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Merge branch 'development-restricted' into copying-pake

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Signed-off-by: David Horstmann <david.horstmann@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Horstmann 2024-03-06 11:18:28 +00:00 committed by GitHub
commit a5175634b0
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201 changed files with 10795 additions and 4928 deletions
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4
.gitignore vendored
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@ -63,5 +63,7 @@ massif-*
/cscope*.out
/tags
# Clangd compilation database
# clangd compilation database
compile_commands.json
# clangd index files
/.cache/clangd/index/

2
BRANCHES.md
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@ -106,6 +106,6 @@ The following branches are currently maintained:
- [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/)
- [`mbedtls-2.28`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.28)
maintained until at least the end of 2024, see
<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.6>.
<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.7>.
Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch.

8
CMakeLists.txt
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@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ endif()
# If this is the root project add longer list of available CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE values
if(CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR STREQUAL CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR)
set(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE ${CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE}
CACHE STRING "Choose the type of build: None Debug Release Coverage ASan ASanDbg MemSan MemSanDbg Check CheckFull"
CACHE STRING "Choose the type of build: None Debug Release Coverage ASan ASanDbg MemSan MemSanDbg Check CheckFull TSan TSanDbg"
FORCE)
endif()
@ -212,6 +212,8 @@ if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU)
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_COVERAGE "-O0 -g3 --coverage")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASAN "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O3")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASANDBG "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_TSAN "-fsanitize=thread -O3")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_TSANDBG "-fsanitize=thread -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK "-Os")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECKFULL "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK} -Wcast-qual")
endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNU)
@ -225,6 +227,8 @@ if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG)
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_ASANDBG "-fsanitize=address -fno-common -fsanitize=undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MEMSAN "-fsanitize=memory -O3")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MEMSANDBG "-fsanitize=memory -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls -fsanitize-memory-track-origins=2")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_TSAN "-fsanitize=thread -O3")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_TSANDBG "-fsanitize=thread -O1 -g3 -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-calls")
set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK "-Os")
endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG)
@ -379,7 +383,7 @@ if(NOT DISABLE_PACKAGE_CONFIG_AND_INSTALL)
write_basic_package_version_file(
"cmake/MbedTLSConfigVersion.cmake"
COMPATIBILITY SameMajorVersion
VERSION 3.5.1)
VERSION 3.5.2)
install(
FILES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake/MbedTLSConfig.cmake"

15
ChangeLog
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@ -1,5 +1,20 @@
Mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= Mbed TLS 3.5.2 branch released 2024-01-26
Security
* Fix a timing side channel in private key RSA operations. This side channel
could be sufficient for an attacker to recover the plaintext. A local
attacker or a remote attacker who is close to the victim on the network
might have precise enough timing measurements to exploit this. It requires
the attacker to send a large number of messages for decryption. For
details, see "Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack", Hubert Kario. Reported
by Hubert Kario, Red Hat.
* Fix a failure to validate input when writing x509 extensions lengths which
could result in an integer overflow, causing a zero-length buffer to be
allocated to hold the extension. The extension would then be copied into
the buffer, causing a heap buffer overflow.
= Mbed TLS 3.5.1 branch released 2023-11-06
Changes

3
ChangeLog.d/7764.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Features
* Add functions mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa() and mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa()
to convert between Mbed TLS and PSA curve identifiers.

4
ChangeLog.d/8060.txt
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@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Features
* The CCM and GCM modules no longer depend on MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C. People who
use CCM and GCM but don't need the Cipher API can now disable
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C in order to save code size.

4
ChangeLog.d/8340.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Features
* Add functions mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type() and
mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg() to convert between mbedtls_md_type_t and
psa_algorithm_t.

4
ChangeLog.d/8461.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Bugfix
* Fix unsupported PSA asymmetric encryption and decryption
(psa_asymmetric_[en|de]crypt) with opaque keys.
Resolves #8461.

2
ChangeLog.d/8726.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
Features
* Add partial platform support for z/OS.

5
ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
Features
* Add support for record size limit extension as defined by RFC 8449
and configured with MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT.
Application data sent and received will be fragmented according to
Record size limits negotiated during handshake.

3
ChangeLog.d/ctr-perf.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Features
* Improve performance of AES-GCM, AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG when
hardware accelerated AES is not present (around 13-23% on 64-bit Arm).

11
ChangeLog.d/driver-only-cipher.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
Features
* If a cipher or AEAD mechanism has a PSA driver, you can now build the
library without the corresponding built-in implementation. Generally
speaking that requires both the key type and algorithm to be accelerated
or they'll both be built in. However, for CCM and GCM the built-in
implementation is able to take advantage of a driver that only
accelerates the key type (that is, the block cipher primitive). See
docs/driver-only-builds.md for full details and current limitations.
* The CTR_DRBG module will now use AES from a PSA driver if MBEDTLS_AES_C is
disabled. This requires PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING in addition to
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES.

5
ChangeLog.d/ecp-keypair-utilities.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
Features
* Add utility functions to manipulate mbedtls_ecp_keypair objects, filling
gaps made by making its fields private: mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(),
mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(), mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(),
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(). Fixes #5017, #5441, #8367, #8652.

8
ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt
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@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
Security
* Fix a timing side channel in private key RSA operations. This side channel
could be sufficient for an attacker to recover the plaintext. A local
attacker or a remote attacker who is close to the victim on the network
might have precise enough timing measurements to exploit this. It requires
the attacker to send a large number of messages for decryption. For
details, see "Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack", Hubert Kario. Reported
by Hubert Kario, Red Hat.

3
ChangeLog.d/fix-tls-SuiteB.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
* Remove accidental introduction of RSA signature algorithms
in TLS Suite B Profile. Fixes #8221.

3
ChangeLog.d/fix-tls13-server-min-version-check.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
* Fix TLS server accepting TLS 1.2 handshake while TLS 1.2
is disabled at runtime. Fixes #8593.

2
ChangeLog.d/iar-gcc-perf.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
Features
* Improve performance for gcc (versions older than 9.3.0) and IAR.

3
ChangeLog.d/move-mbedtls-ecc-psa-helpers.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Changes
* Moved declaration of functions mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa and
mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa from psa/crypto_extra.h to mbedtls/psa_util.h

9
ChangeLog.d/no-cipher.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
Features
* Fewer modules depend on MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, making it possible to save code
size by disabling it in more circumstances. In particular, the CCM and
GCM modules no longer depend on MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C. Also,
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO can now be enabled without MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C if all
unauthenticated (non-AEAD) ciphers are disabled, or if they're all
fully provided by drivers. See docs/driver-only-builds.md for full
details and current limitations; in particular, NIST_KW and PKCS5/PKCS12
decryption still unconditionally depend on MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C.

3
ChangeLog.d/non-psa-pk-implementation.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Changes
* mbedtls_pk_sign_ext() is now always available, not just when
PSA (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) is enabled.

6
ChangeLog.d/tls-max-version-reset.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
Security
* Restore the maximum TLS version to be negotiated to the configured one
when an SSL context is reset with the mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() API.
An attacker was able to prevent an Mbed TLS server from establishing any
TLS 1.3 connection potentially resulting in a Denial of Service or forced
version downgrade from TLS 1.3 to TLS 1.2. Fixes #8654 reported by hey3e.

54
configs/config-tfm.h
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@ -21,20 +21,48 @@
/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM needs third-party files, so disable it. */
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
/* TF-M provides its own dummy implementations to save code size.
* We don't have any way to disable the tests that need these feature,
* so we just keep AES decryption enabled. We will resolve this through
* an official way to disable AES decryption, then this deviation
* will no longer be needed:
* https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7368
*/
#undef MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT
#undef MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT
/* Use built-in platform entropy functions (TF-M provides its own). */
#undef MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
/* Disable buffer-based memory allocator. This isn't strictly required,
* but using the native allocator is faster and works better with
* memory management analysis frameworks such as ASan. */
#undef MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
// This macro is enabled in TFM Medium but is disabled here because it is
// incompatible with baremetal builds in Mbed TLS.
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
// This macro is enabled in TFM Medium but is disabled here because it is
// incompatible with baremetal builds in Mbed TLS.
#undef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
// These platform-related TF-M settings are not useful here.
#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS
#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR
#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO
#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT
#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS
#undef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE
/*
* In order to get an example config that works cleanly out-of-the-box
* for both baremetal and non-baremetal builds, we detect baremetal builds
* (either IAR, Arm compiler or __ARM_EABI__ defined), and adjust some
* variables accordingly.
*/
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) || defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(__ARM_EABI__)
#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
#else
/* Use built-in platform entropy functions (TF-M provides its own). */
#undef MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
#endif
/***********************************************************************
* Local changes to crypto config below this delimiter
**********************************************************************/
// We expect TF-M to pick this up soon
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT
/* CCM is the only cipher/AEAD enabled in TF-M configuration files, but it
* does not need CIPHER_C to be enabled, so we can disable it in order
* to reduce code size further. */
#undef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C

25
configs/ext/README.md Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
Summary
-------
The two files:
* crypto_config_profile_medium.h
* tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h
are copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors, and are distributed under the license normally
used by Mbed TLS: a dual Apache 2.0 or GPLv2-or-later license.
Background
----------
The two files crypto_config_profile_medium.h and tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h
are taken verbatim from the TF-M source code here:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/lib/ext/mbedcrypto/mbedcrypto_config
In TF-M, they are distributed under a 3-Clause BSD license, as noted at the top of the files.
In Mbed TLS, with permission from the TF-M project, they are distributed under a dual [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html) OR [GPL-2.0-or-later](https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0-or-later.html) license, with copyright assigned to The Mbed TLS Contributors.
We only retain the note at the top of the files because we are taking the files verbatim, for ease of
maintenance.

13
configs/ext/config_tfm.h Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
/*
* Empty placeholder
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
/*
* This file is intentionally empty.
*
* Having an empty file here allows us to build the TF-M config, which references this file,
* without making any changes to the TF-M config.
*/

55
configs/ext/crypto_config_profile_medium.h
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@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018-2023, Arm Limited. All rights reserved.
*
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
*/
/**
* \file psa/crypto_config.h
* \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines)
*
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)
/**
* When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled in mbedtls_config.h,
@ -50,7 +51,7 @@
//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1
//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1
//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1
//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1
//#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1
@ -105,33 +106,27 @@
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 /* Deprecated */
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 /* Deprecated */
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1
/*
* The following symbols extend and deprecate the legacy
* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR ones. They include the usage of that key in
* the name's suffix. "_USE" is the most generic and it can be used to describe
* a generic suport, whereas other ones add more features on top of that and
* they are more specific.
*/
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1
/***********************************************************************
* Local edits below this delimiter
**********************************************************************/
/* Between Mbed TLS 3.4 and 3.5, the PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR macro
* (commented-out above) has been replaced with the following new macros: */
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 /* Not supported */
/* Between Mbed TLS 3.4 and 3.5, the following macros have been added: */
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 // Not supported
#ifdef CRYPTO_HW_ACCELERATOR
#include "crypto_accelerator_config.h"
#endif
#endif /* PROFILE_M_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */

13
configs/ext/mbedtls_entropy_nv_seed_config.h Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
/*
* Empty placeholder
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
/*
* This file is intentionally empty.
*
* Having an empty file here allows us to build the TF-M config, which references this file,
* without making any changes to the TF-M config.
*/

220
configs/ext/tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h
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@ -8,13 +8,29 @@
* memory footprint.
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
* Copyright (C) 2006-2023, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
#ifndef PROFILE_M_MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H
#define PROFILE_M_MBEDTLS_CONFIG_H
#include "config_tfm.h"
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE)
#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1
#endif
@ -80,44 +96,6 @@
* \{
*/
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_MD2_PROCESS_ALT
*
* MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let mbed TLS use you
* alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in
* mind that function prototypes should remain the same.
*
* This replaces only one function. The header file from mbed TLS is still
* used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT flags.
*
* Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT, mbed TLS will
* no longer provide the mbedtls_sha1_process() function, but it will still provide
* the other function (using your mbedtls_sha1_process() function) and the definition
* of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible
* with this definition.
*
* \note Because of a signature change, the core AES encryption and decryption routines are
* currently named mbedtls_aes_internal_encrypt and mbedtls_aes_internal_decrypt,
* respectively. When setting up alternative implementations, these functions should
* be overridden, but the wrapper functions mbedtls_aes_decrypt and mbedtls_aes_encrypt
* must stay untouched.
*
* \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then is is recommended to also set
* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES
* tables.
*
* Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding
* function.
*
* \warning MD2, MD4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use
* constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding
* dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests
* and ciphers instead.
*
*/
#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT
#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES
*
@ -171,21 +149,6 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY
*
* Enable a dummy error function to make use of mbedtls_strerror() in
* third party libraries easier when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is disabled
* (no effect when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled).
*
* You can safely disable this if MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled, or if you're
* not using mbedtls_strerror() or error_strerror() in your application.
*
* Disable if you run into name conflicts and want to really remove the
* mbedtls_strerror()
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
*
@ -223,26 +186,7 @@
* \note The entropy collector will write to the seed file before entropy is
* given to an external source, to update it.
*/
// This macro is enabled in TFM Medium but is disabled here because it is
// incompatible with baremetal builds in Mbed TLS.
//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
*
* Enable key identifiers that encode a key owner identifier.
*
* This is only meaningful when building the library as part of a
* multi-client service. When you activate this option, you must provide an
* implementation of the type mbedtls_key_owner_id_t and a translation from
* mbedtls_svc_key_id_t to file name in all the storage backends that you
* you wish to support.
*
* Note that while this define has been removed from TF-M's copy of this config
* file, TF-M still passes this option to Mbed TLS during the build via CMake.
* Therefore we keep it in our copy. See discussion on PR #7426 for more info.
*
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
@ -326,26 +270,21 @@
#define MBEDTLS_AES_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT
* \def MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
*
* Remove decryption operation for AES, ARIA and Camellia block cipher.
* Use only 128-bit keys in AES operations to save ROM.
*
* \note This feature is incompatible with insecure block cipher,
* MBEDTLS_DES_C, and cipher modes which always require decryption
* operation, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS and
* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C. When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled,
* this feature is incompatible with following supported PSA equivalence,
* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING, PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING,
* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES.
* Uncomment this macro to remove support for AES operations that use 192-
* or 256-bit keys.
*
* Uncommenting this macro reduces the size of AES code by ~300 bytes
* on v8-M/Thumb2.
*
* Module: library/aes.c
* library/aesce.c
* library/aesni.c
* library/aria.c
* library/camellia.c
* library/cipher.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C
*/
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT
#define MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
@ -388,18 +327,6 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
*
* Enable error code to error string conversion.
*
* Module: library/error.c
* Caller:
*
* This module enables mbedtls_strerror().
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C
*
@ -413,40 +340,7 @@
* This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code
* (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF).
*/
#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C /* Used for HUK deriviation */
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_MD_C
*
* Enable the generic layer for message digest (hashing) and HMAC.
*
* Requires: one of: MBEDTLS_MD5_C, MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C, MBEDTLS_SHA1_C,
* MBEDTLS_SHA224_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C, MBEDTLS_SHA384_C,
* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C with at least
* one hash.
* Module: library/md.c
* Caller: library/constant_time.c
* library/ecdsa.c
* library/ecjpake.c
* library/hkdf.c
* library/hmac_drbg.c
* library/pk.c
* library/pkcs5.c
* library/pkcs12.c
* library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
* library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
* library/rsa.c
* library/ssl_cookie.c
* library/ssl_msg.c
* library/ssl_tls.c
* library/x509.c
* library/x509_crt.c
* library/x509write_crt.c
* library/x509write_csr.c
*
* Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_MD_C
//#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C /* Used for HUK deriviation */
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
@ -484,6 +378,15 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE
/**
* \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
@ -508,9 +411,7 @@
* either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of
* the PSA ITS interface
*/
// This macro is enabled in TFM Medium but is disabled here because it is
// incompatible with baremetal builds in Mbed TLS.
//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
/* \} name SECTION: mbed TLS modules */
@ -614,6 +515,47 @@
/* ECP options */
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 0 /**< Disable fixed-point speed-up */
/**
* Uncomment to enable p256-m. This is an alternative implementation of
* key generation, ECDH and (randomized) ECDSA on the curve SECP256R1.
* Compared to the default implementation:
*
* - p256-m has a much smaller code size and RAM footprint.
* - p256-m is only available via the PSA API. This includes the pk module
* when #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled.
* - p256-m does not support deterministic ECDSA, EC-JPAKE, custom protocols
* over the core arithmetic, or deterministic derivation of keys.
*
* We recommend enabling this option if your application uses the PSA API
* and the only elliptic curve support it needs is ECDH and ECDSA over
* SECP256R1.
*
* If you enable this option, you do not need to enable any ECC-related
* MBEDTLS_xxx option. You do need to separately request support for the
* cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA API:
* - #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG for PSA-based
* configuration;
* - #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO if you want to use p256-m from PK, X.509 or TLS;
* - #PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256;
* - #PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH and/or #PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA as needed;
* - #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY, #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC,
* #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT,
* #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT and/or
* #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE as needed.
*
* \note To benefit from the smaller code size of p256-m, make sure that you
* do not enable any ECC-related option not supported by p256-m: this
* would cause the built-in ECC implementation to be built as well, in
* order to provide the required option.
* Make sure #PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA, #PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE and
* #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE, and curves other than
* SECP256R1 are disabled as they are not supported by this driver.
* Also, avoid defining #MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED or
* #MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED as those currently require a subset of
* the built-in ECC implementation, see docs/driver-only-builds.md.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED
/* \} name SECTION: Customisation configuration options */
#if CRYPTO_NV_SEED

