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Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream/development' into make_tests_thread_safe

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Paul Elliott 2024-02-09 14:33:58 +00:00
commit 54ad01efed
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7
.github/pull_request_template.md vendored
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@ -18,3 +18,10 @@ Please tick as appropriate and edit the reasons (e.g.: "backport: not needed bec
Please refer to the [contributing guidelines](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/CONTRIBUTING.md), especially the
checklist for PR contributors.
Help make review efficient:
* Multiple simple commits
- please structure your PR into a series of small commits, each of which does one thing
* Avoid force-push
- please do not force-push to update your PR - just add new commit(s)
* See our [Guidelines for Contributors](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/reviews/review-for-contributors/) for more details about the review process.

8
3rdparty/everest/Makefile.inc vendored
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES+=-I../3rdparty/everest/include -I../3rdparty/everest/include/everest -I../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib
THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES+=-I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/include -I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/include/everest -I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/include/everest/kremlib
THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS+= \
../3rdparty/everest/library/everest.o \
../3rdparty/everest/library/x25519.o \
../3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.o
$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/library/everest.o \
$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/library/x25519.o \
$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.o

6
3rdparty/p256-m/Makefile.inc vendored
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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES+=-I../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/include -I../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/include/p256-m -I../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_interface
THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES+=-I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/p256-m/p256-m/include -I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/p256-m/p256-m/include/p256-m -I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/p256-m/p256-m_driver_interface
THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS+= \
../3rdparty/p256-m//p256-m_driver_entrypoints.o \
../3rdparty/p256-m//p256-m/p256-m.o
$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/p256-m//p256-m_driver_entrypoints.o \
$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/p256-m//p256-m/p256-m.o

2
BRANCHES.md
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@ -106,6 +106,6 @@ The following branches are currently maintained:
- [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/)
- [`mbedtls-2.28`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.28)
maintained until at least the end of 2024, see
<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.6>.
<https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/releases/tag/v2.28.7>.
Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch.

7
CMakeLists.txt
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@ -114,6 +114,11 @@ if(MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE)
endif()
# We now potentially need to link all executables against PThreads, if available
set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE)
set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE)
find_package(Threads)
# If this is the root project add longer list of available CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE values
if(CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR STREQUAL CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR)
set(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE ${CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE}
@ -381,7 +386,7 @@ if(NOT DISABLE_PACKAGE_CONFIG_AND_INSTALL)
write_basic_package_version_file(
"cmake/MbedTLSConfigVersion.cmake"
COMPATIBILITY SameMajorVersion
VERSION 3.5.1)
VERSION 3.5.2)
install(
FILES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake/MbedTLSConfig.cmake"

15
ChangeLog
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@ -1,5 +1,20 @@
Mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date)
= Mbed TLS 3.5.2 branch released 2024-01-26
Security
* Fix a timing side channel in private key RSA operations. This side channel
could be sufficient for an attacker to recover the plaintext. A local
attacker or a remote attacker who is close to the victim on the network
might have precise enough timing measurements to exploit this. It requires
the attacker to send a large number of messages for decryption. For
details, see "Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack", Hubert Kario. Reported
by Hubert Kario, Red Hat.
* Fix a failure to validate input when writing x509 extensions lengths which
could result in an integer overflow, causing a zero-length buffer to be
allocated to hold the extension. The extension would then be copied into
the buffer, causing a heap buffer overflow.
= Mbed TLS 3.5.1 branch released 2023-11-06
Changes

3
ChangeLog.d/7764.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Features
* Add functions mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa() and mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa()
to convert between Mbed TLS and PSA curve identifiers.

3
ChangeLog.d/7765.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Features
* Add functions mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() and mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw() to
convert ECDSA signatures between raw and DER (ASN.1) formats.

7
ChangeLog.d/8030.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
Changes
* Extended PSA Crypto configurations options for FFDH by making it possible
to select only some of the parameters / groups, with the macros
PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_XXXX. You now need to defined the corresponding macro
for each size you want to support. Also, if you have an FFDH accelerator,
you'll need to define the appropriate MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL macros to signal
support for these domain parameters.

4
ChangeLog.d/8060.txt
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@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
Features
* The CCM and GCM modules no longer depend on MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C. People who
use CCM and GCM but don't need the Cipher API can now disable
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C in order to save code size.

4
ChangeLog.d/8340.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Features
* Add functions mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type() and
mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg() to convert between mbedtls_md_type_t and
psa_algorithm_t.

8
ChangeLog.d/8357.txt
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@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
Features
* It is now possible to have AEADs support (CCM, GCM and ChaChaPoly) without
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C. This holds both for the builtin suport (MBEDTLS_CCM_C,
MBEDTLS_GCM_C and MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) as well as the PSA one
(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM, PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM, PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305).
On the PSA side this means that it is possible to enable
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C without MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C if none of the
non-authenticated ciphers is enabled.

4
ChangeLog.d/8461.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Bugfix
* Fix unsupported PSA asymmetric encryption and decryption
(psa_asymmetric_[en|de]crypt) with opaque keys.
Resolves #8461.

10
ChangeLog.d/8647.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
Default behavior changes
* psa_import_key() now only accepts RSA keys in the PSA standard formats.
The undocumented ability to import other formats (PKCS#8, SubjectPublicKey,
PEM) accepted by the pkparse module has been removed. Applications that
need these formats can call mbedtls_pk_parse_{public,}key() followed by
mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa().
Changes
* RSA support in PSA no longer auto-enables the pkparse and pkwrite modules,
saving code size when those are not otherwise enabled.

2
ChangeLog.d/8726.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
Features
* Add partial platform support for z/OS.

5
ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
Features
* Add support for record size limit extension as defined by RFC 8449
and configured with MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT.
Application data sent and received will be fragmented according to
Record size limits negotiated during handshake.

3
ChangeLog.d/ctr-perf.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Features
* Improve performance of AES-GCM, AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG when
hardware accelerated AES is not present (around 13-23% on 64-bit Arm).

8
ChangeLog.d/8358.txt → ChangeLog.d/driver-only-cipher.txt
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@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
Features
* If a cipher or AEAD mechanism has a PSA driver, you can now build the
library without the corresponding built-in implementation. See
library without the corresponding built-in implementation. Generally
speaking that requires both the key type and algorithm to be accelerated
or they'll both be built in. However, for CCM and GCM the built-in
implementation is able to take advantage of a driver that only
accelerates the key type (that is, the block cipher primitive). See
docs/driver-only-builds.md for full details and current limitations.
* It is possible to disable MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C in some circumstances, please
see docs/driver-only-builds.md for full details and current limitations.
* The CTR_DRBG module will now use AES from a PSA driver if MBEDTLS_AES_C is
disabled. This requires PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING in addition to
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES.

5
ChangeLog.d/ecp-keypair-utilities.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
Features
* Add utility functions to manipulate mbedtls_ecp_keypair objects, filling
gaps made by making its fields private: mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(),
mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(), mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(),
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(). Fixes #5017, #5441, #8367, #8652.

3
ChangeLog.d/fix-tls-SuiteB.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
* Remove accidental introduction of RSA signature algorithms
in TLS Suite B Profile. Fixes #8221.

3
ChangeLog.d/fix-tls13-server-min-version-check.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
* Fix TLS server accepting TLS 1.2 handshake while TLS 1.2
is disabled at runtime. Fixes #8593.

3
ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_incorrect_initial_capacity.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
Bugfix
* Correct initial capacities for key derivation algorithms:TLS12_PRF,
TLS12_PSK_TO_MS, PBKDF2-HMAC, PBKDF2-CMAC

2
ChangeLog.d/iar-gcc-perf.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
Features
* Improve performance for gcc (versions older than 9.3.0) and IAR.

4
ChangeLog.d/linux-aarch64-hwcap.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
Bugfix
* On Linux on ARMv8, fix a build error with SHA-256 and SHA-512
acceleration detection when the libc headers do not define the
corresponding constant. Reported by valord577.

