None of the test cases in tests_suite_memory_buffer_alloc actually
need MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG. Some have additional checks when
MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG but all are useful even without it. So enable
them all and #ifdef out the parts that require DEBUG.
The test case "Memory buffer small buffer" emits a message
"FATAL: verification of first header failed". In this test case, it's
actually expected, but it looks weird to see this message from a
passing test. Add a comment that states this explicitly, and modify
the test description to indicate that the failure is expected, and
change the test function name to be more accurate.
Fix#309
The default entropy nonce length is either zero or nonzero depending
on the desired security strength and the entropy length.
The implementation calculates the actual entropy nonce length from the
actual entropy length, and therefore it doesn't need a constant that
indicates the default entropy nonce length. A portable application may
be interested in this constant, however. And our test code could
definitely use it.
Define a constant MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN and use it in
test code. Previously, test_suite_ctr_drbg had knowledge about the
default entropy nonce length built in and test_suite_psa_crypto_init
failed. Now both use MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN.
This change means that the test ctr_drbg_entropy_usage no longer
validates that the default entropy nonce length is sensible. So add a
new test that checks that the default entropy length and the default
entropy nonce length are sufficient to ensure the expected security
strength.
Change the default entropy nonce length to be nonzero in some cases.
Specifically, the default nonce length is now set in such a way that
the entropy input during the initial seeding always contains enough
entropy to achieve the maximum possible security strength per
NIST SP 800-90A given the key size and entropy length.
If MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN is kept to its default value,
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() now grabs extra entropy for a nonce if
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled and either
MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 is enabled or MBEDTLS_SHA512_C is
disabled. If MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled, or if
the entropy module uses SHA-512, then the default value of
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN does not require a second call to the
entropy function to achieve the maximum security strength.
This choice of default nonce size guarantees NIST compliance with the
maximum security strength while keeping backward compatibility and
performance high: in configurations that do not require grabbing more
entropy, the code will not grab more entropy than before.
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() always set the entropy length to the default,
so a call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() before seed() had no
effect. Change this to the more intuitive behavior that
set_entropy_len() sets the entropy length and seed() respects that and
only uses the default entropy length if there was no call to
set_entropy_len().
This removes the need for the test-only function
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len(). Just call
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len() followed by
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(), it works now.
Consolidate the invalid-handle tests from test_suite_psa_crypto and
test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management. Start with the code in
test_suite_psa_crypto_slot_management and adapt it to test one invalid
handle value per run of the test function.
mbedtls_asn1_get_int() and mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() behave differently
on negative INTEGERs (0200). Don't change the library behavior for now
because this might break interoperability in some applications. Change
the test function to the library behavior.
Fix the test data with negative INTEGERs. These test cases were
previously not run (they were introduced but deliberately deactivated
in 27d806fab41a11441d97017158fcb1356ef7e74f). The test data was
actually wrong: ASN.1 uses two's complement, which has no negative 0,
and some encodings were wrong. Now the tests have correct data, and
the test code rectifies the expected data to match the library
behavior.
mbedtls_asn1_get_int() and mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() behave differently
on an empty INTEGER (0200). Don't change the library behavior for now
because this might break interoperability in some applications. Write
a test function that matches the library behavior.
When the asn1parse module is enabled but the bignum module is
disabled, the asn1parse test suite did not work. Fix this.
* Fix a syntax error in get_integer() (label immediately followed by a
closing brace).
* Fix an unused variable in get_integer().
* Fix `TEST_ASSERT( *p == q );` in nested_parse() failing because `*p`
was not set.
* Fix nested_parse() not outputting the length of what it parsed.
Add some ECDSA test cases where the hash is shorter or longer than the
key length, to check that the API doesn't enforce a relationship
between the two.
