diff --git a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_functions_codes.h b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_functions_codes.h
index dd926d7137..44ebf678f4 100644
--- a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_functions_codes.h
+++ b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_functions_codes.h
@@ -36,6 +36,14 @@ enum {
     PSA_HASH_UPDATE,
     PSA_HASH_VERIFY,
     PSA_IMPORT_KEY,
+    PSA_MAC_ABORT,
+    PSA_MAC_COMPUTE,
+    PSA_MAC_SIGN_FINISH,
+    PSA_MAC_SIGN_SETUP,
+    PSA_MAC_UPDATE,
+    PSA_MAC_VERIFY,
+    PSA_MAC_VERIFY_FINISH,
+    PSA_MAC_VERIFY_SETUP,
 };
 
 #endif /*  _PSA_FUNCTIONS_CODES_H_ */
diff --git a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_crypto_client.c b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_crypto_client.c
index 377b2369cf..844c93951d 100644
--- a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_crypto_client.c
+++ b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_crypto_client.c
@@ -1976,3 +1976,607 @@ fail:
 
     return status;
 }
+
+
+psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation
+    )
+{
+    uint8_t *params = NULL;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    size_t result_length;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    size_t needed = psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+                    psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(*operation);
+
+    params = malloc(needed);
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *pos = params;
+    size_t remaining = needed;
+    int ok;
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, *operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psa_crypto_call(PSA_MAC_ABORT,
+                         params, (size_t) (pos - params), &result, &result_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        printf("PSA_MAC_ABORT server call failed\n");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_length;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, &status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(params);
+    free(result);
+
+    return status;
+}
+
+
+psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg,
+    const uint8_t *input, size_t  input_length,
+    uint8_t *mac, size_t  mac_size,
+    size_t *mac_length
+    )
+{
+    uint8_t *params = NULL;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    size_t result_length;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    size_t needed = psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+                    psasim_serialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t_needs(key) +
+                    psasim_serialise_psa_algorithm_t_needs(alg) +
+                    psasim_serialise_buffer_needs(input, input_length) +
+                    psasim_serialise_buffer_needs(mac, mac_size) +
+                    psasim_serialise_size_t_needs(*mac_length);
+
+    params = malloc(needed);
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *pos = params;
+    size_t remaining = needed;
+    int ok;
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t(&pos, &remaining, key);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_algorithm_t(&pos, &remaining, alg);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, input, input_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, mac, mac_size);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_size_t(&pos, &remaining, *mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psa_crypto_call(PSA_MAC_COMPUTE,
+                         params, (size_t) (pos - params), &result, &result_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        printf("PSA_MAC_COMPUTE server call failed\n");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_length;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, &status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_return_buffer(&rpos, &rremain, mac, mac_size);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_size_t(&rpos, &rremain, mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(params);
+    free(result);
+
+    return status;
+}
+
+
+psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+    uint8_t *mac, size_t  mac_size,
+    size_t *mac_length
+    )
+{
+    uint8_t *params = NULL;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    size_t result_length;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    size_t needed = psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+                    psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(*operation) +
+                    psasim_serialise_buffer_needs(mac, mac_size) +
+                    psasim_serialise_size_t_needs(*mac_length);
+
+    params = malloc(needed);
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *pos = params;
+    size_t remaining = needed;
+    int ok;
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, *operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, mac, mac_size);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_size_t(&pos, &remaining, *mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psa_crypto_call(PSA_MAC_SIGN_FINISH,
+                         params, (size_t) (pos - params), &result, &result_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        printf("PSA_MAC_SIGN_FINISH server call failed\n");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_length;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, &status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_return_buffer(&rpos, &rremain, mac, mac_size);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_size_t(&rpos, &rremain, mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(params);
+    free(result);
+
+    return status;
+}
+
+
+psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg
+    )
+{
+    uint8_t *params = NULL;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    size_t result_length;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    size_t needed = psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+                    psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(*operation) +
+                    psasim_serialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t_needs(key) +
+                    psasim_serialise_psa_algorithm_t_needs(alg);
+
+    params = malloc(needed);
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *pos = params;
+    size_t remaining = needed;
+    int ok;
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, *operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t(&pos, &remaining, key);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_algorithm_t(&pos, &remaining, alg);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psa_crypto_call(PSA_MAC_SIGN_SETUP,
+                         params, (size_t) (pos - params), &result, &result_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        printf("PSA_MAC_SIGN_SETUP server call failed\n");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_length;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, &status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(params);
