Merge pull request #1288 from Mbed-TLS/mbedtls-3.6.1_mergeback

Mbedtls 3.6.1 mergeback

BRANCHES.md

@@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ The following branches are currently maintained:
 - [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/)
 - [`mbedtls-3.6`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-3.6)
  maintained until March 2027, see
-  <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v3.6.0>.
+  <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v3.6.1>.
 - [`mbedtls-2.28`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.28)
  maintained until the end of 2024, see
-  <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.8>.
+  <https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.9>.
 
 Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch.

CMakeLists.txt

@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ cmake_policy(SET CMP0012 NEW)
 if(TEST_CPP)
     project("Mbed TLS"
         LANGUAGES C CXX
-        VERSION 3.6.0
+        VERSION 3.6.1
     )
 else()
     project("Mbed TLS"
         LANGUAGES C
-        VERSION 3.6.0
+        VERSION 3.6.1
     )
 endif()
 
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ if(NOT DISABLE_PACKAGE_CONFIG_AND_INSTALL)
     write_basic_package_version_file(
         "cmake/MbedTLSConfigVersion.cmake"
             COMPATIBILITY SameMajorVersion
-            VERSION 3.6.0)
+            VERSION 3.6.1)
 
     install(
         FILES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake/MbedTLSConfig.cmake"

ChangeLog

@@ -1,5 +1,188 @@
 Mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
 
+= Mbed TLS 3.6.1 branch released 2024-08-30
+
+API changes
+   * The experimental functions psa_generate_key_ext() and
+     psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() are no longer declared when compiling
+     in C++. This resolves a build failure under C++ compilers that do not
+     support flexible array members (a C99 feature not adopted by C++).
+     Fixes #9020.
+
+Default behavior changes
+   * In a PSA-client-only build (i.e. MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT &&
+     !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C), do not automatically enable local crypto when the
+     corresponding PSA mechanism is enabled, since the server provides the
+     crypto. Fixes #9126.
+   * A TLS handshake may now call psa_crypto_init() if TLS 1.3 is enabled.
+     This can happen even if TLS 1.3 is offered but eventually not selected
+     in the protocol version negotiation.
+   * By default, the handling of TLS 1.3 tickets by the Mbed TLS client is now
+     disabled at runtime. Applications that were using TLS 1.3 tickets
+     signalled by MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET return values now
+     need to enable the handling of TLS 1.3 tickets through the new
+     mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets() API.
+
+New deprecations
+   * The experimental functions psa_generate_key_ext() and
+     psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() are deprecated in favor of
+     psa_generate_key_custom() and psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().
+     They have almost exactly the same interface, but the variable-length
+     data is passed in a separate parameter instead of a flexible array
+     member.
+   * The following cryptographic mechanisms are planned to be removed
+     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
+     - DES (including 3DES).
+     - PKCS#1v1.5 encryption/decryption (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5).
+       (OAEP, PSS, and PKCS#1v1.5 signature are staying.)
+     - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman with custom groups.
+       (RFC 7919 groups remain supported.)
+     - Elliptic curves of size 225 bits or less.
+   * The following cipher suites are planned to be removed from (D)TLS 1.2
+     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
+     - TLS_RSA_* (including TLS_RSA_PSK_*), i.e. cipher suites using
+       RSA decryption.
+       (RSA signatures, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_RSA_*, are staying.)
+     - TLS_ECDH_*, i.e. cipher suites using static ECDH.
+       (Ephemeral ECDH, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_*, is staying.)
+     - TLS_DHE_*, i.e. cipher suites using finite-field Diffie-Hellman.
+       (Ephemeral ECDH, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_*, is staying.)
+     - TLS_*CBC*, i.e. all cipher suites using CBC.
+   * The following low-level application interfaces are planned to be removed
+     from the public API in Mbed TLS 4.0:
+     - Hashes: hkdf.h, md5.h, ripemd160.h, sha1.h, sha3.h, sha256.h, sha512.h;
+     - Random generation: ctr_drbg.h, hmac_drbg.h, entropy.h;
+     - Ciphers and modes: aes.h, aria.h, camellia.h, chacha20.h, chachapoly.h,
+       cipher.h, cmac.h, gcm.h, poly1305.h;
+     - Private key encryption mechanisms: pkcs5.h, pkcs12.h.
+     - Asymmetric cryptography: bignum.h, dhm.h, ecdh.h, ecdsa.h, ecjpake.h,
+       ecp.h, rsa.h.
+     The cryptographic mechanisms remain present, but they will only be
+     accessible via the PSA API (psa_xxx functions introduced gradually
+     starting with Mbed TLS 2.17) and, where relevant, `pk.h`.
+     For guidance on migrating application code to the PSA API, please consult
+     the PSA transition guide (docs/psa-transition.md).
+   * The following integration interfaces are planned to be removed
+     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
+     - MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT replacement of cryptographic modules and functions.
+       Use PSA transparent drivers instead.
+     - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT and MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C.
+       Use PSA opaque drivers instead.
+
+Features
+   * When the new compilation option MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled,
+     the number of volatile PSA keys is virtually unlimited, at the expense
+     of increased code size. This option is off by default, but enabled in
+     the default mbedtls_config.h. Fixes #9216.
+
+Security
+   * Unlike previously documented, enabling MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE does
+     not cause the PSA subsystem to use HMAC_DRBG: it uses HMAC_DRBG only when
+     MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG and MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C are disabled.
+     CVE-2024-45157
+   * Fix a stack buffer overflow in mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw() and
+     mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() when the bits parameter is larger than the
+     largest supported curve. In some configurations with PSA disabled,
+     all values of bits are affected. This never happens in internal library
+     calls, but can affect applications that call these functions directly.
+     CVE-2024-45158
+   * With TLS 1.3, when a server enables optional authentication of the
+     client, if the client-provided certificate does not have appropriate values
+     in keyUsage or extKeyUsage extensions, then the return value of
+     mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() would incorrectly have the
+     MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE and MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE bits
+     clear. As a result, an attacker that had a certificate valid for uses other
+     than TLS client authentication could be able to use it for TLS client
+     authentication anyway. Only TLS 1.3 servers were affected, and only with
+     optional authentication (required would abort the handshake with a fatal
+     alert).
+     CVE-2024-45159
+
+Bugfix
+   * Fix TLS 1.3 client build and runtime when support for session tickets is
+     disabled (MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option). Fixes #6395.
+   * Fix compilation error when memcpy() is a function-like macros. Fixes #8994.
+   * MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C and MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C are now automatically enabled
+     as soon as MBEDTLS_RSA_C is enabled. Fixes #9041.
+   * Fix undefined behaviour (incrementing a NULL pointer by zero length) when
+     passing in zero length additional data to multipart AEAD.
+   * Fix rare concurrent access bug where attempting to operate on a
+     non-existent key while concurrently creating a new key could potentially
+     corrupt the key store.
+   * Fix error handling when creating a key in a dynamic secure element
+     (feature enabled by MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C). In a low memory condition,
+     the creation could return PSA_SUCCESS but using or destroying the key
+     would not work. Fixes #8537.
+   * Fix issue of redefinition warning messages for _GNU_SOURCE in
+     entropy_poll.c and sha_256.c. There was a build warning during
+     building for linux platform.
+     Resolves #9026
+   * Fix a compilation warning in pk.c when PSA is enabled and RSA is disabled.
+   * Fix the build when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled and the built-in
+     CMAC is enabled, but no built-in unauthenticated cipher is enabled.
+     Fixes #9209.
+   * Fix redefinition warnings when SECP192R1 and/or SECP192K1 are disabled.
+     Fixes #9029.
+   * Fix psa_cipher_decrypt() with CCM* rejecting messages less than 3 bytes
+     long. Credit to Cryptofuzz. Fixes #9314.
+   * Fix interference between PSA volatile keys and built-in keys
+     when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled and
+     MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT is more than 4096.
+   * Document and enforce the limitation of mbedtls_psa_register_se_key()
+     to persistent keys. Resolves #9253.
+   * Fix Clang compilation error when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled
+     but MBEDTLS_DHM_C is disabled. Reported by Michael Schuster in #9188.
+   * Fix server mode only build when MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C is enabled but
+     MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C is disabled. Reported by M-Bab on GitHub in #9186.
+   * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C was disabled and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C enabled,
+     some code was defining 0-size arrays, resulting in compilation errors.
+     Fixed by disabling the offending code in configurations without PSA
+     Crypto, where it never worked. Fixes #9311.
+   * Fix unintended performance regression when using short RSA public keys.
+     Fixes #9232.
+   * Fixes an issue where some TLS 1.2 clients could not connect to an
+     Mbed TLS 3.6.0 server, due to incorrect handling of
+     legacy_compression_methods in the ClientHello.
+     Fixes #8995, #9243.
+   * Fix TLS connections failing when the handshake selects TLS 1.3
+     in an application that does not call psa_crypto_init().
+     Fixes #9072.
+   * Fix TLS connection failure in applications using an Mbed TLS client in
+     the default configuration connecting to a TLS 1.3 server sending tickets.
+     See the documentation of
+     mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets() for more
+     information.
+     Fixes #8749.
+   * Fix a memory leak that could occur when failing to process an RSA
+     key through some PSA functions due to low memory conditions.
+   * Fixed a regression introduced in 3.6.0 where the CA callback set with
+     mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() would stop working when connections were
+     upgraded to TLS 1.3. Fixed by adding support for the CA callback with TLS
+     1.3.
+   * Fixed a regression introduced in 3.6.0 where clients that relied on
+     optional/none authentication mode, by calling mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode()
+     with MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL or MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE, would stop
+     working when connections were upgraded to TLS 1.3. Fixed by adding
+     support for optional/none with TLS 1.3 as well. Note that the TLS 1.3
+     standard makes server authentication mandatory; users are advised not to
+     use authmode none, and to carefully check the results when using optional
+     mode.
+   * Fixed a regression introduced in 3.6.0 where context-specific certificate
+     verify callbacks, set with mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() as opposed to
+     mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(), would stop working when connections were
+     upgraded to TLS 1.3. Fixed by adding support for context-specific verify
+     callback in TLS 1.3.
+
+Changes
+   * Warn if mbedtls/check_config.h is included manually, as this can
+     lead to spurious errors. Error if a *adjust*.h header is included
+     manually, as this can lead to silently inconsistent configurations,
+     potentially resulting in buffer overflows.
+     When migrating from Mbed TLS 2.x, if you had a custom config.h that
+     included check_config.h, remove this inclusion from the Mbed TLS 3.x
+     configuration file (renamed to mbedtls_config.h). This change was made
+     in Mbed TLS 3.0, but was not announced in a changelog entry at the time.
+
 = Mbed TLS 3.6.0 branch released 2024-03-28
 
