diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h
index d8844fcc32..883b98828d 100644
--- a/library/ssl_misc.h
+++ b/library/ssl_misc.h
@@ -2150,6 +2150,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
                                            unsigned char *buf,
                                            const unsigned char *end,
                                            size_t *out_len);
+
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                           size_t early_data_len);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
index bc737047a4..a3b4d355b4 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c
@@ -1454,6 +1454,47 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
 
     return 0;
 }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+                                           size_t early_data_len)
+{
+    uint32_t uint32_early_data_len = (uint32_t) early_data_len;
+
+    /*
+     * This function should be called only while an handshake is in progress
+     * and thus a session under negotiation. Add a sanity check to detect a
+     * misuse.
+     */
+    if (ssl->session_negotiate == NULL) {
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1
+     *
+     * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data
+     * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.
+     */
+    if (uint32_early_data_len >
+        (ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size -
+         ssl->early_data_count)) {
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
+            2, ("EarlyData: Too many early data received, %u > %u",
+                ssl->early_data_count + uint32_early_data_len,
+                ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size));
+
+        MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+            MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+        return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+    ssl->early_data_count += uint32_early_data_len;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
 
 /* Reset SSL context and update hash for handling HRR.
diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
index 2391915357..449fa380f1 100644
--- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
+++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c
@@ -2913,17 +2913,14 @@ static int ssl_tls13_end_of_early_data_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
     }
 
     if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) {
-        MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received early data"));
-        /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1
-         *
-         * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data
-         * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.
-         *
-         * TODO: Add received data size check here.
-         */
         if (ssl->in_offt == NULL) {
+            MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received early data"));
             /* Set the reading pointer */
             ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg;
+            ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(ssl, ssl->in_msglen);
+            if (ret != 0) {
+                return ret;
+            }
         }
         return SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA;
     }