For the sign_deterministic tests, the keys are
tests/data_files/ec_256_prv.pem and tests/data_files/ec_384_prv.pem
and the signatures were obtained with Python Cryptodome:
from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify
from Crypto.Hash import SHA256, SHA384
from Crypto.PublicKey import ECC
from Crypto.Signature import DSS
k2 = ECC.import_key(unhexlify("3077020101042049c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eeea00a06082a8648ce3d030107a144034200047772656f814b399279d5e1f1781fac6f099a3c5ca1b0e35351834b08b65e0b572590cdaf8f769361bcf34acfc11e5e074e8426bdde04be6e653945449617de45"))
SHA384.new(b'hello').hexdigest()
hexlify(DSS.new(k2, 'deterministic-rfc6979').sign(SHA384.new(b'hello')))
k3 = ECC.import_key(unhexlify("3081a402010104303f5d8d9be280b5696cc5cc9f94cf8af7e6b61dd6592b2ab2b3a4c607450417ec327dcdcaed7c10053d719a0574f0a76aa00706052b81040022a16403620004d9c662b50ba29ca47990450e043aeaf4f0c69b15676d112f622a71c93059af999691c5680d2b44d111579db12f4a413a2ed5c45fcfb67b5b63e00b91ebe59d09a6b1ac2c0c4282aa12317ed5914f999bc488bb132e8342cc36f2ca5e3379c747"))
SHA256.new(b'hello').hexdigest()
hexlify(DSS.new(k3, 'deterministic-rfc6979').sign(SHA256.new(b'hello')))
There were tests to ensure that each entropy source reaches its
threshold, but no test that covers the total amount of entropy. Add
test cases with a known set of entropy sources and make sure that we
always gather at least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes from a strong
source.
Always pass a context object to entropy_dummy_source. This lets us
write tests that register more than one source and keep track of how
many times each one is called.
* origin/pr/2843: (26 commits)
Make hyperlink a hyperlink in every markdown flavor
Update the crypto submodule to be the same as development
Document test case descriptions
Restore MBEDTLS_TEST_OUTCOME_FILE after test_default_out_of_box
ssl-opt.sh: Fix some test case descriptions
Reject non-ASCII characters in test case descriptions
Process input files as binary
Factor description-checking code into a common function
Fix cosmetic error in warnings
Fix regex matching run_test calls in ssl-opt.sh
all.sh: run check-test-cases.py
Better information messages for quick checks
Fix configuration short name in key-exchanges.pl
Make test case descriptions unique
New test script check-test-cases.py
Document the test outcome file
Create infrastructure for architecture documents in Markdown
all.sh --outcome-file creates an outcome file
Set meaningful test configuration names when running tests
ssl-opt: remove semicolons from test case descriptions
...
Add invasive checks that peek at the stored persistent data after some
successful import, generation or destruction operations and after
reinitialization to ensure that the persistent data in storage has the
expected content.
Add a parameter to the p_validate_slot_number method to allow the
driver to modify the persistent data.
With the current structure of the core, the persistent data is already
updated. All it took was adding a way to modify it.
When registering a key in a secure element, go through the transaction
mechanism. This makes the code simpler, at the expense of a few extra
storage operations. Given that registering a key is typically very
rare over the lifetime of a device, this is an acceptable loss.
Drivers must now have a p_validate_slot_number method, otherwise
registering a key is not possible. This reduces the risk that due to a
mistake during the integration of a device, an application might claim
a slot in a way that is not supported by the driver.
If none of the inputs to a key derivation is a
PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET passed with
psa_key_derivation_input_key(), forbid
psa_key_derivation_output_key(). It usually doesn't make sense to
derive a key object if the secret isn't itself a proper key.
After passing some inputs, try getting one byte of output, just to
check that this succeeds (for a valid sequence of inputs) or fails
with BAD_STATE (for an invalid sequence of inputs). Either output a
1-byte key or a 1-byte buffer depending on the test data.
The test data was expanded as follows:
* Output key type (or not a key): same as the SECRET input if success
is expected, otherwise NONE.
* Expected status: PSA_SUCCESS after valid inputs, BAD_STATE after any
invalid input.