9
ChangeLog.d/no-cipher.txt Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
Features
* Fewer modules depend on MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, making it possible to save code
size by disabling it in more circumstances. In particular, the CCM and
GCM modules no longer depend on MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C. Also,
MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO can now be enabled without MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C if all
unauthenticated (non-AEAD) ciphers are disabled, or if they're all
fully provided by drivers. See docs/driver-only-builds.md for full
details and current limitations; in particular, NIST_KW and PKCS5/PKCS12
decryption still unconditionally depend on MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C.

36
docs/architecture/psa-migration/md-cipher-dispatch.md
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@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg);
The job of this private function is to return 1 if `hash_alg` can be performed through PSA now, and 0 otherwise. It is only defined on algorithms that are enabled via PSA.
As a starting point, return 1 if PSA crypto has been initialized. This will be refined later (to return 1 if the [accelerator subsystem](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/6007) has been initialized).
As a starting point, return 1 if PSA crypto's driver subsystem has been initialized.
Usage note: for algorithms that are not enabled via PSA, calling `psa_can_do_hash` is generally safe: whether it returns 0 or 1, you can call a PSA hash function on the algorithm and it will return `PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED`.
@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ Note that this assumes that an operation that has been started via PSA can be co
#### Error code conversion
After calling a PSA function, call `mbedtls_md_error_from_psa` to convert its status code.
After calling a PSA function, MD light calls `mbedtls_md_error_from_psa` to convert its status code.
### Support all legacy algorithms in PSA
@ -566,14 +566,15 @@ The architecture can be extended to support `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` with a l
* Compile-time dependencies: instead of checking `defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)`, check `defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)`.
* Implementers of `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` will need to provide `psa_can_do_hash()` (or a more general function `psa_can_do`) alongside `psa_crypto_init()`. Note that at this point, it will become a public interface, hence we won't be able to change it at a whim.
### Internal "block cipher" abstraction (Cipher light)
### Internal "block cipher" abstraction (previously known as "Cipher light")
#### Definition
The new module is automatically enabled in `build_info.h` by modules that need
it, namely: CCM, GCM, only when `CIPHER_C` is not available. Note: CCM and GCM
currently depend on the full `CIPHER_C` (enforced by `check_config.h`); this
hard dependency would be replaced by the above auto-enablement.
The new module is automatically enabled in `config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h` by modules that need
it (namely: CCM, GCM) only when `CIPHER_C` is not available, or the new module
is needed for PSA dispatch (see next section). Note: CCM and GCM currently
depend on the full `CIPHER_C` (enforced by `check_config.h`); this hard
dependency would be replaced by the above auto-enablement.
The following API functions are offered:
```
@ -593,6 +594,23 @@ The only supported ciphers are AES, ARIA and Camellia. They are identified by
an `mbedtls_cipher_id_t` in the `setup()` function, because that's how they're
identifed by callers (GCM/CCM).
#### Cipher light dual dispatch
#### Block cipher dual dispatch
This is likely to come in the future, but has not been defined yet.
Support for dual dispatch in the new internal module `block_cipher` is extremely similar to that in MD light.
A block cipher context contains either a legacy module's context (AES, ARIA, Camellia) or a PSA key identifier; it has a field indicating which one is in use. All fields are private.
The `engine` field is almost redundant with knowledge about `type`. However, when an algorithm is available both via a legacy module and a PSA accelerator, we will choose based on the runtime availability of the accelerator when the context is set up. This choice needs to be recorded in the context structure.
Support is determined at runtime using the new internal function
```
int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg);
```
The job of this private function is to return 1 if `hash_alg` can be performed through PSA now, and 0 otherwise. It is only defined on algorithms that are enabled via PSA. As a starting point, return 1 if PSA crypto's driver subsystem has been initialized.
Each function in the module needs to know whether to dispatch via PSA or legacy. All functions consult the context's `engine` field, except `setup()` which will set it according to the key type and the return value of `psa_can_do_cipher()` as discussed above.
Note that this assumes that an operation that has been started via PSA can be completed. This implies that `mbedtls_psa_crypto_free` must not be called while an operation using PSA is in progress.
After calling a PSA function, `block_cipher` functions call `mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa` to convert its status code.

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Bridges between legacy and PSA crypto APIs
==========================================
## Introduction
### Goal of this document
This document explores the needs of applications that use both Mbed TLS legacy crypto interfaces and PSA crypto interfaces. Based on [requirements](#requirements), we [analyze gaps](#gap-analysis) and [API design](#api-design).
This is a design document. The target audience is library maintainers. See the companion document [“Transitioning to the PSA API”](../../psa-transition.md) for a user focus on the same topic.
### Keywords
* [TODO] A part of the analysis that isn't finished.
* [OPEN] Open question: a specific aspect of the design where there are several plausible decisions.
* [ACTION] A finalized part of the design that will need to be carried out.
### Context
Mbed TLS 3.x supports two cryptographic APIs:
* The legacy API `mbedtls_xxx` is inherited from PolarSSL.
* The PSA API `psa_xxx` was introduced in Mbed TLS 2.17.
Mbed TLS is gradually shifting from the legacy API to the PSA API. Mbed TLS 4.0 will be the first version where the PSA API is considered the main API, and large parts of the legacy API will be removed.
In Mbed TLS 4.0, the cryptography will be provided by a separate project [TF-PSA-Crypto](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto). For simplicity, in this document, we just refer to the whole as “Mbed TLS”.
### Document history
This document was originally written when preparing Mbed TLS 3.6. Mbed TLS 3.6 includes both PSA and legacy APIs covering largely overlapping ground. Many legacy APIs will be removed in Mbed TLS 4.0.
## Requirements
### Why mix APIs?
There is functionality that is tied to one API and is not directly available in the other API:
* Only PSA fully supports PSA accelerators and secure element integration.
* Only PSA supports isolating cryptographic material in a secure service.
* The legacy API has features that are not present (yet) in PSA, notably parsing and formatting asymmetric keys.
The legacy API can partially leverage PSA features via `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`, but this has limited scope.
In addition, many applications cannot be migrated in a single go. For large projects, it is impractical to rewrite a significant part of the code all at once. (For example, Mbed TLS itself will have taken more than 6 years to transition.) Projects that use one or more library in addition to Mbed TLS must follow the evolution of these libraries, each of which might have its own pace.
### Where mixing happens
Mbed TLS can be, and normally is, built with support for both APIs. Therefore no special effort is necessary to allow an application to use both APIs.
Special effort is necessary to use both APIs as part of the implementation of the same feature. From an informal analysis of typical application requirements, we identify four parts of the use of cryptography which can be provided by different APIs:
* Metadata manipulation: parsing and producing encrypted or signed files, finding mutually supported algorithms in a network protocol negotiation, etc.
* Key management: parsing, generating, deriving and formatting cryptographic keys.
* Data manipulation other than keys. In practice, most data formats within the scope of the legacy crypto APIs are trivial (ciphertexts, hashes, MACs, shared secrets). The one exception is ECDSA signatures.
* Cryptographic operations: hash, sign, encrypt, etc.
From this, we deduce the following requirements:
* Convert between PSA and legacy metadata.
* Creating a key with the legacy API and consuming it in the PSA API.
* Creating a key with the PSA API and consuming it in the legacy API.
* Manipulating data formats, other than keys, where the PSA API is lacking.
### Scope limitations
The goal of this document is to bridge the legacy API and the PSA API. The goal is not to provide a PSA way to do everything that is currently possible with the legacy API. The PSA API is less flexible in some regards, and extending it is out of scope in the present study.
With respect to the legacy API, we do not consider functionality of low-level modules for individual algorithms. Our focus is on applications that use high-level legacy crypto modules (md, cipher, pk) and need to combine that with uses of the PSA APIs.
## Gap analysis
The document [“Transitioning to the PSA API”](../../psa-transition.md) enumerates the public header files in Mbed TLS 3.4 and the API elements (especially enums and functions) that they provide, listing PSA equivalents where they exist. There are gaps in two cases:
* Where the PSA equivalents do not provide the same functionality. A typical example is parsing and formatting asymmetric keys.
* To convert between data representations used by legacy APIs and data representations used by PSA APIs.
Based on “[Where mixing happens](#where-mixing-happens)”, we focus the gap analysis on two topics: metadata and keys. This chapter explores the gaps in each family of cryptographic mechanisms.
### Generic metadata gaps
#### Need for error code conversion
Do we need public functions to convert between `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx` error codes and `PSA_ERROR_xxx` error codes? We have such functions for internal use.
Mbed TLS needs these conversions because it has many functions that expose one API (legacy/API) but are implemented on top of the other API. Most applications would convert legacy and PSA error code to their own error codes, and converting between `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx` error codes and `PSA_ERROR_xxx` is not particularly helpful for that. Application code might need such conversion functions when implementing an X.509 or TLS callback (returning `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx`) on top of PSA functions, but this is a very limited use case.
Conclusion: no need for public error code conversion functions.
### Hash gap analysis
Hashes do not involve keys, and involves no nontrivial data format. Therefore the only gap is with metadata, namely specifying a hash algorithm.
Hashes are often used as building blocks for other mechanisms (HMAC, signatures, key derivation, etc.). Therefore metadata about hashes is relevant not only when calculating hashes, but also when performing many other cryptographic operations.
Gap: functions to convert between `psa_algorithm_t` hash algorithms and `mbedtls_md_type_t`. Such functions exist in Mbed TLS 3.5 (`mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type`, `mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg`) but they are declared only in private headers.
### MAC gap analysis
[TODO]