+    free(result);
+
+    return status;
+}
+
+
+psa_status_t psa_mac_update(
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *input, size_t  input_length
+    )
+{
+    uint8_t *params = NULL;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    size_t result_length;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    size_t needed = psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+                    psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(*operation) +
+                    psasim_serialise_buffer_needs(input, input_length);
+
+    params = malloc(needed);
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *pos = params;
+    size_t remaining = needed;
+    int ok;
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, *operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, input, input_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psa_crypto_call(PSA_MAC_UPDATE,
+                         params, (size_t) (pos - params), &result, &result_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        printf("PSA_MAC_UPDATE server call failed\n");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_length;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, &status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(params);
+    free(result);
+
+    return status;
+}
+
+
+psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg,
+    const uint8_t *input, size_t  input_length,
+    const uint8_t *mac, size_t  mac_length
+    )
+{
+    uint8_t *params = NULL;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    size_t result_length;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    size_t needed = psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+                    psasim_serialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t_needs(key) +
+                    psasim_serialise_psa_algorithm_t_needs(alg) +
+                    psasim_serialise_buffer_needs(input, input_length) +
+                    psasim_serialise_buffer_needs(mac, mac_length);
+
+    params = malloc(needed);
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *pos = params;
+    size_t remaining = needed;
+    int ok;
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t(&pos, &remaining, key);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_algorithm_t(&pos, &remaining, alg);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, input, input_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, mac, mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psa_crypto_call(PSA_MAC_VERIFY,
+                         params, (size_t) (pos - params), &result, &result_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        printf("PSA_MAC_VERIFY server call failed\n");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_length;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, &status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(params);
+    free(result);
+
+    return status;
+}
+
+
+psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+    const uint8_t *mac, size_t  mac_length
+    )
+{
+    uint8_t *params = NULL;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    size_t result_length;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    size_t needed = psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+                    psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(*operation) +
+                    psasim_serialise_buffer_needs(mac, mac_length);
+
+    params = malloc(needed);
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *pos = params;
+    size_t remaining = needed;
+    int ok;
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, *operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, mac, mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psa_crypto_call(PSA_MAC_VERIFY_FINISH,
+                         params, (size_t) (pos - params), &result, &result_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        printf("PSA_MAC_VERIFY_FINISH server call failed\n");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_length;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, &status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(params);
+    free(result);
+
+    return status;
+}
+
+
+psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+    psa_algorithm_t alg
+    )
+{
+    uint8_t *params = NULL;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    size_t result_length;
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+    size_t needed = psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+                    psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(*operation) +
+                    psasim_serialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t_needs(key) +
+                    psasim_serialise_psa_algorithm_t_needs(alg);
+
+    params = malloc(needed);
+    if (params == NULL) {
+        status = PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *pos = params;
+    size_t remaining = needed;
+    int ok;
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, *operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t(&pos, &remaining, key);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_algorithm_t(&pos, &remaining, alg);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psa_crypto_call(PSA_MAC_VERIFY_SETUP,
+                         params, (size_t) (pos - params), &result, &result_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        printf("PSA_MAC_VERIFY_SETUP server call failed\n");
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_length;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, &status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+fail:
+    free(params);
+    free(result);
+
+    return status;
+}
diff --git a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_crypto_server.c b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_crypto_server.c
index 0a84010f73..856186f6a3 100644
--- a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_crypto_server.c
+++ b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_crypto_server.c
@@ -2234,6 +2234,706 @@ fail:
     return 0;       // This shouldn't happen!
 }
 
+// Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure
+int psa_mac_abort_wrapper(
+    uint8_t *in_params, size_t in_params_len,
+    uint8_t **out_params, size_t *out_params_len)
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation;
+
+    uint8_t *pos = in_params;
+    size_t remaining = in_params_len;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    int ok;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, &operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    // Now we call the actual target function
+
+    status = psa_mac_abort(
+        operation
+        );
+
+    // NOTE: Should really check there is no overflow as we go along.