 API changes

ChangeLog.d/9126.txt

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Default behavior changes
-   * In a PSA-client-only build (i.e. MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT &&
-     !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C), do not automatically enable local crypto when the
-     corresponding PSA mechanism is enabled, since the server provides the
-     crypto. Fixes #9126.

ChangeLog.d/announce-4.0-removals.txt

@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-New deprecations
-   * The following cryptographic mechanisms are planned to be removed
-     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
-     - DES (including 3DES).
-     - PKCS#1v1.5 encryption/decryption (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5).
-       (OAEP, PSS, and PKCS#1v1.5 signature are staying.)
-     - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman with custom groups.
-       (RFC 7919 groups remain supported.)
-     - Elliptic curves of size 225 bits or less.
-   * The following cipher suites are planned to be removed from (D)TLS 1.2
-     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
-     - TLS_RSA_* (including TLS_RSA_PSK_*), i.e. cipher suites using
-       RSA decryption.
-       (RSA signatures, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_RSA_*, are staying.)
-     - TLS_ECDH_*, i.e. cipher suites using static ECDH.
-       (Ephemeral ECDH, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_*, is staying.)
-     - TLS_DHE_*, i.e. cipher suites using finite-field Diffie-Hellman.
-       (Ephemeral ECDH, i.e. TLS_ECDHE_*, is staying.)
-     - TLS_*CBC*, i.e. all cipher suites using CBC.
-   * The following low-level application interfaces are planned to be removed
-     from the public API in Mbed TLS 4.0:
-     - Hashes: hkdf.h, md5.h, ripemd160.h, sha1.h, sha3.h, sha256.h, sha512.h;
-     - Random generation: ctr_drbg.h, hmac_drbg.h, entropy.h;
-     - Ciphers and modes: aes.h, aria.h, camellia.h, chacha20.h, chachapoly.h,
-       cipher.h, cmac.h, gcm.h, poly1305.h;
-     - Private key encryption mechanisms: pkcs5.h, pkcs12.h.
-     - Asymmetric cryptography: bignum.h, dhm.h, ecdh.h, ecdsa.h, ecjpake.h,
-       ecp.h, rsa.h.
-     The cryptographic mechanisms remain present, but they will only be
-     accessible via the PSA API (psa_xxx functions introduced gradually
-     starting with Mbed TLS 2.17) and, where relevant, `pk.h`.
-     For guidance on migrating application code to the PSA API, please consult
-     the PSA transition guide (docs/psa-transition.md).
-   * The following integration interfaces are planned to be removed
-     in Mbed TLS 4.0:
-     - MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT replacement of cryptographic modules and functions.
-       Use PSA transparent drivers instead.
-     - MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT and MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C.
-       Use PSA opaque drivers instead.

ChangeLog.d/asn1-missing-guard-in-rsa.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C and MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C are now automatically enabled
-     as soon as MBEDTLS_RSA_C is enabled. Fixes #9041.

ChangeLog.d/check-config.txt

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-Changes
-   * Warn if mbedtls/check_config.h is included manually, as this can
-     lead to spurious errors. Error if a *adjust*.h header is included
-     manually, as this can lead to silently inconsistent configurations,
-     potentially resulting in buffer overflows.
-     When migrating from Mbed TLS 2.x, if you had a custom config.h that
-     included check_config.h, remove this inclusion from the Mbed TLS 3.x
-     configuration file (renamed to mbedtls_config.h). This change was made
-     in Mbed TLS 3.0, but was not announced in a changelog entry at the time.

ChangeLog.d/disable-new-session-tickets.txt

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix TLS connection failure in applications using an Mbed TLS client in
-     the default configuration connecting to a TLS 1.3 server sending tickets.
-     See the documentation of
-     mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets() for more
-     information.
-     Fixes #8749.
-
-Changes
-   * By default, the handling of TLS 1.3 tickets by the Mbed TLS client is now
-     disabled at runtime. Applications that were using TLS 1.3 tickets
-     signalled by MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET return values now
-     need to enable the handling of TLS 1.3 tickets through the new
-     mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets() API.

