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https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git
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Merge pull request #6499 from xkqian/tls13_write_end_of_early_data
Tls13 write end of early data
This commit is contained in:
commit
834e65d47f
@ -533,7 +533,8 @@
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO 2
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS 8 // NEW IN TLS 1.3
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 5
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS 8
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE 11
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12
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#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
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@ -671,10 +672,12 @@ typedef enum {
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MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
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@ -961,9 +961,20 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
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MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl,
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buf_len,
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msg_len));
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mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO);
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}
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/*
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* Set next state. Note that if TLS 1.3 is proposed, this may be
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* overwritten by mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello().
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*/
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mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO);
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
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if (ssl->handshake->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 &&
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MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 <= ssl->tls_version) {
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ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(ssl);
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}
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#endif
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}
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cleanup:
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@ -2740,4 +2740,8 @@ static inline void mbedtls_ssl_session_clear_ticket_flags(
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
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int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
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#endif
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#endif /* ssl_misc.h */
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@ -893,7 +893,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext(
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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int configured_psk_count = 0;
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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psa_algorithm_t hash_alg;
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psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
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const unsigned char *identity;
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size_t identity_len;
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size_t l_binders_len = 0;
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@ -1092,6 +1092,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(buf, end, 2);
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selected_identity = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(buf, 0);
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ssl->handshake->selected_identity = (uint16_t) selected_identity;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("selected_identity = %d", selected_identity));
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@ -1118,6 +1119,16 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_pre_shared_key_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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return ret;
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}
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if (mbedtls_psa_translate_md(ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac)
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!= hash_alg) {
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
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1, ("Invalid ciphersuite for external psk."));
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MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
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MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
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}
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ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len);
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if (ret != 0) {
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret);
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@ -1211,6 +1222,80 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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return 0;
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}
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int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
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{
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((void) ssl);
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_NONE;
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const unsigned char *psk;
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size_t psk_len;
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const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
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if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) {
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
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mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
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ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO);
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#endif
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
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1, ("Set hs psk for early data when writing the first psk"));
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ret = ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk(ssl, &hash_alg, &psk, &psk_len);
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if (ret != 0) {
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
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1, "ssl_tls13_ticket_get_psk", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(ssl, psk, psk_len);
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if (ret != 0) {
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Early data are going to be encrypted using the ciphersuite
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* associated with the pre-shared key used for the handshake.
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* Note that if the server rejects early data, the handshake
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* based on the pre-shared key may complete successfully
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* with a selected ciphersuite different from the ciphersuite
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* associated with the pre-shared key. Only the hashes of the
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* two ciphersuites have to be the same. In that case, the
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* encrypted handshake data and application data are
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* encrypted using a different ciphersuite than the one used for
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* the rejected early data.
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*/
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ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
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ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite);
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ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
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/* Enable psk and psk_ephermal to make stage early happy */
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ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode =
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MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL;
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/* Start the TLS 1.3 key schedule:
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* Set the PSK and derive early secret.
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*/
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ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl);
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if (ret != 0) {
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
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1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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/* Derive early data key material */
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ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl);
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if (ret != 0) {
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
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1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Functions for parsing and processing Server Hello
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*/
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@ -1627,8 +1712,6 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(ssl, ciphersuite_info);
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handshake->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info;
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ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = cipher_suite;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("server hello, chosen ciphersuite: ( %04x ) - %s",
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cipher_suite, ciphersuite_info->name));
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@ -1824,8 +1907,39 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
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goto cleanup;
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
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if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) &&
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(handshake->selected_identity != 0 ||
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handshake->ciphersuite_info->id !=
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ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) {
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/* RFC8446 4.2.11
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* If the server supplies an "early_data" extension, the
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* client MUST verify that the server's selected_identity
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* is 0. If any other value is returned, the client MUST
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* abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
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*
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* RFC 8446 4.2.10
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* In order to accept early data, the server MUST have accepted a PSK
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* cipher suite and selected the first key offered in the client's
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* "pre_shared_key" extension. In addition, it MUST verify that the
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* following values are the same as those associated with the
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* selected PSK:
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* - The TLS version number
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* - The selected cipher suite
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* - The selected ALPN [RFC7301] protocol, if any
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*
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* We check here that when early data is involved the server
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* selected the cipher suite associated to the pre-shared key
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* as it must have.
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*/
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MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
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MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
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}
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#endif
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if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, handshake->key_exchange_mode)) {
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if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(
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ssl, handshake->key_exchange_mode)) {
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ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2,
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("Key exchange mode(%s) is not supported.",
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@ -1837,16 +1951,27 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
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("Selected key exchange mode: %s",
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ssl_tls13_get_kex_mode_str(handshake->key_exchange_mode)));
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/* Start the TLS 1.3 key schedule: Set the PSK and derive early secret.
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/* Start the TLS 1.3 key scheduling if not already done.
