In structure types that are passed to user callbacks, add a field that the
library won't ever care about. The application can use this field to either
identify an instance of the structure with a handle, or store a pointer to
extra data.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Provide an additional pair of #defines, MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
and MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY. At most one of them may be
specified. If used, it is necessary to compile with -march=armv8-a+crypto.
The MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT and MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT mechanisms
continue to work, and are mutually exclusive with A64_CRYPTO.
There should be minimal code size impact if no A64_CRYPTO option is set.
Signed-off-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com>
psa_aead_encrypt_setup() and psa_aead_decrypt_setup() were returning
PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, while the same failed checks were producing
PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if they happened in psa_aead_encrypt() or
psa_aead_decrypt().
The PSA Crypto API 1.1 spec will specify PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
in the case that the supplied algorithm is not an AEAD one.
Also move these shared checks to a helper function, to reduce code
duplication and ensure that the functions remain in sync.
Signed-off-by: Bence Szépkúti <bence.szepkuti@arm.com>
* Updated the default argument to create less noise with argument
passing.
* Reworded ChangeLog to match MbedTLS documentation/ announcement
requirements
Signed-off-by: Archana <archana.madhavan@silabs.com>
Declare mbedtls_md functions as MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL, meaning that
their return values should be checked.
Do check the return values in our code. We were already doing that
everywhere for hash calculations, but not for HMAC calculations.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
Zeroize local MAC variables used for CBC+HMAC cipher suites. In encryption,
this is just good hygiene but probably not needed for security since the
data protected by the MAC that could leak is about to be transmitted anyway.
In DTLS decryption, this could be a security issue since an adversary could
learn the MAC of data that they were trying to inject. At least with
encrypt-then-MAC, the adversary could then easily inject a datagram with
a corrected packet. TLS would still be safe since the receiver would close
the connection after the bad MAC.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
mbedtls_pk_parse_key() makes a temporary copy of the key when it calls
pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(), because that function requires a
writable buffer. pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der() always rejects an
empty password, so skip calling it in that case, which allows us to
skip the allocation as well.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