ChangeLog.d/dynamic-keystore.txt

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-Features
-   * When the new compilation option MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled,
-     the number of volatile PSA keys is virtually unlimited, at the expense
-     of increased code size. This option is off by default, but enabled in
-     the default mbedtls_config.h. Fixes #9216.
-
-Bugfix
-   * Fix interference between PSA volatile keys and built-in keys
-     when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled and
-     MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT is more than 4096.

ChangeLog.d/fix-clang-psa-build-without-dhm.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix Clang compilation error when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled
-     but MBEDTLS_DHM_C is disabled. Reported by Michael Schuster in #9188.

ChangeLog.d/fix-compilation-when-memcpy-is-function-like-macro.txt

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix compilation error when memcpy() is a function-like macros. Fixes #8994.

ChangeLog.d/fix-concurrently-loading-non-existent-keys.txt

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix rare concurrent access bug where attempting to operate on a
-     non-existent key while concurrently creating a new key could potentially
-     corrupt the key store.

ChangeLog.d/fix-legacy-compression-issue.txt

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fixes an issue where some TLS 1.2 clients could not connect to an
-     Mbed TLS 3.6.0 server, due to incorrect handling of
-     legacy_compression_methods in the ClientHello.
-     Fixes #8995, #9243.
-

ChangeLog.d/fix-psa-cmac.txt

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix the build when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled and the built-in
-     CMAC is enabled, but no built-in unauthenticated cipher is enabled.
-     Fixes #9209.

ChangeLog.d/fix-redefination_warning_messages_for_GNU_SOURCE.txt

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix issue of redefinition warning messages for _GNU_SOURCE in
-     entropy_poll.c and sha_256.c. There was a build warning during
-     building for linux platform.
-     Resolves #9026

ChangeLog.d/fix-rsa-performance-regression.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix unintended performance regression when using short RSA public keys.
-     Fixes #9232.

ChangeLog.d/fix-secure-element-key-creation.txt

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix error handling when creating a key in a dynamic secure element
-     (feature enabled by MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C). In a low memory condition,
-     the creation could return PSA_SUCCESS but using or destroying the key
-     would not work. Fixes #8537.

ChangeLog.d/fix-server-mode-only-build.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix server mode only build when MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C is enabled but
-     MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C is disabled. Reported by M-Bab on GitHub in #9186.

ChangeLog.d/fix-test-suite-pk-warnings.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix redefinition warnings when SECP192R1 and/or SECP192K1 are disabled.
-     Fixes #9029.

ChangeLog.d/fix_ubsan_mp_aead_gcm.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix undefined behaviour (incrementing a NULL pointer by zero length) when
-     passing in zero length additional data to multipart AEAD.

ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_psa_register_se_key.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Document and enforce the limitation of mbedtls_psa_register_se_key()
-     to persistent keys. Resolves #9253.

ChangeLog.d/pk-norsa-warning.txt

@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix a compilation warning in pk.c when PSA is enabled and RSA is disabled.

ChangeLog.d/psa_cipher_decrypt-ccm_star-iv_length_enforcement.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix psa_cipher_decrypt() with CCM* rejecting messages less than 3 bytes
-     long. Credit to Cryptofuzz. Fixes #9314.

ChangeLog.d/psa_generate_key_custom.txt

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-API changes
-   * The experimental functions psa_generate_key_ext() and
-     psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() are no longer declared when compiling
-     in C++. This resolves a build failure under C++ compilers that do not
-     support flexible array members (a C99 feature not adopted by C++).
-     Fixes #9020.
-
-New deprecations
-   * The experimental functions psa_generate_key_ext() and
-     psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext() are deprecated in favor of
-     psa_generate_key_custom() and psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().
-     They have almost exactly the same interface, but the variable-length
-     data is passed in a separate parameter instead of a flexible array
-     member.

ChangeLog.d/psa_util_in_builds_without_psa.txt

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C was disabled and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C enabled,
-     some code was defining 0-size arrays, resulting in compilation errors.
-     Fixed by disabling the offending code in configurations without PSA
-     Crypto, where it never worked. Fixes #9311.

ChangeLog.d/tls13-psa_crypto_init.txt

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix TLS connections failing when the handshake selects TLS 1.3
-     in an application that does not call psa_crypto_init().
-     Fixes #9072.
-
-Changes
-   * A TLS handshake may now call psa_crypto_init() if TLS 1.3 is enabled.
-     This can happen even if TLS 1.3 is offered but eventually not selected
-     in the protocol version negotiation.

ChangeLog.d/tls13-without-tickets.txt

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-Bugfix
-   * Fix TLS 1.3 client build and runtime when support for session tickets is
-     disabled (MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option). Fixes #6395.

doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 /**
- * @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.6.0 API Documentation
+ * @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.6.1 API Documentation
  *
  * This documentation describes the internal structure of Mbed TLS.  It was
  * automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in

doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-PROJECT_NAME           = "Mbed TLS v3.6.0"
+PROJECT_NAME           = "Mbed TLS v3.6.1"
 OUTPUT_DIRECTORY       = ../apidoc/
 FULL_PATH_NAMES        = NO
 OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C  = YES

include/mbedtls/build_info.h

@@ -26,16 +26,16 @@
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR  3
 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR  6
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  0
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH  1
 
 /**
  * The single version number has the following structure:
  *    MMNNPP00
  *    Major version | Minor version | Patch version
  */
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x03060000
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER         0x03060100
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "3.6.0"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING         "3.6.1"
-#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "Mbed TLS 3.6.0"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL    "Mbed TLS 3.6.1"
 
 /* Macros for build-time platform detection */
 

include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h

@@ -4034,11 +4034,18 @@
  * Use HMAC_DRBG with the specified hash algorithm for HMAC_DRBG for the
  * PSA crypto subsystem.
  *
- * If this option is unset:
+ * If this option is unset, the library chooses a hash (currently between
- * - If CTR_DRBG is available, the PSA subsystem uses it rather than HMAC_DRBG.
+ * #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 and #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) based on availability and
- * - Otherwise, the PSA subsystem uses HMAC_DRBG with either
+ * unspecified heuristics.
- *   #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 or #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 based on availability and
+ *
- *   on unspecified heuristics.
+ * \note The PSA crypto subsystem uses the first available mechanism amongst
+ *       the following:
+ *       - #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG if enabled;
+ *       - Entropy from #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C plus CTR_DRBG with AES
+ *         if #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C is enabled;
+ *       - Entropy from #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C plus HMAC_DRBG.
+ *
+ *       A future version may reevaluate the prioritization of DRBG mechanisms.
  */
 //#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
 

library/CMakeLists.txt

@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
 if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
     set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
     add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto})
-    set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.0 SOVERSION 16)
+    set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.1 SOVERSION 16)
     target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
 
     if(TARGET ${everest_target})
@@ -312,11 +312,11 @@ if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
     endif()
 
     add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509})
-    set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.0 SOVERSION 7)
+    set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.1 SOVERSION 7)
     target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target})
 
     add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls})
-    set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.0 SOVERSION 21)
+    set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.1 SOVERSION 21)
     target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target})
 endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
 

library/psa_crypto_random_impl.h

@@ -21,13 +21,10 @@ typedef mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t mbedtls_psa_random_context_t;
 #include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
 
 /* Choose a DRBG based on configuration and availability */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
-
-#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
-
-#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
 
 #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
+#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE
 
 #elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
 
@@ -49,17 +46,11 @@ typedef mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t mbedtls_psa_random_context_t;
 #error "No hash algorithm available for HMAC_DBRG."
 #endif
 
-#else /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/
 
 #error "No DRBG module available for the psa_crypto module."
 