233
docs/architecture/psa-migration/md-cipher-dispatch.md
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@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ We can classify code that implements or uses cryptographic mechanisms into sever
* Software implementations of primitive cryptographic mechanisms. These are not expected to change.
* Software implementations of constructed cryptographic mechanisms (e.g. HMAC, CTR_DRBG, RSA (calling a hash for PSS/OAEP, and needing to know the hash length in PKCS1v1.5 sign/verify), …). These need to keep working whenever a legacy implementation of the auxiliary mechanism is available, regardless of whether a PSA implementation is also available.
* Code implementing the PSA crypto interface. This is not expected to change, except perhaps to expose some internal functionality to overhauled glue code.
* Code that's subject to `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`: `pk.h`, X.509, TLS (excluding TLS 1.3).
* Code that always uses PSA for crypto: TLS 1.3, LMS.
* Code that's subject to `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`: `pk.h`, X.509, TLS (excluding parts specific TLS 1.3).
* Code that always uses PSA for crypto: TLS 1.3 (except things common with 1.2), LMS.
For the purposes of this work, three domains emerge:
@ -110,23 +110,79 @@ For the purposes of this work, three domains emerge:
#### Non-use-PSA modules
The following modules in Mbed TLS call another module to perform cryptographic operations which, in the long term, will be provided through a PSA interface, but cannot make any PSA-related assumption:
The following modules in Mbed TLS call another module to perform cryptographic operations which, in the long term, will be provided through a PSA interface, but cannot make any PSA-related assumption.
* CCM (block cipher in ECB mode; interdependent with cipher)
* cipher (cipher and AEAD algorithms)
* CMAC (AES-ECB and DES-ECB, but could be extended to the other block ciphers; interdependent with cipher)
* CTR\_DRBG (AES-ECB, but could be extended to the other block ciphers)
* entropy (hashes via low-level)
Hashes and HMAC (after the work on driver-only hashes):
* entropy (hashes via MD-light)
* ECDSA (HMAC\_DRBG; `md.h` exposed through API)
* ECJPAKE (hashes via md; `md.h` exposed through API)
* GCM (block cipher in ECB mode; interdependent with cipher)
* md (hashes and HMAC)
* NIST\_KW (AES-ECB; interdependent with cipher)
* ECJPAKE (hashes via MD-light; `md.h` exposed through API)
* MD (hashes and HMAC)
* HKDF (HMAC via `md.h`; `md.h` exposed through API)
* HMAC\_DRBG (hashes and HMAC via `md.h`; `md.h` exposed through API)
* PEM (AES and DES in CBC mode without padding; MD5 hash via low-level)
* PKCS12 (cipher, generically, selected from ASN.1 or function parameters; hashes via md; `cipher.h` exposed through API)
* PKCS5 (cipher, generically, selected from ASN.1; HMAC via `md.h`; `md.h` exposed through API)
* RSA (hash via md for PSS and OAEP; `md.h` exposed through API)
* PKCS12 (hashes via MD-light)
* PKCS5 (HMAC via `md.h`; `md.h` exposed through API)
* PKCS7 (hashes via MD)
* RSA (hash via MD-light for PSS and OAEP; `md.h` exposed through API)
* PEM (MD5 hash via MD-light)
Symmetric ciphers and AEADs (before work on driver-only cipher):
* PEM:
* AES, DES or 3DES in CBC mode without padding, decrypt only (!).
* Currently using low-level non-generic APIs.
* No hard dependency, features guarded by `AES_C` resp. `DES_C`.
* Functions called: `setkey_dec()` + `crypt_cbc()`.
* PKCS12:
* In practice: 2DES or 3DES in CBC mode with PKCS7 padding, decrypt only
(when called from pkparse).
* In principle: any cipher-mode (default padding), passed an
`mbedtls_cipher_type_t` as an argument, no documented restriction.
* Cipher, generically, selected from ASN.1 or function parameters;
no documented restriction but in practice TODO (inc. padding and
en/decrypt, look at standards and tests)
* Unconditional dependency on `CIPHER_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Note: `cipher.h` exposed through API.
* Functions called: `setup`, `setkey`, `set_iv`, `reset`, `update`, `finish` (in sequence, once).
* PKCS5 (PBES2, `mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2()`):
* 3DES or DES in CBC mode with PKCS7 padding, both encrypt and decrypt.
* Note: could also be AES in the future, see #7038.
* Unconditional dependency on `CIPHER_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Functions called: `setup`, `setkey`, `crypt`.
* CTR\_DRBG:
* AES in ECB mode, encrypt only.
* Currently using low-level non-generic API (`aes.h`).
* Unconditional dependency on `AES_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Functions called: `setkey_enc`, `crypt_ecb`.
* CCM:
* AES, Camellia or Aria in ECB mode, encrypt only.
* Unconditional dependency on `AES_C || CAMELLIA_C || ARIA_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Unconditional dependency on `CIPHER_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Note: also called by `cipher.c` if enabled.
* Functions called: `info`, `setup`, `setkey`, `update` (several times) - (never finish)
* CMAC:
* AES or DES in ECB mode, encrypt only.
* Unconditional dependency on `AES_C || DES_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Unconditional dependency on `CIPHER_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Note: also called by `cipher.c` if enabled.
* Functions called: `info`, `setup`, `setkey`, `update` (several times) - (never finish)
* GCM:
* AES, Camellia or Aria in ECB mode, encrypt only.
* Unconditional dependency on `AES_C || CAMELLIA_C || ARIA_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Unconditional dependency on `CIPHER_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Note: also called by `cipher.c` if enabled.
* Functions called: `info`, `setup`, `setkey`, `update` (several times) - (never finish)
* NIST\_KW:
* AES in ECB mode, both encryt and decrypt.
* Unconditional dependency on `AES_C || DES_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Unconditional dependency on `CIPHER_C` in `check_config.h`.
* Note: also called by `cipher.c` if enabled.
* Note: `cipher.h` exposed through API.
* Functions called: `info`, `setup`, `setkey`, `update` (several times) - (never finish)
* Cipher:
* potentially any cipher/AEAD in any mode and any direction
Note: PSA cipher is built on Cipher, but PSA AEAD directly calls the underlying AEAD modules (GCM, CCM, ChachaPoly).
### Difficulties
@ -263,12 +319,72 @@ These problems are easily solvable.
* We can make names and HMAC optional. The mixed-domain hash interface won't be the full `MBEDTLS_MD_C` but a subset.
* We can optimize `md.c` without making API changes to `md.h`.
### Scope reductions and priorities for 3.x
This section documents things that we chose to temporarily exclude from the scope in the 3.x branch (which will eventually be in scope again after 4.0) as well as things we chose to prioritize if we don't have time to support everything.
#### Don't support PK, X.509 and TLS without `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`
We do not need to support driver-only hashes and ciphers in PK. X.509 and TLS without `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`. Users who want to take full advantage of drivers will need to enabled this macro.
Note that this applies to TLS 1.3 as well, as some uses of hashes and all uses of ciphers there are common with TLS 1.2, hence governed by `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`, see [this macro's extended documentation](../../docs/use-psa-crypto.html).
This will go away naturally in 4.0 when this macros is not longer an option (because it's always on).
#### Don't support for `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` without `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`
We generally don't really support builds with `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` without `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`. For example, both `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` and `MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3` require `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C`, while in principle they should only require `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT`.
Considering this existing restriction which we do not plan to lift before 4.0, it is acceptable driver-only hashes and cipher support to have the same restriction in 3.x.
It is however desirable for the design to keep support for `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` in mind, in order to avoid making it more difficult to add in the future.
#### For cipher: prioritize constrained devices and modern TLS
The primary target is a configuration like TF-M's medium profile, plus TLS with only AEAD ciphersuites.
This excludes things like:
- Support for encrypted PEM, PKCS5 and PKCS12 encryption, and PKCS8 encrypted keys in PK parse. (Not widely used on highly constrained devices.)
- Support for NIST-KW. (Same justification.)
- Support for CMAC. (Same justification, plus can be directly accelerated.)
- Support for CBC ciphersuites in TLS. (They've been recommended against for a while now.)
### Dual-dispatch for block cipher primitives
Considering the priorities stated above, initially we want to support GCM, CCM and CTR-DRBG. All three of them use the block cipher primitive only in the encrypt direction. Currently, GCM and CCM use the Cipher layer in order to work with AES, Aria and Camellia (DES is excluded by the standards due to its smaller block size) and CTR-DRBG directly uses the low-level API from `aes.h`. In all cases, access to the "block cipher primitive" is done by using "ECB mode" (which for both Cipher and `aes.h` only allows a single block, contrary to PSA which implements actual ECB mode).
The two AEAD modes, GCM and CCM, have very similar needs and positions in the stack, strongly suggesting using the same design for both. On the other hand, there are a number of differences between CTR-DRBG and them.
- CTR-DRBG only uses AES (and there is no plan to extend it to other block ciphers at the moment), while GCM and CCM need to work with 3 block ciphers already.
- CTR-DRBG holds a special position in the stack: most users don't care about it per se, they only care about getting random numbers - in fact PSA users don't even need to know what DRBG is used. In particular, no part of the stack is asking questions like "is CTR-DRBG-AES available?" - an RNG needs to be available and that's it - contrary to similar questions about AES-GCM etc. which are asked for example by TLS.
So, it makes sense to use different designs for CTR-DRBG on one hand, and GCM/CCM on the other hand:
- CTR-DRBG can just check if `AES_C` is present and "fall back" to PSA if not.
- GCM and CCM need an common abstraction layer that allows:
- Using AES, Aria or Camellia in a uniform way.
- Dispatching to built-in or driver.
The abstraction layer used by GCM and CCM may either be a new internal module, or a subset of the existing Cipher API, extended with the ability to dispatch to a PSA driver.
Reasons for making this layer's API a subset of the existing Cipher API:
- No need to design, implement and test a new module. (Will need to test the new subset though, as well as the extended behaviour.)
- No code change in GCM and CCM - only need to update dependencies.
- No risk for code duplication between a potential new module and Cipher: source-level, and in in particular in builds that still have `CIPHER_C` enabled. (Compiled-code duplication could be avoided by excluding the new module in such builds, though.)
- If want to support other users of Cipher later (such as NIST-KW, CMAC, PKCS5 and PKCS12), we can just extend dual-dispatch support to other modes/operations in Cipher and keep those extra modules unchanged as well.
Possible costs of re-using (a subset of) the existing Cipher API instead of defining a new one:
- We carry over costs associated with `cipher_info_t` structures. (Currently the info structure is used for 3 things: (1) to check if the cipher is supported, (2) to check its block size, (3) because `setup()` requires it).
- We carry over questionable implementation decisions, like dynamic allocation of context.
Those costs could be avoided by refactoring (parts of) Cipher, but that would probably mean either:
- significant differences in how the `cipher.h` API is implemented between builds with the full Cipher or only a subset;
- or more work to apply the simplifications to all of Cipher.
Prototyping both approaches showed better code size savings and cleaner code with a new internal module (see section "Internal "block cipher" abstraction (Cipher light)" below).
## Specification
### MD light
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/6474 implements part of this specification, but it's based on Mbed TLS 3.2, so it needs to be rewritten for 3.3.
#### Definition of MD light
MD light is a subset of `md.h` that implements the hash calculation interface described in ”[Designing an interface for hashes](#designing-an-interface-for-hashes)”. It is activated by `MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT` in `mbedtls_config.h`.
@ -378,7 +494,7 @@ int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg);
The job of this private function is to return 1 if `hash_alg` can be performed through PSA now, and 0 otherwise. It is only defined on algorithms that are enabled via PSA.
As a starting point, return 1 if PSA crypto has been initialized. This will be refined later (to return 1 if the [accelerator subsystem](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/6007) has been initialized).
As a starting point, return 1 if PSA crypto's driver subsystem has been initialized.
Usage note: for algorithms that are not enabled via PSA, calling `psa_can_do_hash` is generally safe: whether it returns 0 or 1, you can call a PSA hash function on the algorithm and it will return `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`.
@ -398,31 +514,7 @@ Note that this assumes that an operation that has been started via PSA can be co
#### Error code conversion
After calling a PSA function, call `mbedtls_md_error_from_psa` to convert its status code. This function is currently defined in `hash_info.c`.
### Migration to MD light
#### Migration of modules that used to call MD and now do the legacy-or-PSA dance
Get rid of the case where `MBEDTLS_MD_C` is undefined. Enable `MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT` in `build_info.h`.
#### Migration of modules that used to call a low-level hash module and now do the legacy-or-PSA dance
Switch to calling MD (light) unconditionally. Enable `MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT` in `build_info.h`.
#### Migration of modules that call a low-level hash module
Switch to calling MD (light). Enable `MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT` in `build_info.h`.
#### Migration of use-PSA mixed code
Instead of calling `hash_info.h` functions to obtain metadata, get it from `md.h`.
Optionally, code that currently tests on `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` just to determine whether to call MD or PSA to calculate hashes can switch to just having the MD variant.
#### Remove `legacy_or_psa.h`
It's no longer used.
After calling a PSA function, MD light calls `mbedtls_md_error_from_psa` to convert its status code.
### Support all legacy algorithms in PSA
@ -461,10 +553,6 @@ static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_of_md_info(
Work in progress on this conversion is at https://github.com/gilles-peskine-arm/mbedtls/tree/hash-unify-ids-wip-1
#### Get rid of the hash_info module
The hash_info module is redundant with MD light. Move `mbedtls_md_error_from_psa` to `md.c`, defined only when `MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA` is defined. The rest is no longer used.
#### Unify HMAC with PSA
PSA has its own HMAC implementation. In builds with both `MBEDTLS_MD_C` and `PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC` not fully provided by drivers, we should have a single implementation. Replace the one in `md.h` by calls to the PSA driver interface. This will also give mixed-domain modules access to HMAC accelerated directly by a PSA driver (eliminating the need to a HMAC interface in software if all supported hashes have an accelerator that includes HMAC support).
@ -477,3 +565,52 @@ The architecture can be extended to support `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` with a l
* Compile-time dependencies: instead of checking `defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)`, check `defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)`.
* Implementers of `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` will need to provide `psa_can_do_hash()` (or a more general function `psa_can_do`) alongside `psa_crypto_init()`. Note that at this point, it will become a public interface, hence we won't be able to change it at a whim.
### Internal "block cipher" abstraction (previously known as "Cipher light")
#### Definition
The new module is automatically enabled in `config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h` by modules that need
it (namely: CCM, GCM) only when `CIPHER_C` is not available, or the new module
is needed for PSA dispatch (see next section). Note: CCM and GCM currently
depend on the full `CIPHER_C` (enforced by `check_config.h`); this hard
dependency would be replaced by the above auto-enablement.
The following API functions are offered:
```
void mbedtls_block_cipher_init(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx);
void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx);
int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id);
int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned key_bitlen);
int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16]);
```
The only supported ciphers are AES, ARIA and Camellia. They are identified by
an `mbedtls_cipher_id_t` in the `setup()` function, because that's how they're
identifed by callers (GCM/CCM).
#### Block cipher dual dispatch
Support for dual dispatch in the new internal module `block_cipher` is extremely similar to that in MD light.
A block cipher context contains either a legacy module's context (AES, ARIA, Camellia) or a PSA key identifier; it has a field indicating which one is in use. All fields are private.
The `engine` field is almost redundant with knowledge about `type`. However, when an algorithm is available both via a legacy module and a PSA accelerator, we will choose based on the runtime availability of the accelerator when the context is set up. This choice needs to be recorded in the context structure.
Support is determined at runtime using the new internal function
```
int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg);
```
The job of this private function is to return 1 if `hash_alg` can be performed through PSA now, and 0 otherwise. It is only defined on algorithms that are enabled via PSA. As a starting point, return 1 if PSA crypto's driver subsystem has been initialized.
Each function in the module needs to know whether to dispatch via PSA or legacy. All functions consult the context's `engine` field, except `setup()` which will set it according to the key type and the return value of `psa_can_do_cipher()` as discussed above.
Note that this assumes that an operation that has been started via PSA can be completed. This implies that `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free` must not be called while an operation using PSA is in progress.
After calling a PSA function, `block_cipher` functions call `mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa` to convert its status code.