+    size_t result_size =
+        psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+        psasim_serialise_psa_status_t_needs(status) +
+        psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(operation);
+
+    result = malloc(result_size);
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_size;
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    *out_params = result;
+    *out_params_len = result_size;
+
+    return 1;   // success
+
+fail:
+    free(result);
+
+    return 0;       // This shouldn't happen!
+}
+
+// Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure
+int psa_mac_compute_wrapper(
+    uint8_t *in_params, size_t in_params_len,
+    uint8_t **out_params, size_t *out_params_len)
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg;
+    uint8_t *input = NULL;
+    size_t input_length;
+    uint8_t *mac = NULL;
+    size_t mac_size;
+    size_t mac_length;
+
+    uint8_t *pos = in_params;
+    size_t remaining = in_params_len;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    int ok;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t(&pos, &remaining, &key);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_algorithm_t(&pos, &remaining, &alg);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, &input, &input_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, &mac, &mac_size);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_size_t(&pos, &remaining, &mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    // Now we call the actual target function
+
+    status = psa_mac_compute(
+        key,
+        alg,
+        input, input_length,
+        mac, mac_size,
+        &mac_length
+        );
+
+    // NOTE: Should really check there is no overflow as we go along.
+    size_t result_size =
+        psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+        psasim_serialise_psa_status_t_needs(status) +
+        psasim_serialise_buffer_needs(mac, mac_size) +
+        psasim_serialise_size_t_needs(mac_length);
+
+    result = malloc(result_size);
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_size;
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_buffer(&rpos, &rremain, mac, mac_size);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_size_t(&rpos, &rremain, mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    *out_params = result;
+    *out_params_len = result_size;
+
+    free(input);
+    free(mac);
+
+    return 1;   // success
+
+fail:
+    free(result);
+
+    free(input);
+    free(mac);
+
+    return 0;       // This shouldn't happen!
+}
+
+// Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure
+int psa_mac_sign_finish_wrapper(
+    uint8_t *in_params, size_t in_params_len,
+    uint8_t **out_params, size_t *out_params_len)
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation;
+    uint8_t *mac = NULL;
+    size_t mac_size;
+    size_t mac_length;
+
+    uint8_t *pos = in_params;
+    size_t remaining = in_params_len;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    int ok;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, &operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, &mac, &mac_size);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_size_t(&pos, &remaining, &mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    // Now we call the actual target function
+
+    status = psa_mac_sign_finish(
+        operation,
+        mac, mac_size,
+        &mac_length
+        );
+
+    // NOTE: Should really check there is no overflow as we go along.
+    size_t result_size =
+        psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+        psasim_serialise_psa_status_t_needs(status) +
+        psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(operation) +
+        psasim_serialise_buffer_needs(mac, mac_size) +
+        psasim_serialise_size_t_needs(mac_length);
+
+    result = malloc(result_size);
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_size;
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_buffer(&rpos, &rremain, mac, mac_size);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_size_t(&rpos, &rremain, mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    *out_params = result;
+    *out_params_len = result_size;
+
+    free(mac);
+
+    return 1;   // success
+
+fail:
+    free(result);
+
+    free(mac);
+
+    return 0;       // This shouldn't happen!
+}
+
+// Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure
+int psa_mac_sign_setup_wrapper(
+    uint8_t *in_params, size_t in_params_len,
+    uint8_t **out_params, size_t *out_params_len)
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation;
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg;
+
+    uint8_t *pos = in_params;
+    size_t remaining = in_params_len;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    int ok;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, &operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t(&pos, &remaining, &key);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_algorithm_t(&pos, &remaining, &alg);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    // Now we call the actual target function
+
+    status = psa_mac_sign_setup(
+        operation,
+        key,
+        alg
+        );
+
+    // NOTE: Should really check there is no overflow as we go along.
+    size_t result_size =
+        psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+        psasim_serialise_psa_status_t_needs(status) +
+        psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(operation);
+
+    result = malloc(result_size);
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_size;
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    *out_params = result;
+    *out_params_len = result_size;
+
+    return 1;   // success
+
+fail:
+    free(result);
+
+    return 0;       // This shouldn't happen!