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE && !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C*/
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
-#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
-#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
-#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
-#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C && !MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
 
 /* The maximum number of bytes that mbedtls_psa_get_random() is expected to return. */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)

library/psa_crypto_rsa.c

@@ -197,16 +197,14 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_public_key(
 
     status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(
         attributes->type, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, &rsa);
-    if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+    if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        return status;
+        status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY,
+                                            rsa,
+                                            data,
+                                            data_size,
+                                            data_length);
     }
 
-    status = mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY,
-                                        rsa,
-                                        data,
-                                        data_size,
-                                        data_length);
-
     mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
     mbedtls_free(rsa);
 
@@ -264,6 +262,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_generate_key(
                               (unsigned int) attributes->bits,
                               exponent);
     if (ret != 0) {
+        mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa);
         return mbedtls_to_psa_error(ret);
     }
 
@@ -330,7 +329,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_sign_hash(
                                                  key_buffer_size,
                                                  &rsa);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
-        return status;
+        goto exit;
     }
 
     status = psa_rsa_decode_md_type(alg, hash_length, &md_alg);

library/psa_util.c

@@ -443,6 +443,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_l
     if (raw_len != (2 * coordinate_len)) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
     }
+    if (coordinate_len > sizeof(r)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+    }
 
     /* Since raw and der buffers might overlap, dump r and s before starting
      * the conversion. */
@@ -561,6 +564,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_l
     if (raw_size < coordinate_size * 2) {
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
     }
+    if (2 * coordinate_size > sizeof(raw_tmp)) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+    }
 
     /* Check that the provided input DER buffer has the right header. */
     ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, der + der_len, &data_len,

library/ssl_misc.h

@@ -1674,18 +1674,53 @@ static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 }
 
 /*
- * Check usage of a certificate wrt extensions:
+ * Verify a certificate.
- * keyUsage, extendedKeyUsage (later), and nSCertType (later).
  *
- * Warning: cert_endpoint is the endpoint of the cert (ie, of our peer when we
+ * [in/out] ssl: misc. things read
- * check a cert we received from them)!
+ *               ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result updated
+ * [in] authmode: one of MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_{NONE,OPTIONAL,REQUIRED}
+ * [in] chain: the certificate chain to verify (ie the peer's chain)
+ * [in] ciphersuite_info: For TLS 1.2, this session's ciphersuite;
+ *                        for TLS 1.3, may be left NULL.
+ * [in] rs_ctx: restart context if restartable ECC is in use;
+ *              leave NULL for no restartable behaviour.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0 if the handshake should continue. Depending on the
+ *   authmode it means:
+ *   - REQUIRED: the certificate was found to be valid, trusted & acceptable.
+ *     ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result is 0.
+ *   - OPTIONAL: the certificate may or may not be acceptable, but
+ *     ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result was updated with the result.
+ *   - NONE: the certificate wasn't even checked.
+ * - MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE if
+ *   the certificate was found to be invalid/untrusted/unacceptable and the
+ *   handshake should be aborted (can only happen with REQUIRED).
+ * - another error code if another error happened (out-of-memory, etc.)
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_ssl_verify_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                   int authmode,
+                                   mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+                                   const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info,
+                                   void *rs_ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Check usage of a certificate wrt usage extensions:
+ * keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage.
+ * (Note: nSCertType is deprecated and not standard, we don't check it.)
+ *
+ * Note: if tls_version is 1.3, ciphersuite is ignored and can be NULL.
+ *
+ * Note: recv_endpoint is the receiver's endpoint.
  *
  * Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not.
  */
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
                                  const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
-                                 int cert_endpoint,
+                                 int recv_endpoint,
+                                 mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version,
                                  uint32_t *flags);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
 

library/ssl_tls.c

@@ -1354,29 +1354,6 @@ static int ssl_conf_check(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
         return ret;
     }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
-    /* RFC 8446 section 4.4.3
-     *
-     * If the verification fails, the receiver MUST terminate the handshake with
-     * a "decrypt_error" alert.
-     *
-     * If the client is configured as TLS 1.3 only with optional verify, return
-     * bad config.
-     *
-     */
-    if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(
-            (mbedtls_ssl_context *) ssl)                            &&
-        ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT                &&
-        ssl->conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3    &&
-        ssl->conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3    &&
-        ssl->conf->authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
-            1, ("Optional verify auth mode "
-                "is not available for TLS 1.3 client"));
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG;
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
-
     if (ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL) {
         MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("no RNG provided"));
         return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG;
@@ -6397,71 +6374,6 @@ const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id)
 }
 #endif
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
-int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
-                                 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
-                                 int cert_endpoint,
-                                 uint32_t *flags)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    unsigned int usage = 0;
-    const char *ext_oid;
-    size_t ext_len;
-
-    if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
-        /* Server part of the key exchange */
-        switch (ciphersuite->key_exchange) {
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
-                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT;
-                break;
-
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
-                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
-                break;
-
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
-                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT;
-                break;
-
-            /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK:
-            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE:
-                usage = 0;
-        }
-    } else {
-        /* Client auth: we only implement rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign for now */
-        usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(cert, usage) != 0) {
-        *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE;
-        ret = -1;
-    }
-
-    if (cert_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
-        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH;
-        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH);
-    } else {
-        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH;
-        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH);
-    }
-
-    if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(cert, ext_oid, ext_len) != 0) {
-        *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE;
-        ret = -1;
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
-
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
 int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                          const mbedtls_md_type_t md,
@@ -7980,196 +7892,6 @@ static int ssl_parse_certificate_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
     return SSL_CERTIFICATE_EXPECTED;
 }
 
-MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
-static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
-                                        int authmode,
-                                        mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
-                                        void *rs_ctx)
-{
-    int ret = 0;
-    const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
-        ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
-    int have_ca_chain = 0;
-
-    int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
-    void *p_vrfy;
-
-    if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (ssl->f_vrfy != NULL) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use context-specific verification callback"));
-        f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy;
-        p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy;
-    } else {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use configuration-specific verification callback"));
-        f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy;
-        p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Main check: verify certificate
-     */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
-    if (ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL) {
-        ((void) rs_ctx);
-        have_ca_chain = 1;
-
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification"));
-        ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(
-            chain,
-            ssl->conf->f_ca_cb,
-            ssl->conf->p_ca_cb,
-            ssl->conf->cert_profile,
-            ssl->hostname,
-            &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
-            f_vrfy, p_vrfy);
-    } else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
-    {
-        mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
-        mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
-        if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) {
-            ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
-            ca_crl   = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
-        } else
-#endif
-        {
-            ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
-            ca_crl   = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
-        }
-
-        if (ca_chain != NULL) {
-            have_ca_chain = 1;
-        }
-
-        ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(
-            chain,
-            ca_chain, ca_crl,
-            ssl->conf->cert_profile,
-            ssl->hostname,
-            &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
-            f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx);
-    }
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret);
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
-    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
-        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
-     */
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
-    {
-        const mbedtls_pk_context *pk = &chain->pk;
-
-        /* If certificate uses an EC key, make sure the curve is OK.
-         * This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good
-         * enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use here. */
-        if (mbedtls_pk_can_do(pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
-            /* and in the unlikely case the above assumption no longer holds
-             * we are making sure that pk_ec() here does not return a NULL
-             */
-            mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk);
-            if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("invalid group ID"));
-                return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-            }
-            if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, grp_id) != 0) {
-                ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |=
-                    MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
-
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (EC key curve)"));
-                if (ret == 0) {
-                    ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
-
-    if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(chain,
-                                     ciphersuite_info,
-                                     !ssl->conf->endpoint,
-                                     &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result) != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)"));
-        if (ret == 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
-     * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
-     * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
-     * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
-     * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
-     * ssl_parse_certificate even if verification was optional. */
-    if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
-        (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
-         ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) {
-        ret = 0;
-    }
-
-    if (have_ca_chain == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain"));
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
-    }
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        uint8_t alert;
-
-        /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
-           Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
-           may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
-        if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED;
-        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA;
-        } else {
-            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN;
-        }
-        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
-                                       alert);
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
-    if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x",
-                                  (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result));
-    } else {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear"));
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 static int ssl_remember_peer_crt_digest(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
@@ -8226,6 +7948,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 {
     int ret = 0;
     int crt_expected;
+    /* Authmode: precedence order is SNI if used else configuration */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
     const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET
                        ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode
@@ -8305,8 +8028,9 @@ crt_verify:
     }
 #endif
 
