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Remove ccm input validation.

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VALIDATE and VALIDATE_RET macros are obsolete.

Signed-off-by: Mateusz Starzyk <mateusz.starzyk@mobica.com>
This commit is contained in:
Mateusz Starzyk 2021-07-27 14:12:30 +02:00
parent ca9dc8d1d7
commit 5d97601e81
1 changed files with 0 additions and 25 deletions
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25
library/ccm.c
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@ -47,18 +47,12 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT)
#define CCM_VALIDATE_RET( cond ) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT )
#define CCM_VALIDATE( cond ) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE( cond )
/*
* Initialize context
*/
void mbedtls_ccm_init( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx )
{
CCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ccm_context ) );
}
@ -70,9 +64,6 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits,
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB );
if( cipher_info == NULL )
@ -201,13 +192,6 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_starts( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv,
size_t iv_len )
{
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT || \
mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT || \
mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || \
mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT );
/* Also implies q is within bounds */
if( iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
@ -250,8 +234,6 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
size_t plaintext_len,
size_t tag_len )
{
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
/*
* Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
* Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code.
@ -283,8 +265,6 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *add,
size_t add_len )
{
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx->add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
size_t olen, use_len, offset;
@ -337,16 +317,12 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
size_t *output_len )
{
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx->plaintext_len == 0 || input != NULL );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx->plaintext_len == 0 || output != NULL );
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
size_t use_len, offset, olen;
if( output_size < input_len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT );
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( output_length != NULL );
*output_len = input_len;
while ( input_len > 0 )
@ -421,7 +397,6 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_finish( mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
CCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag_len == 0 || tag != NULL );
/*
* Authentication: reset counter and crypt/mask internal tag
*/