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@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Tempting platform requirements that we cannot add to the default `MBEDTLS_THREAD
If you build with `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` and `MBEDTLS_THREADING_C`, the code must be functionally correct: no race conditions, deadlocks or livelocks.
The [PSA Crypto API specification](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/overview/conventions.html#concurrent-calls) defines minimum expectations for concurrent calls. They must work as if they had been executed one at a time, except that the following cases have undefined behavior:
The [PSA Crypto API specification](https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/overview/conventions.html#concurrent-calls) defines minimum expectations for concurrent calls. They must work as if they had been executed one at a time (excluding resource-management errors), except that the following cases have undefined behavior:
* Destroying a key while it's in use.
* Concurrent calls using the same operation object. (An operation object may not be used by more than one thread at a time. But it can move from one thread to another between calls.)
@ -281,28 +281,56 @@ Note that a thread must hold the global mutex when it reads or changes a slot's
#### Slot states
For concurrency purposes, a slot can be in one of three states:
For concurrency purposes, a slot can be in one of four states:
* UNUSED: no thread is currently accessing the slot. It may be occupied by a volatile key or a cached key.
* WRITING: a thread has exclusive access to the slot. This can only happen in specific circumstances as detailed below.
* READING: any thread may read from the slot.
* EMPTY: no thread is currently accessing the slot, and no information is stored in the slot. Any thread is able to change the slot's state to FILLING and begin loading data.
* FILLING: one thread is currently loading or creating material to fill the slot, this thread is responsible for the next state transition. Other threads cannot read the contents of a slot which is in FILLING.
* FULL: the slot contains a key, and any thread is able to use the key after registering as a reader.
* PENDING_DELETION: the key within the slot has been destroyed or marked for destruction, but at least one thread is still registered as a reader. No thread can register to read this slot. The slot must not be wiped until the last reader de-registers, wiping the slot by calling `psa_wipe_key_slot`.
A high-level view of state transitions:
To change `slot` to state `new_state`, a function must call `psa_slot_state_transition(slot, new_state)`.
* `psa_get_empty_key_slot`: UNUSED → WRITING.
* `psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory`: UNUSED or READING → READING. This function only accepts slots in the UNUSED or READING state. A slot with the correct id but in the WRITING state is considered free.
* `psa_unlock_key_slot`: READING → UNUSED or READING.
* `psa_finish_key_creation`: WRITING → READING.
* `psa_fail_key_creation`: WRITING → UNUSED.
* `psa_wipe_key_slot`: any → UNUSED. If the slot is READING or WRITING on entry, this function must wait until the writer or all readers have finished. (By the way, the WRITING state is possible if `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free` is called while a key creation is in progress.) See [“Destruction of a key in use”](#destruction-of-a-key-in-use).
A counter field within each slot keeps track of how many readers have registered. Library functions must call `psa_register_read` before reading the key data within a slot, and `psa_unregister_read` after they have finished operating.
The current `state->lock_count` corresponds to the difference between UNUSED and READING: a slot is in use iff its lock count is nonzero, so `lock_count == 0` corresponds to UNUSED and `lock_count != 0` corresponds to READING.
Any call to `psa_slot_state_transition`, `psa_register_read` or `psa_unregister_read` must be performed by a thread which holds the global mutex.
There is currently no indication of when a slot is in the WRITING state. This only happens between a call to `psa_start_key_creation` and a call to one of `psa_finish_key_creation` or `psa_fail_key_creation`. This new state can be conveyed by a new boolean flag, or by setting `lock_count` to `~0`.
##### Linearizability of the system
To satisfy the requirements in [Correctness out of the box](#correctness-out-of-the-box), we require our functions to be "linearizable" (under certain constraints). This means that any (constraint satisfying) set of concurrent calls are performed as if they were executed in some sequential order.
The standard way of reasoning that this is the case is to identify a "linearization point" for each call, this is a single execution step where the function takes effect (this is usually a step in which the effects of the call become visible to other threads). If every call has a linearization point, the set of calls is equivalent to sequentially performing the calls in order of when their linearization point occurred.
We only require linearizability to hold in the case where a resource-management error is not returned. In a set of concurrent calls, it is permitted for a call c to fail with a PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY return code even if there does not exist a sequential ordering of the calls in which c returns this error. Even if such an error occurs, all calls are still required to be functionally correct.
We only access and modify a slot's state and reader count while we hold the global lock. This ensures the memory in which these fields are stored is correctly synchronized. It also ensures that the key data within the slot is synchronised where needed (the writer unlocks the mutex after filling the data, and any reader must lock the mutex before reading the data).
To help justify that our system is linearizable, here is a list of key slot state changing functions and their linearization points (for the sake of brevity not all failure cases are covered, but those cases are not complex):
* `psa_wipe_key_slot, psa_register_read, psa_unregister_read, psa_slot_state_transition,` - These functions are all always performed under the global mutex, so they have no effects visible to other threads (this implies that they are linearizable).
* `psa_get_empty_key_slot, psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory, psa_load_X_key_into_slot, psa_fail_key_creation` - These functions hold the mutex for all non-setup/finalizing code, their linearization points are the release of the mutex.
* `psa_get_and_lock_key_slot` - If the key is already in a slot, the linearization point is the linearization point of the call to `psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory`. If the key is not in a slot and is loaded into one, the linearization point is the linearization point of the call to `psa_load_X_key_into_slot`.
* `psa_start_key_creation` - From the perspective of other threads, the only effect of a successful call to this function is that the amount of usable resources decreases (a key slot which was usable is now unusable). Since we do not consider resource management as linearizable behaviour, when arguing for linearizability of the system we consider this function to have no visible effect to other threads.
* `psa_finish_key_creation` - On a successful load, we lock the mutex and set the state of the slot to FULL, the linearization point is then the following unlock. On an unsuccessful load, the linearization point is when we return - no action we have performed has been made visible to another thread as the slot is still in a FILLING state.
* `psa_destroy_key, psa_close_key, psa_purge_key` - As per the requirements, we need only argue for the case where the key is not in use here. The linearization point is the unlock after wiping the data and setting the slot state to EMPTY.
* `psa_import_key, psa_copy_key, psa_generate_key, mbedtls_psa_register_se_key` - These functions call both `psa_start_key_creation` and `psa_finish_key_creation`, the linearization point of a successful call is the linearization point of the call to `psa_finish_key_creation`. The linearization point of an unsuccessful call is the linearization point of the call to `psa_fail_key_creation`.
* `psa_key_derivation_output_key` - Same as above. If the operation object is in use by multiple threads, the behaviour need not be linearizable.
Library functions which operate on a slot will return `PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE` if the slot is in an inappropriate state for the function at the linearization point.
##### Key slot state transition diagram
![](key-slot-state-transitions.png)
In the state transition diagram above, an arrow between two states `q1` and `q2` with label `f` indicates that if the state of a slot is `q1` immediately before `f`'s linearization point, it may be `q2` immediately after `f`'s linearization point.
##### Generating the key slot state transition diagram from source
To generate the state transition diagram in https://app.diagrams.net/, open the following url:
https://viewer.diagrams.net/?tags=%7B%7D&highlight=FFFFFF&edit=_blank&layers=1&nav=1&title=key-slot-state-transitions#R5Vxbd5s4EP4t%2B%2BDH5iAJcXms4ySbrdtNT7qX9MWHgGyrxcABHNv59SsM2EhgDBhs3PVL0CANoBl9fDMaMkC3i%2FWDb3jzz65F7AGUrPUAjQYQAqBh9ieSbGKJIqFYMPOplXTaC57pO0mEUiJdUosEXMfQde2QerzQdB2HmCEnM3zfXfHdpq7NX9UzZiQneDYNOy%2F9h1rhPJZqUN3Lfyd0Nk%2BvDBQ9PrMw0s7JkwRzw3JXGRG6G6Bb33XD%2BGixviV2NHnpvMTj7g%2Bc3d2YT5ywyoDv4H08%2Ffvxj9VX3XGGw5cf3o9PHxJjvBn2MnngAVRspm9o0Td2OIsO7%2F8aj1Mx0585U9B5bgQTnxgW8YP07Ksv9he1bOcn3KSTzm6c2Zc1hqs5DcmzZ5jRmRVzsegK4cJmLcAOjcCLjT6la2LtVGUnJZmnN%2BKHZJ0RJZP0QNwFCf0N65KclbXEYDuPTdqrjP0T0Txj%2BlRmJB4322neG4UdJHapYSMACowkzphjfYy8nbVM2wgCavIT5btLx4pmaCSxFpscf%2FNvcmrbeMk2Rutsv9Emba1puBvEjl8y8v2QqJGOOGiNwF36Jjnul6Hhz0hY0k%2BO%2BxGLW8V522Zshwtsl8p8YhshfePXfpFBkys8uZQ92UHXwYrgE%2FFzJ6Oya1VUpOo3euancWplJKiNpymnduttu0k4wQFhzgGXjk9mNAiJv13seX9kBhkbr%2BxlwK9Xm86cyEeZQxCfCaJlSRnafkxOLKhlRTqGPgnou%2FG61Re5khc93PZx8XCAR4XOVb56RADYvTOSq3CwXAQM0g2UVJ2zxAd4mt%2BkaoAwxJ1OA9KNLasA%2Ft3np28v14nevQNvvXXwTmBYysAwKIXhHdxLWbiXjsB9c%2FCGFcEb9Au8ec%2FJgWxl7D7yDugYrFO6mXE4LzAmU4Pak59kMzEZXofUdfoM2ema6SNkJ5ohp1Qc3x1%2B51%2FF94%2Fj8eOXh17DMFIuDMNyldderTjnt18u0Lm4kXAVIz3dfRlt3b2inUZ347tvj39%2BuU4b9Y7PqF3RmepRZbPotTmdSdNOx%2BgM7BWdgRJ7%2BWkyVAGLJmWs8G9BLCs3KsAq1FTMGkhQX5XrAEUgTfJ5yY5WyHXYFSdk4YWbLeEJbDfsMdlJF1Qfuc5OjXwuegOKXtTt48sNbhIwxaMuGjL1K98VYYwkpRijMDjg0QBEWawUZJAmqc1QRpYElGG%2BjgSX7DoFVow0U%2BrQYH41cVW6uE7Gmg%2FM7rKu8mCDWvEpRSvUegboKaKfgi3Npf%2B2RZaYbZwv51492dMcg6rm3FGvMEhWMecwitowb4MVQZHIoQ9ADPMBY5PplizPwzes82imSlL5fUGhPzjSX9bK9LOD%2BI6bLp7RUDYBfTA9%2B50sH%2Bkz%2Fvi0rha6CVsGFQO4lNEZjjWxXfNnhtTV0GDabkCiobVGeUtm8uyo%2BtFjf9A%2FtVEb6A%2BQxntZO1k1nr5CfC7sR0X74K3QzixwVwxrMzyz2zy9XBHw%2B5WnhyrkvATjhoAPDuVWzsQpUVGsUwhDFglC392cDl%2FtQGVvIW63jFsIpmVN4aOZdBmc6L47HN5wkNc9xsmX4LfHwKs%2BTB6Eu57AE6N3mcwa0gBnbaSCorO1uaqsZpJ7CtDrXKQjHouQVn7P4l2iIzwWl%2BrvhsfmyyOup9JFbo3gsegeC47bEvh1kUgsNGT7%2BxSXxrfW6BzsFV4iIbzFTesukCpkCSvG72153HXtRZQumlYiRF3YcmqLPqVZzC4ThIWzc5ZKrspbEzwMdbg1UTUtiHsNKwpoCitCPZfSXfFtMSMprufiQsLeAkprhVwRoECekbQVj%2FG7GF0UchXb9UxV%2FcehoQkMNYcTXBFO%2BhXVwQNJ%2BNpwAgWWonRXHlrsdrDA7XJpoFzQUyN9tKIeyeXoryNvXr5Q26jQ2H0P1y6IAXQhEMuT3pwlz55TOohNfcESIXHSeMcSbbNAGpahrMs6RBoS9XLVGbAS0NRNA7GnyV4F6PxNqBK6UaG0%2B6HyJwJ6qTIA6ijDze%2Bso%2BxSPoToZXqpfK3%2Fz9JLT3S5Hk%2FhRNNmX9%2B%2B338yHccr%2FIyqHfLGlZw1%2BiSzM%2BpWtRC2X0VqSKgew2JeqDLc4iOZqvaoW6HPVWJuEQOzXcOaeMQPIlxxwi0ZY%2Ffk1q%2Ba2Gp6XVI7pM4JakrLN66DGpaiQAuIiGVQGIie6Pxnq6CAl6wAqu9Cv9gXl1VT%2F1VL9%2Fa74OmW%2Brk2T%2Fnkbu57gsolw4KiqrUde0WnLBnW3P9fj7j7%2Fr%2BjoLv%2FAA%3D%3D
#### Destruction of a key in use
Problem: In [Key destruction long-term requirements](#key-destruction-long-term-requirements) we require that the key slot is destroyed (by `psa_wipe_key_slot`) even while it's in use (READING or WRITING).
Problem: In [Key destruction long-term requirements](#key-destruction-long-term-requirements) we require that the key slot is destroyed (by `psa_wipe_key_slot`) even while it's in use (FILLING or with at least one reader).
How do we ensure that? This needs something more sophisticated than mutexes (concurrency number >2)! Even a per-slot mutex isn't enough (we'd need a reader-writer lock).
@ -310,11 +338,11 @@ Solution: after some team discussion, we've decided to rely on a new threading a
##### Mutex only
When calling `psa_wipe_key_slot` it is the callers responsibility to set the slot state to WRITING first. For most functions this is a clean UNUSED -> WRITING transition: psa_get_empty_key_slot, psa_get_and_lock_key_slot, psa_close_key, psa_purge_key.
When calling `psa_wipe_key_slot` it is the callers responsibility to set the slot state to PENDING_DELETION first. For most functions this is a clean {FULL, !has_readers} -> PENDING_DELETION transition: psa_get_empty_key_slot, psa_get_and_lock_key_slot, psa_close_key, psa_purge_key.
`psa_wipe_all_key_slots` is only called from `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free`, here we will need to return an error as we won't be able to free the key store if a key is in use without compromising the state of the secure side. This is acceptable as an untrusted application cannot call `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free` in a crypto service. In a service integration, `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free` on the client cuts the communication with the crypto service. Also, this is the current behaviour.
`psa_destroy_key` marks the slot as deleted, deletes persistent keys and opaque keys and returns. This only works if drivers are protected by a mutex (and the persistent storage as well if needed). When the last reading operation finishes, it wipes the key slot. This will free the key ID, but the slot might be still in use. In case of volatile keys freeing up the ID while the slot is still in use does not provide any benefit and we don't need to do it.
`psa_destroy_key` registers as a reader, marks the slot as deleted, deletes persistent keys and opaque keys and unregisters before returning. This will free the key ID, but the slot might be still in use. This only works if drivers are protected by a mutex (and the persistent storage as well if needed). `psa_destroy_key` transfers to PENDING_DELETION as an intermediate state. The last reading operation will wipe the key slot upon unregistering. In case of volatile keys freeing up the ID while the slot is still in use does not provide any benefit and we don't need to do it.
These are serious limitations, but this can be implemented with mutexes only and arguably satisfies the [Key destruction short-term requirements](#key-destruction-short-term-requirements).
@ -329,9 +357,9 @@ We can't reuse the `lock_count` field to mark key slots deleted, as we still nee
#### Condition variables
Clean UNUSED -> WRITING transition works as before.
Clean UNUSED -> PENDING_DELETION transition works as before.
`psa_wipe_all_key_slots` and `psa_destroy_key` mark the slot as deleted and go to sleep until the slot state becomes UNUSED. When waking up, they wipe the slot, and return.
`psa_wipe_all_key_slots` and `psa_destroy_key` mark the slot as deleted and go to sleep until the slot has no registered readers. When waking up, they wipe the slot, and return.
If the slot is already marked as deleted the threads calling `psa_wipe_all_key_slots` and `psa_destroy_key` go to sleep until the deletion completes. To satisfy [Key destruction long-term requirements](#key-destruction-long-term-requirements) none of the threads may return from the call until the slot is deleted completely. This can be achieved by signalling them when the slot has already been wiped and ready for use, that is not marked for deletion anymore. To handle spurious wake-ups, these threads need to be able to tell whether the slot was already deleted. This is not trivial, because by the time the thread wakes up, theoretically the slot might be in any state. It might have been reused and maybe even marked for deletion again.
@ -354,7 +382,7 @@ Alternatively, protecting operation contexts can be left as the responsibility o
#### Drivers
Each driver that hasn’t got the "thread_safe” property set has a dedicated mutex.
Each driver that hasn’t got the "thread_safe” property set has a dedicated mutex.
Implementing "thread_safe” drivers depends on the condition variable protection in the key store, as we must guarantee that the core never starts the destruction of a key while there are operations in progress on it.

