Avoid compiler warning about size comparison (like in commit 7910cdd):
Clang builds fail, warning about comparing uint8_t to a size that may be >255.
Signed-off-by: Michael Schuster <michael@schuster.ms>
A large block of code is only reachable if MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is
enabled, i.e. if MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled with driver-only ECC.
Compilers are likely to figure it out, but still, for clarity and
robustness, do guard that block of code with the appropriate conditional
compilation guard.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
The endpoint field is needed to serialize/deserialize
a session in TLS 1.2 the same way it is needed in the
TLS 1.3 case: client specific fields that should not
be in the serialized version on server side if both
TLS client and server are enabled in the TLS library.
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
Instead of setting both algorithm and enrollement algorithm in the
PK module when parsing the key:
- for Weierstrass keys we only set ECDSA algorithm,
- for Montgomery keys we don't set any algorithm.
Reasons:
- PK module can only do ECDSA and not ECDH
- ECDH is only used in TLS
- Montgomery keys cannot be used to do ECDSA, while Weierstrass ones
can do both ECDSA and ECDH.
So the idea is that once TLS needs the key to do ECDH (either Weierstrass
and Montgomery), it exports the one parsed from the PK module and then
re-imports it setting proper algorithm and flags. In this way the TLS
module will own the new key so it will be its duty to clear it on
exit.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
RNG check is added in ssl_conf_check when calling mbedtls_ssl_setup,
so there is no need to check it again.
Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang <yanray.wang@arm.com>
On a parsing error in TLS, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, not a
crypto error code.
On error paths, emit a level-1 debug message. Report the offending sizes.
Downgrade an informational message's level to 3.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Fix a buffer overflow in TLS 1.2 ClientKeyExchange parsing. When
MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the length of the public key in an ECDH
or ECDHE key exchange was not validated. This could result in an overflow of
handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, overwriting further data in the handshake
structure or further on the heap.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
When MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined, opaque and non-opaque keys
are basically stored in the same way (only a diffferent ownership for
the key itself), so they should be treated similarly in the code.
Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti <valerio.setti@nordicsemi.no>
