The tests above are required then optional then none. Follow the same
pattern here.
Just moving things around (see git's --color-moved option).
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
This is for compatibility, for people transitioning from 1.2 to 1.3.
See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9223 "Mandatory server
authentication" and reports linked from there.
In the future we're likely to make server authentication mandatory in
both 1.2 and 1.3. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7080
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
In terms of line coverage, this was covered, except we never checked the
behaviour was as intended.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
This is a duplicate from the previous test, except it forces TLS 1.2.
The previous test does not force a version, so it picks 1.3 in the
default/full config. However we have a build with 1.2 only in all.sh, in
which the previous test would pick 1.2. So, there was no test gap and
the behaviour was indeed tested with 1.2.
However when measuring code coverage with lcov, currently we can only
use a single build. So, I'm adding this variant of the test case as a
so that the 1.2 code looks covered in the report from
basic-build-test.sh. This is for my convenience while I make sure
everything is covered before refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
* restricted/development-restricted: (30 commits)
Tiny fix in ChangeLog pt 2
Tiny fix in ChangeLog
Changelog entry for the RSA memory leak
Edit ChangeLog entry
Update ChangeLog
Add test cases for extKeyUsage
Rationalize extKeyUsage tests
Use P_CLI when O_CLI's status is not reliable
Rationalize keyUsage testing, round 2
Always print detailed cert errors in test programs
Fix 1.3 failure to update flags for (ext)KeyUsage
Rationalize ssl-opt tests for keyUsage
Test cert alert KEY_USAGE -> UNSUPPORTED_CERT
Free allocated memory where methods were returning without freeing
Force MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE based on CTR_DRBG
Document that MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE does not force HMAC
Clean up constant-flow memsan testing
Improve description of who is affected
More diversified sizes in tests
Fix stack buffer overflow in ECDSA signature format conversions
...
Generally speaking, in this group of test we use O_SRV when testing our
client's behaviour, and O_CLI when testing our server's behaviour. I
don't think that's essential, but why not.
Well, for these two tests there's a reason why not: O_CLI often exits 0,
seemingly not minding that the server aborted the handshake with a fatal
alert, but sometimes it exits 1. (I've observed 0 on my machine, on two
runs of OpenCI and Internal CI, and 1 in some test in one run of
Internal CI.)
So, use our client instead, which exits non-zero consistently.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
- cli-auth 1.2 was missing a test with an irrelevant bit set in addition
to the relevant bit (which was added for 1.3 previously)
- use consistent naming for fail (hard/soft)
Note: currently there are no "fail (soft)" cases for 1.3 authentication
of server by client, as server auth is mandatory in 1.3 (this will
change in 3.6.1).
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Previously the client was only printing them on handshake success, and
the server was printing them on success and some but not all failures.
This makes ssl-opt.sh more consistent as we can always check for the
presence of the expected message in the output, regardless of whether
the failure is hard or soft.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
- consistent naming with explicit version
- in each section, have a positive case with just the needed bit set,
and one with an irrelevant bit set in addition (cli 1.3 only had the
former, and cli-auth 1.3 only the later)
- when auth_mode optional is supported failing cases should come in
pairs: soft+hard, this wasn't the case for cli-auth 1.3. (Note: cli 1.3
currently does not support auth_mode optional.)
- failing cases should check that the correct flag is printed and the
expected alert is sent.
The last (two) points have uncovered a bug in 1.3 code:
- In fail (hard) cases the correct alert isn't send, but a more generic
one instead.
- In fail (soft) cases the issue with the certificate is not reported,
actually the certificate is reported as valid.
Both share the same root cause: the flags are not updated properly when
checking the keyUsage extension. This will be addressed in future
commits.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
In terms of line coverage, this was covered, except we never checked the
behaviour was as intended.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
We were only testing the static key store (MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC
disabled) with configs/*.h. Add a component with the static key store and
everything else (including built-in keys), and a component with the static
key store and CTR_DBRG using PSA for AES (which means PSA uses a volatile
key internally).
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