221
docs/driver-only-builds.md
View File

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ driver.
In order to have some mechanism provided only by a driver, you'll want
the following compile-time configuration options enabled:
- `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` (enabled by default) - this enables PSA Crypto.
- `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` (disabled by default) - this makes PK, X.509 and
TLS use PSA Crypto. You need to enable this if you're using PK, X.509 or TLS
@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ mechanism through the PSA API in Mbed
TLS](proposed/psa-conditional-inclusion-c.md) for details.
In addition, for each mechanism you want provided only by your driver:
- Define the corresponding `PSA_WANT` macro in `psa/crypto_config.h` - this
means the algorithm will be available in the PSA Crypto API.
- Define the corresponding `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL` in your build. This could be
@ -52,9 +54,21 @@ Mechanisms covered
------------------
For now, only the following (families of) mechanisms are supported:
- hashes: SHA-3, SHA-2, SHA-1, MD5, etc.
- elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC): ECDH, ECDSA, EC J-PAKE, ECC key types.
- finite-field Diffie-Hellman: FFDH algorithm, DH key types.
- RSA: PKCS#1 v1.5 and v2.1 signature and encryption algorithms, RSA key types
(for now, only crypto, no X.509 or TLS support).
- AEADs:
- GCM and CCM with AES, ARIA and Camellia key types
- ChachaPoly with ChaCha20 Key type
- Unauthenticated ciphers:
- key types: AES, ARIA, Camellia, DES
- modes: ECB, CBC, CTR, CFB, OFB, XTS
For each family listed above, all the mentioned alorithms/key types are also
all the mechanisms that exist in PSA API.
Supported means that when those are provided only by drivers, everything
(including PK, X.509 and TLS if `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled) should
@ -62,18 +76,13 @@ work in the same way as if the mechanisms where built-in, except as documented
in the "Limitations" sub-sections of the sections dedicated to each family
below.
In the near future (end of 2023), we are planning to also add support for
ciphers (AES) and AEADs (GCM, CCM, ChachaPoly).
Currently (mid-2023) we don't have plans to extend this to RSA. If
you're interested in driver-only support for RSA, please let us know.
Hashes
------
It is possible to have all hash operations provided only by a driver.
More precisely:
- you can enable `PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256` without `MBEDTLS_SHA256_C`, provided
you have `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256` enabled;
- and similarly for all supported hash algorithms: `MD5`, `RIPEMD160`,
@ -92,6 +101,7 @@ considerations](#general-considerations) above.
If you want to check at compile-time whether a certain hash algorithm is
available in the present build of Mbed TLS, regardless of whether it's
provided by a driver or built-in, you should use the following macros:
- for code that uses only the PSA Crypto API: `PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx` from
`psa/crypto.h`;
- for code that uses non-PSA crypto APIs: `MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_xxx` from
@ -101,10 +111,12 @@ Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC)
---------------------------------
It is possible to have most ECC operations provided only by a driver:
- the ECDH, ECDSA and EC J-PAKE algorithms;
- key import, export, and random generation.
More precisely, if:
- you have driver support for ECC public and using private keys (that is,
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY` and
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC` are enabled), and
@ -113,6 +125,7 @@ More precisely, if:
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_xxx` macros is enabled as well);
then you can:
- enable `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH` without `MBEDTLS_ECDH_C`, provided
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH` is enabled
- enable `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA` without `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C`, provided
@ -121,6 +134,7 @@ then you can:
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE` is enabled.
In addition, if:
- none of `MBEDTLS_ECDH_C`, `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C`, `MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C` are enabled
(see conditions above), and
- you have driver support for all enabled ECC key pair operations - that is,
@ -132,9 +146,11 @@ then you can also disable `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`. However, a small subset of it might
still be included in the build, see limitations sub-section below.
In addition, if:
- `MBEDTLS_ECP_C` is fully removed (see limitation sub-section below), and
- support for RSA key types and algorithms is fully disabled, and
- support for DH key types and the FFDH algorithm is either disabled, or
- `MBEDTLS_ECP_C` is fully removed (see limitation sub-section below),
- and support for RSA key types and algorithms is either fully disabled or
fully provided by a driver,
- and support for DH key types and the FFDH algorithm is either disabled or
fully provided by a driver,
then you can also disable `MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C`.
@ -142,6 +158,7 @@ then you can also disable `MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C`.
In such builds, all crypto operations via the PSA Crypto API will work as
usual, as well as the PK, X.509 and TLS modules if `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is
enabled, with the following exceptions:
- direct calls to APIs from the disabled modules are not possible;
- PK, X.509 and TLS will not support restartable ECC operations (see
limitation sub-section below).
@ -149,6 +166,7 @@ enabled, with the following exceptions:
If you want to check at compile-time whether a certain curve is available in
the present build of Mbed TLS, regardless of whether ECC is provided by a
driver or built-in, you should use the following macros:
- for code that uses only the PSA Crypto API: `PSA_WANT_ECC_xxx` from
`psa/crypto.h`;
- for code that may also use non-PSA crypto APIs: `MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_xxx` from
@ -164,6 +182,7 @@ automatically defined when enabling `MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED`.
A limited subset of `ecp.c` will still be automatically re-enabled if any of
the following is enabled:
- `MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED` - support for parsing ECC keys where the
public part is in compressed format;
- `MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED` - support for parsing ECC keys where the
@ -237,6 +256,184 @@ The same holds for the associated algorithm:
`[PSA_WANT|MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL]_ALG_FFDH` allow builds accelerating FFDH and
removing builtin support (i.e. `MBEDTLS_DHM_C`).
### Limitations
Support for deterministic derivation of a DH keypair
(i.e. `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE`) is not supported.
RSA
---
It is possible for all RSA operations to be provided only by a driver.
More precisely, if:
- all the RSA algorithms that are enabled (`PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_*`) are also
accelerated (`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_*`),
- and all the RSA key types that are enabled (`PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_*`) are
also accelerated (`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_*`),
then you can disable `MBEDTLS_RSA_C`, `MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15` and
`MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21`, and RSA will still work in PSA Crypto.
### Limitations on RSA acceleration
Unlike other mechanisms, for now in configurations with driver-only RSA, only
PSA Crypto works. In particular, PK, X.509 and TLS will _not_ work with
driver-only RSA even if `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled.
Currently (early 2024) we don't have plans to extend this support. If you're
interested in wider driver-only support for RSA, please let us know.
Ciphers (unauthenticated and AEAD)
----------------------------------
It is possible to have all ciphers and AEAD operations provided only by a
driver. More precisely, for each desired combination of key type and
algorithm/mode you can:
- Enable desired PSA key type(s):
- `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES`,
- `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA`,
- `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA`,
- `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20`,
- `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES`.
- Enable desired PSA algorithm(s):
- Unauthenticated ciphers modes:
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING`,
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7`,
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG`,
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB`,
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR`,
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING`,
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB`,
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER`.
- AEADs:
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM`,
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM`,
- `PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305`.
- Enable `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_[KEY_TYPE_xxx|ALG_yyy]` symbol(s) which correspond
to the `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx` and `PSA_WANT_ALG_yyy` of the previous steps.
- Disable builtin support of key types:
- `MBEDTLS_AES_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_ARIA_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_DES_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C`.
and algorithms/modes:
- `MBEDTLS_CBC_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_CFB_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_CTR_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_OFB_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_XTS_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_CCM_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_GCM_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C`,
- `MBEDTLS_NULL_CIPHER`.
Once a key type and related algorithm are accelerated, all the PSA Crypto APIs
will work, as well as X.509 and TLS (with `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` enabled) but
some non-PSA APIs will be absent or have reduced functionality, see
[Restrictions](#restrictions) for details.
### Restrictions
- If an algorithm other than CCM and GCM (see
["Partial acceleration for CCM/GCM"](#partial-acceleration-for-ccmgcm) below)
is enabled but not accelerated, then all key types that can be used with it
will need to be built-in.
- If a key type is enabled but not accelerated, then all algorithms that can be
used with it will need to be built-in.
Some legacy modules can't take advantage of PSA drivers yet, and will either
need to be disabled, or have reduced features when the built-in implementations
of some ciphers are removed:
- `MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C` needs built-in AES: it must be disabled when
`MBEDTLS_AES_C` is disabled.
- `MBEDTLS_CMAC_C` needs built-in AES/DES: it must be disabled when
`MBEDTLS_AES_C` and `MBEDTLS_DES_C` are both disabled. When only one of them
is enabled, then only the corresponding cipher will be available at runtime
for use with `mbedtls_cipher_cmac_xxx`. (Note: if there is driver support for
CMAC and all compatible key types, then `PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC` can be enabled
without `MBEDTLS_CMAC_C` and CMAC will be usable with `psa_max_xxx` APIs.)
- `MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C`: the `mbedtls_cipher_xxx()` APIs will only work with
ciphers that are built-in - that is, both the underlying cipher
(eg `MBEDTLS_AES_C`) and the mode (eg `MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC` or
`MBEDTLS_GCM_C`).
- `MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C`: encryption/decryption (PBES2, PBE) will only work with
ciphers that are built-in.
- PEM decryption will only work with ciphers that are built-in.
- PK parse will only be able to parse encrypted keys using built-in ciphers.
Note that if you also disable `MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C`, there will be additional
restrictions, see [Disabling `MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C`](#disabling-mbedtls_cipher_c).
### Legacy <-> PSA matching
Note that the relationship between legacy (i.e. `MBEDTLS_xxx_C`) and PSA
(i.e. `PSA_WANT_xxx`) symbols is not always 1:1. For example:
- ECB mode is always enabled in the legacy configuration for each key type that
allows it (AES, ARIA, Camellia, DES), whereas it must be explicitly enabled
in PSA with `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING`.
- In the legacy API, `MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C` enables the ChaCha20 stream cipher, and
enabling `MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C` also enables the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD. In the
PSA API, you need to enable `PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20` for both, plus
`PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER` or `PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305` as desired.
- The legacy symbol `MBEDTLS_CCM_C` adds support for both cipher and AEAD,
whereas in PSA there are 2 different symbols: `PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG`
and `PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM`, respectively.
### Partial acceleration for CCM/GCM
[This section depends on #8598 so it might be updated while that PR progresses.]
In case legacy CCM/GCM algorithms are enabled, it is still possible to benefit
from PSA acceleration of the underlying block cipher by enabling support for
ECB mode (`PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING` + `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING`)
together with desired key type(s) (`PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_[AES|ARIA|CAMELLIA]` +
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_[AES|ARIA|CAMELLIA]`).
In such configurations it is possible to:
- Use CCM and GCM via the PSA Crypto APIs.
- Use CCM and GCM via legacy functions `mbedtls_[ccm|gcm]_xxx()` (but not the
legacy functions `mbedtls_cipher_xxx()`).
- Disable legacy key types (`MBEDTLS_[AES|ARIA|CAMELLIA]_C`) if there is no
other dependency requiring them.
ChaChaPoly has no such feature, so it requires full acceleration (key type +
algorithm) in order to work with a driver.
### CTR-DRBG
The legacy CTR-DRBG module (enabled by `MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C`) can also benefit
from PSA acceleration if both of the following conditions are met:
- The legacy AES module (`MBEDTLS_AES_C`) is not enabled and
- AES is supported on the PSA side together with ECB mode, i.e.
`PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES` + `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING`.
### Disabling `MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C`
It is possible to save code size by disabling MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C when all of the
following conditions are met:
- The application is not using the `mbedtls_cipher_` API.
- In PSA, all unauthenticated (that is, non-AEAD) ciphers are either disabled or
fully accelerated (that is, all compatible key types are accelerated too).
- Either TLS is disabled, or `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled.
- `MBEDTLS_NIST_KW` is disabled.
- `MBEDTLS_CMAC_C` is disabled. (Note: support for CMAC in PSA can be provided by
a driver.)
In such a build, everything will work as usual except for the following:
- Encryption/decryption functions from the PKCS5 and PKCS12 module will not be
available (only key derivation functions).
- Parsing of PKCS5- or PKCS12-encrypted keys in PK parse will fail.
Note: AEAD ciphers (CCM, GCM, ChachaPoly) do not have a dependency on
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C even when using the built-in implementations.
If you also have some ciphers fully accelerated and the built-ins removed, see
[Restrictions](#restrictions) for restrictions related to removing the built-ins.

1349
docs/psa-transition.md Normal file
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4
docs/redirects.yaml
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@ -7,5 +7,5 @@
# expose it.
- type: exact
from_url: /projects/api/en/latest/$rest
to_url: /projects/api/en/development/
from_url: /projects/api/en/latest/*
to_url: /projects/api/en/development/:splat

2
doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
View File

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
*/
/**
* @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.5.1 API Documentation
* @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.5.2 API Documentation
*
* This documentation describes the internal structure of Mbed TLS. It was
* automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in

2
doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
PROJECT_NAME = "Mbed TLS v3.5.1"
PROJECT_NAME = "Mbed TLS v3.5.2"
OUTPUT_DIRECTORY = ../apidoc/
FULL_PATH_NAMES = NO
OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C = YES

18
include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h
View File

@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/camellia.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
#include "psa/crypto_types.h"
#endif
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -35,8 +39,22 @@ typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */
} mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t;
/**
* Used internally to indicate whether a context uses legacy or PSA.
*
* Internal use only.
*/
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY = 0,
MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA,
} mbedtls_block_cipher_engine_t;
typedef struct {
mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
mbedtls_block_cipher_engine_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(engine);
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_key_id);
#endif
union {
unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)

21
include/mbedtls/build_info.h
View File

@ -26,16 +26,16 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 3
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 5
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 1
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 2
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03050100
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.5.1"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.5.1"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03050200
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.5.2"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.5.2"
/* Macros for build-time platform detection */
@ -62,6 +62,11 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) && \
(defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC))
#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64
#endif
/* This is defined if the architecture is Armv8-A, or higher */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A)
#if defined(__ARM_ARCH) && defined(__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE)
@ -78,6 +83,14 @@
#endif
#endif
#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \
&& !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER)
/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */
#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC
#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \
(__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__)
#endif
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE)
#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1
#endif

10
include/mbedtls/ccm.h
View File

@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h"
#endif
@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context {
#MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or
#MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or
#MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#else
mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#endif
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< Working value holding context's
state. Used for chunked data input */
@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_ccm_finish(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
/**
* \brief The CCM checkup routine.
*

23
include/mbedtls/check_config.h
View File

@ -153,7 +153,9 @@
#endif /* not all curves accelerated */
#endif /* some curve accelerated */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !(defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) && \
defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)))
#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
@ -279,15 +281,6 @@
#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
/* Helpers for hash dependencies, will be undefined at the end of the file */
/* Do SHA-256, 384, 512 to cover Entropy and TLS. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \
@ -331,13 +324,15 @@
#endif
#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && ( \
!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \
!(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA))
#error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && ( \
!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \
!(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA))
#error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif

105
include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
View File

@ -22,11 +22,18 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H
#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H
/* GCM_C and CCM_C can either depend on (in order of preference) CIPHER_C or
* BLOCK_CIPHER_C. If the former is not defined, auto-enable the latter. */
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C
/* Auto-enable CIPHER_C when any of the unauthenticated ciphers is builtin
* in PSA. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG))
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
#endif
/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT based on MBEDTLS_MD_C.
@ -165,6 +172,88 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT */
/* BLOCK_CIPHER module can dispatch to PSA when:
* - PSA is enabled and drivers have been initialized
* - desired key type is supported on the PSA side
* If the above conditions are not met, but the legacy support is enabled, then
* BLOCK_CIPHER will dynamically fallback to it.
*
* In case BLOCK_CIPHER is defined (see below) the following symbols/helpers
* can be used to define its capabilities:
* - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA: there is at least 1 key type between AES,
* ARIA and Camellia which is supported through a driver;
* - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_xxx_VIA_PSA: xxx key type is supported through a
* driver;
* - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_xxx_VIA_LEGACY: xxx key type is supported through
* a legacy module (i.e. MBEDTLS_xxx_C)
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_LEGACY
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_LEGACY
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_LEGACY
#endif
/* Helpers to state that BLOCK_CIPHER module supports AES, ARIA and/or Camellia
* block ciphers via either PSA or legacy. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_LEGACY)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_AES
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_LEGACY)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_ARIA
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_LEGACY)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_CAMELLIA
#endif
/* GCM_C and CCM_C can either depend on (in order of preference) BLOCK_CIPHER_C
* or CIPHER_C. The former is auto-enabled when:
* - CIPHER_C is not defined, which is also the legacy solution;
* - BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA because in this case BLOCK_CIPHER can take advantage
* of the driver's acceleration.
*/
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)) && \
(!defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA))
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C
#endif
/* Helpers for GCM/CCM capabilities */
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_AES))
#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_ARIA))
#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_CAMELLIA))
#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA
#endif
/* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT is auto-enabled by the following symbols:
* - MBEDTLS_ECP_C because now it consists of MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT plus functions
* for curve arithmetic. As a consequence if MBEDTLS_ECP_C is required for
@ -235,9 +324,9 @@
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
/* The PK wrappers need pk_write functions to format RSA key objects
* when they are dispatching to the PSA API. This happens under USE_PSA_CRYPTO,
* and also even without USE_PSA_CRYPTO for mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(). */
/* The PK wrappers need pk_write/pk_parse functions to format RSA key objects
* when they are dispatching to the PSA API. This happens under MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO,
* and even under just MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C in psa_crypto_rsa.c. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
#define MBEDTLS_PK_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C

14
include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h
View File

@ -692,11 +692,6 @@
#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE 1
#endif
#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM))
#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD 1
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 1
@ -709,8 +704,7 @@
#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES */
#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD)
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
#define MBEDTLS_AES_C
#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */
@ -721,8 +715,7 @@
#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */
#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD)
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */
@ -733,8 +726,7 @@
#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */
#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD)
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */

1
include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h
View File

@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \

18
include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h
View File

@ -32,7 +32,14 @@
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
/* In case AES_C is defined then it is the primary option for backward
* compatibility purposes. If that's not available, PSA is used instead */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#else
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif
#include "entropy.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
@ -150,6 +157,13 @@ extern "C" {
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + 1) / 2
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context {
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id;
psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
} mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context;
#endif
/**
* \brief The CTR_DRBG context structure.
*/
@ -175,7 +189,11 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context {
* This is the maximum number of requests
* that can be made between reseedings. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aes_ctx); /*!< The AES context. */
#else
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_ctx); /*!< The PSA context. */
#endif
/*
* Callbacks (Entropy)

2
include/mbedtls/debug.h
View File

@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
/**
* \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always
* used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the

111
include/mbedtls/ecp.h
View File

@ -1259,9 +1259,56 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng);
/** \brief Set the public key in a key pair object.
*
* \note This function does not check that the point actually
* belongs to the given group. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey()
* on \p Q before calling this function to check that.
*
* \note This function does not check that the public key matches
* the private key that is already in \p key, if any.
* To check the consistency of the resulting key pair object,
* call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() after setting both
* the public key and the private key.
*
* \param grp_id The ECP group identifier.
* \param key The key pair object. It must be initialized.
* If its group has already been set, it must match \p grp_id.
* If its group has not been set, it will be set to \p grp_id.
* If the public key has already been set, it is overwritten.
* \param Q The public key to copy. This must be a point on the
* curve indicated by \p grp_id.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p key does not
* match \p grp_id.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for
* the group is not implemented.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q);
/**
* \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key.
*
* \note This function does not set the public key in the
* key pair object. Without a public key, the key pair object
* cannot be used with operations that require the public key.
* Call mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public() to set the public
* key from the private key. Alternatively, you can call
* mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key() to set the public key part,
* and then optionally mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() to check
* that the private and public parts are consistent.
*
* \note If a public key has already been set in the key pair
* object, this function does not check that it is consistent
* with the private key. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv()
* after setting both the public key and the private key
* to make that check.
*
* \param grp_id The ECP group identifier.
* \param key The destination key.
* \param buf The buffer containing the binary representation of the
@ -1299,6 +1346,32 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
/**
* \brief This function exports an elliptic curve public key.
*
* \param key The public key.
* \param format The point format. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED.
* (For groups without these formats, this parameter is
* ignored. But it still has to be either of the above
* values.)
* \param olen The address at which to store the length of
* the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
* of length \p buflen Bytes.
* \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer
* is too small to hold the point.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format
* or the export for the given group is not implemented.
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int format, size_t *olen,
unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
/**
* \brief This function checks that the keypair objects
* \p pub and \p prv have the same group and the
@ -1323,16 +1396,48 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
/** \brief Calculate the public key from a private key in a key pair.
*
* \param key A keypair structure. It must have a private key set.
* If the public key is set, it will be overwritten.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c
* NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
*
* \return \c 0 on success. The key pair object can be used for
* operations that require the public key.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX
* error code on calculation failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
/** \brief Query the group that a key pair belongs to.
*
* \param key The key pair to query.
*
* \return The group ID for the group registered in the key pair
* object.
* This is \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if no group has been set
* in the key pair object.
*/
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key);
/**
* \brief This function exports generic key-pair parameters.
*
* Each of the output parameters can be a null pointer
* if you do not need that parameter.
*
* \param key The key pair to export from.
* \param grp Slot for exported ECP group.
* It must point to an initialized ECP group.
* It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP group.
* \param d Slot for the exported secret value.
* It must point to an initialized mpi.
* It must either be null or point to an initialized mpi.
* \param Q Slot for the exported public value.
* It must point to an initialized ECP point.
* It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP point.
*
* \return \c 0 on success,
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.

8
include/mbedtls/gcm.h
View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h"
#endif
@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ extern "C" {
* \brief The GCM context structure.
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_gcm_context {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#else
mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#endif
uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(HL)[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable low. */
uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(HH)[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable high. */

27
include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
View File

@ -2207,6 +2207,8 @@
* Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS
* signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1).
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
*
* Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT
@ -2593,6 +2595,8 @@
* library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
* library/ssl_msg.c
* library/ssl_ticket.c (unless MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled)
* Auto-enabled by: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C depending on which ciphers are enabled
* (see the documentation of that option for details).
*
* Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers.
*/
@ -2623,6 +2627,13 @@
* The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default.
* To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above.
*
* AES support can either be achived through builtin (MBEDTLS_AES_C) or PSA.
* Builtin is the default option when MBEDTLS_AES_C is defined otherwise PSA
* is used.
*
* \warning When using PSA, the user should call `psa_crypto_init()` before
* using any CTR_DRBG operation (except `mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init()`).
*
* \note AES-128 will be used if \c MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH is set.
*
* \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG,
@ -2632,7 +2643,9 @@
* Module: library/ctr_drbg.c
* Caller:
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C
* Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or
* (PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING and
* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
*
* This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator.
*/
@ -3089,7 +3102,6 @@
*
* Module: library/pkcs5.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
* Auto-enables: MBEDTLS_MD_C
*
* \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must
@ -3124,8 +3136,8 @@
* Module: library/pkcs12.c
* Caller: library/pkparse.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C and either
* MBEDTLS_MD_C or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
* Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C and either MBEDTLS_MD_C or
* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
*
* \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must
* call psa_crypto_init() before doing any PKCS12 operations.
@ -3171,11 +3183,12 @@
*
* Module: library/psa_crypto.c
*
* Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C,
* either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C,
* Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C,
* or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C,
* or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG.
*
* Auto-enables: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C if any unauthenticated (ie, non-AEAD) cipher
* is enabled in PSA (unless it's fully accelerated, see
* docs/driver-only-builds.md about that).
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C

4
include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h
View File

@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *
* \param client_ctx Will contain the connected client socket
* \param client_ip Will contain the client IP address, can be NULL
* \param buf_size Size of the client_ip buffer
* \param ip_len Will receive the size of the client IP written,
* \param cip_len Will receive the size of the client IP written,
* can be NULL if client_ip is null
*
* \return 0 if successful, or
@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *
*/
int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx,
mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx,
void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len);
void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *cip_len);
/**
* \brief Check and wait for the context to be ready for read/write

2
include/mbedtls/oid.h
View File

@ -698,7 +698,6 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const char **oid, size_t
* \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
*/
int mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
/**
@ -714,6 +713,7 @@ int mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_cipher_type_
int mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg,
mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}

17
include/mbedtls/pk.h
View File

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif
@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context {
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); /**< Underlying public key context */
/* The following field is used to store the ID of a private key in the
* following cases:
* - opaque key when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined
* - opaque key when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is defined
* - normal key when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined. In this case:
* - the pk_ctx above is not not used to store the private key anymore.
* Actually that field not populated at all in this case because also
@ -239,15 +239,10 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context {
*
* Note: this private key storing solution only affects EC keys, not the
* other ones. The latters still use the pk_ctx to store their own
* context.
*
* Note: this priv_id is guarded by MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and not by
* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA (as the public counterpart below) because,
* when working with opaque keys, it can be used also in
* mbedtls_pk_sign_ext for RSA keys. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
* context. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(priv_id); /**< Key ID for opaque keys */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/* The following fields are meant for storing the public key in raw format
* which is handy for:
* - easily importing it into the PSA context
@ -615,7 +610,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
/**
* \brief Make signature given a signature type.
*
@ -652,7 +646,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type,
unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
/**
* \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_sign()

8
include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h
View File

@ -31,14 +31,14 @@
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV 2 /**< initialization vector */
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY 3 /**< integrity / MAC key */
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT 0
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT 1
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/**
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
/**
* \brief The PKCS#12 derivation function uses a password and a salt

9
include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h
View File

@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
@ -30,14 +31,14 @@
/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x2e00
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT 0
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT 1
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT
#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/**
@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C*/
/**
* \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC without using the HMAC context

78
include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
View File

@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
/* Expose whatever RNG the PSA subsystem uses to applications using the
@ -100,5 +102,81 @@ extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state;
#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) */
/** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions
* @{
*/
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
#include <mbedtls/ecp.h>
/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA.
*
* \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier
* (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`).
* \param[out] bits On success the bit size of the curve; 0 on failure.
*
* \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function
* returns the proper PSA curve identifier
* (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). This holds even if the curve is
* not supported by the ECP module.
* \return \c 0 if the curve is not supported in the PSA API.
*/
psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid,
size_t *bits);
/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS.
*
* \param family A PSA elliptic curve family identifier
* (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`).
* \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve.
*
* \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function
* returns the corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve
* identifier (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if the combination of \c curve
* and \p bits is not supported.
*/
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family,
size_t bits);
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
/**
* \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier
* associated with the given digest type.
*
* \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE.
*
* \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will
* not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm.
*
* \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is
* supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
*
* \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type,
* regardless of whether it is supported or not.
*/
static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type)
{
return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type;
}
/**
* \brief This function returns the given digest type
* associated with the PSA algorithm identifier.
*
* \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for.
*
* \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is
* supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
*
* \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg,
* regardless of whether it is supported or not.
*/
static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg)
{
return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK);
}
/**@}*/
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */

2
include/mbedtls/rsa.h
View File

@ -878,6 +878,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash,
unsigned char *sig);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
/**
* \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature
* operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN).
@ -978,6 +979,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash,
unsigned char *sig);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
/**
* \brief This function performs a public RSA operation and checks

21
include/mbedtls/ssl.h
View File

@ -447,7 +447,7 @@
/*
* TLS 1.3 signature algorithms
* RFC 8446, Section 4.2.2
* RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3
*/
/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
@ -687,7 +687,6 @@ typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED,
MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP,
MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
@ -1189,6 +1188,11 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_session {
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
/*!< RecordSizeLimit received from the peer */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)
uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(record_size_limit);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(exported);
/** TLS version negotiated in the session. Used if and when renegotiating
@ -3752,6 +3756,8 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
* used for certificate signature are controlled by the
* verification profile, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile().
*
* \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs().
*
* \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
* (preferred hash first).
*
@ -3776,13 +3782,16 @@ void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/**
* \brief Configure allowed signature algorithms for use in TLS 1.3
* \brief Configure allowed signature algorithms for use in TLS
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
* \param sig_algs List of allowed IANA values for TLS 1.3 signature algorithms,
* terminated by \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE. The list must remain
* available throughout the lifetime of the conf object. Supported
* values are available as \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_XXXX
* terminated by #MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE. The list must remain
* available throughout the lifetime of the conf object.
* - For TLS 1.3, values of \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_XXXX should be
* used.
* - For TLS 1.2, values should be given as
* "(HashAlgorithm << 8) | SignatureAlgorithm".
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const uint16_t *sig_algs);

14
include/mbedtls/threading.h
View File

@ -100,6 +100,20 @@ extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex;
extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
/*
* A mutex used to make the PSA subsystem thread safe.
*
* key_slot_mutex protects the registered_readers and
* state variable for all key slots in &global_data.key_slots.
*
* This mutex must be held when any read from or write to a state or
* registered_readers field is performed, i.e. when calling functions:
* psa_key_slot_state_transition(), psa_register_read(), psa_unregister_read(),
* psa_key_slot_has_readers() and psa_wipe_key_slot(). */
extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
#ifdef __cplusplus

4
include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h
View File

@ -25,8 +25,12 @@
#include <psa/crypto_driver_common.h>
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
#endif
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
/*

85
include/psa/crypto_extra.h
View File

@ -428,6 +428,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed,
* of psa_set_key_type() when you need to specify domain parameters.
*
* The format for the required domain parameters varies based on the key type.
* Mbed TLS supports the following key type with domain parameters:
*
* - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR),
* the domain parameter data consists of the public exponent,
@ -437,32 +438,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed,
* key data and the exponent recorded in the attribute structure is ignored.
* As an exception, the public exponent 65537 is represented by an empty
* byte string.
* - For DSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY or #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR),
* the `Dss-Params` format as defined by RFC 3279 &sect;2.3.2.
* ```
* Dss-Params ::= SEQUENCE {
* p INTEGER,
* q INTEGER,
* g INTEGER
* }
* ```
* - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange keys
* (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM) or
* #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(#PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM)), the
* `DomainParameters` format as defined by RFC 3279 &sect;2.3.3.
* ```
* DomainParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
* p INTEGER, -- odd prime, p=jq +1
* g INTEGER, -- generator, g
* q INTEGER, -- factor of p-1
* j INTEGER OPTIONAL, -- subgroup factor
* validationParams ValidationParams OPTIONAL
* }
* ValidationParams ::= SEQUENCE {
* seed BIT STRING,
* pgenCounter INTEGER
* }
* ```
*
* \note This function may allocate memory or other resources.
* Once you have called this function on an attribute structure,
@ -471,6 +446,9 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed,
* \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change
* in future versions of the library.
*
* \note Due to an implementation limitation, domain parameters are ignored
* for keys that are managed by a driver.
*
* \param[in,out] attributes Attribute structure where the specified domain
* parameters will be stored.
* If this function fails, the content of
@ -486,10 +464,13 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed,
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
*/
#if !defined(PSA_SET_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS)
#define PSA_SET_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS
psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
psa_key_type_t type,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length);
#endif /* PSA_SET_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS */
/**
* \brief Get domain parameters for a key.
@ -501,6 +482,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
* \note This is an experimental extension to the interface. It may change
* in future versions of the library.
*
* \note Due to an implementation limitation, domain parameters are not
* supported with keys that are managed by a driver.
*
* \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query.
* \param[out] data On success, the key domain parameters.
* \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
@ -513,6 +497,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
* The key is managed by a driver.
*/
psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
@ -557,53 +543,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters(
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions
* @{
*/
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
#include <mbedtls/ecp.h>
/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA.
*
* \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of
* Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice.
*
* \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier
* (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`).
* \param[out] bits On success, the bit size of the curve.
*
* \return The corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier
* (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`).
* \return \c 0 on failure (\p grpid is not recognized).
*/
psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid,
size_t *bits);
/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS.
*
* \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of
* Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice.
*
* \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier
* (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`).
* \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve.
* \param bits_is_sloppy If true, \p bits may be the bit-length rounded up
* to the nearest multiple of 8. This allows the caller
* to infer the exact curve from the length of a key
* which is supplied as a byte string.
*
* \return The corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier
* (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \c curve is not recognized.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \p bits is not
* correct for \p curve.
*/
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve,
size_t bits,
int bits_is_sloppy);
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
/**@}*/
/** \defgroup psa_external_rng External random generator
* @{

15
include/psa/crypto_struct.h
View File

@ -254,6 +254,18 @@ struct psa_key_attributes_s {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
psa_key_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
/* Unlike normal buffers, there are three cases for domain_parameters
* and domain_parameters_size:
* - domain_parameters_size == SIZE_MAX && domain_parameters == NULL:
* Access to domain parameters is not supported for this key.
* This is a hack which should not exist, intended for keys managed
* by a driver, because drivers don't support domain parameters.
* - domain_parameters_size == 0 && domain_parameters == NULL:
* The domain parameters are empty.
* - domain_parameters_size > 0 &&
* domain_parameters == valid pointer to domain_parameters_size bytes:
* The domain parameters are non-empty.
*/
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters);
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters_size);
};
@ -356,10 +368,13 @@ static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm(
/* This function is declared in crypto_extra.h, which comes after this
* header file, but we need the function here, so repeat the declaration. */
#if !defined(PSA_SET_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS)
#define PSA_SET_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS
psa_status_t psa_set_key_domain_parameters(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
psa_key_type_t type,
const uint8_t *data,
size_t data_length);
#endif /* PSA_SET_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS */
static inline void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
psa_key_type_t type)

24
include/psa/crypto_values.h
View File

@ -279,6 +279,11 @@
* to read from a resource. */
#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143)
/** This can be returned if a function can no longer operate correctly.
* For example, if an essential initialization operation failed or
* a mutex operation failed. */
#define PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-144)
/** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`.
*/
#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136)
@ -594,19 +599,23 @@
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note For secp224k1, the bit-size is 225 (size of a private value).
*
* \note Mbed TLS only supports secp192k1 and secp256k1.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17)
/** SEC random curves over prime fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* secp192k1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1.
* secp192r1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1.
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12)
/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete) */
/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete, not supported in Mbed TLS) */
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b)
/** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields.
@ -616,6 +625,8 @@
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27)
@ -626,6 +637,8 @@
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22)
@ -636,6 +649,8 @@
* It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b)
@ -645,6 +660,9 @@
* brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1,
* brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1.
* It is defined in RFC 5639.
*
* \note Mbed TLS only supports the 256-bit, 384-bit and 512-bit curves
* in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30)
@ -673,6 +691,8 @@
* - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent
* to Curve448.
* Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support Edwards curves yet.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42)

6
library/CMakeLists.txt
View File

@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.1 SOVERSION 15)
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.2 SOVERSION 15)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
if(TARGET ${everest_target})
@ -309,11 +309,11 @@ if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
endif()
add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509})
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.1 SOVERSION 6)
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.2 SOVERSION 6)
target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target})
add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls})
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.1 SOVERSION 20)
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.2 SOVERSION 20)
target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target})
endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)

