From 5b13f60aa34128462fe8c60655100da3935c9734 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Mon, 5 Jul 2021 18:09:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Fix indentation Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- ChangeLog | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 2dc8c098f0..2ec0d8c8ac 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -302,15 +302,15 @@ Features PSA Cryptograpy API 1.0.0 specification. Security -* Fix a bias in the generation of finite-field Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) - private keys and of blinding values for DHM and elliptic curves (ECP) - computations. Reported by FlorianF89 in #4245. -* Fix a potential side channel vulnerability in ECDSA ephemeral key generation. - An adversary who is capable of very precise timing measurements could - learn partial information about the leading bits of the nonce used for the - signature, allowing the recovery of the private key after observing a - large number of signature operations. This completes a partial fix in - Mbed TLS 2.20.0. + * Fix a bias in the generation of finite-field Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) + private keys and of blinding values for DHM and elliptic curves (ECP) + computations. Reported by FlorianF89 in #4245. + * Fix a potential side channel vulnerability in ECDSA ephemeral key generation. + An adversary who is capable of very precise timing measurements could + learn partial information about the leading bits of the nonce used for the + signature, allowing the recovery of the private key after observing a + large number of signature operations. This completes a partial fix in + Mbed TLS 2.20.0. * An adversary with access to precise enough information about memory accesses (typically, an untrusted operating system attacking a secure enclave) could recover an RSA private key after observing the victim