-    ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify(ssl, authmode,
+    ret = mbedtls_ssl_verify_certificate(ssl, authmode, chain,
-                                       chain, rs_ctx);
+                                         ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info,
+                                         rs_ctx);
     if (ret != 0) {
         goto exit;
     }
@@ -9972,4 +9696,274 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
     return 0;
 }
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+/*
+ * The following functions are used by 1.2 and 1.3, client and server.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+                                 const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
+                                 int recv_endpoint,
+                                 mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version,
+                                 uint32_t *flags)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    unsigned int usage = 0;
+    const char *ext_oid;
+    size_t ext_len;
+
+    /*
+     * keyUsage
+     */
+
+    /* Note: don't guard this with MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C because the server wants
+     * to check what a compliant client will think while choosing which cert
+     * to send to the client. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+    if (tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 &&
+        recv_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
+        /* TLS 1.2 server part of the key exchange */
+        switch (ciphersuite->key_exchange) {
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
+                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT;
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
+                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
+                break;
+
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
+                usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT;
+                break;
+
+            /* Don't use default: we want warnings when adding new values */
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK:
+            case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE:
+                usage = 0;
+        }
+    } else
+#endif
+    {
+        /* This is either TLS 1.3 authentication, which always uses signatures,
+         * or 1.2 client auth: rsa_sign and mbedtls_ecdsa_sign are the only
+         * options we implement, both using signatures. */
+        (void) tls_version;
+        (void) ciphersuite;
+        usage = MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
+    }
+
+    if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(cert, usage) != 0) {
+        *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE;
+        ret = -1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * extKeyUsage
+     */
+
+    if (recv_endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
+        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH;
+        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH);
+    } else {
+        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH;
+        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH);
+    }
+
+    if (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(cert, ext_oid, ext_len) != 0) {
+        *flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE;
+        ret = -1;
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_verify_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                   int authmode,
+                                   mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+                                   const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info,
+                                   void *rs_ctx)
+{
+    if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Primary check: use the appropriate X.509 verification function
+     */
+    int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
+    void *p_vrfy;
+    if (ssl->f_vrfy != NULL) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use context-specific verification callback"));
+        f_vrfy = ssl->f_vrfy;
+        p_vrfy = ssl->p_vrfy;
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Use configuration-specific verification callback"));
+        f_vrfy = ssl->conf->f_vrfy;
+        p_vrfy = ssl->conf->p_vrfy;
+    }
+
+    int ret = 0;
+    int have_ca_chain_or_callback = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+    if (ssl->conf->f_ca_cb != NULL) {
+        ((void) rs_ctx);
+        have_ca_chain_or_callback = 1;
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification"));
+        ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(
+            chain,
+            ssl->conf->f_ca_cb,
+            ssl->conf->p_ca_cb,
+            ssl->conf->cert_profile,
+            ssl->hostname,
+            &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
+            f_vrfy, p_vrfy);
+    } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+    {
+        mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
+        mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+        if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) {
+            ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
+            ca_crl   = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
+        } else
+#endif
+        {
+            ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
+            ca_crl   = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
+        }
+
+        if (ca_chain != NULL) {
+            have_ca_chain_or_callback = 1;
+        }
+
+        ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(
+            chain,
+            ca_chain, ca_crl,
+            ssl->conf->cert_profile,
+            ssl->hostname,
+            &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
+            f_vrfy, p_vrfy, rs_ctx);
+    }
+
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret);
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
+    if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
+     */
+
+    /* With TLS 1.2 and ECC certs, check that the curve used by the
+     * certificate is on our list of acceptable curves.
+     *
+     * With TLS 1.3 this is not needed because the curve is part of the
+     * signature algorithm (eg ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256) which is checked when
+     * we validate the signature made with the key associated to this cert.
+     */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
+    defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+    if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 &&
+        mbedtls_pk_can_do(&chain->pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)) {
+        if (mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(ssl, mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(&chain->pk)) != 0) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (EC key curve)"));
+            ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
+            if (ret == 0) {
+                ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+    /* Check X.509 usage extensions (keyUsage, extKeyUsage) */
+    if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(chain,
+                                     ciphersuite_info,
+                                     ssl->conf->endpoint,
+                                     ssl->tls_version,
+                                     &ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result) != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)"));
+        if (ret == 0) {
+            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* With authmode optional, we want to keep going if the certificate was
+     * unacceptable, but still fail on other errors (out of memory etc),
+     * including fatal errors from the f_vrfy callback.
+     *
+     * The only acceptable errors are:
+     * - MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED: cert rejected by primary check;
+     * - MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE: cert rejected by secondary checks.
+     * Anything else is a fatal error. */
+    if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
+        (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
+         ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) {
+        ret = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* Return a specific error as this is a user error: inconsistent
+     * configuration - can't verify without trust anchors. */
+    if (have_ca_chain_or_callback == 0 && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain"));
+        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
+    }
+
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        uint8_t alert;
+
+        /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
+           Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
+           may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
+        if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED;
+        } else if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA;
+        } else {
+            alert = MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN;
+        }
+        mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+                                       alert);
+    }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result != 0) {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x",
+                                  (unsigned int) ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result));
+    } else {
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear"));
+    }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+
+    return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */

library/ssl_tls12_server.c

@@ -756,7 +756,9 @@ static int ssl_pick_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
          * and decrypting with the same RSA key.
          */
         if (mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(cur->cert, ciphersuite_info,
-                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags) != 0) {
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+                                         MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2,
+                                         &flags) != 0) {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("certificate mismatch: "
                                       "(extended) key usage extension"));
             continue;

library/ssl_tls13_generic.c

@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
         mbedtls_free(ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert);
     }
 
+    /* This is used by ssl_tls13_validate_certificate() */
     if (certificate_list_len == 0) {
         ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert = NULL;
         ret = 0;
@@ -635,25 +636,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
 static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 {
-    int ret = 0;
+    /* Authmode: precedence order is SNI if used else configuration */
-    int authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
-    mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
+    const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET
-    mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl;
+                       ? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode
-    const char *ext_oid;
+                       : ssl->conf->authmode;
-    size_t ext_len;
+#else
-    uint32_t verify_result = 0;
+    const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
-
-    /* If SNI was used, overwrite authentication mode
-     * from the configuration. */
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
-    if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
-        if (ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET) {
-            authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
-        } else
-#endif
-        authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
-    }
 #endif
 
     /*
@@ -685,6 +674,11 @@ static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+        /* Regardless of authmode, the server is not allowed to send an empty
+         * certificate chain. (Last paragraph before 4.4.2.1 in RFC 8446: "The
+         * server's certificate_list MUST always be non-empty.") With authmode
+         * optional/none, we continue the handshake if we can't validate the
+         * server's cert, but we still break it if no certificate was sent. */
         if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
             MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT,
                                          MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE);
@@ -693,114 +687,9 @@ static int ssl_tls13_validate_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
     }
 