35
library/aes.c
View File

@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#endif
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "ctr.h"
/*
* This is a convenience shorthand macro to check if we need reverse S-box and
@ -1441,36 +1442,38 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output)
{
int c, i;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
n = *nc_off;
size_t offset = *nc_off;
if (n > 0x0F) {
if (offset > 0x0F) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
while (length--) {
if (n == 0) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < length;) {
size_t n = 16;
if (offset == 0) {
ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block);
if (ret != 0) {
goto exit;
}
for (i = 16; i > 0; i--) {
if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) {
break;
}
}
mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(nonce_counter);
} else {
n -= offset;
}
c = *input++;
*output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]);
n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
if (n > (length - i)) {
n = (length - i);
}
mbedtls_xor(&output[i], &input[i], &stream_block[offset], n);
// offset might be non-zero for the last block, but in that case, we don't use it again
offset = 0;
i += n;
}
*nc_off = n;
// capture offset for future resumption
*nc_off = (*nc_off + length) % 16;
ret = 0;
exit:

12
library/aesce.c
View File

@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
* By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without
* requiring -march on the command line.
*
* `arm_neon.h` could be included by any header file, so we put these defines
* `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines
* at the top of this file, before any includes.
*/
#define __ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO 1
@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
#include "aesce.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(__ARM_NEON)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE)
/* Compiler version checks. */
#if defined(__clang__)
@ -76,12 +76,6 @@
# endif
#endif
#ifdef __ARM_NEON
#include <arm_neon.h>
#else
#error "Target does not support NEON instructions"
#endif
#if !(defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) || defined(__ARM_FEATURE_AES)) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG)
# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION)
@ -619,6 +613,6 @@ void mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16],
#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C */

13
library/aesce.h
View File

@ -15,12 +15,18 @@
#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_H
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(__ARM_NEON)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) \
&& defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) \
&& (defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) || defined(__clang__) || defined(MSC_VER))
/* MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE is defined if we have a suitable target platform, and a
* potentially suitable compiler (compiler version & flags are not checked when defining
* this). */
#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE
#ifdef __cplusplus
@ -121,9 +127,10 @@ int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk,
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A)
#error "AES hardware acceleration not supported on this platform"
#error "AES hardware acceleration not supported on this platform / compiler"
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C && MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A && __ARM_NEON */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C && MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A && MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS &&
(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC || __clang__ || MSC_VER) */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_H */

2
library/aesni.c
View File

@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
#pragma GCC push_options
#pragma GCC target ("pclmul,sse2,aes")
#define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA
#elif defined(__clang__)
#elif defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 5)
#pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("pclmul,sse2,aes"))), apply_to=function)
#define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA
#endif

156
library/alignment.h
View File

@ -23,15 +23,66 @@
* efficient when this is not defined.
*/
#if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED) \
|| defined(__i386__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__)
|| defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) \
|| defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64)
/*
* __ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED is defined where appropriate by armcc, gcc 7, clang 9
* (and later versions) for Arm v7 and later; all x86 platforms should have
* efficient unaligned access.
*
* https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/arm64-windows-abi-conventions?view=msvc-170#alignment
* specifies that on Windows-on-Arm64, unaligned access is safe (except for uncached
* device memory).
*/
#define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
#endif
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) \
|| defined(__ICCRX__) || defined(__ICCRL78__) || defined(__ICCRISCV__))
#pragma language=save
#pragma language=extended
#define MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA
/* IAR recommend this technique for accessing unaligned data in
* https://www.iar.com/knowledge/support/technical-notes/compiler/accessing-unaligned-data
* This results in a single load / store instruction (if unaligned access is supported).
* According to that document, this is only supported on certain architectures.
*/
#define UINT_UNALIGNED
typedef uint16_t __packed mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t;
typedef uint32_t __packed mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t;
typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t;
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 40504) && \
((MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 90300) || (!defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)))
/*
* Old versions of gcc, depending on how the target is specified, may generate a branch to memcpy
* for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than generating some LDR or LDRB instructions
* (similar for stores).
* Recent versions where unaligned access is not enabled also do this.
*
* For performance (and code size, in some cases), we want to avoid the branch and just generate
* some inline load/store instructions since the access is small and constant-size.
*
* The manual states:
* "The aligned attribute specifies a minimum alignment for the variable or structure field,
* measured in bytes."
* https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Variable-Attributes.html
*
* Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 9.3.0
* We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested.
*/
#define UINT_UNALIGNED
typedef uint16_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t;
typedef uint32_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t;
typedef uint64_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t;
#endif
/*
* We try to force mbedtls_(get|put)_unaligned_uintXX to be always inline, because this results
* in code that is both smaller and faster. IAR and gcc both benefit from this when optimising
* for size.
*/
/**
* Read the unsigned 16 bits integer from the given address, which need not
* be aligned.
@ -39,10 +90,20 @@
* \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data
* \return Data at the given address
*/
inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p)
{
uint16_t r;
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p;
r = *p16;
#else
memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r));
#endif
return r;
}
@ -53,9 +114,19 @@ inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p)
* \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data
* \param x data to write
*/
inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x)
{
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p;
*p16 = x;
#else
memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x));
#endif
}
/**
@ -65,10 +136,20 @@ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x)
* \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data
* \return Data at the given address
*/
inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p)
{
uint32_t r;
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p;
r = *p32;
#else
memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r));
#endif
return r;
}
@ -79,9 +160,19 @@ inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p)
* \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data
* \param x data to write
*/
inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x)
{
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p;
*p32 = x;
#else
memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x));
#endif
}
/**
@ -91,10 +182,20 @@ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x)
* \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data
* \return Data at the given address
*/
inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p)
{
uint64_t r;
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p;
r = *p64;
#else
memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r));
#endif
return r;
}
@ -105,11 +206,25 @@ inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p)
* \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data
* \param x data to write
*/
inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x)
{
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p;
*p64 = x;
#else
memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x));
#endif
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA)
#pragma language=restore
#endif
/** Byte Reading Macros
*
* Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th
@ -175,6 +290,16 @@ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x)
#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev
#endif
/* Detect IAR built-in byteswap routine */
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#if defined(__ARM_ACLE)
#include <arm_acle.h>
#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(x) ((uint16_t) __rev16((uint32_t) (x)))
#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev
#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __revll
#endif
#endif
/*
* Where compiler built-ins are not present, fall back to C code that the
* compiler may be able to detect and transform into the relevant bswap or
@ -219,10 +344,25 @@ static inline uint64_t mbedtls_bswap64(uint64_t x)
#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) */
#if !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__)
#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
/* IAR defines __xxx_ENDIAN__, but not __BYTE_ORDER__ */
#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 0
#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__)
#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1
#else
static const uint16_t mbedtls_byte_order_detector = { 0x100 };
#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN (*((unsigned char *) (&mbedtls_byte_order_detector)) == 0x01)
#endif
#else
#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN ((__BYTE_ORDER__) == (__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__))
#if (__BYTE_ORDER__) == (__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__)
#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1
#else
#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 0
#endif
#endif /* !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) */
/**

3
library/bignum.c
View File

@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X,
* about whether the assignment was made or not.
* (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.)
*/
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_ARM64) && (_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103)
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) && \
(_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103)
/*
* MSVC miscompiles this function if it's inlined prior to Visual Studio 2022 version 17.1. See:
* https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/t/c-compiler-miscompiles-part-of-mbedtls-library-on/1646989

101
library/block_cipher.c
View File

@ -11,12 +11,52 @@
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#endif
#include "block_cipher_internal.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
static psa_key_type_t psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t cipher_id)
{
switch (cipher_id) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
return PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
return PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA;
#endif
default:
return PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
}
}
static int mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status)
{
return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_cipher_errors,
psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */
void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) {
psa_destroy_key(ctx->psa_key_id);
return;
}
#endif
switch (ctx->id) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
@ -42,26 +82,39 @@ void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx)
int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id)
{
switch (cipher_id) {
ctx->id = (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES :
(cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA :
(cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA :
MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
psa_key_type_t psa_key_type = psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id);
if (psa_key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE &&
psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)) {
ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA;
return 0;
}
ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY;
#endif
switch (ctx->id) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:
ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES;
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->ctx.aes);
return 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA;
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
mbedtls_aria_init(&ctx->ctx.aria);
return 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA;
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
mbedtls_camellia_init(&ctx->ctx.camellia);
return 0;
#endif
default:
ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE;
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
}
@ -70,6 +123,26 @@ int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned key_bitlen)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) {
psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_status_t status;
psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id));
psa_set_key_bits(&key_attr, key_bitlen);
psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING);
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT);
status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bitlen), &ctx->psa_key_id);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status);
}
psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */
switch (ctx->id) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
@ -92,6 +165,20 @@ int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16])
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) {
psa_status_t status;
size_t olen;
status = psa_cipher_encrypt(ctx->psa_key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING,
input, 16, output, 16, &olen);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status);
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */
switch (ctx->id) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:

70
library/ccm.c
View File

@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
#include "block_cipher_internal.h"
#endif
@ -56,7 +56,17 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
#else
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits,
@ -79,19 +89,9 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
#else
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
#endif
return 0;
return ret;
}
/*
@ -102,10 +102,10 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
if (ctx == NULL) {
return;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
#else
mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
#endif
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context));
}
@ -128,11 +128,11 @@ static int mbedtls_ccm_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char tmp_buf[16] = { 0 };
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, tmp_buf);
#else
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, 16, tmp_buf, &olen);
#else
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, tmp_buf);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
size_t len_left;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
size_t olen;
#endif
@ -206,10 +206,10 @@ static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
}
/* Start CBC-MAC with first block*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
#else
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t use_len, offset;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
size_t olen;
#endif
@ -334,10 +334,10 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
add += use_len;
if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->add_len) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
#else
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
size_t use_len, offset;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
size_t olen;
#endif
@ -403,10 +403,10 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, input, use_len);
if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
#else
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
@ -438,10 +438,10 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
memcpy(output, local_output, use_len);
if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
#else
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
/*
* Examples 1 to 3 from SP800-38C Appendix C
*/

16
library/cipher_wrap.c
View File

@ -114,7 +114,9 @@ enum mbedtls_cipher_base_index {
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_PREVENT_EMPTY_ENUM
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C))
/* shared by all GCM ciphers */
static void *gcm_ctx_alloc(void)
{
@ -134,7 +136,9 @@ static void gcm_ctx_free(void *ctx)
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C))
/* shared by all CCM ciphers */
static void *ccm_ctx_alloc(void)
{
@ -562,14 +566,14 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_xts_info = {
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
static int gcm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_bitlen)
{
return mbedtls_gcm_setkey((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
key, key_bitlen);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aes_info = {
@ -646,14 +650,14 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_gcm_info = {
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
static int ccm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_bitlen)
{
return mbedtls_ccm_setkey((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
key, key_bitlen);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aes_info = {

20
library/cmac.c
View File

@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "constant_time_internal.h"
#include <string.h>
@ -57,7 +58,7 @@ static int cmac_multiply_by_u(unsigned char *output,
{
const unsigned char R_128 = 0x87;
const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B;
unsigned char R_n, mask;
unsigned char R_n;
unsigned char overflow = 0x00;
int i;
@ -74,21 +75,8 @@ static int cmac_multiply_by_u(unsigned char *output,
overflow = input[i] >> 7;
}
/* mask = ( input[0] >> 7 ) ? 0xff : 0x00
* using bit operations to avoid branches */
/* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
* well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( push )
#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
#endif
mask = -(input[0] >> 7);
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#pragma warning( pop )
#endif
output[blocksize - 1] ^= R_n & mask;
R_n = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0] >> 7), R_n);
output[blocksize - 1] ^= R_n;
return 0;
}

92
library/common.h
View File

@ -21,15 +21,10 @@
#if defined(__ARM_NEON)
#include <arm_neon.h>
#endif /* __ARM_NEON */
#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \
&& !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER)
/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */
#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC
#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \
(__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__)
#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64)
#include <arm64_neon.h>
#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS
#endif
/** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests.
@ -163,6 +158,12 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const(
return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n;
}
/* Always inline mbedtls_xor() for similar reasons as mbedtls_xor_no_simd(). */
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
/**
* Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that
* r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n
@ -173,31 +174,61 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const(
* \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
* \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
* \param n Number of bytes to process.
*
* \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or
* mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent).
* If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in
* AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar
* registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where
* the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster.
* For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same.
*/
inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned char *b, size_t n)
static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r,
const unsigned char *a,
const unsigned char *b,
size_t n)
{
size_t i = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
#if defined(__ARM_NEON) && \
(!defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 70300))
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) && \
(!(defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 70300))
/* Old GCC versions generate a warning here, so disable the NEON path for these compilers */
for (; (i + 16) <= n; i += 16) {
uint8x16_t v1 = vld1q_u8(a + i);
uint8x16_t v2 = vld1q_u8(b + i);
uint8x16_t x = veorq_u8(v1, v2);
vst1q_u8(r + i, x);
}
#elif defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__aarch64__)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
/* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case
* where n is a constant multiple of 16.
* For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time
* constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */
if (n % 16 == 0) {
return;
}
#endif
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64)
/* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */
for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) {
uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i);
mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x);
}
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
if (n % 8 == 0) {
return;
}
#endif
#else
for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) {
uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i);
mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x);
}
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
if (n % 4 == 0) {
return;
}
#endif
#endif
#endif
for (; i < n; i++) {
@ -205,11 +236,18 @@ inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned
}
}
/* Always inline mbedtls_xor_no_simd() as we see significant perf regressions when it does not get
* inlined (e.g., observed about 3x perf difference in gcm_mult_largetable with gcc 7 - 12) */
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
/**
* Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that
* r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n
*
* In some situations, this can perform better than mbedtls_xor (e.g., it's about 5%
* In some situations, this can perform better than mbedtls_xor() (e.g., it's about 5%
* better in AES-CBC).
*
* \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r
@ -218,6 +256,14 @@ inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned
* \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
* \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
* \param n Number of bytes to process.
*
* \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or
* mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent).
* If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in
* AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar
* registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where
* the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster.
* For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same.
*/
static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r,
const unsigned char *a,
@ -226,17 +272,31 @@ static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r,
{
size_t i = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
#if defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__aarch64__)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64)
/* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */
for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) {
uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i);
mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x);
}
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
/* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case
* where n is a constant multiple of 8.
* For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time
* constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */
if (n % 8 == 0) {
return;
}
#endif
#else
for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) {
uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i);
mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x);
}
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
if (n % 4 == 0) {
return;
}
#endif
#endif
#endif
for (; i < n; i++) {

13
library/constant_time.c
View File

@ -21,19 +21,6 @@
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many
* arguments in each translating place. */
static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status)
{
return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_ssl_errors,
ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_ssl_errors),
psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
}
#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status)
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM)
/*
* Define an object with the value zero, such that the compiler cannot prove that it

35
library/ctr.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
/**
* \file ctr.h
*
* \brief This file contains common functionality for counter algorithms.
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_H
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_H
#include "common.h"
/**
* \brief Increment a big-endian 16-byte value.
* This is quite performance-sensitive for AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG.
*
* \param n A 16-byte value to be incremented.
*/
static inline void mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(uint8_t n[16])
{
// The 32-bit version seems to perform about the same as a 64-bit version
// on 64-bit architectures, so no need to define a 64-bit version.
for (int i = 3;; i--) {
uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(n, i << 2);
x += 1;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, n, i << 2);
if (x != 0 || i == 0) {
break;
}
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_H */