### Cipher and AEAD gap analysis
[TODO]
### Key derivation gap analysis
[TODO]
### Random generation gap analysis
[TODO]
### Asymmetric cryptography gap analysis
#### Asymmetric cryptography metadata
The legacy API only has generic support for two key types: RSA and ECC, via the pk module. ECC keys can also be further classified according to their curve. The legacy API also supports DHM (Diffie-Hellman-Merkle = FFDH: finite-field Diffie-Hellman) keys, but those are not integrated in the pk module.
An RSA or ECC key can potentially be used for different algorithms in the scope of the pk module:
* RSA: PKCS#1v1.5 signature, PSS signature, PKCS#1v1.5 encryption, OAEP encryption.
* ECC: ECDSA signature (randomized or deterministic), ECDH key agreement (via `mbedtls_pk_ec`).
ECC keys are also involved in EC-JPAKE, but this happens internally: the EC-JPAKE interface only needs one piece of metadata, namely, to identify a curve.
Since there is no algorithm that can be used with multiple types, and PSA keys have a policy that (for the most part) limits them to one algorithm, there does not seem to be a need to convert between legacy and PSA asymmetric key types on their own. The useful metadata conversions are:
* Selecting an **elliptic curve**.
This means converting between an `mbedtls_ecp_group_id` and a pair of `{psa_ecc_family_t; size_t}`.
This is fulfilled by `mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa` and `mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa`, which were introduced into the public API between Mbed TLS 3.5 and 3.6 ([#8664](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8664)).
* Selecting A **DHM group**.
PSA only supports predefined groups, whereas legacy only supports ad hoc groups. An existing application referring to `MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHExxx` values would need to refer to `PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919`; an existing application using arbitrary groups cannot migrate to PSA.
* Simultaneously supporting **a key type and an algorithm**.
On the legacy side, this is an `mbedtls_pk_type_t` value and more. For ECDSA, the choice between randomized and deterministic is made at compile time. For RSA, the choice of encryption or signature algorithm is made either by configuring the underlying `mbedtls_rsa_context` or when calling the operation function.
On the PSA side, this is a `psa_key_type_t` value and an algorithm which is normally encoded as policy information in a `psa_key_attributes_t`. The algorithm is also needed in its own right when calling operation functions.
#### Using a legacy key pair or public key with PSA
There are several scenarios where an application has a legacy key pair or public key (`mbedtls_pk_context`) and needs to create a PSA key object (`psa_key_id_t`).
Reasons for first creating a legacy key object, where it's impossible or impractical to directly create a PSA key:
* A very common case where the input is a legacy key object is parsing. PSA does not (yet) have an equivalent of the `mbedtls_pk_parse_xxx` functions.
* The PSA key creation interface is less flexible in some cases. In particular, PSA RSA key generation does not (yet) allow choosing the public exponent.
* The pk object may be created by a part of the application (or a third-party library) that hasn't been migrated to the PSA API yet.
Reasons for needing a PSA key object:
* Using the key with third-party interface that takes a PSA key identifier as input. (Mbed TLS itself has a few TLS functions that take PSA key identifiers, but as of Mbed TLS 3.5, it is always possible to use a legacy key instead.)
* Benefiting from a PSA accelerator, or from PSA's world separation, even without `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`. (Not a priority scenario: we generally expect people to activate `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` at an early stage of their migration to PSA.)
Gap: a way to create a PSA key object from an `mbedtls_pk_context`. This partially exists in the form of `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`, but it is not fully satisfactory, for reasons that are detailed in “[API to create a PSA key from a PK context](#api-to-create-a-psa-key-from-a-pk-context)” below.
#### Using a PSA key as a PK context
There are several scenarios where an application has a PSA key and needs to use it through an interface that wants an `mbedtls_pk_context` object. Typically, there is an existing key in the PSA key store (possibly in a secure element and non-exportable), and the key needs to be used in an interface that requires a `mbedtls_pk_context *` input, such as Mbed TLS's X.509 and TLS APIs or a similar third-party interface, or the `mbedtls_pk_write_xxx` interfaces which do not (yet) have PSA equivalents.
There is a function `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` that mostly does this. However, it has several limitations:
* It creates a PK key of type `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE` that wraps the PSA key. This is good enough in some scenarios, but not others. For example, it's ok for pkwrite, because we've upgraded the pkwrite code to handle `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. That doesn't help users of third-party libraries that haven't yet been upgraded.
* It ties the lifetime of the PK object to the PSA key, which is error-prone: if the PSA key is destroyed but the PK object isn't, there is no way to reliably detect any subsequent misuse of the PK object.
* It is only available under `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`. This is not a priority concern, since we generally expect people to activate `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` at an early stage of their migration to PSA. However, this function is useful to use specific PSA keys in X.509/TLS regardless of whether X.509/TLS use the PSA API for all cryptographic operations, so this is a wart in the current API.
It therefore appears that we need two ways to “convert” a PSA key to PK:
* Wrapping, which is what `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` does. This works for any PSA key but is limited by the key's lifetime and creates a PK object with limited functionality.
* Copying, which requires a new function. This requires an exportable key but creates a fully independent, fully functional PK object.
Gap: a way to copy a PSA key into a PK context. This can only be expected to work if the PSA key is exportable.
After some discussion, have not identified anything we want to change in the behavior of `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque`. We only want to generalize it to non-`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` and to document it better.
#### Signature formats
The pk module uses signature formats intended for X.509. The PSA module uses the simplest sensible signature format.
* For RSA, the formats are the same.
* For ECDSA, PSA uses a fixed-size concatenation of (r,s), whereas X.509 and pk use an ASN.1 DER encoding of the sequence (r,s).
Gap: We need APIs to convert between these two formats. The conversion code already exists under the hood, but it's in pieces that can't be called directly.
There is a design choice here: do we provide conversions functions for ECDSA specifically, or do we provide conversion functions that take an algorithm as argument and just happen to be a no-op with RSA? One factor is plausible extensions. These conversions functions will remain useful in Mbed TLS 4.x and perhaps beyond. We will at least add EdDSA support, and its signature encoding is the fixed-size concatenation (r,s) even in X.509. We may well also add support for some post-quantum signatures, and their concrete format is still uncertain.
Given the uncertainty, it would be nice to provide a sufficiently generic interface to convert between the PSA and the pk signature format, parametrized by the algorithm. However, it is difficult to predict exactly what parameters are needed. For example, converting from an ASN.1 ECDSA signature to (r,s) requires the knowledge of the curve, or at least the curve's size. Therefore we are not going to add a generic function at this stage.
For ECDSA, there are two plausible APIs: follow the ASN.1/X.509 write/parse APIs, or present an ordinary input/output API. The ASN.1 APIs are the way they are to accommodate nested TLV structures. But ECDSA signatures do not appear nested in TLV structures in either TLS (there's just a signature field) or X.509 (the signature is inside a BITSTRING, not directly in a SEQUENCE). So there does not seem to be a need for an ASN.1-like API for the ASN.1 format, just the format conversion itself in a buffer that just contains the signature.
#### Asymmetric cryptography TODO
[TODO] Other gaps?
## New APIs
This section presents new APIs to implement based on the [gap analysis](#gap-analysis).
### General notes
Each action to implement a function entails:
* Implement the library function.
* Document it precisely, including error conditions.
* Unit-test it.
* Mention it where relevant in the PSA transition guide.
### Hash APIs
Based on the [gap analysis](#hash-gap-analysis):
[ACTION] [#8340](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/8340) Move `mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type` and `mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg` from `library/md_psa.h` to `include/mbedtls/md.h`.
### MAC APIs
[TODO]
### Cipher and AEAD APIs
[TODO]
### Key derivation APIs
[TODO]
### Random generation APIs
[TODO]
### Asymmetric cryptography APIs
#### Asymmetric cryptography metadata APIs
Based on the [gap analysis](#asymmetric-cryptography-metadata):
* No further work is needed about RSA specifically. The amount of metadata other than hashes is sufficiently small to be handled in ad hoc ways in applications, and hashes have [their own conversions](#hash-apis).
* No further work is needed about ECC specifically. We have just added adequate functions.
* No further work is needed about DHM specifically. There is no good way to translate the relevant information.
* [OPEN] Is there a decent way to convert between `mbedtls_pk_type_t` plus extra information, and `psa_key_type_t` plus policy information? The two APIs are different in crucial ways, with different splits between key type, policy information and operation algorithm.
Thinking so far: there isn't really a nice way to present this conversion. For a specific key, `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` and `mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa` do the job.
#### API to create a PSA key from a PK context
Based on the [gap analysis](#using-a-legacy-key-pair-or-public-key-with-psa):
Given an `mbedtls_pk_context`, we want a function that creates a PSA key with the same key material and algorithm. “Same key material” is straightforward, but “same algorithm” is not, because a PK context has incomplete algorithm information. For example, there is no way to distinguish between an RSA key that is intended for signature or for encryption. Between algorithms of the same nature, there is no way to distinguish a key intended for PKCS#1v1.5 and one intended for PKCS#1v2.1 (OAEP/PSS): this is indicated in the underlying RSA context, but the indication there is only a default that can be overridden by calling `mbedtls_pk_{sign,verify}_ext`. Also there is no way to distinguish between `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)` and `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW`: in the legacy interface, this is only determined when actually doing a signature/verification operation. Therefore the function that creates the PSA key needs extra information to indicate which algorithm to put in the key's policy.
When creating a PSA key, apart from the key material, the key is determined by attributes, which fall under three categories:
* Type and size. These are directly related to the key material and can be deduced from it if the key material is in a structured format, which is the case with an `mbedtls_pk_context` input.
