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https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git
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Implement PSA client-side ECDHE-PSK
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <narmstrong@baylibre.com>
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@ -1813,6 +1813,7 @@ static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
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( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
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static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char **p,
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@ -2348,8 +2349,10 @@ start_processing:
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
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( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
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if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
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ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
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ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
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{
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if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
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@ -2365,6 +2368,7 @@ start_processing:
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else
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
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( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
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@ -2998,6 +3002,149 @@ ecdh_calc_secret:
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
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defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
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if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
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{
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psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
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mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
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/*
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* opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
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*/
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if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
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{
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/* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
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* and we check that the server's choice is among the
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* ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
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}
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/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
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if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
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header_len = 4;
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content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
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if( header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
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( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
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}
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ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len );
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ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len );
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memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len,
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ssl->conf->psk_identity,
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ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
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header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) );
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/*
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* Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange.
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*/
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/* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by
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* applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While
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* the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes
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* such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not
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* yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF.
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* For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation
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* of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */
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key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
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psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
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psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH );
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psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type );
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psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits );
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/* Generate ECDH private key. */
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status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes,
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&handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
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/* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
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* The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS,
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* but we just need to add a length byte before that. */
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unsigned char *own_pubkey = ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1;
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unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
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size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t)( end - own_pubkey );
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size_t own_pubkey_len;
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status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
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own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
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&own_pubkey_len );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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{
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psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
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handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
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}
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ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len;
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content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1;
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/* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */
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unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster;
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unsigned char *p_end = p + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster );
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size_t zlen;
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/* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
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status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH,
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handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
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handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
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handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
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p + 2,
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p_end - ( p + 2 ),
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&zlen );
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destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
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handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( zlen, p, 0 );
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p += 2 + zlen;
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/* opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; */
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if( p_end - p < 2 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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const unsigned char *psk = NULL;
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size_t psk_len = 0;
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if( mbedtls_ssl_get_psk( ssl, &psk, &psk_len )
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== MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED )
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{
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/*
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* This should never happen because the existence of a PSK is always
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* checked before calling this function
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*/
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
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}
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( psk_len, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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if( p_end < p || (size_t)( p_end - p ) < psk_len )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
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memcpy( p, psk, psk_len );
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p += psk_len;
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ssl->handshake->pmslen = p - ssl->handshake->premaster;
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}
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else
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
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if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) )
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{
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