191
library/ctr_drbg.c
View File

@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
#include "ctr.h"
#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
@ -24,15 +25,60 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#endif
/* Using error translation functions from PSA to MbedTLS */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#endif
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
static psa_status_t ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx,
unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
{
psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_status_t status;
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT);
psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING);
psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES);
status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, key_len, &psa_ctx->key_id);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto exit;
}
status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&psa_ctx->operation, psa_ctx->key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto exit;
}
exit:
psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
return status;
}
static void ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx)
{
psa_cipher_abort(&psa_ctx->operation);
psa_destroy_key(psa_ctx->key_id);
psa_ctx->operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
psa_ctx->key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
}
#endif
/*
* CTR_DRBG context initialization
*/
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx)
{
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context));
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->aes_ctx);
#else
ctx->psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
ctx->psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
#endif
/* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly.
* See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */
ctx->reseed_counter = -1;
@ -56,7 +102,11 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx)
mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex);
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->aes_ctx);
#else
ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx);
#endif
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context));
ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
ctx->reseed_counter = -1;
@ -117,8 +167,17 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE];
unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
unsigned char *p, *iv;
mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx;
int ret = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx;
#else
psa_status_t status;
size_t tmp_len;
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context psa_ctx;
psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
#endif
int i, j;
size_t buf_len, use_len;
@ -129,7 +188,6 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16);
mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx);
/*
* Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer
@ -151,10 +209,20 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
key[i] = i;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx);
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, key,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
#else
status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, key, sizeof(key));
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
goto exit;
}
#endif
/*
* Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data
@ -170,10 +238,19 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
use_len -= (use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) ?
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
chain, chain)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
#else
status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE,
chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
goto exit;
}
#endif
}
memcpy(tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE);
@ -187,23 +264,46 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
/*
* Do final encryption with reduced data
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, tmp,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
#else
ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx);
status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
goto exit;
}
#endif
iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE;
p = output;
for (j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
iv, iv)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
#else
status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE,
iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
goto exit;
}
#endif
memcpy(p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE);
p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
}
exit:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes_ctx);
#else
ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx);
#endif
/*
* tidy up the stack
*/
@ -234,8 +334,12 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
{
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
unsigned char *p = tmp;
int i, j;
int j;
int ret = 0;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
psa_status_t status;
size_t tmp_len;
#endif
memset(tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
@ -243,34 +347,47 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
/*
* Increase counter
*/
for (i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) {
if (++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0) {
break;
}
}
mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter);
/*
* Crypt counter block
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
ctx->counter, p)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
#else
status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter),
p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
goto exit;
}
#endif
p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
}
for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++) {
tmp[i] ^= data[i];
}
mbedtls_xor(tmp, tmp, data, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
/*
* Update key and counter
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, tmp,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
#else
ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx);
status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
goto exit;
}
#endif
memcpy(ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE);
@ -447,10 +564,20 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
good_nonce_len(ctx->entropy_len));
/* Initialize with an empty key. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, key,
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
#else
psa_status_t status;
status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
return status;
}
#endif
/* Do the initial seeding. */
if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal(ctx, custom, len,
@ -485,10 +612,11 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
{
int ret = 0;
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng;
unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
unsigned char *p = output;
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
int i;
struct {
unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
} locals;
size_t use_len;
if (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) {
@ -499,7 +627,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
}
memset(add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
memset(locals.add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
if (ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ||
ctx->prediction_resistance) {
@ -510,51 +638,58 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
}
if (add_len > 0) {
if ((ret = block_cipher_df(add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) {
if ((ret = block_cipher_df(locals.add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) {
if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
}
while (output_len > 0) {
/*
* Increase counter
* Increase counter (treat it as a 128-bit big-endian integer).
*/
for (i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) {
if (++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0) {
break;
}
}
mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter);
/*
* Crypt counter block
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
ctx->counter, tmp)) != 0) {
ctx->counter, locals.tmp)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
#else
psa_status_t status;
size_t tmp_len;
status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter),
locals.tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
goto exit;
}
#endif
use_len = (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE)
? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len;
/*
* Copy random block to destination
*/
memcpy(p, tmp, use_len);
memcpy(p, locals.tmp, use_len);
p += use_len;
output_len -= use_len;
}
if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) {
if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
ctx->reseed_counter++;
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(add_input, sizeof(add_input));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&locals, sizeof(locals));
return ret;
}

69
library/ecp.c
View File

@ -1074,13 +1074,7 @@ cleanup:
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi((N), (N), &grp->P)); \
} while (0)
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \
!(defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT))) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED) && \
!(defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT)))
MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED
static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *X,
const mbedtls_mpi *A,
@ -1092,7 +1086,6 @@ static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
cleanup:
return ret;
}
#endif /* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */
/*
* Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int.
@ -1115,6 +1108,7 @@ cleanup:
return ret;
}
MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED
static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *X,
const mbedtls_mpi *A,
@ -1128,6 +1122,7 @@ cleanup:
return ret;
}
MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED
static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *X,
const mbedtls_mpi *A,
@ -1144,10 +1139,7 @@ cleanup:
#define MPI_ECP_SUB_INT(X, A, c) \
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int_mod(grp, X, A, c))
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED) && \
!(defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT))
MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED
static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *X,
size_t count)
@ -1158,8 +1150,6 @@ static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
cleanup:
return ret;
}
#endif \
/* All functions referencing mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod() are alt-implemented without fallback */
/*
* Macro wrappers around ECP modular arithmetic
@ -3208,6 +3198,25 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
/* Group not set yet */
if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
} else if (key->grp.id != grp_id) {
/* Group mismatch */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
return mbedtls_ecp_copy(&key->Q, Q);
}
#define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32
#define ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE 56
/*
@ -3324,6 +3333,18 @@ cleanup:
return ret;
}
/*
* Write a public key.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int format, size_t *olen,
unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
return mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&key->grp, &key->Q,
format, olen, buf, buflen);
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
/*
* Check a public-private key pair
@ -3365,8 +3386,22 @@ cleanup:
return ret;
}
int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng)
{
return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&key->grp, &key->Q, &key->d, &key->grp.G,
f_rng, p_rng);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key)
{
return key->grp.id;
}
/*
* Export generic key-pair parameters.
*/
@ -3375,15 +3410,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_export(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(grp, &key->grp)) != 0) {
if (grp != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(grp, &key->grp)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(d, &key->d)) != 0) {
if (d != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(d, &key->d)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(Q, &key->Q)) != 0) {
if (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(Q, &key->Q)) != 0) {
return ret;
}

2
library/entropy_poll.c
View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \
!defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \
!defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__)
!defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) && !defined(__MVS__)
#error \
"Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in mbedtls_config.h"
#endif

61
library/gcm.c
View File

@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
#include "block_cipher_internal.h"
#endif
@ -66,11 +66,11 @@ static int gcm_gen_table(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx)
memset(h, 0, 16);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, h, h);
#else
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen);
#else
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, h, h);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
@ -139,7 +139,17 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
#else
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits,
@ -162,16 +172,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
#else
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
#endif
if ((ret = gcm_gen_table(ctx)) != 0) {
@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *p;
size_t use_len;
uint64_t iv_bits;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
size_t olen = 0;
#endif
@ -320,10 +320,10 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, &olen);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->base_ectr);
#else
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, &olen);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
@ -401,12 +401,9 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
/* Increment the counter. */
static void gcm_incr(unsigned char y[16])
{
size_t i;
for (i = 16; i > 12; i--) {
if (++y[i - 1] != 0) {
break;
}
}
uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(y, 12);
x++;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, y, 12);
}
/* Calculate and apply the encryption mask. Process use_len bytes of data,
@ -419,11 +416,11 @@ static int gcm_mask(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ectr);
#else
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, &olen);
#else
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ectr);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ectr, 16);
@ -649,17 +646,17 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_free(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx)
if (ctx == NULL) {
return;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
#else
mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
#endif
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context));
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
/*
* AES-GCM test vectors from:
*

37
library/md_psa.h
View File

@ -15,43 +15,6 @@
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "psa/crypto.h"
/**
* \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier
* associated with the given digest type.
*
* \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE.
*
* \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will
* not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm.
*
* \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is
* supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
*
* \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type,
* regardless of whether it is supported or not.
*/
static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type)
{
return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type;
}
/**
* \brief This function returns the given digest type
* associated with the PSA algorithm identifier.
*
* \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for.
*
* \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is
* supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
*
* \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg,
* regardless of whether it is supported or not.
*/
static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg)
{
return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK);
}
/** Convert PSA status to MD error code.
*
* \param status PSA status.

14
library/net_sockets.c
View File

@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static int net_would_block(const mbedtls_net_context *ctx)
*/
int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx,
mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx,
void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *ip_len)
void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *cip_len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
int type;
@ -399,22 +399,22 @@ int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx,
if (client_ip != NULL) {
if (client_addr.ss_family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &client_addr;
*ip_len = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
*cip_len = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
if (buf_size < *ip_len) {
if (buf_size < *cip_len) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
memcpy(client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *ip_len);
memcpy(client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *cip_len);
} else {
struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &client_addr;
*ip_len = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
*cip_len = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
if (buf_size < *ip_len) {
if (buf_size < *cip_len) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
memcpy(client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *ip_len);
memcpy(client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *cip_len);
}
}

4
library/oid.c
View File

@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ static const oid_md_hmac_t oid_md_hmac[] =
FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, oid_md_hmac)
FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac, oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_hmac)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
/*
* For PKCS#12 PBEs
*/
@ -904,7 +904,7 @@ FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg,
md_alg,
mbedtls_cipher_type_t,
cipher_alg)
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
/* Return the x.y.z.... style numeric string for the given OID */
int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(char *buf, size_t size,

80
library/pk.c
View File

@ -18,6 +18,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) && !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "rsa_internal.h"
#endif
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
@ -26,9 +29,9 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#include "md_psa.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#include <limits.h>
@ -41,9 +44,9 @@ void mbedtls_pk_init(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx)
{
ctx->pk_info = NULL;
ctx->pk_ctx = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
ctx->priv_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
memset(ctx->pub_raw, 0, sizeof(ctx->pub_raw));
ctx->pub_raw_len = 0;
@ -311,7 +314,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg,
}
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_algorithm_t key_alg, key_alg2;
psa_status_t status;
status = psa_get_key_attributes(ctx->priv_id, &attributes);
@ -319,8 +321,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg,
return 0;
}
key_alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes);
key_alg2 = psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes);
psa_algorithm_t key_alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes);
/* Key's enrollment is available only when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT is
* defined, i.e. when the Mbed TLS implementation of PSA Crypto is being used.
* Even though we don't officially support using other implementations of PSA
* Crypto with TLS and X.509 (yet), we're still trying to simplify the life of
* people who would like to try it before it's officially supported. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
psa_algorithm_t key_alg2 = psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
key_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&attributes);
psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
@ -329,18 +338,23 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg,
}
/*
* Common case: the key alg or alg2 only allows alg.
* Common case: the key alg [or alg2] only allows alg.
* This will match PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT & PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH
* directly.
* This would also match ECDSA/RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN/RSA_PSS with
* a fixed hash on key_alg/key_alg2.
* a fixed hash on key_alg [or key_alg2].
*/
if (alg == key_alg || alg == key_alg2) {
if (alg == key_alg) {
return 1;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
if (alg == key_alg2) {
return 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
/*
* If key_alg or key_alg2 is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash,
* If key_alg [or key_alg2] is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash,
* and alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash,
* then alg is compliant with this key alg
*/
@ -351,12 +365,13 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg,
(alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (key_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) {
return 1;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(key_alg2) &&
PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(key_alg2) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH &&
(alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (key_alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) {
return 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
}
return 0;
@ -567,7 +582,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options,
return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
} else
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
{
if (sig_len < mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
@ -660,7 +675,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
f_rng, p_rng, NULL);
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
/*
* Make a signature given a signature type.
*/
@ -672,11 +686,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
*sig_len = 0;
if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@ -690,8 +699,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type,
sig, sig_size, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng);
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
const psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
if (psa_md_alg == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@ -708,12 +719,31 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type,
return mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg),
ctx->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_size, sig_len);
#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if (sig_size < mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
mbedtls_rsa_context *const rsa_ctx = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx);
const int ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(rsa_ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
(unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig);
if (ret == 0) {
*sig_len = rsa_ctx->len;
}
return ret;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#else
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
/*
* Decrypt message

38
library/pk_internal.h
View File

@ -19,9 +19,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#define PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status)
#define PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \
@ -30,9 +28,23 @@
#define PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \
psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors, \
psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls)
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
/* Headers/footers for PEM files */
#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----"
#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----"
#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----"
#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----"
#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----"
#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----"
#define PEM_BEGIN_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----"
#define PEM_END_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
/**
* Public function mbedtls_pk_ec() can be used to get direct access to the
* wrapped ecp_keypair structure pointed to the pk_ctx. However this is not
@ -68,10 +80,10 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(const mbedtls_pk_context pk)
return NULL;
}
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
{
mbedtls_ecp_group_id id;
@ -86,13 +98,13 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_cont
}
opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs);
curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(opaque_key_type);
id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs), 0);
id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs));
psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs);
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits, 0);
id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits);
#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
id = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
@ -105,6 +117,16 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_cont
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448)
#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 || MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 */
#define MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id) \
((id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) || (id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448))
static inline int mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
{
mbedtls_ecp_group_id id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk);
return MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
/* Helper for (deterministic) ECDSA */

167
library/pk_wrap.c
View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#include "pk_wrap.h"
#include "pk_internal.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "md_psa.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
@ -26,17 +26,14 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
#include "pkwrite.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
@ -49,123 +46,6 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
int mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status)
{
switch (status) {
case PSA_SUCCESS:
return 0;
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG;
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED;
case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE:
case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
case PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT:
case PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID:
case PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR;
case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
default:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
}
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
int mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa_rsa(psa_status_t status)
{
switch (status) {
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED;
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING;
case PSA_SUCCESS:
return 0;
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED;
case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE:
case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
case PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT:
case PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID:
case PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR;
case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
default:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
}
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY || PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
int mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa_ecdsa(psa_status_t status)
{
switch (status) {
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
case PSA_SUCCESS:
return 0;
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED;
case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
case PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE:
case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
case PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT:
case PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID:
case PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR;
case PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
default:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
}
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
static int rsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
{
@ -281,7 +161,7 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t alg,
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
@ -344,7 +224,7 @@ cleanup:
}
return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
static int rsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
@ -955,37 +835,34 @@ static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
return 0;
}
/* Common helper for ECDSA sign using PSA functions. */
/* Common helper for ECDSA sign using PSA functions.
* Instead of extracting key's properties in order to check which kind of ECDSA
* signature it supports, we try both deterministic and non-deterministic.
*/
static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t status;
psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md;
psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_algorithm_t alg, alg2;
status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
status = psa_sign_hash(key_id,
PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)),
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len);
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto done;
} else if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED) {
return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&key_attr);
alg2 = psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&key_attr);
psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
if (PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg2)) {
psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg));
} else {
psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg));
}
status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_size, sig_len);
status = psa_sign_hash(key_id,
PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)),
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
done:
ret = pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(sig, sig_len, sig_size);
return ret;

24
library/pk_wrap.h
View File

@ -15,9 +15,9 @@
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#endif
struct mbedtls_pk_info_t {
/** Public key type */
@ -125,24 +125,6 @@ extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info;
extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info;
extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa_ecdsa(psa_status_t status);
#endif
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status);
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pk_error_from_psa_rsa(psa_status_t status);
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY || PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md,
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx,
@ -151,6 +133,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md,
size_t *sig_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */

6
library/pkcs12.c
View File

@ -17,7 +17,9 @@
#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
@ -29,7 +31,7 @@
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params(mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations)
@ -238,7 +240,7 @@ exit:
return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
static void pkcs12_fill_buffer(unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
const unsigned char *filler, size_t fill_len)

6
library/pkcs5.c
View File

@ -24,7 +24,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
@ -34,7 +36,7 @@
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations,
int *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type)
@ -261,7 +263,7 @@ exit:
return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *password,

63
library/pkparse.c
View File

@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#include "pk_internal.h"
#include <string.h>
@ -27,10 +29,6 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#include "pk_internal.h"
#endif
/* Extended formats */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
@ -105,16 +103,21 @@ static int pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_key_usage_t flags;
psa_status_t status;
psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(pk->ec_family));
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH);
psa_key_usage_t flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE;
/* Montgomery allows only ECDH, others ECDSA too */
if (pk->ec_family != PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) {
flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE;
psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes,
MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
if (pk->ec_family == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) {
/* Do not set algorithm here because Montgomery keys cannot do ECDSA and
* the PK module cannot do ECDH. When the key will be used in TLS for
* ECDH, it will be exported and then re-imported with proper flags
* and algorithm. */
flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT;
} else {
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes,
MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT;
}
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, flags);
@ -247,7 +250,7 @@ static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id;
int ret;
ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits, 0);
ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp_key);
ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp_key.grp), ecp_group_id);
@ -863,12 +866,6 @@ static int pk_get_pk_alg(unsigned char **p,
return 0;
}
/* Helper for Montgomery curves */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES)
#define MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id) \
((id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) || (id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448))
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */
/*
* SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
@ -1412,7 +1409,7 @@ MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *end;
mbedtls_asn1_buf pbe_alg_oid, pbe_params;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
#endif
@ -1460,7 +1457,7 @@ MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(
/*
* Decrypt EncryptedData with appropriate PBE
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
if (mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg(&pbe_alg_oid, &md_alg, &cipher_alg) == 0) {
if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT,
cipher_alg, md_alg,
@ -1474,8 +1471,8 @@ MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(
decrypted = 1;
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2, &pbe_alg_oid) == 0) {
if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(&pbe_params, MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT, pwd, pwdlen,
p, len, buf, len, &outlen)) != 0) {
@ -1488,7 +1485,7 @@ MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(
decrypted = 1;
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
{
((void) pwd);
}
@ -1534,8 +1531,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
} else {
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----",
"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----",
PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA,
key, pwd, pwdlen, &len);
}
@ -1564,8 +1560,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
} else {
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----",
"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----",
PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC,
PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC,
key, pwd, pwdlen, &len);
}
if (ret == 0) {
@ -1594,8 +1590,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
} else {
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----",
"-----END PRIVATE KEY-----",
PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8, PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8,
key, NULL, 0, &len);
}
if (ret == 0) {
@ -1616,8 +1611,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
} else {
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
"-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----",
"-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----",
PEM_BEGIN_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8,
PEM_END_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8,
key, NULL, 0, &len);
}
if (ret == 0) {
@ -1743,8 +1738,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
} else {
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----",
"-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----",
PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA,
key, NULL, 0, &len);
}
@ -1777,8 +1771,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
} else {
ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----",
"-----END PUBLIC KEY-----",
PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY, PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY,
key, NULL, 0, &len);
}