+}
+
+// Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure
+int psa_mac_update_wrapper(
+    uint8_t *in_params, size_t in_params_len,
+    uint8_t **out_params, size_t *out_params_len)
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation;
+    uint8_t *input = NULL;
+    size_t input_length;
+
+    uint8_t *pos = in_params;
+    size_t remaining = in_params_len;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    int ok;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, &operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, &input, &input_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    // Now we call the actual target function
+
+    status = psa_mac_update(
+        operation,
+        input, input_length
+        );
+
+    // NOTE: Should really check there is no overflow as we go along.
+    size_t result_size =
+        psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+        psasim_serialise_psa_status_t_needs(status) +
+        psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(operation);
+
+    result = malloc(result_size);
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_size;
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    *out_params = result;
+    *out_params_len = result_size;
+
+    free(input);
+
+    return 1;   // success
+
+fail:
+    free(result);
+
+    free(input);
+
+    return 0;       // This shouldn't happen!
+}
+
+// Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure
+int psa_mac_verify_wrapper(
+    uint8_t *in_params, size_t in_params_len,
+    uint8_t **out_params, size_t *out_params_len)
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg;
+    uint8_t *input = NULL;
+    size_t input_length;
+    uint8_t *mac = NULL;
+    size_t mac_length;
+
+    uint8_t *pos = in_params;
+    size_t remaining = in_params_len;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    int ok;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t(&pos, &remaining, &key);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_algorithm_t(&pos, &remaining, &alg);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, &input, &input_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, &mac, &mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    // Now we call the actual target function
+
+    status = psa_mac_verify(
+        key,
+        alg,
+        input, input_length,
+        mac, mac_length
+        );
+
+    // NOTE: Should really check there is no overflow as we go along.
+    size_t result_size =
+        psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+        psasim_serialise_psa_status_t_needs(status);
+
+    result = malloc(result_size);
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_size;
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    *out_params = result;
+    *out_params_len = result_size;
+
+    free(input);
+    free(mac);
+
+    return 1;   // success
+
+fail:
+    free(result);
+
+    free(input);
+    free(mac);
+
+    return 0;       // This shouldn't happen!
+}
+
+// Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure
+int psa_mac_verify_finish_wrapper(
+    uint8_t *in_params, size_t in_params_len,
+    uint8_t **out_params, size_t *out_params_len)
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation;
+    uint8_t *mac = NULL;
+    size_t mac_length;
+
+    uint8_t *pos = in_params;
+    size_t remaining = in_params_len;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    int ok;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, &operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_buffer(&pos, &remaining, &mac, &mac_length);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    // Now we call the actual target function
+
+    status = psa_mac_verify_finish(
+        operation,
+        mac, mac_length
+        );
+
+    // NOTE: Should really check there is no overflow as we go along.
+    size_t result_size =
+        psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+        psasim_serialise_psa_status_t_needs(status) +
+        psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(operation);
+
+    result = malloc(result_size);
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_size;
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    *out_params = result;
+    *out_params_len = result_size;
+
+    free(mac);
+
+    return 1;   // success
+
+fail:
+    free(result);
+
+    free(mac);
+
+    return 0;       // This shouldn't happen!
+}
+
+// Returns 1 for success, 0 for failure
+int psa_mac_verify_setup_wrapper(
+    uint8_t *in_params, size_t in_params_len,
+    uint8_t **out_params, size_t *out_params_len)
+{
+    psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_mac_operation_t *operation;
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key;
+    psa_algorithm_t alg;
+
+    uint8_t *pos = in_params;
+    size_t remaining = in_params_len;
+    uint8_t *result = NULL;
+    int ok;
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_begin(&pos, &remaining);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&pos, &remaining, &operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t(&pos, &remaining, &key);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_deserialise_psa_algorithm_t(&pos, &remaining, &alg);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    // Now we call the actual target function
+
+    status = psa_mac_verify_setup(
+        operation,
+        key,
+        alg
+        );
+
+    // NOTE: Should really check there is no overflow as we go along.