* Policy. This includes the chosen algorithm, which as discussed above cannot be fully deduced from the `mbedtls_pk_context` object. Just choosing one algorithm is problematic because it doesn't allow implementation-specific extensions, such as Mbed TLS's enrollment algorithm. The intended usage flags cannot be deduced from the PK context either, but the conversion function could sensibly just enable all the relevant usage flags. Users who want a more restrictive usage can call `psa_copy_key` and `psa_destroy_key` to obtain a PSA key object with a more restrictive usage.
* Persistence and location. This is completely orthogonal to the information from the `mbedtls_pk_context` object. It is convenient, but not necessary, for the conversion function to allow customizing these aspects. If it doesn't, users can call the conversion function and then call `psa_copy_key` and `psa_destroy_key` to move the key to its desired location.
To allow the full flexibility around policies, and make the creation of a persistent key more convenient, the conversion function shall take a `const psa_key_attributes_t *` input, like all other functions that create a PSA key. In addition, there shall be a helper function to populate a `psa_key_attributes_t` with a sensible default. This lets the caller choose a more flexible, or just different usage policy, unlike the default-then-copy approach which only allows restricting the policy.
This is close to the existing function `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`, but does not bake in the implementation-specific consideration that a PSA key has exactly two algorithms, and also allows the caller to benefit from default for the policy in more cases.
[ACTION] [#8708](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/8708) Implement `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` and `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` as described below. These functions are available whenever `MBEDTLS_PK_C` and `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` are both defined. Deprecate `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`.
```
int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
psa_key_usage_flags_t usage,
psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id);
```
* `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` does not change the id/lifetime fields of the attributes (which indicate a volatile key by default).
* [OPEN] Or should it reset them to 0? Resetting is more convenient for the case where the pk key is a `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. But that's an uncommon use case. It's probably less surprising if this function leaves the lifetime-related alone, since its job is to set the type-related and policy-related attributes.
* `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets the type and size based on what's in the pk context.
* The key type is a key pair if the context contains a private key and the indicated usage is a private-key usage. The key type is a public key if the context only contains a public key, in which case a private-key usage is an error.
* `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets the usage flags based on the `usage` parameter. It extends the usage to other usage that is possible:
* `EXPORT` and `COPY` are always set.
* If `SIGN_{HASH,MESSAGE}` is set then so is `VERIFY_{HASH,MESSAGE}`.
* If `DECRYPT` is set then so is `ENCRYPT`.
* It is an error if `usage` has more than one flag set, or has a usage that is incompatible with the key type.
* `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets the algorithm usage policy based on information in the key object and on `usage`.
* For an RSA key with the `MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15` padding mode, the algorithm policy is `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)` for a sign/verify usage, and `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT` for an encrypt/decrypt usage.
* For an RSA key with the `MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21` padding mode, the algorithm policy is `PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)` for a sign/verify usage, and `PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash)` for an encrypt/decrypt usage where `hash` is from the RSA key's parameters. (Note that `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` is only allowed in signature algorithms.)
* For an `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` or `MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA` with a sign/verify usage, the algorithm policy is `PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA` if `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC` is enabled and `PSA_ALG_ECDSA` otherwise. In either case, the hash policy is `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH`.
* For an `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` or `MBEDTLS_PK_ECDKEY_DH` with the usage `PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE`, the algorithm is `PSA_ALG_ECDH`.
* For a `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`, this function reads the attributes of the existing PK key and copies them (without overriding the lifetime and key identifier in `attributes`), then applies a public-key restriction if needed.
* Public-key restriction: if `usage` is a public-key usage, change the type to the corresponding public-key type, and remove private-key usage flags from the usage flags read from the existing key.
* `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` checks that the type field in the attributes is consistent with the content of the `mbedtls_pk_context` object (RSA/ECC, and availability of the private key).
* The key type can be a public key even if the private key is available.
* `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` does not need to check the bit-size in the attributes: `psa_import_key` will do enough checks.
* `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` does not check that the policy in the attributes is sensible. That's on the user.
#### API to copy a PSA key to a PK context
Based on the [gap analysis](#using-a-psa-key-as-a-pk-context):
[ACTION] [#8709](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/8709) Implement `mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa` as described below.
```
int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id,
mbedtls_pk_context *pk);
```
* `pk` must be initialized, but not set up.
* It is an error if the key is neither a key pair nor a public key.
* It is an error if the key is not exportable.
* The resulting pk object has a transparent type, not `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. That's `MBEDTLS_PK_RSA` for RSA keys (since pk objects don't use `MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS` as a type), and `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` for ECC keys (following the example of pkparse).
* Once this function returns, the pk object is completely independent of the PSA key.
* Calling `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt` on the resulting pk context will perform an algorithm that is compatible with the PSA key's primary algorithm policy (`psa_get_key_algorithm`) if that is a matching operation type (sign/verify, encrypt/decrypt), but with no restriction on the hash (as if the policy had `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` instead of a specific hash, and with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW` merged with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)`).
* For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will be based on the compile-time setting `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC`, like `mbedtls_pk_sign` today.
* For an RSA key, the output key will allow both encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify regardless of the original key's policy. The original key's policy determines the output key's padding mode.
* The primary intent of this requirement is to allow an application to switch to PSA for creating the key material (for example to benefit from a PSA accelerator driver, or to start using a secure element), without modifying the code that consumes the key. For RSA keys, the PSA primary algorithm policy is how one conveys the same information as RSA key padding information in the legacy API. Convey this in the documentation.
#### API to create a PK object that wraps a PSA key
Based on the [gap analysis](#using-a-psa-key-as-a-pk-context):
[ACTION] [#8712](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/8712) Clarify the documentation of `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` regarding which algorithms the resulting key will perform with `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt`.
[ACTION] [#8710](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/8710) Provide `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` whenever `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` is enabled, not just when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled. This is nice-to-have, not critical. Update `use-psa-crypto.md` accordingly.
[OPEN] What about `mbedtls_pk_sign_ext` and `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext`?
#### API to convert between signature formats
Based on the [gap analysis](#signature-formats):
[ACTION] [#7765](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7765) Implement `mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der` and `mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw` as described below.
```
int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits,
const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len,
unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len);
int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits,
const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len,
unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len);
```
* These functions convert between the signature format used by `mbedtls_pk_{sign,verify}{,_ext}` and the signature format used by `psa_{sign,verify}_{hash,message}`.
* The input and output buffers can overlap.
* The `bits` parameter is necessary in the DER-to-raw direction because the DER format lacks leading zeros, so something else needs to convey the size of (r,s). The `bits` parameter is redundant in the raw-to-DER direction, but we have it anyway because [it helps catch errors](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8681#discussion_r1445980971), and it isn't a burden on the caller because the information is readily available in practice.
* Should these functions rely on the ASN.1 module? We experimented [calling ASN.1 functions](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8681), [reimplementing simpler ASN.1 functions](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8696), and [providing the functions from the ASN.1 module](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8703). Providing the functions from the ASN.1 module [won on a compromise of code size and simplicity](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7765#issuecomment-1893670015).

60
docs/driver-only-builds.md
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@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ driver.
In order to have some mechanism provided only by a driver, you'll want
the following compile-time configuration options enabled:
- `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C` (enabled by default) - this enables PSA Crypto.
- `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` (disabled by default) - this makes PK, X.509 and
TLS use PSA Crypto. You need to enable this if you're using PK, X.509 or TLS
@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ mechanism through the PSA API in Mbed
TLS](proposed/psa-conditional-inclusion-c.md) for details.
In addition, for each mechanism you want provided only by your driver:
- Define the corresponding `PSA_WANT` macro in `psa/crypto_config.h` - this
means the algorithm will be available in the PSA Crypto API.
- Define the corresponding `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL` in your build. This could be
@ -52,9 +54,12 @@ Mechanisms covered
------------------
For now, only the following (families of) mechanisms are supported:
- hashes: SHA-3, SHA-2, SHA-1, MD5, etc.
- elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC): ECDH, ECDSA, EC J-PAKE, ECC key types.
- finite-field Diffie-Hellman: FFDH algorithm, DH key types.
- RSA: PKCS#1 v1.5 and v2.1 signature and encryption algorithms, RSA key types
(for now, only crypto, no X.509 or TLS support).
- AEADs:
- GCM and CCM with AES, ARIA and Camellia key types
- ChachaPoly with ChaCha20 Key type
@ -71,15 +76,13 @@ work in the same way as if the mechanisms where built-in, except as documented
in the "Limitations" sub-sections of the sections dedicated to each family
below.
Currently (mid-2023) we don't have plans to extend this to RSA. If
you're interested in driver-only support for RSA, please let us know.
Hashes
------
It is possible to have all hash operations provided only by a driver.
More precisely:
- you can enable `PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256` without `MBEDTLS_SHA256_C`, provided
you have `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256` enabled;
- and similarly for all supported hash algorithms: `MD5`, `RIPEMD160`,
@ -98,6 +101,7 @@ considerations](#general-considerations) above.
If you want to check at compile-time whether a certain hash algorithm is
available in the present build of Mbed TLS, regardless of whether it's
provided by a driver or built-in, you should use the following macros:
- for code that uses only the PSA Crypto API: `PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx` from
`psa/crypto.h`;
- for code that uses non-PSA crypto APIs: `MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_xxx` from
@ -107,10 +111,12 @@ Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC)
---------------------------------
It is possible to have most ECC operations provided only by a driver:
- the ECDH, ECDSA and EC J-PAKE algorithms;
- key import, export, and random generation.
More precisely, if:
- you have driver support for ECC public and using private keys (that is,
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY` and
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC` are enabled), and
@ -119,6 +125,7 @@ More precisely, if:
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_xxx` macros is enabled as well);
then you can:
- enable `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH` without `MBEDTLS_ECDH_C`, provided
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH` is enabled
- enable `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA` without `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C`, provided
@ -127,6 +134,7 @@ then you can:
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE` is enabled.
In addition, if:
- none of `MBEDTLS_ECDH_C`, `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C`, `MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C` are enabled
(see conditions above), and
- you have driver support for all enabled ECC key pair operations - that is,
@ -138,9 +146,11 @@ then you can also disable `MBEDTLS_ECP_C`. However, a small subset of it might
still be included in the build, see limitations sub-section below.
In addition, if:
- `MBEDTLS_ECP_C` is fully removed (see limitation sub-section below), and
- support for RSA key types and algorithms is fully disabled, and
- support for DH key types and the FFDH algorithm is either disabled, or
- `MBEDTLS_ECP_C` is fully removed (see limitation sub-section below),
- and support for RSA key types and algorithms is either fully disabled or
fully provided by a driver,
- and support for DH key types and the FFDH algorithm is either disabled or
fully provided by a driver,
then you can also disable `MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C`.
@ -148,6 +158,7 @@ then you can also disable `MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C`.
In such builds, all crypto operations via the PSA Crypto API will work as
usual, as well as the PK, X.509 and TLS modules if `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is
enabled, with the following exceptions:
- direct calls to APIs from the disabled modules are not possible;
- PK, X.509 and TLS will not support restartable ECC operations (see
limitation sub-section below).
@ -155,6 +166,7 @@ enabled, with the following exceptions:
If you want to check at compile-time whether a certain curve is available in
the present build of Mbed TLS, regardless of whether ECC is provided by a
driver or built-in, you should use the following macros:
- for code that uses only the PSA Crypto API: `PSA_WANT_ECC_xxx` from
`psa/crypto.h`;
- for code that may also use non-PSA crypto APIs: `MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_xxx` from
@ -170,6 +182,7 @@ automatically defined when enabling `MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED`.
A limited subset of `ecp.c` will still be automatically re-enabled if any of
the following is enabled:
- `MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED` - support for parsing ECC keys where the
public part is in compressed format;
- `MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED` - support for parsing ECC keys where the
@ -243,12 +256,37 @@ The same holds for the associated algorithm:
`[PSA_WANT|MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL]_ALG_FFDH` allow builds accelerating FFDH and
removing builtin support (i.e. `MBEDTLS_DHM_C`).
RSA
---
It is possible for all RSA operations to be provided only by a driver.
More precisely, if:
- all the RSA algorithms that are enabled (`PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_*`) are also
accelerated (`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_*`),
- and all the RSA key types that are enabled (`PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_*`) are
also accelerated (`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_*`),
then you can disable `MBEDTLS_RSA_C`, `MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15` and
`MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21`, and RSA will still work in PSA Crypto.
### Limitations on RSA acceleration
Unlike other mechanisms, for now in configurations with driver-only RSA, only
PSA Crypto works. In particular, PK, X.509 and TLS will _not_ work with
driver-only RSA even if `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled.
Currently (early 2024) we don't have plans to extend this support. If you're
interested in wider driver-only support for RSA, please let us know.
Ciphers (unauthenticated and AEAD)
----------------------------------
It is possible to have all ciphers and AEAD operations provided only by a
driver. More precisely, for each desired combination of key type and
algorithm/mode you can:
- Enable desired PSA key type(s):
- `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES`,
- `PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA`,
@ -305,6 +343,7 @@ some non-PSA APIs will be absent or have reduced functionality, see
Some legacy modules can't take advantage of PSA drivers yet, and will either
need to be disabled, or have reduced features when the built-in implementations
of some ciphers are removed:
- `MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C` needs built-in AES: it must be disabled when
`MBEDTLS_AES_C` is disabled.
- `MBEDTLS_CMAC_C` needs built-in AES/DES: it must be disabled when
@ -329,6 +368,7 @@ restrictions, see [Disabling `MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C`](#disabling-mbedtls_cipher_c).
Note that the relationship between legacy (i.e. `MBEDTLS_xxx_C`) and PSA
(i.e. `PSA_WANT_xxx`) symbols is not always 1:1. For example:
- ECB mode is always enabled in the legacy configuration for each key type that
allows it (AES, ARIA, Camellia, DES), whereas it must be explicitly enabled
in PSA with `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING`.
@ -349,9 +389,12 @@ from PSA acceleration of the underlying block cipher by enabling support for
ECB mode (`PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING` + `MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING`)
together with desired key type(s) (`PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_[AES|ARIA|CAMELLIA]` +
`MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_[AES|ARIA|CAMELLIA]`).
In such configurations it is possible to:
- Use CCM and GCM via the PSA Crypto APIs.
- Use CCM and GCM via legacy functions (`mbedtls_[ccm|gcm]_xxx()`).
- Use CCM and GCM via legacy functions `mbedtls_[ccm|gcm]_xxx()` (but not the
legacy functions `mbedtls_cipher_xxx()`).
- Disable legacy key types (`MBEDTLS_[AES|ARIA|CAMELLIA]_C`) if there is no
other dependency requiring them.
@ -362,6 +405,7 @@ algorithm) in order to work with a driver.
The legacy CTR-DRBG module (enabled by `MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C`) can also benefit
from PSA acceleration if both of the following conditions are met:
- The legacy AES module (`MBEDTLS_AES_C`) is not enabled and
- AES is supported on the PSA side together with ECB mode, i.e.
`PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES` + `PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING`.
@ -370,6 +414,7 @@ from PSA acceleration if both of the following conditions are met:
It is possible to save code size by disabling MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C when all of the
following conditions are met:
- The application is not using the `mbedtls_cipher_` API.
- In PSA, all unauthenticated (that is, non-AEAD) ciphers are either disabled or
fully accelerated (that is, all compatible key types are accelerated too).
@ -379,6 +424,7 @@ following conditions are met:
a driver.)
In such a build, everything will work as usual except for the following:
- Encryption/decryption functions from the PKCS5 and PKCS12 module will not be
available (only key derivation functions).
- Parsing of PKCS5- or PKCS12-encrypted keys in PK parse will fail.

10
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@ -443,6 +443,10 @@ The equivalent to `mbedtls_md_type_t` and `MBEDTLS_MD_XXX` constants is the type
| `MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384` | `PSA_ALG_SHA3_384` |
| `MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512` | `PSA_ALG_SHA3_512` |
The following helper functions can be used to convert between the 2 types:
- `mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type()` converts from legacy `mbedtls_md_type_t` to PSA's `psa_algorithm_t`.
- `mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg()` converts from PSA's `psa_algorithm_t` to legacy `mbedtls_md_type_t`.
### MAC mechanism selection
PSA Crypto has a generic API with the same functions for all MAC mechanisms. The mechanism is determined by a combination of an algorithm value of type [`psa_algorithm_t`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1gac2e4d47f1300d73c2f829a6d99252d69) and a key type value of type [`psa_key_type_t`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1ga63fce6880ca5933b5d6baa257febf1f6).
@ -725,7 +729,11 @@ An ECC public key has the type [`PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve)`](https://mb
An ECC key pair has the type [`PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1ga0b6f5d4d5037c54ffa850d8059c32df0) where `curve` is a curve family identifier. A key with this type can be used both for private-key and public-key operations (there is no separate key type for a private key without the corresponding public key).
You can always use a private key for operations on the corresponding public key (as long as the policy permits it).
A curve is fully determined by a curve family identifier and the private key size in bits. The following table gives the correspondence between legacy and PSA elliptic curve designations.
A curve is fully determined by a curve family identifier and the private key size in bits. You can use the following functions to convert between the PSA and legacy elliptic curve designations:
- [`mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa()`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__psa__tls__helpers/#group__psa__tls__helpers_1ga9c83c095adfec7da99401cf81e164f99) converts from the legacy curve type identifier to PSA curve family and bit-size.
- [`mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa()`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__psa__tls__helpers/#group__psa__tls__helpers_1ga6243eb619d5b2f5fe4667811adeb8a12) converts from PSA curve family and bit-size to the legacy identifier.