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*
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* TODO: We don't have to do this in case we offered 0-RTT and the
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* server accepted it. In this case, we could skip generating
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* the early secret. */
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ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl);
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if (ret != 0) {
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early",
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ret);
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goto cleanup;
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* If we proposed early data then we have already derived an
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* early secret using the selected PSK and its associated hash.
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* It means that if the negotiated key exchange mode is psk or
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* psk_ephemeral, we have already correctly computed the
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* early secret and thus we do not do it again. In all other
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* cases we compute it here.
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*/
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
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if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT ||
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handshake->key_exchange_mode ==
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MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL)
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#endif
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{
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ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early(ssl);
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if (ret != 0) {
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(
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1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_schedule_stage_early", ret);
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goto cleanup;
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}
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}
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ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl);
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@ -1859,6 +1984,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
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mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(ssl, handshake->transform_handshake);
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic"));
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ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = handshake->ciphersuite_info->id;
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ssl->session_in = ssl->session_negotiate;
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cleanup:
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@ -1889,6 +2015,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
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return ret;
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}
|
||||
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ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id;
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return 0;
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}
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@ -2108,6 +2235,44 @@ cleanup:
|
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||||
}
|
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|
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/*
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* Handler for MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
|
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*
|
||||
* RFC 8446 section 4.5
|
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*
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* struct {} EndOfEarlyData;
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If the server sent an "early_data" extension in EncryptedExtensions, the
|
||||
* client MUST send an EndOfEarlyData message after receiving the server
|
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* Finished. Otherwise, the client MUST NOT send an EndOfEarlyData message.
|
||||
*/
|
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||||
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
||||
static int ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||||
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
|
||||
size_t buf_len;
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("=> write EndOfEarlyData"));
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(
|
||||
ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
|
||||
&buf, &buf_len));
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(
|
||||
ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(ssl, buf_len, 0));
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write EndOfEarlyData"));
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* STATE HANDLING: CertificateRequest
|
||||
@ -2367,13 +2532,21 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
|
||||
if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) {
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA);
|
||||
} else if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) {
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
|
||||
ssl,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED);
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(
|
||||
ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -2789,6 +2962,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
ret = ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(ssl);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
|
||||
ret = ssl_tls13_write_end_of_early_data(ssl);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
|
||||
ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_certificate(ssl);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@ -2828,6 +3005,20 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE);
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
|
||||
if (ret == 0) {
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO);
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
|
||||
1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic"));
|
||||
mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(
|
||||
ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
||||
|
@ -1378,9 +1378,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||||
unsigned char hash_transcript[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE + 4];
|
||||
size_t hash_len;
|
||||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
|
||||
uint16_t cipher_suite = ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite;
|
||||
ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(cipher_suite);
|
||||
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
||||
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Reset SSL session for HRR"));
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
|
||||
transform_earlydata,
|
||||
ssl->conf->endpoint,
|
||||
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
|
||||
handshake->ciphersuite_info->id,
|
||||
&traffic_keys,
|
||||
ssl);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
@ -1699,7 +1699,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
|
||||
transform_handshake,
|
||||
ssl->conf->endpoint,
|
||||
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
|
||||
handshake->ciphersuite_info->id,
|
||||
&traffic_keys,
|
||||
ssl);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
@ -1789,7 +1789,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_application_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_populate_transform(
|
||||
transform_application,
|
||||
ssl->conf->endpoint,
|
||||
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite,
|
||||
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id,
|
||||
&traffic_keys,
|
||||
ssl);
|
||||
if (ret != 0) {
|
||||
|
@ -2100,7 +2100,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
||||
static int ssl_tls13_finalize_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
static int ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
||||
ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_handshake_transform(ssl);
|
||||
@ -2140,7 +2140,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(
|
||||
ssl, buf_len, msg_len));
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_finalize_write_server_hello(ssl));
|
||||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_finalize_server_hello(ssl));
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
|
||||
/* The server sends a dummy change_cipher_spec record immediately
|
||||
|
@ -275,14 +275,16 @@ requires_any_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_
|
||||
run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: EarlyData: basic check, good" \
|
||||
"$G_NEXT_SRV -d 10 --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:+ECDHE-PSK:+PSK --earlydata --disable-client-cert" \
|
||||
"$P_CLI debug_level=4 early_data=1 reco_mode=1 reconnect=1 reco_delay=900" \
|
||||
1 \
|
||||
0 \
|
||||
-c "Reconnecting with saved session" \
|
||||
-c "NewSessionTicket: early_data(42) extension received." \
|
||||
-c "ClientHello: early_data(42) extension exists." \
|
||||
-c "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension received." \
|
||||
-c "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension exists." \
|
||||
-c "<= write EndOfEarlyData" \
|
||||
-s "Parsing extension 'Early Data/42' (0 bytes)" \
|
||||
-s "Sending extension Early Data/42 (0 bytes)" \
|
||||
-s "END OF EARLY DATA (5) was received." \
|
||||
-s "early data accepted"
|
||||
|
||||
requires_gnutls_tls1_3
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user