risk of writing or reading bytes in the wrong order.
The two last types, `MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR` and
`MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR`, improve the readability of the code and
reduce the risk of error in the non-completely-trivial arithmetic to
check that we do not write or read past the end of a data buffer. The
usage of those macros combined with the following rule mitigate the risk
to read/write past the end of a data buffer.
Examples:
```
hs_hdr[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( total_hs_len );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, p, 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 7 );
```
- To mitigate what happened here
(https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/4882#discussion_r701704527) from
happening again, use always a local variable named `p` for the reading
pointer in functions parsing TLS 1.3 data, and for the writing pointer in
functions writing data into an output buffer and only that variable. The
name `p` has been chosen as it was already widely used in TLS code.
- When an TLS 1.3 structure is written or read by a function or as part of
a function, provide as documentation the definition of the structure as
it is in the TLS 1.3 specification.
General coding rules:
- We prefer grouping "related statement lines" by not adding blank lines
between them.
Example 1:
```
ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_cipher_suites( ssl, buf, end, &output_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
buf += output_len;
```
Example 2:
```
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cipher_suites_iter, end, 2 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( cipher_suite, cipher_suites_iter, 0 );
cipher_suites_iter += 2;
```
- Use macros for constants that are used in different functions, different
places in the code. When a constant is used only locally in a function
(like the length in bytes of the vector lengths in functions reading and
writing TLS handshake message) there is no need to define a macro for it.
Example: `#define CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32`
- When declaring a pointer the dereferencing operator should be prepended to
the pointer name not appended to the pointer type:
Example: `mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl;`
- Maximum line length is 80 characters.
Exceptions:
- string literals can extend beyond 80 characters as we do not want to
split them to ease their search in the code base.
- A line can be more than 80 characters by a few characters if just looking
at the 80 first characters is enough to fully understand the line. For
example it is generally fine if some closure characters like ";" or ")"
are beyond the 80 characters limit.
If a line becomes too long due to a refactoring (for example renaming a
function to a longer name, or indenting a block more), avoid rewrapping
lines in the same commit: it makes the review harder. Make one commit with
the longer lines and another commit with just the rewrapping.
- When in successive lines, functions and macros parameters should be aligned
vertically.
Example:
```
int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned hs_type,
unsigned char **buf,
size_t *buf_len );
```
- When a function's parameters span several lines, group related parameters
together if possible.
For example, prefer:
```
mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( ssl, hs_type,
buf, buf_len );
```
over
```
mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( ssl, hs_type, buf,
buf_len );
```
even if it fits.
Overview of handshake code organization
---------------------------------------
The TLS 1.3 handshake protocol is implemented as a state machine. The
functions `mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_{client,server}_step` are the top level
functions of that implementation. They are implemented as a switch over all the
possible states of the state machine.
Most of the states are either dedicated to the processing or writing of an
handshake message.
The implementation does not go systematically through all states as this would
result in too many checks of whether something needs to be done or not in a
given state to be duplicated across several state handlers. For example, on
client side, the states related to certificate parsing and validation are
bypassed if the handshake is based on a pre-shared key and thus does not
involve certificates.
On the contrary, the implementation goes systematically though some states
even if they could be bypassed if it helps in minimizing when and where inbound
and outbound keys are updated. The `MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE` state on
client side is a example of that.
The names of the handlers processing/writing an handshake message are
prefixed with `(mbedtls_)ssl_tls13_{process,write}`. To ease the maintenance and
reduce the risk of bugs, the code of the message processing and writing
handlers is split into a sequence of stages.
The sending of data to the peer only occurs in `mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step`
between the calls to the handlers and as a consequence handlers do not have to
care about the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE error code. Furthermore, all pending
data are flushed before to call the next handler. That way, handlers do not
have to worry about pending data when changing outbound keys.
### Message processing handlers
For message processing handlers, the stages are:
* coordination stage: check if the state should be bypassed. This stage is
optional. The check is either purely based on the reading of the value of some
fields of the SSL context or based on the reading of the type of the next
message. The latter occurs when it is not known what the next handshake message
will be, an example of that on client side being if we are going to receive a
CertificateRequest message or not. The intent is, apart from the next record
reading to not modify the SSL context as this stage may be repeated if the
next handshake message has not been received yet.
* fetching stage: at this stage we are sure of the type of the handshake
message we must receive next and we try to fetch it. If we did not go through
a coordination stage involving the next record type reading, the next
handshake message may not have been received yet, the handler returns with
`MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ` without changing the current state and it will be
called again later.
* pre-processing stage: prepare the SSL context for the message parsing. This
stage is optional. Any processing that must be done before the parsing of the
message or that can be done to simplify the parsing code. Some simple and
partial parsing of the handshake message may append at that stage like in the
ServerHello message pre-processing.
* parsing stage: parse the message and restrict as much as possible any
update of the SSL context. The idea of the pre-processing/parsing/post-processing
organization is to concentrate solely on the parsing in the parsing function to
reduce the size of its code and to simplify it.
* post-processing stage: following the parsing, further update of the SSL
context to prepare for the next incoming and outgoing messages. This stage is
optional. For example, secret and key computations occur at this stage, as well
as handshake messages checksum update.
* state change: the state change is done in the main state handler to ease the
navigation of the state machine transitions.
### Message writing handlers
For message writing handlers, the stages are:
* coordination stage: check if the state should be bypassed. This stage is
optional. The check is based on the value of some fields of the SSL context.
* preparation stage: prepare for the message writing. This stage is optional.
Any processing that must be done before the writing of the message or that can
be done to simplify the writing code.
* writing stage: write the message and restrict as much as possible any update
of the SSL context. The idea of the preparation/writing/finalization
organization is to concentrate solely on the writing in the writing function to
reduce the size of its code and simplify it.
* finalization stage: following the writing, further update of the SSL
context to prepare for the next incoming and outgoing messages. This stage is
optional. For example, handshake secret and key computation occur at that
stage (ServerHello writing finalization), switching to handshake keys for
outbound message on server side as well.
* state change: the state change is done in the main state handler to ease
the navigation of the state machine transitions.
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