The following table gives the correspondence between legacy and PSA elliptic curve designations.
| Mbed TLS legacy curve identifier | PSA curve family | Curve bit-size |
| -------------------------------- | ---------------- | -------------- |

4
docs/redirects.yaml
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@ -7,5 +7,5 @@
# expose it.
- type: exact
from_url: /projects/api/en/latest/$rest
to_url: /projects/api/en/development/
from_url: /projects/api/en/latest/*
to_url: /projects/api/en/development/:splat

2
doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h
View File

@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
*/
/**
* @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.5.1 API Documentation
* @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.5.2 API Documentation
*
* This documentation describes the internal structure of Mbed TLS. It was
* automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in

4
doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
PROJECT_NAME = "Mbed TLS v3.5.1"
PROJECT_NAME = "Mbed TLS v3.5.2"
OUTPUT_DIRECTORY = ../apidoc/
FULL_PATH_NAMES = NO
OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C = YES
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ EXTRACT_ALL = YES
EXTRACT_PRIVATE = YES
EXTRACT_STATIC = YES
CASE_SENSE_NAMES = NO
INPUT = ../include input
INPUT = ../include input ../tests/include/alt-dummy
FILE_PATTERNS = *.h
RECURSIVE = YES
EXCLUDE_SYMLINKS = YES

5
include/mbedtls/asn1.h
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@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data {
}
mbedtls_asn1_named_data;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
/**
* \brief Get the length of an ASN.1 element.
* Updates the pointer to immediately behind the length.
@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_len(unsigned char **p,
int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *len, int tag);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
/**

5
include/mbedtls/asn1write.h
View File

@ -36,7 +36,8 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
/**
* \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format.
*
@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
*/
int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
unsigned char tag);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C)
/**

18
include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h
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@ -24,6 +24,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/camellia.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
#include "psa/crypto_types.h"
#endif
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
@ -35,8 +39,22 @@ typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */
} mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t;
/**
* Used internally to indicate whether a context uses legacy or PSA.
*
* Internal use only.
*/
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY = 0,
MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA,
} mbedtls_block_cipher_engine_t;
typedef struct {
mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
mbedtls_block_cipher_engine_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(engine);
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_key_id);
#endif
union {
unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)

16
include/mbedtls/build_info.h
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@ -26,16 +26,16 @@
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 3
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 5
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 1
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 2
/**
* The single version number has the following structure:
* MMNNPP00
* Major version | Minor version | Patch version
*/
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03050100
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.5.1"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.5.1"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03050200
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.5.2"
#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.5.2"
/* Macros for build-time platform detection */
@ -83,6 +83,14 @@
#endif
#endif
#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \
&& !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER)
/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */
#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC
#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \
(__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__)
#endif
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE)
#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1
#endif

10
include/mbedtls/ccm.h
View File

@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h"
#endif
@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context {
#MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or
#MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or
#MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#else
mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#endif
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< Working value holding context's
state. Used for chunked data input */
@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_ccm_finish(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
/**
* \brief The CCM checkup routine.
*

10
include/mbedtls/check_config.h
View File

@ -324,13 +324,15 @@
#endif
#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && ( \
!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \
!(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA))
#error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && ( \
!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \
!(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA))
#error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
#endif

10
include/mbedtls/cipher.h
View File

@ -678,7 +678,6 @@ int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
{
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0);
if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
@ -698,7 +697,6 @@ static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(
static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
{
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE);
if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE;
}
@ -719,7 +717,6 @@ static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(
static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
{
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0);
if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
@ -743,8 +740,6 @@ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size(
static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
{
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(
ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE);
if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE;
}
@ -764,7 +759,6 @@ static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type(
static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
{
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0);
if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
return 0;
}
@ -784,8 +778,6 @@ static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name(
static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
{
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(
ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE);
if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE;
}
@ -805,8 +797,6 @@ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(
static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation(
const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
{
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(
ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE);
if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE;
}

115
include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
View File

@ -22,11 +22,18 @@
#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H
#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H
/* GCM_C and CCM_C can either depend on (in order of preference) CIPHER_C or
* BLOCK_CIPHER_C. If the former is not defined, auto-enable the latter. */
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C
/* Auto-enable CIPHER_C when any of the unauthenticated ciphers is builtin
* in PSA. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG))
#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
#endif
/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT based on MBEDTLS_MD_C.
@ -165,6 +172,88 @@
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT */
/* BLOCK_CIPHER module can dispatch to PSA when:
* - PSA is enabled and drivers have been initialized
* - desired key type is supported on the PSA side
* If the above conditions are not met, but the legacy support is enabled, then
* BLOCK_CIPHER will dynamically fallback to it.
*
* In case BLOCK_CIPHER is defined (see below) the following symbols/helpers
* can be used to define its capabilities:
* - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA: there is at least 1 key type between AES,
* ARIA and Camellia which is supported through a driver;
* - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_xxx_VIA_PSA: xxx key type is supported through a
* driver;
* - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_xxx_VIA_LEGACY: xxx key type is supported through
* a legacy module (i.e. MBEDTLS_xxx_C)
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_LEGACY
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_LEGACY
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_LEGACY
#endif
/* Helpers to state that BLOCK_CIPHER module supports AES, ARIA and/or Camellia
* block ciphers via either PSA or legacy. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_LEGACY)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_AES
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_LEGACY)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_ARIA
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_LEGACY)
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_CAMELLIA
#endif
/* GCM_C and CCM_C can either depend on (in order of preference) BLOCK_CIPHER_C
* or CIPHER_C. The former is auto-enabled when:
* - CIPHER_C is not defined, which is also the legacy solution;
* - BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA because in this case BLOCK_CIPHER can take advantage
* of the driver's acceleration.
*/
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)) && \
(!defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA))
#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C
#endif
/* Helpers for GCM/CCM capabilities */
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_AES))
#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_ARIA))
#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA
#endif
#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_CAMELLIA))
#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA
#endif
/* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT is auto-enabled by the following symbols:
* - MBEDTLS_ECP_C because now it consists of MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT plus functions
* for curve arithmetic. As a consequence if MBEDTLS_ECP_C is required for
@ -235,15 +324,6 @@
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
/* The PK wrappers need pk_write/pk_parse functions to format RSA key objects
* when they are dispatching to the PSA API. This happens under MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO,
* and even under just MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C in psa_crypto_rsa.c. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
#define MBEDTLS_PK_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
#endif
/* Helpers to state that each key is supported either on the builtin or PSA side. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1
@ -311,6 +391,13 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY
#endif
/* psa_util file features some ECDSA conversion functions, to convert between
