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Add a changelog entry for the cookie parsing bounds bug
Co-authored-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
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ChangeLog.d/cookie_parsing_bug.txt
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ChangeLog.d/cookie_parsing_bug.txt
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Security
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* Fix a buffer overread in DTLS ClientHello parsing in servers with
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE enabled. An unauthenticated client
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or a man-in-the-middle could cause a DTLS server to read up to 255 bytes
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after the end of the SSL input buffer. The buffer overread only happens
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when MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN is less than a threshold that depends on
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the exact configuration: 258 bytes if using mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check(),
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and possibly up to 571 bytes with a custom cookie check function.
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If the function provider deliberately omits these size checks, he/she
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is responsible for the negative impact on his/her code.
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Reported by the Cybeats PSI Team.
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