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Get rid of md_info outside helper functions

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Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2022-07-15 13:18:15 +02:00 committed by Przemek Stekiel
parent 35c09e4824
commit faa3b4e0c3
1 changed files with 16 additions and 29 deletions
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45
library/rsa.c
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@ -502,10 +502,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding,
if( ( padding == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) &&
( hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) )
{
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( hash_id );
if( md_info == NULL )
/* Just make sure this hash is supported in this build. */
if( mbedtls_hash_info_get_size( hash_id ) == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
@ -1236,7 +1234,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p = output;
unsigned int hlen;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
@ -1246,12 +1243,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
if( f_rng == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
if( md_info == NULL )
hlen = mbedtls_hash_info_get_size( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
if( hlen == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
olen = ctx->len;
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
/* first comparison checks for overflow */
if( ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 )
@ -1399,7 +1395,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned int hlen;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( output_max_len == 0 || output != NULL );
@ -1418,12 +1413,10 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
if( md_info == NULL )
hlen = mbedtls_hash_info_get_size( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
if( hlen == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
// checking for integer underflow
if( 2 * hlen + 2 > ilen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@ -1609,7 +1602,6 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t msb;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
@ -1628,20 +1620,18 @@ static int rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
/* Gather length of hash to sign */
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
if( md_info == NULL )
size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_hash_info_get_size( md_alg );
if( exp_hashlen == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) )
if( hashlen != exp_hashlen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
if( md_info == NULL )
hlen = mbedtls_hash_info_get_size( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id );
if( hlen == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
if (saltlen == MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY)
{
/* Calculate the largest possible salt length, up to the hash size.
@ -2001,7 +1991,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned int hlen;
size_t observed_salt_len, msb;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE] = {0};
RSA_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
@ -2028,20 +2017,18 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
/* Gather length of hash to sign */
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg );
if( md_info == NULL )
size_t exp_hashlen = mbedtls_hash_info_get_size( md_alg );
if( exp_hashlen == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( hashlen != mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ) )
if( hashlen != exp_hashlen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mgf1_hash_id );
if( md_info == NULL )
hlen = mbedtls_hash_info_get_size( mgf1_hash_id );
if( hlen == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
/*
* Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits
*/