999
library/pkwrite.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

27
library/platform_util.c
View File

@ -217,36 +217,15 @@ struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(const mbedtls_time_t *tt,
void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *, int, const char *);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
/*
* Provide external definitions of some inline functions so that the compiler
* has the option to not inline them
*/
extern inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r,
const unsigned char *a,
const unsigned char *b,
size_t n);
extern inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p);
extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x);
extern inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p);
extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x);
extern inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p);
extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT)
#include <time.h>
#if !defined(_WIN32) && \
(defined(unix) || defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || \
(defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)))
(defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) || defined(__HAIKU__))
#include <unistd.h>
#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */
#if (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 199309L)
#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __HAIKU__) */
#if (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 199309L) || defined(__HAIKU__)
mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void)
{
int ret;

1128
library/psa_crypto.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

6
library/psa_crypto_cipher.c
View File

@ -532,7 +532,11 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_cipher_update(
output_length);
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING */
{
if (input_length == 0) {
/* There is no input, nothing to be done */
*output_length = 0;
status = PSA_SUCCESS;
} else {
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
mbedtls_cipher_update(&operation->ctx.cipher, input,
input_length, output, output_length));

5
library/psa_crypto_client.c
View File

@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_key_domain_parameters(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length)
{
if (attributes->domain_parameters == NULL &&
attributes->domain_parameters_size == SIZE_MAX) {
return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
if (attributes->domain_parameters_size > data_size) {
return PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}

118
library/psa_crypto_core.h
View File

@ -33,10 +33,24 @@
*/
int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg);
/**
* Tell if PSA is ready for this cipher.
*
* \note For now, only checks the state of the driver subsystem,
* not the algorithm. Might do more in the future.
*
* \param cipher_alg The cipher algorithm (ignored for now).
*
* \return 1 if the driver subsytem is ready, 0 otherwise.
*/
int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg);
typedef enum {
PSA_SLOT_EMPTY = 0,
PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED,
} psa_key_slot_status_t;
PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL,
PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION,
} psa_key_slot_state_t;
/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material
* and metadata for one key.
@ -44,18 +58,37 @@ typedef enum {
typedef struct {
psa_core_key_attributes_t attr;
psa_key_slot_status_t status;
/*
* The current state of the key slot, as described in
* docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety/psa-thread-safety.md.
*
* Library functions can modify the state of a key slot by calling
* psa_key_slot_state_transition.
*
* The state variable is used to help determine whether library functions
* which operate on the slot succeed. For example, psa_finish_key_creation,
* which transfers the state of a slot from PSA_SLOT_FILLING to
* PSA_SLOT_FULL, must fail with error code PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* if the state of the slot is not PSA_SLOT_FILLING.
*
* Library functions which traverse the array of key slots only consider
* slots that are in a suitable state for the function.
* For example, psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory, which finds a slot
* containing a given key ID, will only check slots whose state variable is
* PSA_SLOT_FULL. */
psa_key_slot_state_t state;
/*
* Number of locks on the key slot held by the library.
* Number of functions registered as reading the material in the key slot.
*
* This counter is incremented by one each time a library function
* retrieves through one of the dedicated internal API a pointer to the
* key slot.
* Library functions must not write directly to registered_readers
*
* This counter is decremented by one each time a library function stops
* accessing the key slot and states it by calling the
* psa_unlock_key_slot() API.
* A function must call psa_register_read(slot) before reading the current
* contents of the slot for an operation.
* They then must call psa_unregister_read(slot) once they have finished
* reading the current contents of the slot.
* A function must call psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot) to check if
* the slot is in use for reading.
*
* This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while the library
* may access it. For example, such control is needed in the following
@ -66,10 +99,9 @@ typedef struct {
* the library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load the
* persistent key.
* . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread asks to close
* or purge or destroy a key while it is in used by the library through
* another thread.
*/
size_t lock_count;
* or purge or destroy a key while it is in use by the library through
* another thread. */
size_t registered_readers;
/* Dynamically allocated key data buffer.
* Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */
@ -84,31 +116,17 @@ typedef struct {
#define PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY ( \
0)
/** Test whether a key slot is occupied.
*
* A key slot is occupied iff the key type is nonzero. This works because
* no valid key can have 0 as its key type.
/** Test whether a key slot has any registered readers.
* If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
* global key slot mutex.
*
* \param[in] slot The key slot to test.
*
* \return 1 if the slot is occupied, 0 otherwise.
* \return 1 if the slot has any registered readers, 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline int psa_is_key_slot_occupied(const psa_key_slot_t *slot)
static inline int psa_key_slot_has_readers(const psa_key_slot_t *slot)
{
return slot->status == PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED;
}
/** Test whether a key slot is locked.
*
* A key slot is locked iff its lock counter is strictly greater than 0.
*
* \param[in] slot The key slot to test.
*
* \return 1 if the slot is locked, 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline int psa_is_key_slot_locked(const psa_key_slot_t *slot)
{
return slot->lock_count > 0;
return slot->registered_readers > 0;
}
/** Retrieve flags from psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags.
@ -178,13 +196,20 @@ static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(
/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy.
*
* Persistent storage is not affected.
* Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY.
* If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
* global key slot mutex.
*
* \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* Success. This includes the case of a key slot that was
* already fully wiped.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
* The slot has been successfully wiped.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* The slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FULL or PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, and
* the amount of registered readers was not equal to 1. Or,
* the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. Or,
* the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FILLING, and the amount
* of registered readers was not equal to 0.
*/
psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot);
@ -906,6 +931,25 @@ typedef struct psa_crypto_local_output_s {
psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_alloc(uint8_t *output, size_t output_len,
psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output);
/** Allocate a local copy of an output buffer and copy the contents into it.
*
* \note This allocates and copies a buffer
* whose contents will be copied back to the
* original in a future call to
* psa_crypto_local_output_free().
*
* \param[in] output Pointer to output buffer.
* \param[in] output_len Length of the output buffer.
* \param[out] local_output Pointer to a psa_crypto_local_output_t struct to
* populate with the local output copy.
* \return #PSA_SUCCESS, if the buffer was successfully
* copied.
* \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, if a copy of
* the buffer cannot be allocated.
*/
psa_status_t psa_crypto_local_output_alloc_with_copy(uint8_t *output, size_t output_len,
psa_crypto_local_output_t *local_output);
/** Copy from a local copy of an output buffer back to the original, then
* free the local copy.
*

74
library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h"
#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h"
#include "md_psa.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -32,6 +32,61 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH)
/* Helper function to verify if the provided EC's family and key bit size are valid.
*
* Note: "bits" parameter is used both as input and output and it might be updated
* in case provided input value is not multiple of 8 ("sloppy" bits).
*/
static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t *bits)
{
switch (family) {
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:
switch (*bits) {
case 192:
case 224:
case 256:
case 384:
case 521:
return PSA_SUCCESS;
case 528:
*bits = 521;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:
switch (*bits) {
case 256:
case 384:
case 512:
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:
switch (*bits) {
case 448:
case 255:
return PSA_SUCCESS;
case 256:
*bits = 255;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:
switch (*bits) {
case 192:
/* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */
case 256:
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
break;
}
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
psa_key_type_t type, size_t curve_bits,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length,
@ -82,16 +137,15 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ecp);
status = check_ecc_parameters(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), &curve_bits);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto exit;
}
/* Load the group. */
grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type),
curve_bits, !explicit_bits);
grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type),
curve_bits);
if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
/* We can't distinguish between a nonsensical family/size combination
* (which would warrant PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT) and a
* well-regarded curve that Mbed TLS just doesn't know about (which
* would warrant PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED). For uniformity with how
* curves that Mbed TLS knows about but for which support is disabled
* at build time, return NOT_SUPPORTED. */
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto exit;
}
@ -285,7 +339,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key(
psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(
attributes->core.type);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id =
mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(curve, attributes->core.bits, 0);
mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, attributes->core.bits);
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info =
mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id);

2
library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h"
#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h"
#include "psa_crypto_hash.h"
#include "md_psa.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

100
library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
View File

@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
#endif
typedef struct {
psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT];
@ -108,7 +111,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(
for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id)) {
/* Only consider slots which are in a full state. */
if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) &&
(mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id))) {
break;
}
}
@ -117,7 +122,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(
}
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
status = psa_lock_key_slot(slot);
status = psa_register_read(slot);
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
*p_slot = slot;
}
@ -141,36 +146,38 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void)
for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
slot->lock_count = 1;
slot->registered_readers = 1;
slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION;
(void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
}
global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0;
}
psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot)
psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot)
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t slot_idx;
psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unlocked_persistent_key_slot;
psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unused_persistent_key_slot;
if (!global_data.key_slots_initialized) {
status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
goto error;
}
selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot = NULL;
selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot = NULL;
for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
if (!psa_is_key_slot_occupied(slot)) {
if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) {
selected_slot = slot;
break;
}
if ((unlocked_persistent_key_slot == NULL) &&
(!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) &&
(!psa_is_key_slot_locked(slot))) {
unlocked_persistent_key_slot = slot;
if ((unused_persistent_key_slot == NULL) &&
(slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) &&
(!psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) &&
(!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime))) {
unused_persistent_key_slot = slot;
}
}
@ -182,14 +189,18 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
* storage.
*/
if ((selected_slot == NULL) &&
(unlocked_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) {
selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot;
selected_slot->lock_count = 1;
psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot);
(unused_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) {
selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot;
psa_register_read(selected_slot);
status = psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto error;
}
}
if (selected_slot != NULL) {
status = psa_lock_key_slot(selected_slot);
status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(selected_slot, PSA_SLOT_EMPTY,
PSA_SLOT_FILLING);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto error;
}
@ -239,7 +250,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
slot, data->slot_number, sizeof(data->slot_number));
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED;
status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL);
}
goto exit;
}
@ -250,7 +262,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
goto exit;
}
slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED;
status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL);
exit:
psa_free_persistent_key_data(key_data, key_data_length);
@ -324,8 +337,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
/* Copy actual key length and core attributes into the slot on success */
slot->key.bytes = key_buffer_length;
slot->attr = attributes.core;
slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED;
status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL);
exit:
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot);
@ -358,7 +372,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS)
psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id;
status = psa_get_empty_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot);
status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return status;
}
@ -380,12 +394,17 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
psa_wipe_key_slot(*p_slot);
if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) {
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
} else {
/* Add implicit usage flags. */
psa_extend_key_usage_flags(&(*p_slot)->attr.policy.usage);
psa_key_slot_state_transition((*p_slot), PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL);
status = psa_register_read(*p_slot);
}
return status;
@ -394,26 +413,37 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
}
psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
{
if (slot == NULL) {
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) &&
(slot->state != PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION)) {
return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
if (slot->lock_count > 0) {
slot->lock_count--;
/* If we are the last reader and the slot is marked for deletion,
* we must wipe the slot here. */
if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) &&
(slot->registered_readers == 1)) {
return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
}
if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) {
slot->registered_readers--;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors,
* do our best to report if the lock counter is equal to zero. Assert with
* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the lock counter is strictly greater
* than zero: if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and
* do our best to report if there are no registered readers. Assert with
* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that there are registered readers:
* if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and
* the function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the
* execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails.
*/
MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->lock_count > 0);
MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot));
return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
@ -480,7 +510,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle)
*handle = key;
return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
return psa_unregister_read(slot);
#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
(void) key;
@ -506,10 +536,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle)
return status;
}
if (slot->lock_count <= 1) {
if (slot->registered_readers == 1) {
return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
} else {
return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
return psa_unregister_read(slot);
}
}
@ -524,10 +554,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
}
if ((!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) &&
(slot->lock_count <= 1)) {
(slot->registered_readers == 1)) {
return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
} else {
return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
return psa_unregister_read(slot);
}
}
@ -539,10 +569,10 @@ void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats)
for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
const psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
if (psa_is_key_slot_locked(slot)) {
if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) {
++stats->locked_slots;
}
if (!psa_is_key_slot_occupied(slot)) {
if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) {
++stats->empty_slots;
continue;
}

98
library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h
View File

@ -54,8 +54,9 @@ static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile(psa_key_id_t key_id)
* In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key
* into a key slot if not already done.
*
* On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of
* the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
* On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading.
* It is the responsibility of the caller to call psa_unregister_read(slot)
* when they have finished reading the contents of the slot.
*
* \param key Key identifier to query.
* \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the
@ -95,50 +96,92 @@ psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void);
* This does not affect persistent storage. */
void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void);
/** Find a free key slot.
/** Find a free key slot and reserve it to be filled with a key.
*
* This function returns a key slot that is available for use and is in its
* ground state (all-bits-zero). On success, the key slot is locked. It is
* the responsibility of the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not
* access it anymore.
* This function finds a key slot that is free,
* sets its state to PSA_SLOT_FILLING and then returns the slot.
*
* On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING.
* It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to
* PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished.
*
* \param[out] volatile_key_id On success, volatile key identifier
* associated to the returned slot.
* \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the slot.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
* There were no free key slots.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* This function attempted to operate on a key slot which was in an
* unexpected state.
*/
psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot);
psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot);
/** Lock a key slot.
/** Change the state of a key slot.
*
* This function increments the key slot lock counter by one.
* This function changes the state of the key slot from expected_state to
* new state. If the state of the slot was not expected_state, the state is
* unchanged.
*
* If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
* global key slot mutex.
*
* \param[in] slot The key slot.
* \param[in] expected_state The current state of the slot.
* \param[in] new_state The new state of the slot.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
The key slot's state variable is new_state.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* The slot's state was not expected_state.
*/
static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition(
psa_key_slot_t *slot, psa_key_slot_state_t expected_state,
psa_key_slot_state_t new_state)
{
if (slot->state != expected_state) {
return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
slot->state = new_state;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
/** Register as a reader of a key slot.
*
* This function increments the key slot registered reader counter by one.
* If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
* global key slot mutex.
*
* \param[in] slot The key slot.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
The key slot lock counter was incremented.
The key slot registered reader counter was incremented.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* The lock counter already reached its maximum value and was not
* increased.
* The reader counter already reached its maximum value and was not
* increased, or the slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_FULL.
*/
static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
{
if (slot->lock_count >= SIZE_MAX) {
if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) ||
(slot->registered_readers >= SIZE_MAX)) {
return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
slot->lock_count++;
slot->registered_readers++;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
/** Unlock a key slot.
/** Unregister from reading a key slot.
*
* This function decrements the key slot lock counter by one.
* This function decrements the key slot registered reader counter by one.
* If the state of the slot is PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION,
* and there is only one registered reader (the caller),
* this function will call psa_wipe_key_slot().
* If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
* global key slot mutex.
*
* \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot
* a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns
@ -146,13 +189,16 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
*
* \param[in] slot The key slot.
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* \p slot is NULL or the key slot lock counter has been
* decremented successfully.
* \p slot is NULL or the key slot reader counter has been
* decremented (and potentially wiped) successfully.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* The lock counter was equal to 0.
*
* The slot's state was neither PSA_SLOT_FULL nor
* PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION.
* Or a wipe was attempted and the slot's state was not
* PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION.
* Or registered_readers was equal to 0.
*/
psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot);
psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot);
/** Test whether a lifetime designates a key in an external cryptoprocessor.
*

175
library/psa_util.c
View File

@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
#include <psa/crypto.h>
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
/* The following includes are needed for MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX macros */
@ -38,6 +37,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
#include <mbedtls/pk.h>
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
#include <mbedtls/cipher.h>
#endif
/* PSA_SUCCESS is kept at the top of each error table since
* it's the most common status when everything functions properly. */
@ -50,6 +52,17 @@ const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_md_errors[] =
{ PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED }
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_cipher_errors[] =
{
{ PSA_SUCCESS, 0 },
{ PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE },
{ PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA },
{ PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED }
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C)
const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[] =
{
@ -58,6 +71,7 @@ const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[] =
{ PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA }
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3))
const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_ssl_errors[] =
@ -157,4 +171,163 @@ int psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status)
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
/****************************************************************/
/* Key management */
/****************************************************************/
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid,
size_t *bits)
{
switch (grpid) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:
*bits = 192;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:
*bits = 224;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:
*bits = 256;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:
*bits = 384;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:
*bits = 521;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:
*bits = 256;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:
*bits = 384;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:
*bits = 512;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:
*bits = 255;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:
*bits = 192;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1)
/* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:
*bits = 256;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:
*bits = 448;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY;
#endif
default:
*bits = 0;
return 0;
}
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family,
size_t bits)
{
switch (family) {
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:
switch (bits) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192)
case 192:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224)
case 224:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256)
case 256:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384)
case 384:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
case 521:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1;
#endif
}
break;
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:
switch (bits) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)
case 256:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)
case 384:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)
case 512:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1;
#endif
}
break;
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:
switch (bits) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)
case 255:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)
case 448:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448;
#endif
}
break;
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:
switch (bits) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192)
case 192:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224)
/* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256)
case 256:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1;
#endif
}
break;
}
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
}
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */

4
library/psa_util_internal.h
View File

@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ typedef struct {
extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_md_errors[4];
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_cipher_errors[4];
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C)
extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[3];
#endif

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