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Threat Model: improve wording and grammar

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Signed-off-by: Janos Follath <janos.follath@arm.com>
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Janos Follath 2023-03-14 12:47:27 +00:00
parent 042e433eda
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1 changed files with 16 additions and 16 deletions
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32
SECURITY.md
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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch.
## Threat model ## Threat model
We use the following classification of attacks: We classify attacks based on the capabilities of the attacker.
### Remote attacks ### Remote attacks
@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ or delaying legitimate messages, and injecting messages.
Mbed TLS aims to fully protect against remote attacks and to enable the user Mbed TLS aims to fully protect against remote attacks and to enable the user
application in providing full protection against remote attacks. Said application in providing full protection against remote attacks. Said
protection is limited to providing security guarantees offered by the protocol protection is limited to providing security guarantees offered by the protocol
in question. (For example Mbed TLS alone won't guarantee that the messages will being implemented. (For example Mbed TLS alone won't guarantee that the
arrive without delay, as the TLS protocol doesn't guarantee that either.) messages will arrive without delay, as the TLS protocol doesn't guarantee that
either.)
**Warning!** Depending on network latency, the timing of messages might be **Warning!** Block ciphers do not yet achieve full protection against attackers
enough to launch some timing attacks. Block ciphers do not yet achieve full who can measure the timing of packets with sufficient precision. For details
protection against these. For details and workarounds see the [Block and workarounds see the [Block Ciphers](#block-ciphers) section.
Ciphers](#block-ciphers) section.
### Local attacks ### Local attacks
@ -70,14 +70,14 @@ details and workarounds see the [Block Ciphers](#block-ciphers) section.
The attacker code running on the platform has access to some sensor capable of The attacker code running on the platform has access to some sensor capable of
picking up information on the physical state of the hardware while Mbed TLS is picking up information on the physical state of the hardware while Mbed TLS is
running. This can for example be any analogue to digital converter on the running. This could for example be an analogue-to-digital converter on the
platform that is located unfortunately enough to pick up the CPU noise. (See platform that is located unfortunately enough to pick up the CPU noise. (See
for example the [Leaky Noise for example the [Leaky Noise
paper](https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8297).) paper](https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8297).)
Mbed TLS doesn't offer any security guarantees against local non-timing based Mbed TLS doesn't make any security guarantees against local non-timing-based
side channel attacks. If local non-timing attacks are present in a use case or side channel attacks. If local non-timing attacks are present in a use case or
a user application's threat model, it needs to be mitigated by the platform. a user application's threat model, they need to be mitigated by the platform.
#### Local fault injection attacks #### Local fault injection attacks
@ -85,23 +85,23 @@ Software running on the same hardware can affect the physical state of the
device and introduce faults. (See for example the [Row Hammer device and introduce faults. (See for example the [Row Hammer
paper](https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~yoonguk/papers/kim-isca14.pdf).) paper](https://users.ece.cmu.edu/~yoonguk/papers/kim-isca14.pdf).)
Mbed TLS doesn't offer any security guarantees against local fault injection Mbed TLS doesn't make any security guarantees against local fault injection
attacks. If local fault injection attacks are present in a use case or a user attacks. If local fault injection attacks are present in a use case or a user
application's threat model, it needs to be mitigated by the platform. application's threat model, they need to be mitigated by the platform.
### Physical attacks ### Physical attacks
The attacker has access to physical information about the hardware Mbed TLS is The attacker has access to physical information about the hardware Mbed TLS is
running on and/or can alter the physical state of the hardware (eg. power running on and/or can alter the physical state of the hardware (e.g. power
analysis, radio emissions or fault injection). analysis, radio emissions or fault injection).
Mbed TLS doesn't offer any security guarantees against physical attacks. If Mbed TLS doesn't make any security guarantees against physical attacks. If
physical attacks are present in a use case or a user application's threat physical attacks are present in a use case or a user application's threat
model, it needs to be mitigated by physical countermeasures. model, they need to be mitigated by physical countermeasures.
### Caveats ### Caveats
#### Out of scope countermeasures #### Out-of-scope countermeasures
Mbed TLS has evolved organically and a well defined threat model hasn't always Mbed TLS has evolved organically and a well defined threat model hasn't always
been present. Therefore, Mbed TLS might have countermeasures against attacks been present. Therefore, Mbed TLS might have countermeasures against attacks