mirror of
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git
synced 2025-04-10 15:45:34 +00:00
Fix buffer overflow in TLS 1.2 ClientKeyExchange parsing
Fix a buffer overflow in TLS 1.2 ClientKeyExchange parsing. When MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the length of the public key in an ECDH or ECDHE key exchange was not validated. This could result in an overflow of handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, overwriting further data in the handshake structure or further on the heap. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
12c5aaae57
commit
c8df898204
@ -3734,6 +3734,11 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Store peer's ECDH public key. */
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("data_len=%zu sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)=%zu", data_len, sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)));
|
||||
if (data_len > sizeof(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey)) {
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid data length"));
|
||||
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey, p, data_len);
|
||||
handshake->xxdh_psa_peerkey_len = data_len;
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user