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Make verify_chain() iterative

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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard 2017-07-05 17:05:03 +02:00
parent f86f491f25
commit ce6e52ff42
1 changed files with 74 additions and 67 deletions
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141
library/x509_crt.c
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@ -2071,11 +2071,9 @@ static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
* -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq * -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq
* *
* Arguments: * Arguments:
* - child: the current bottom of the chain to verify * - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn
* - trust_ca, ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile() * - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp
* - top: 1 if child is known to be locally trusted * - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile()
* - path_cnt: current depth as passed to f_vrfy() (EE = 0, etc)
* - self_cnt: number of self-issued certs seen so far in the chain
* - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain * - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain
* *
* Return value: * Return value:
@ -2084,88 +2082,99 @@ static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
* even if it was found to be invalid * even if it was found to be invalid
*/ */
static int x509_crt_verify_chain( static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca, mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl, mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile, const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
int top, int path_cnt, int self_cnt,
x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE] ) x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE] )
{ {
uint32_t *flags; uint32_t *flags;
mbedtls_x509_crt *child;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent; mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
int parent_is_trusted = 0; int parent_is_trusted = 0;
int child_is_trusted = 0;
int path_cnt = 0;
int self_cnt = 0;
/* Add certificate to the verification chain */ child = crt;
ver_chain[path_cnt].crt = child;
flags = &ver_chain[path_cnt].flags;
/* Check time-validity (all certificates) */ while( 1 ) {
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) ) /* Add certificate to the verification chain */
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED; ver_chain[path_cnt].crt = child;
flags = &ver_chain[path_cnt].flags;
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) ) /* Check time-validity (all certificates) */
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE; if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED;
/* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */ if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &child->valid_from ) )
if( top ) *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE;
return( 0 );
/* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */ /* Stop here for trusted roots (but not for trusted EE certs) */
if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 ) if( child_is_trusted )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD; return( 0 );
if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 ) /* Check signature algorithm: MD & PK algs */
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK; if( x509_profile_check_md_alg( profile, child->sig_md ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD;
/* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */ if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, child->sig_pk ) != 0 )
if( path_cnt == 0 && *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */ /* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */
parent = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent_is_trusted, if( path_cnt == 0 &&
path_cnt, self_cnt ); x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
/* No parent? We're done here */ /* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */
if( parent == NULL ) parent = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent_is_trusted,
{ path_cnt, self_cnt );
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
return( 0 );
}
/* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs. /* No parent? We're done here */
* These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO], if( parent == NULL )
* and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */ {
if( ( path_cnt != 0 ) && x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 ) *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
self_cnt++; return( 0 );
}
/* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA, /* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.
* and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */ * These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],
if( ! parent_is_trusted && * and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */
1 + path_cnt > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA ) if( ( path_cnt != 0 ) && x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 )
{ self_cnt++;
/* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
}
/* if parent is trusted, the signature was checked by find_parent() */ /* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA,
if( ! parent_is_trusted && x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent ) != 0 ) * and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED; if( ! parent_is_trusted &&
1 + path_cnt > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
{
/* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
}
/* check size of signing key */ /* if parent is trusted, the signature was checked by find_parent() */
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, child->sig_pk, &parent->pk ) != 0 ) if( ! parent_is_trusted && x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
/* check size of signing key */
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, child->sig_pk, &parent->pk ) != 0 )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
/* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */ /* Check trusted CA's CRL for the given crt */
*flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile ); *flags |= x509_crt_verifycrl(child, parent, ca_crl, profile );
#else
(void) ca_crl;
#endif #endif
/* verify the rest of the chain starting from parent */ /* prepare for next iteration */
return( x509_crt_verify_chain( parent, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile, child = parent;
parent_is_trusted, path_cnt + 1, self_cnt, parent = NULL;
ver_chain ) ); child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted;
++path_cnt;
}
} }
/* /*
@ -2290,9 +2299,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
*ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY; *ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
/* Check the chain */ /* Check the chain */
ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile, ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile, ver_chain );
0, 0, 0,
ver_chain );
if( ret != 0 ) if( ret != 0 )
goto exit; goto exit;