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+    return mbedtls_ssl_verify_certificate(ssl, authmode,
-    if (ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL) {
+                                          ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
-        ca_chain = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain;
+                                          NULL, NULL);
-        ca_crl = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_crl;
-    } else
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
-    {
-        ca_chain = ssl->conf->ca_chain;
-        ca_crl = ssl->conf->ca_crl;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Main check: verify certificate
-     */
-    ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(
-        ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
-        ca_chain, ca_crl,
-        ssl->conf->cert_profile,
-        ssl->hostname,
-        &verify_result,
-        ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy);
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "x509_verify_cert", ret);
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
-     */
-    if (ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT) {
-        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH;
-        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH);
-    } else {
-        ext_oid = MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH;
-        ext_len = MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH);
-    }
-
-    if ((mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(
-             ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
-             MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) != 0) ||
-        (mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(
-             ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
-             ext_oid, ext_len) != 0)) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("bad certificate (usage extensions)"));
-        if (ret == 0) {
-            ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile is supposed to report a
-     * verification failure through MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED,
-     * with details encoded in the verification flags. All other kinds
-     * of error codes, including those from the user provided f_vrfy
-     * functions, are treated as fatal and lead to a failure of
-     * mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_certificate even if verification was optional.
-     */
-    if (authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL &&
-        (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
-         ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE)) {
-        ret = 0;
-    }
-
-    if (ca_chain == NULL && authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("got no CA chain"));
-        ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED;
-    }
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        /* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
-           Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
-           may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
-        if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED, ret);
-        } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT, ret);
-        } else if (verify_result & (MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE |
-                                    MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE |
-                                    MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE |
-                                    MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK |
-                                    MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY)) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT, ret);
-        } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED, ret);
-        } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED, ret);
-        } else if (verify_result & MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED) {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA, ret);
-        } else {
-            MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
-                MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN, ret);
-        }
-    }
-
-#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
-    if (verify_result != 0) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("! Certificate verification flags %08x",
-                                  (unsigned int) verify_result));
-    } else {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Certificate verification flags clear"));
-    }
-#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
-
-    ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = verify_result;
-    return ret;
 }
 #else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
 MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL

programs/ssl/ssl_client2.c

@@ -2223,7 +2223,9 @@ usage:
             ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) {
             mbedtls_printf(" failed\n  ! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned -0x%x\n",
                            (unsigned int) -ret);
-            if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+            if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
+                ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE) {
                 mbedtls_printf(
                     "    Unable to verify the server's certificate. "
                     "Either it is invalid,\n"
@@ -2234,7 +2236,13 @@ usage:
                     "not using TLS 1.3.\n"
                     "    For TLS 1.3 server, try `ca_path=/etc/ssl/certs/`"
                     "or other folder that has root certificates\n");
+
+                flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(&ssl);
+                char vrfy_buf[512];
+                x509_crt_verify_info(vrfy_buf, sizeof(vrfy_buf), "  ! ", flags);
+                mbedtls_printf("%s\n", vrfy_buf);
             }
+#endif
             mbedtls_printf("\n");
             goto exit;
         }

programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c

@@ -3513,7 +3513,8 @@ handshake:
                        (unsigned int) -ret);
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
-        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED) {
+        if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED ||
+            ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE) {
             char vrfy_buf[512];
             flags = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(&ssl);
 

tests/Makefile

@@ -212,8 +212,7 @@ $(BINARIES): %$(EXEXT): %.c $(MBEDLIBS) $(TEST_OBJS_DEPS) $(MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS)
 clean:
 ifndef WINDOWS
 	rm -rf $(BINARIES) *.c *.datax
-	rm -f src/*.o src/drivers/*.o src/test_helpers/*.o src/libmbed* src/test_keys.h src/test_certs.h
+	rm -f src/*.o src/drivers/*.o src/test_helpers/*.o src/libmbed*
-	rm -f src/test_keys.h src/test_certs.h
 	rm -f include/test/instrument_record_status.h
 	rm -f include/alt-extra/*/*_alt.h
 	rm -rf libtestdriver1
@@ -224,10 +223,8 @@ else
 	if exist *.datax del /Q /F *.datax
 	if exist src/*.o del /Q /F src/*.o
 	if exist src/drivers/*.o del /Q /F src/drivers/*.o
-	if exist src/test_keys.h del /Q /F src/test_keys.h
-	if exist src/test_certs.h del /Q /F src/test_cers.h
 	if exist src/test_helpers/*.o del /Q /F src/test_helpers/*.o
-	if exist src/libmbed* del /Q /F src/libmed*
+	if exist src/libmbed* del /Q /F src/libmbed*
 	if exist include/test/instrument_record_status.h del /Q /F include/test/instrument_record_status.h
 endif
 

tests/ssl-opt.sh

@@ -2155,7 +2155,7 @@ run_test    "TLS: password protected server key, two certificates" \
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "CA callback on client" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 " \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 " \
             0 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
             -S "error" \
@@ -2165,7 +2165,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
 requires_hash_alg SHA_256
 run_test    "CA callback on server" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
             0 \
@@ -2722,9 +2722,10 @@ run_test    "Single supported algorithm sending: openssl client" \
             0
 
 # Tests for certificate verification callback
+requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Configuration-specific CRT verification callback" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 context_crt_cb=0 debug_level=3" \
+            "$P_CLI context_crt_cb=0 debug_level=3" \
             0 \
             -S "error" \
             -c "Verify requested for " \
@@ -2732,9 +2733,10 @@ run_test    "Configuration-specific CRT verification callback" \
             -C "Use context-specific verification callback" \
             -C "error"
 
+requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Context-specific CRT verification callback" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=3" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 context_crt_cb=1 debug_level=3" \
+            "$P_CLI context_crt_cb=1 debug_level=3" \
             0 \
             -S "error" \
             -c "Verify requested for " \
@@ -5809,38 +5811,78 @@ run_test    "DER format: with 9 trailing random bytes" \
 # Tests for auth_mode, there are duplicated tests using ca callback for authentication
 # When updating these tests, modify the matching authentication tests accordingly
 
+# The next 4 cases test the 3 auth modes with a badly signed server cert.
 requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client required" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             1 \
             -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
             -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=48" \
             -c "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA
+# We don't check that the server receives the alert because it might
+# detect that its write end of the connection is closed and abort
+# before reading the alert message.
+
+run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client required (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
+             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
+            1 \
+            -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=48" \
+            -c "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA
 
 run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client optional" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls13 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             0 \
             -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
             -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=48" \
             -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
-requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
+run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client optional (1.2)" \
-run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client optional, no trusted CA" \
+            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
-            "$P_SRV" \
+             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             0 \
             -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
-            -c "! Certificate verification flags"\
             -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=48" \
-            -C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+
+run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client none" \
+            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
+             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=none" \
+            0 \
+            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=48" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+
+run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client none (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
+             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=none" \
+            0 \
+            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=48" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
 requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
 run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client required, no trusted CA" \
@@ -5853,6 +5895,65 @@ run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client required, no trusted CA" \
             -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -c "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
 
+requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
+run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client required, no trusted CA (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=required ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            1 \
+            -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -c "! Certificate verification flags"\
+            -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -c "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+
+requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
+run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client optional, no trusted CA" \
+            "$P_SRV" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            0 \
+            -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -c "! Certificate verification flags"\
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \
+            -C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+
+requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
+run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client optional, no trusted CA (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            0 \
+            -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -c "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -c "! Certificate verification flags"\
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \
+            -C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+
+requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
+run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client none, no trusted CA" \
+            "$P_SRV" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=none ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            0 \
+            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! Certificate verification flags"\
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \
+            -C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+
+requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
+run_test    "Authentication: server goodcert, client none, no trusted CA (1.2)" \
+            "$P_SRV" \
+            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 auth_mode=none ca_file=none ca_path=none" \
+            0 \
+            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! Certificate verification flags"\
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed" \
+            -C "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate"
+
 # The purpose of the next two tests is to test the client's behaviour when receiving a server
 # certificate with an unsupported elliptic curve. This should usually not happen because
 # the client informs the server about the supported curves - it does, though, in the
@@ -5878,16 +5979,6 @@ run_test    "Authentication: server ECDH p256v1, client optional, p256v1 unsuppo
             -c "! Certificate verification flags"\
             -c "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" # Expect failure only at ECDH params check
 
-run_test    "Authentication: server badcert, client none" \
-            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
-             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=1 auth_mode=none" \
-            0 \
-            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
-            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
-            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
-
 requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
 run_test    "Authentication: client SHA256, server required" \
             "$P_SRV auth_mode=required" \
@@ -6098,7 +6189,7 @@ requires_full_size_output_buffer
 run_test    "Authentication: server max_int+1 chain, client optional" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt \
+            "$P_CLI server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt \
                     auth_mode=optional" \
             1 \
             -c "X509 - A fatal error occurred"
@@ -6219,7 +6310,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server badcert, client required" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             1 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
             -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
@@ -6231,7 +6322,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server badcert, client optional" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             0 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
             -c "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
@@ -6239,6 +6330,18 @@ run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server badcert, client optional" \
             -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
+run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server badcert, client none" \
+            "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
+             key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=none" \
+            0 \
+            -C "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
+            -C "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
+            -C "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -C "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
+            -C "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
+
 # The purpose of the next two tests is to test the client's behaviour when receiving a server
 # certificate with an unsupported elliptic curve. This should usually not happen because
 # the client informs the server about the supported curves - it does, though, in the
@@ -6270,7 +6373,7 @@ run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server ECDH p256v1, client optional, p
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
-run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA256, server required" \
+run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA384, server required" \
             "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server6.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server6.key \
@@ -6282,7 +6385,7 @@ run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA256, server required" \
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 requires_any_configs_enabled $TLS1_2_KEY_EXCHANGES_WITH_CERT
-run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA384, server required" \
+run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA256, server required" \
             "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server6.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server6.key \
@@ -6294,7 +6397,7 @@ run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client SHA384, server required" \
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client badcert, server required" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
             1 \
@@ -6309,7 +6412,6 @@ run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client badcert, server required" \
             -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
             -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -s "send alert level=2 message=48" \
-            -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -s "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 # We don't check that the client receives the alert because it might
 # detect that its write end of the connection is closed and abort
@@ -6317,7 +6419,7 @@ run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client badcert, server required" \
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client cert not trusted, server required" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-selfsigned.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
             1 \
@@ -6331,12 +6433,11 @@ run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client cert not trusted, server requir
             -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -s "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
             -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
-            -c "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned" \
             -s "X509 - Certificate verification failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client badcert, server optional" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=3 crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5-badsign.crt \
              key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key" \
             0 \
@@ -6359,7 +6460,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server max_int chain, client default" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c09.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/09.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 server_name=CA09 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 server_name=CA09 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \
             0 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
             -C "X509 - A fatal error occurred"
@@ -6370,7 +6471,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server max_int+1 chain, client default" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 ca_callback=1 server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 ca_callback=1 server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt" \
             1 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
             -c "X509 - A fatal error occurred"
@@ -6381,7 +6482,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: server max_int+1 chain, client optional" \
             "$P_SRV crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
-            "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt \
+            "$P_CLI ca_callback=1 server_name=CA10 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt \
                     debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             1 \
             -c "use CA callback for X.509 CRT verification" \
@@ -6391,7 +6492,7 @@ requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA
 requires_full_size_output_buffer
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client max_int+1 chain, server optional" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=optional" \
             "$P_CLI crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
             1 \
@@ -6402,7 +6503,7 @@ requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA
 requires_full_size_output_buffer
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client max_int+1 chain, server required" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c10.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/10.key" \
             1 \
@@ -6413,7 +6514,7 @@ requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA" $MAX_IM_CA
 requires_full_size_output_buffer
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
 run_test    "Authentication, CA callback: client max_int chain, server required" \
-            "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV ca_callback=1 debug_level=3 ca_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/00.crt auth_mode=required" \
             "$P_CLI crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/c09.pem \
                     key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/dir-maxpath/09.key" \
             0 \
@@ -6578,7 +6679,9 @@ run_test    "SNI: CA override with CRL" \
             -S "skip parse certificate verify" \
             -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=44" \
             -s "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED
 
 # Tests for SNI and DTLS
 
@@ -6726,7 +6829,9 @@ run_test    "SNI: DTLS, CA override with CRL" \
             -S "skip parse certificate verify" \
             -s "x509_verify_cert() returned" \
             -S "! The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=44" \
             -s "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED
 
 # Tests for non-blocking I/O: exercise a variety of handshake flows
 
@@ -7640,22 +7745,26 @@ run_test    "ALPN: both, no common" \
 
 # Tests for keyUsage in leaf certificates, part 1:
 # server-side certificate/suite selection
+#
+# This is only about 1.2 (for 1.3, all key exchanges use signatures).
+# In 4.0 this will probably go away as all TLS 1.2 key exchanges will use
+# signatures too, following the removal of RSA #8170 and static ECDH #9201.
 
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: RSA, digitalSignature -> (EC)DHE-RSA" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: RSA, digitalSignature -> (EC)DHE-RSA" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
             0 \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-[EC]*DHE-RSA-WITH-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: RSA, keyEncipherment -> RSA" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: RSA, keyEncipherment -> RSA" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
             0 \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-RSA-WITH-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: RSA, keyAgreement -> fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: RSA, keyAgreement -> fail" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ka.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
@@ -7663,7 +7772,7 @@ run_test    "keyUsage srv: RSA, keyAgreement -> fail" \
             -C "Ciphersuite is "
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, digitalSignature -> ECDHE-ECDSA" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: ECC, digitalSignature -> ECDHE-ECDSA" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ds.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
@@ -7671,14 +7780,14 @@ run_test    "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, digitalSignature -> ECDHE-ECDSA" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-"
 
 
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, keyAgreement -> ECDH-" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: ECC, keyAgreement -> ECDH-" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
             0 \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-ECDH-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, keyEncipherment -> fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage srv 1.2: ECC, keyEncipherment -> fail" \
             "$P_SRV force_version=tls12 key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ke.crt" \
             "$P_CLI" \
@@ -7687,8 +7796,12 @@ run_test    "keyUsage srv: ECDSA, keyEncipherment -> fail" \
 