+    size_t result_size =
+        psasim_serialise_begin_needs() +
+        psasim_serialise_psa_status_t_needs(status) +
+        psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(operation);
+
+    result = malloc(result_size);
+    if (result == NULL) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    uint8_t *rpos = result;
+    size_t rremain = result_size;
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_begin(&rpos, &rremain);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_serialise_psa_status_t(&rpos, &rremain, status);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    ok = psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(&rpos, &rremain, operation);
+    if (!ok) {
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    *out_params = result;
+    *out_params_len = result_size;
+
+    return 1;   // success
+
+fail:
+    free(result);
+
+    return 0;       // This shouldn't happen!
+}
+
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_call(psa_msg_t msg)
 {
     int ok = 0;
@@ -2370,6 +3070,38 @@ psa_status_t psa_crypto_call(psa_msg_t msg)
             ok = psa_import_key_wrapper(in_params, in_params_len,
                                         &out_params, &out_params_len);
             break;
+        case PSA_MAC_ABORT:
+            ok = psa_mac_abort_wrapper(in_params, in_params_len,
+                                       &out_params, &out_params_len);
+            break;
+        case PSA_MAC_COMPUTE:
+            ok = psa_mac_compute_wrapper(in_params, in_params_len,
+                                         &out_params, &out_params_len);
+            break;
+        case PSA_MAC_SIGN_FINISH:
+            ok = psa_mac_sign_finish_wrapper(in_params, in_params_len,
+                                             &out_params, &out_params_len);
+            break;
+        case PSA_MAC_SIGN_SETUP:
+            ok = psa_mac_sign_setup_wrapper(in_params, in_params_len,
+                                            &out_params, &out_params_len);
+            break;
+        case PSA_MAC_UPDATE:
+            ok = psa_mac_update_wrapper(in_params, in_params_len,
+                                        &out_params, &out_params_len);
+            break;
+        case PSA_MAC_VERIFY:
+            ok = psa_mac_verify_wrapper(in_params, in_params_len,
+                                        &out_params, &out_params_len);
+            break;
+        case PSA_MAC_VERIFY_FINISH:
+            ok = psa_mac_verify_finish_wrapper(in_params, in_params_len,
+                                               &out_params, &out_params_len);
+            break;
+        case PSA_MAC_VERIFY_SETUP:
+            ok = psa_mac_verify_setup_wrapper(in_params, in_params_len,
+                                              &out_params, &out_params_len);
+            break;
     }
 
     free(in_params);
diff --git a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_generate.pl b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_generate.pl
index b2a59b20f1..ea5088e7a5 100755
--- a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_generate.pl
+++ b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_generate.pl
@@ -2398,3 +2398,407 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
  */
 psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output,
                                  size_t output_size);
+
+/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message.
+ *
+ * \note To verify the MAC of a message against an
+ *       expected value, use psa_mac_verify() instead.
+ *       Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
+ *       MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
+ *       because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
+ *       about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess
+ *       a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls.
+ *
+ * \param key               Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
+ *                          must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
+ * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the input message.
+ * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac          Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.
+ * \param mac_size          Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac_length   On success, the number of bytes
+ *                          that make up the MAC value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ *         \p mac_size is too small
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+                             psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                             const uint8_t *input,
+                             size_t input_length,
+                             uint8_t *mac,
+                             size_t mac_size,
+                             size_t *mac_length);
+
+/** Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value.
+ *
+ * \param key               Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
+ *                          must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.
+ * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the input message.
+ * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] mac           Buffer containing the expected MAC value.
+ * \param mac_length        Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the input.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ *         The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
+ *         differs from the expected value.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+                            psa_algorithm_t alg,
+                            const uint8_t *input,
+                            size_t input_length,
+                            const uint8_t *mac,
+                            size_t mac_length);
+
+/** The type of the state data structure for multipart MAC operations.
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on a MAC operation object, the application must
+ * initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ *   \code
+ *   psa_mac_operation_t operation;
+ *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
+ *   \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ *   \code
+ *   psa_mac_operation_t operation = {0};
+ *   \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT,
+ *   for example:
+ *   \code
+ *   psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
+ *   \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function psa_mac_operation_init()
+ *   to the structure, for example:
+ *   \code
+ *   psa_mac_operation_t operation;
+ *   operation = psa_mac_operation_init();
+ *   \endcode
+ *
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
+ * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
+typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t;
+
+/** \def PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
+ *
+ * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a MAC operation object of type
+ * #psa_mac_operation_t.