* legacy's ASN.1 DER format and PSA's raw one. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)))
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA
#endif
/* Some internal helpers to determine which keys are availble. */
#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \
(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES))

345
include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h
View File

@ -47,139 +47,65 @@
*/
/* ECC: curves: is acceleration complete? */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)
#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256))
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)
#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448))
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
#endif
/* ECC: algs: is acceleration complete? */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE)
#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE))
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS
#endif
/* ECC: key types: is acceleration complete? */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES
#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC))
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES
#endif
/* Special case: we don't support cooked key derivation in drivers yet */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE
#endif
/* Note: the condition is always true as DERIVE can't be accelerated yet */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
/* Note: the condition about key derivation is always true as DERIVE can't be
* accelerated yet */
#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE))
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES
#endif
@ -386,8 +312,6 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif /* missing accel */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
@ -396,8 +320,6 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif /* missing accel */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
@ -405,8 +327,6 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif /* missing accel */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
@ -414,8 +334,6 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif /* missing accel */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */
@ -423,8 +341,6 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif /* missing accel */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
@ -433,20 +349,149 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif /* missing accel */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif
/* End of ECC section */
/*
* DH key types follow the same pattern used above for EC keys. They are defined
* by a triplet (group, key_type, alg). A triplet is accelerated if all its
* component are accelerated, otherwise each component needs to be builtin.
*/
/* DH: groups: is acceleration complete? */
#if (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192))
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS
#endif
/* DH: algs: is acceleration complete? */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS
#endif
/* DH: key types: is acceleration complete? */
#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE))
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */
/* End of DH section */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF)
/*
@ -634,46 +679,12 @@
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C
#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
#define MBEDTLS_PK_C
#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */
@ -692,11 +703,6 @@
#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE 1
#endif
#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM)) || \
(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM))
#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD 1
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 1
@ -709,8 +715,7 @@
#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES */
#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD)
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
#define MBEDTLS_AES_C
#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */
@ -721,8 +726,7 @@
#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */
#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD)
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */
@ -733,8 +737,7 @@
#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */
#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) || \
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_AEAD)
defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE)
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */

11
include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h
View File

@ -81,13 +81,22 @@
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#define PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)

1
include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h
View File

@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \

159
include/mbedtls/debug.h
View File

@ -149,165 +149,8 @@ extern "C" {
*/
void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(int threshold);
/**
* \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used
* through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl
* context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the message has occurred in
* \param line line number the message has occurred at
* \param format format specifier, in printf format
* \param ... variables used by the format specifier
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *format, ...) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6);
/**
* \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This
* function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro,
* which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param text the name of the function that returned the error
* \param ret the return code value
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *text, int ret);
/**
* \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function
* is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro,
* which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the
* variable or buffer name
* \param buf the buffer to be outputted
* \param len length of the buffer
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line, const char *text,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
/**
* \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always
* used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the
* ssl context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the
* variable name
* \param X the MPI variable
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
/**
* \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always
* used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the
* ssl context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the
* variable name
* \param X the ECP point
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
/**
* \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This
* function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro,
* which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param text a name or label for the certificate being output
* \param crt X.509 certificate structure
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
#endif
/* Note: the MBEDTLS_ECDH_C guard here is mandatory because this debug function
only works for the built-in implementation. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z,
} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr;
/**
* \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug
* output. This function is always used through the
* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file
* and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param ecdh the ECDH context
* \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh,
mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED &&
MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* debug.h */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H */

111
include/mbedtls/ecp.h
View File

@ -1259,9 +1259,56 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng);
/** \brief Set the public key in a key pair object.
*
* \note This function does not check that the point actually
* belongs to the given group. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey()
* on \p Q before calling this function to check that.
*
* \note This function does not check that the public key matches
* the private key that is already in \p key, if any.
* To check the consistency of the resulting key pair object,
* call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() after setting both
* the public key and the private key.
*
* \param grp_id The ECP group identifier.
* \param key The key pair object. It must be initialized.
* If its group has already been set, it must match \p grp_id.
* If its group has not been set, it will be set to \p grp_id.
* If the public key has already been set, it is overwritten.
* \param Q The public key to copy. This must be a point on the
* curve indicated by \p grp_id.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p key does not
* match \p grp_id.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for
* the group is not implemented.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q);
/**
* \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key.
*
* \note This function does not set the public key in the
* key pair object. Without a public key, the key pair object
* cannot be used with operations that require the public key.
* Call mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public() to set the public
* key from the private key. Alternatively, you can call
* mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key() to set the public key part,
* and then optionally mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() to check
* that the private and public parts are consistent.
*
* \note If a public key has already been set in the key pair
* object, this function does not check that it is consistent
* with the private key. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv()
* after setting both the public key and the private key
* to make that check.
*
* \param grp_id The ECP group identifier.
* \param key The destination key.
* \param buf The buffer containing the binary representation of the
@ -1299,6 +1346,32 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
/**
* \brief This function exports an elliptic curve public key.
*
* \param key The public key.
* \param format The point format. This must be either
* #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED.
* (For groups without these formats, this parameter is
* ignored. But it still has to be either of the above
* values.)
* \param olen The address at which to store the length of
* the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
* of length \p buflen Bytes.
* \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer
* is too small to hold the point.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format
* or the export for the given group is not implemented.
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int format, size_t *olen,
unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
/**
* \brief This function checks that the keypair objects
* \p pub and \p prv have the same group and the
@ -1323,16 +1396,48 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
/** \brief Calculate the public key from a private key in a key pair.
*
* \param key A keypair structure. It must have a private key set.
* If the public key is set, it will be overwritten.
* \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
* \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c
* NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
*
* \return \c 0 on success. The key pair object can be used for
* operations that require the public key.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX
* error code on calculation failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
/** \brief Query the group that a key pair belongs to.
*
* \param key The key pair to query.
*
* \return The group ID for the group registered in the key pair
