Change some code style

Change-Id: I67bb642e81693489345867ca87d7e9daa22f83ea
Signed-off-by: XiaokangQian <xiaokang.qian@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
XiaokangQian 2022-04-02 03:34:37 +00:00
parent 3207a32b1e
commit c5763b5efd
2 changed files with 22 additions and 19 deletions

View File

@ -1525,7 +1525,8 @@ static int ecdh_import_public_raw( mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
static int everest_import_public_raw( mbedtls_x25519_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end )
const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end )
{
if( end - buf != MBEDTLS_X25519_KEY_SIZE_BYTES )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );

View File

@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_supported_versions_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( tls13_supported == 0 )
{
/* When we support runtime negotiation of TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3, we need
* a graceful fallback to TLS 1.2 in this case. */
* a graceful fallback to TLS 1.2 in this case.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "TLS 1.3 is not supported by the client" ) );
@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ static int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext(
if( list_size % 2 != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
/* TODO: At the moment, this can happen when receiving a second
/* At the moment, this can happen when receiving a second
* ClientHello after an HRR. We should properly reset the
* state upon receiving an HRR, in which case we should
* not observe handshake->curves already being allocated. */
@ -151,7 +152,8 @@ static int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext(
}
/* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory,
* and leave room for a final 0 */
* and leave room for a final 0
*/
our_size = list_size / 2 + 1;
if( our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX )
our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX;
@ -170,7 +172,8 @@ static int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext(
/* mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id() uses the mbedtls_ecp_curve_info
* data structure (defined in ecp.c), which only includes the list of
* curves implemented. Hence, we only add curves that are also supported
* and implemented by the server. */
* and implemented by the server.
*/
if( curve_info != NULL )
{
*curves++ = curve_info;
@ -187,7 +190,6 @@ static int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_supported_groups_ext(
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || ( MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) )
/* TODO: Code for MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED missing */
/*
* ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext() verifies whether the information in the
* extension is correct and stores the provided key shares. Whether this is an
@ -233,7 +235,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/* We try to find a suitable key share entry and copy it to the
* handshake context. Later, we have to find out whether we can do
* something with the provided key share or whether we have to
* dismiss it and send a HelloRetryRequest message. */
* dismiss it and send a HelloRetryRequest message.
*/
for( ; p < extentions_end; p += cur_share_len )
{
@ -259,7 +262,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
end_of_share = p + cur_share_len;
/* Continue parsing even if we have already found a match,
* for input validation purposes. */
* for input validation purposes.
*/
if( match_found == 1 )
continue;
@ -280,9 +284,6 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, their_curve ) != 0 )
continue;
/* Type 2..X: Other kinds of shares */
/* TO BE ADDED */
/* Skip if we no match succeeded. */
if( their_curve == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE )
{
@ -296,7 +297,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_key_shares_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/* KeyShare parsing
*
* Once we add more key share types, this needs to be a switch
* over the (type of) the named curve */
* over the (type of) the named curve
*/
/* Type 1: ECDHE shares
*
@ -371,8 +373,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_cookie_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
}
}
else {
/* TBD: Check under what cases this is appropriate */
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification skipped" ) );
}
@ -415,7 +417,6 @@ static int ssl_client_hello_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *end );
/* Update the handshake state machine */
/* TODO: At the moment, this doesn't update the state machine - why? */
static int ssl_client_hello_postprocess( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int hrr_required );
@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ static int ssl_client_hello_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* ClientHello layer:
* 0 . 1 protocol version
* 2 . 33 random bytes ( starting with 4 bytes of Unix time )
* 34 . 35 session id length ( 1 byte )
* 34 . 34 session id length ( 1 byte )
* 35 . 34+x session id
* 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length ( 1 byte )
* 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie
@ -554,7 +555,7 @@ static int ssl_client_hello_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* .. . .. extensions ( optional )
*/
/* TBD: Needs to be updated due to mandatory extensions
/* Needs to be updated due to mandatory extensions
* Minimal length ( with everything empty and extensions ommitted ) is
* 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can
* read at least up to session id length without worrying.
@ -584,13 +585,14 @@ static int ssl_client_hello_parse( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", p, 32 );
memcpy( &ssl->handshake->randbytes[0], p, 32 );
p += 32; /* skip random bytes */
/* skip random bytes */
p += 32;
/*
* Parse session ID
*/
sess_len = p[0];
p++; /* skip session id length */
p++;
if( sess_len > 32 )
{