PSA sign/verify: more uniform error on an unsupported hash

Uniformly return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if given an algorithm that includes
a hash, but that hash algorithm is not supported. This will make it easier
to have a uniform treatment of unsupported hashes in automatically generated
tests.

Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine 2024-04-10 20:05:06 +02:00
parent 2ce86b0a1b
commit c5f518357d

View File

@ -2437,6 +2437,58 @@ exit:
/* Message digests */
/****************************************************************/
static int is_hash_supported(psa_algorithm_t alg)
{
switch (alg) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5)
case PSA_ALG_MD5:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160)
case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1)
case PSA_ALG_SHA_1:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224)
case PSA_ALG_SHA_224:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
case PSA_ALG_SHA_256:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
case PSA_ALG_SHA_384:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)
case PSA_ALG_SHA_512:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224)
case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256)
case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384)
case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384:
return 1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512)
case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512:
return 1;
#endif
default:
return 0;
}
}
psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation)
{
/* Aborting a non-active operation is allowed */
@ -3080,16 +3132,44 @@ static psa_status_t psa_sign_verify_check_alg(int input_is_message,
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg)) {
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
}
if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) {
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg))) {
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
}
} else {
if (!PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) {
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = 0;
if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) {
hash_alg = PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg);
}
/* Now hash_alg==0 if alg by itself doesn't need a hash.
* This is good enough for sign-hash, but a guaranteed failure for
* sign-message which needs to hash first for all algorithms
* supported at the moment. */
if (hash_alg == 0 && input_is_message) {
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (hash_alg == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) {
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
/* Give up immediately if the hash is not supported. This has
* several advantages:
* - For mechanisms that don't use the hash at all (e.g.
* ECDSA verification, randomized ECDSA signature), without
* this check, the operation would succeed even though it has
* been given an invalid argument. This would not be insecure
* since the hash was not necessary, but it would be weird.
* - For mechanisms that do use the hash, we avoid an error
* deep inside the execution. In principle this doesn't matter,
* but there is a little more risk of a bug in error handling
* deep inside than in this preliminary check.
* - When calling a driver, the driver might be capable of using
* a hash that the core doesn't support. This could potentially
* result in a buffer overflow if the hash is larger than the
* maximum hash size assumed by the core.
* - Returning a consistent error makes it possible to test
* not-supported hashes in a consistent way.
*/
if (hash_alg != 0 && !is_hash_supported(hash_alg)) {
return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
return PSA_SUCCESS;