+ */
+
+/** Return an initial value for a MAC operation object.
+ */
+static psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void);
+
+/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation.
+ *
+ * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC
+ * (message authentication code) of a byte string.
+ * To verify the MAC of a message against an
+ * expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ *    listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ *    documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
+ * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ *    of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
+ *    of the concatenation of these messages in order.
+ * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish
+ *    calculating the MAC value and retrieve it.
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the
+ * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The
+ * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods:
+ * - A successful call to psa_mac_sign_finish().
+ * - A call to psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ *                          been initialized as per the documentation for
+ *                          #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param key               Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
+ *                          must remain valid until the operation terminates.
+ *                          It must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
+ * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
+ *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+                                mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+                                psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation.
+ *
+ * This function sets up the verification of the MAC
+ * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ *    listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ *    documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
+ * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ *    of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
+ *    of the concatenation of these messages in order.
+ * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish
+ *    calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against
+ *    the expected value.
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the
+ * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The
+ * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods:
+ * - A successful call to psa_mac_verify_finish().
+ * - A call to psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ *                          been initialized as per the documentation for
+ *                          #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param key               Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
+ *                          must remain valid until the operation terminates.
+ *                          It must allow the usage
+ *                          PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.
+ * \param alg               The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ *                          such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *         \c key is not compatible with \c alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ *         \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ *         The key could not be retrieved from storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
+ *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+                                  mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+                                  psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup()
+ * before calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
+ * \param[in] input         Buffer containing the message fragment to add to
+ *                          the MAC calculation.
+ * \param input_length      Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
+ *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+                            const uint8_t *input,
+                            size_t input_length);
+
+/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function.
+ * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating
+ * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update().
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect
+ *          a specific value for the MAC. Call psa_mac_verify_finish() instead.
+ *          Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
+ *          MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
+ *          because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
+ *          about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess
+ *          a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
+ * \param[out] mac          Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.
+ * \param mac_size          Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac_length   On success, the number of bytes
+ *                          that make up the MAC value. This is always
+ *                          #PSA_MAC_LENGTH(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg)
+ *                          where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
+ *                          bit-size respectively of the key and \c alg is the
+ *                          MAC algorithm that is calculated.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ *         The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a
+ *         sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign
+ *         operation), or the library has not been previously initialized
+ *         by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+                                 uint8_t *mac,
+                                 size_t mac_size,
+                                 size_t *mac_length);
+
+/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with
+ * an expected value.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function.
+ * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating
+ * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). It then
+ * compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a
+ * parameter to this function.
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the
+ * comparison between the actual MAC and the expected MAC is performed
+ * in constant time.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
+ * \param[in] mac           Buffer containing the expected MAC value.
+ * \param mac_length        Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ *         The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ *         The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
+ *         differs from the expected MAC.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify
+ *         operation), or the library has not been previously initialized
+ *         by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+                                   const uint8_t *mac,
+                                   size_t mac_length);
+
+/** Abort a MAC operation.
+ *
+ * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
+ * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
+ * can be reused for another operation by calling
+ * psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() again.
+ *
+ * You may call this function any time after the operation object has
+ * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_mac_operation_t.