 # Tests for keyUsage in leaf certificates, part 2:
 # client-side checking of server cert
+#
+# TLS 1.3 uses only signature, but for 1.2 it depends on the key exchange.
+# In 4.0 this will probably change as all TLS 1.2 key exchanges will use
+# signatures too, following the removal of RSA #8170 and static ECDH #9201.
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds_ke.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
@@ -7698,7 +7811,7 @@ run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds_ke.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
@@ -7708,7 +7821,7 @@ run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: OK" \
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
@@ -7718,28 +7831,32 @@ run_test    "keyUsage cli: KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: fail, soft" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: KeyEncipherment, DHE-RSA: fail (soft)" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
             0 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=43" \
             -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature, DHE-RSA: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: DigitalSignature, DHE-RSA: OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
@@ -7749,27 +7866,43 @@ run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature, DHE-RSA: OK" \
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature, RSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: DigitalSignature, RSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1 \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
-run_test    "keyUsage cli: DigitalSignature, RSA: fail, soft" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.2: DigitalSignature, RSA: fail (soft)" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional \
              force_ciphersuite=TLS-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA" \
             0 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=43" \
             -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
 
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: DigitalSignature, RSA: OK" \
+            "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
+             -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ds.crt" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
+            0 \
+            -C "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
+            -c "Ciphersuite is"
+
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
@@ -7785,26 +7918,32 @@ run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment, RSA: OK" \
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyEncipherment, RSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyEncipherment, RSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ke.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyAgreement, RSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyAgreement, RSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ka.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
@@ -7821,32 +7960,40 @@ run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: DigitalSignature, ECDSA: OK" \
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyEncipherment, ECDSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyEncipherment, ECDSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ke.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyAgreement, ECDSA: fail" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli 1.3: KeyAgreement, ECDSA: fail (hard)" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 # Tests for keyUsage in leaf certificates, part 3:
 # server-side checking of client cert
+#
+# Here, both 1.2 and 1.3 only use signatures.
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: RSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: RSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds.crt" \
@@ -7856,25 +8003,40 @@ run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: RSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (soft)" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: RSA, DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment: OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
+             -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ds_ke.crt" \
+            0 \
+            -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+            -S "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (soft)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (hard)" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (hard)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 force_version=tls12 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls12 auth_mode=required" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.ku-ke.crt" \
             1 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
             -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: ECDSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: ECDSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ds.crt" \
@@ -7884,14 +8046,28 @@ run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: ECDSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (soft)" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (soft)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.2: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (hard)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
+             -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
+            1 \
+            -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
+            -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
+
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
@@ -7907,14 +8083,43 @@ run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: RSA, DigitalSignature: OK" \
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (soft)" \
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: RSA, DigitalSignature+KeyEncipherment: OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
+             -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ds_ke.crt" \
+            0 \
+            -s "Verifying peer X.509 certificate... ok" \
+            -S "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (soft)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ke.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: RSA, KeyEncipherment: fail (hard)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2.key \
+             crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server2-sha256.ku-ke.crt" \
+            1 \
+            -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
+            -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
+
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
@@ -7931,13 +8136,29 @@ requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (soft)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "keyUsage cli-auth 1.3: ECDSA, KeyAgreement: fail (hard)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
+             crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.ku-ka.crt" \
+            1 \
+            -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the keyUsage extension" \
+            -s "! mbedtls_ssl_handshake returned"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
+
 # Tests for extendedKeyUsage, part 1: server-side certificate/suite selection
 
 requires_key_exchange_with_cert_in_tls12_or_tls13_enabled
@@ -7971,7 +8192,7 @@ run_test    "extKeyUsage srv: codeSign -> fail" \
 # Tests for extendedKeyUsage, part 2: client-side checking of server cert
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: serverAuth -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.2: serverAuth -> OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-srv.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
@@ -7981,7 +8202,7 @@ run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: serverAuth -> OK" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.2: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-srv_cli.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
@@ -7991,7 +8212,7 @@ run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.2: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs_any.crt" \
             "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
@@ -8001,14 +8222,30 @@ run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
             -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli: codeSign -> fail" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.2: codeSign -> fail (soft)" \
             "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
+            0 \
+            -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -C "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
+            -c "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -C "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE  -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
+
+requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.2: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \
+            "$O_SRV -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
+             -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is TLS-" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE  -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
@@ -8049,19 +8286,22 @@ run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.3: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.3: codeSign -> fail" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli 1.3: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \
             "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -tls1_3 -num_tickets=0 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
-            "$P_CLI debug_level=1" \
+            "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \
             1 \
             -c "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
             -c "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
-            -C "Ciphersuite is"
+            -C "Ciphersuite is" \
+            -c "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -c "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE  -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 # Tests for extendedKeyUsage, part 3: server-side checking of client cert
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: clientAuth -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.2: clientAuth -> OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cli.crt" \
@@ -8070,7 +8310,7 @@ run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: clientAuth -> OK" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.2: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-srv_cli.crt" \
@@ -8079,7 +8319,7 @@ run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: serverAuth,clientAuth -> OK" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.2: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
             "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs_any.crt" \
@@ -8088,22 +8328,27 @@ run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: codeSign,anyEKU -> OK" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: codeSign -> fail (soft)" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.2: codeSign -> fail (soft)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
-            -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+            -S "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" \
+            -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" \
 
 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
-run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.2: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 auth_mode=required" \
             "$O_CLI -tls1_2 -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
             1 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" \
             -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE  -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
 
 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
@@ -8142,13 +8387,29 @@ requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
 requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
                              MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
 run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.3: codeSign -> fail (soft)" \
-            "$P_SRV debug_level=1 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=optional" \
             "$O_NEXT_CLI_NO_CERT -key $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
              -cert $DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
             0 \
             -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -S "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" \
             -S "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
 
+requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_compatible_ephemeral
+requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE \
+                             MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+run_test    "extKeyUsage cli-auth 1.3: codeSign -> fail (hard)" \
+            "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 auth_mode=required" \
+            "$P_CLI key_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.key \
+             crt_file=$DATA_FILES_PATH/server5.eku-cs.crt" \
+            1 \
+            -s "bad certificate (usage extensions)" \
+            -s "send alert level=2 message=43" \
+            -s "! Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension" \
+            -s "Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed"
+            # MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE  -> MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT
+
 # Tests for DHM parameters loading
 
 run_test    "DHM parameters: reference" \

tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data

@@ -6,6 +6,16 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, DER buffer too small
 depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256
 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304402201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
 
+# Check coordinates one byte larger than the largest supported curve.
+# If we add an even larger curve, this test case will fail in the full
+# configuration because mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() will return 0, and we'll
+# need to use larger data for this test case.
+ECDSA Raw -> DER, very large input (536-bit)
+ecdsa_raw_to_der:536:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818a024311111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024322222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
+
+ECDSA Raw -> DER, very large input (1016-bit)
+ecdsa_raw_to_der:1016:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30820102027f11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111027f22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
+
 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Null r
 depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256
 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA
@@ -58,6 +68,16 @@ ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Raw buffer too small
 depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256
 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
 
+# Check coordinates one byte larger than the largest supported curve.
+# If we add an even larger curve, this test case will fail in the full
+# configuration because mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw() will return 0, and we'll
+# need to use larger data for this test case.
+ECDSA DER -> Raw, very large input (536-bit)
+ecdsa_der_to_raw:536:"30818a024311111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024322222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
+
+ECDSA DER -> Raw, very large input (1016-bit)
+ecdsa_der_to_raw:1016:"30820102027f11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111027f22222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL
+
 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong sequence tag
 depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256
 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"40440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG

tests/suites/test_suite_version.data

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 Check compile time library version
-check_compiletime_version:"3.6.0"
+check_compiletime_version:"3.6.1"
 
 Check runtime library version
-check_runtime_version:"3.6.0"
+check_runtime_version:"3.6.1"
 
 Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
 check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0