7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Gilles Peskine
9aa93c8e78 Added a note about new primitives for secure destruction
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
2023-08-07 16:32:09 +02:00
Gilles Peskine
584bf985f5 Elaborate on psa_destroy_key requirements
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
2023-08-07 16:29:19 +02:00
Gilles Peskine
d3a797710a psa_is_key_slot_occupied: change to using the key identifier
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
2023-08-02 18:36:06 +02:00
Gilles Peskine
41618da50e Clarify backward compatibility requirement
There are two somewhat distinct aspects here: if it compiled, it still
compiles; and if it worked functionally, it still works. They're related in
that if application code currently compiles but cannot possibly work, we
could reasonably make it not compile anymore.

Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
2022-02-16 22:32:12 +01:00
Gilles Peskine
41d0334b4c Write up requirements
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
2022-02-15 16:06:09 +01:00
Andrzej Kurek
eec6b2c6b4 Updated slot->attr and slot->key access
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
2022-02-15 16:06:03 +01:00
Gilles Peskine
a42a8de120 PSA thread safety analysis
Looks like a mutex isn't enough?

Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
2021-11-03 12:18:41 +01:00