+ *
+ * In particular, calling psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been
+ * terminated by a call to psa_mac_abort(), psa_mac_sign_finish() or
+ * psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and has no effect.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ *         results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation);
diff --git a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.c b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.c
index 651e0468e2..0cd2e09f95 100644
--- a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.c
+++ b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.c
@@ -139,6 +139,44 @@ static ssize_t find_aead_slot_by_handle(psasim_client_handle_t handle)
     return -1;  /* not found */
 }
 
+static psa_mac_operation_t mac_operations[MAX_LIVE_HANDLES_PER_CLASS];
+static psasim_client_handle_t mac_operation_handles[MAX_LIVE_HANDLES_PER_CLASS];
+static psasim_client_handle_t next_mac_operation_handle = 1;
+
+/* Get a free slot */
+static ssize_t allocate_mac_operation_slot(void)
+{
+    psasim_client_handle_t handle = next_mac_operation_handle++;
+    if (next_mac_operation_handle == 0) {      /* wrapped around */
+        FATAL("Mac operation handle wrapped");
+    }
+
+    for (ssize_t i = 0; i < MAX_LIVE_HANDLES_PER_CLASS; i++) {
+        if (mac_operation_handles[i] == 0) {
+            mac_operation_handles[i] = handle;
+            return i;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ERROR("All slots are currently used. Unable to allocate a new one.");
+
+    return -1;  /* all in use */
+}
+
+/* Find the slot given the handle */
+static ssize_t find_mac_slot_by_handle(psasim_client_handle_t handle)
+{
+    for (ssize_t i = 0; i < MAX_LIVE_HANDLES_PER_CLASS; i++) {
+        if (mac_operation_handles[i] == handle) {
+            return i;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ERROR("Unable to find slot by handle %u", handle);
+
+    return -1;  /* not found */
+}
+
 size_t psasim_serialise_begin_needs(void)
 {
     /* The serialisation buffer will
@@ -679,6 +717,99 @@ int psasim_deserialise_psa_key_attributes_t(uint8_t **pos,
     return 1;
 }
 
+size_t psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(psa_mac_operation_t value)
+{
+    return sizeof(value);
+}
+
+int psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(uint8_t **pos,
+                                         size_t *remaining,
+                                         psa_mac_operation_t value)
+{
+    if (*remaining < sizeof(value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(*pos, &value, sizeof(value));
+    *pos += sizeof(value);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int psasim_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(uint8_t **pos,
+                                           size_t *remaining,
+                                           psa_mac_operation_t *value)
+{
+    if (*remaining < sizeof(*value)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(value, *pos, sizeof(*value));
+
+    *pos += sizeof(*value);
+    *remaining -= sizeof(*value);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+size_t psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(psa_mac_operation_t *operation)
+{
+    (void) operation;
+
+    /* We will actually return a handle */
+    return sizeof(psasim_operation_t);
+}
+
+int psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(uint8_t **pos,
+                                                size_t *remaining,
+                                                psa_mac_operation_t *operation)
+{
+    psasim_operation_t client_operation;
+
+    if (*remaining < sizeof(client_operation)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    ssize_t slot = operation - mac_operations;
+
+    client_operation.handle = mac_operation_handles[slot];
+
+    memcpy(*pos, &client_operation, sizeof(client_operation));
+    *pos += sizeof(client_operation);
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int psasim_server_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(uint8_t **pos,
+                                                  size_t *remaining,
+                                                  psa_mac_operation_t **operation)
+{
+    psasim_operation_t client_operation;
+
+    if (*remaining < sizeof(psasim_operation_t)) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    memcpy(&client_operation, *pos, sizeof(psasim_operation_t));
+    *pos += sizeof(psasim_operation_t);
+    *remaining -= sizeof(psasim_operation_t);
+
+    ssize_t slot;
+    if (client_operation.handle == 0) {         /* We need a new handle */
+        slot = allocate_mac_operation_slot();
+    } else {
+        slot = find_mac_slot_by_handle(client_operation.handle);
+    }
+
+    if (slot < 0) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    *operation = &mac_operations[slot];
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
 size_t psasim_serialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t_needs(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t value)
 {
     return sizeof(value);
@@ -720,4 +851,6 @@ void psa_sim_serialize_reset(void)
     memset(hash_operations, 0, sizeof(hash_operations));
     memset(aead_operation_handles, 0, sizeof(aead_operation_handles));
     memset(aead_operations, 0, sizeof(aead_operations));
+    memset(mac_operation_handles, 0, sizeof(mac_operation_handles));
+    memset(mac_operations, 0, sizeof(mac_operations));
 }
diff --git a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.h b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.h
index 537730c1f8..11de3d711a 100644
--- a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.h
+++ b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.h
@@ -583,6 +583,90 @@ int psasim_deserialise_psa_key_attributes_t(uint8_t **pos,
                                             size_t *remaining,
                                             psa_key_attributes_t *value);
 
+/** Return how much buffer space is needed by \c psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t()
+ *  to serialise a `psa_mac_operation_t`.
+ *
+ * \param value              The value that will be serialised into the buffer
+ *                           (needed in case some serialisations are value-
+ *                           dependent).
+ *
+ * \return                   The number of bytes needed in the buffer by
+ *                           \c psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t() to serialise
+ *                           the given value.
+ */
+size_t psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(psa_mac_operation_t value);
+
+/** Serialise a `psa_mac_operation_t` into a buffer.
+ *
+ * \param pos[in,out]        Pointer to a `uint8_t *` holding current position
+ *                           in the buffer.
+ * \param remaining[in,out]  Pointer to a `size_t` holding number of bytes
+ *                           remaining in the buffer.
+ * \param value              The value to serialise into the buffer.
+ *
+ * \return                   \c 1 on success ("okay"), \c 0 on error.
+ */
+int psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(uint8_t **pos,
+                                         size_t *remaining,
+                                         psa_mac_operation_t value);
+
+/** Deserialise a `psa_mac_operation_t` from a buffer.
+ *
+ * \param pos[in,out]        Pointer to a `uint8_t *` holding current position
+ *                           in the buffer.
+ * \param remaining[in,out]  Pointer to a `size_t` holding number of bytes
+ *                           remaining in the buffer.
+ * \param value              Pointer to a `psa_mac_operation_t` to receive the value
+ *                           deserialised from the buffer.
+ *
+ * \return                   \c 1 on success ("okay"), \c 0 on error.
+ */
+int psasim_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(uint8_t **pos,
+                                           size_t *remaining,
+                                           psa_mac_operation_t *value);
+
+/** Return how much buffer space is needed by \c psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t()
+ *  to serialise a `psa_mac_operation_t`.
+ *
+ * \param value              The value that will be serialised into the buffer
+ *                           (needed in case some serialisations are value-
+ *                           dependent).
+ *
+ * \return                   The number of bytes needed in the buffer by
+ *                           \c psasim_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t() to serialise
+ *                           the given value.
+ */
+size_t psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t_needs(psa_mac_operation_t *value);
+
+/** Serialise a `psa_mac_operation_t` into a buffer on the server side.
+ *
+ * \param pos[in,out]        Pointer to a `uint8_t *` holding current position
+ *                           in the buffer.
+ * \param remaining[in,out]  Pointer to a `size_t` holding number of bytes
+ *                           remaining in the buffer.
+ * \param value              The value to serialise into the buffer.
+ *
+ * \return                   \c 1 on success ("okay"), \c 0 on error.
+ */
+int psasim_server_serialise_psa_mac_operation_t(uint8_t **pos,
+                                                size_t *remaining,
+                                                psa_mac_operation_t *value);
+
+/** Deserialise a `psa_mac_operation_t` from a buffer on the server side.
+ *
+ * \param pos[in,out]        Pointer to a `uint8_t *` holding current position
+ *                           in the buffer.
+ * \param remaining[in,out]  Pointer to a `size_t` holding number of bytes
+ *                           remaining in the buffer.
+ * \param value              Pointer to a `psa_mac_operation_t` to receive the value
+ *                           deserialised from the buffer.
+ *
+ * \return                   \c 1 on success ("okay"), \c 0 on error.
+ */
+int psasim_server_deserialise_psa_mac_operation_t(uint8_t **pos,
+                                                  size_t *remaining,
+                                                  psa_mac_operation_t **value);
+
 /** Return how much buffer space is needed by \c psasim_serialise_mbedtls_svc_key_id_t()
  *  to serialise a `mbedtls_svc_key_id_t`.
  *
diff --git a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.pl b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.pl
index e89fafe0be..75f540b920 100755
--- a/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.pl
+++ b/tests/psa-client-server/psasim/src/psa_sim_serialise.pl
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ my @types = qw(unsigned-int int size_t
                psa_hash_operation_t
                psa_aead_operation_t
                psa_key_attributes_t
+               psa_mac_operation_t
                mbedtls_svc_key_id_t);
 
 grep(s/-/ /g, @types);