* object.
* This is \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if no group has been set
* in the key pair object.
*/
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key);
/**
* \brief This function exports generic key-pair parameters.
*
* Each of the output parameters can be a null pointer
* if you do not need that parameter.
*
* \param key The key pair to export from.
* \param grp Slot for exported ECP group.
* It must point to an initialized ECP group.
* It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP group.
* \param d Slot for the exported secret value.
* It must point to an initialized mpi.
* It must either be null or point to an initialized mpi.
* \param Q Slot for the exported public value.
* It must point to an initialized ECP point.
* It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP point.
*
* \return \c 0 on success,
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.

8
include/mbedtls/gcm.h
View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h"
#endif
@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ extern "C" {
* \brief The GCM context structure.
*/
typedef struct mbedtls_gcm_context {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#else
mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
#endif
uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(HL)[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable low. */
uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(HH)[16]; /*!< Precalculated HTable high. */

6
include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
View File

@ -2579,6 +2579,8 @@
* library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
* library/ssl_msg.c
* library/ssl_ticket.c (unless MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled)
* Auto-enabled by: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C depending on which ciphers are enabled
* (see the documentation of that option for details).
*
* Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers.
*/
@ -3168,7 +3170,9 @@
* Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C,
* or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C,
* or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG.
*
* Auto-enables: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C if any unauthenticated (ie, non-AEAD) cipher
* is enabled in PSA (unless it's fully accelerated, see
* docs/driver-only-builds.md about that).
*/
#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C

127
include/mbedtls/pk.h
View File

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif
@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context {
* inside the ecp_keypair structure
* - the following fields are used for all public key operations: signature
* verify, key pair check and key write.
* - For a key pair, priv_id contains the private key. For a public key,
* priv_id is null.
* Of course, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is not enabled, the legacy
* ecp_keypair structure is used for storing the public key and performing
* all the operations.
@ -484,6 +486,121 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg,
psa_key_usage_t usage);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
/**
* \brief Determine valid PSA attributes that can be used to
* import a key into PSA.
*
* The attributes determined by this function are suitable
* for calling mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa() to create
* a PSA key with the same key material.
*
* The typical flow of operations involving this function is
* ```
* psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
* int ret = mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(pk, &attributes);
* if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted
* // Tweak attributes if desired
* psa_key_id_t key_id = 0;
* ret = mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(pk, &attributes, &key_id);
* if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted
* ```
*
* \note This function does not support RSA-alt contexts
* (set up with mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt()).
*
* \param[in] pk The PK context to use. It must have been set up.
* It can either contain a key pair or just a public key.
* \param usage A single `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx` flag among the following:
* - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: \p pk must contain a
* key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a
* key pair type, and the usage policy will allow
* #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT as well as
* #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
* - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: \p pk must contain a
* key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a
* key pair type.
* - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: The output
* \p attributes will contain a public key type.
* - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: \p pk must contain a
* key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a
* key pair type, and the usage policy will allow
* #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH as well as
* #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH.
* - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: \p pk must contain a
* key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a
* key pair type, and the usage policy will allow
* #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE as well as
* #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
* - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: The output
* \p attributes will contain a public key type.
* - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: The output
* \p attributes will contain a public key type.
* \param[out] attributes
* On success, valid attributes to import the key into PSA.
* - The lifetime and key identifier are unchanged. If the
* attribute structure was initialized or reset before
* calling this function, this will result in a volatile
* key. Call psa_set_key_identifier() before or after this
* function if you wish to create a persistent key. Call
* psa_set_key_lifetime() before or after this function if
* you wish to import the key in a secure element.
* - The key type and bit-size are determined by the contents
* of the PK context. If the PK context contains a key
* pair, the key type can be either a key pair type or
* the corresponding public key type, depending on
* \p usage. If the PK context contains a public key,
* the key type is a public key type.
* - The key's policy is determined by the key type and
* the \p usage parameter. The usage always allows
* \p usage, exporting and copying the key, and
* possibly other permissions as documented for the
* \p usage parameter.
* The permitted algorithm policy is determined as follows
* based on the #mbedtls_pk_type_t type of \p pk,
* the chosen \p usage and other factors:
* - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA whose underlying
* #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
* #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
* if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and
* #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT
* if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT.
* - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA whose underlying
* #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode
* #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 and the digest type
* corresponding to the PSA algorithm \c hash:
* #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
* if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and
* #PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(\c hash)
* if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT.
* - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: not supported.
* - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY
* if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY:
* #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
* if #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is enabled,
* otherwise #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH).
* - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY
* if \p usage is DERIVE:
* #PSA_ALG_ECDH.
* - #MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: same as the primary algorithm
* set for the underlying PSA key, except that
* sign/decrypt flags are removed if the type is
* set to a public key type.
* The underlying key must allow \p usage.
* Note that the enrollment algorithm set with
* psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm() is not copied.
*
* \return 0 on success.
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if \p pk does not contain
* a key of the type identified in \p attributes.
* Another error code on other failures.
*/
int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
psa_key_usage_t usage,
psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
/**
* \brief Verify signature (including padding if relevant).
*
@ -1042,14 +1159,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const mbedtls_pk_context *key);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */
/*
* Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you
* know you do.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Turn an EC or RSA key into an opaque one.

1
include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h
View File

@ -41,7 +41,6 @@
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
/**

4
include/mbedtls/platform_util.h
View File

@ -23,10 +23,6 @@
extern "C" {
#endif
/* Internal macros meant to be called only from within the library. */
#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, ret) do { } while (0)
#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) do { } while (0)
/* Internal helper macros for deprecating API constants. */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)

123
include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
View File

@ -16,6 +16,11 @@
#include "psa/crypto.h"
/* ASN1 defines used in the ECDSA conversion functions.
* Note: intentionally not adding MBEDTLS_ASN1_[PARSE|WRITE]_C guards here
* otherwise error codes would be unknown in test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data.*/
#include <mbedtls/asn1write.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
/* Expose whatever RNG the PSA subsystem uses to applications using the
@ -109,46 +114,116 @@ extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state;
#include <mbedtls/ecp.h>
/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA.
*
* \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of
* Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice.
*
* \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier
* (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`).
* \param[out] bits On success, the bit size of the curve.
* \param[out] bits On success the bit size of the curve; 0 on failure.
*
* \return The corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier
* (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`).
* \return \c 0 on failure (\p grpid is not recognized).
* \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function
* returns the proper PSA curve identifier
* (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). This holds even if the curve is
* not supported by the ECP module.
* \return \c 0 if the curve is not supported in the PSA API.
*/
psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid,
size_t *bits);
/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS.
*
* \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of
* Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice.
*
* \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier
* \param family A PSA elliptic curve family identifier
* (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`).
* \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve.
* \param bits_is_sloppy If true, \p bits may be the bit-length rounded up
* to the nearest multiple of 8. This allows the caller
* to infer the exact curve from the length of a key
* which is supplied as a byte string.
*
* \return The corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier
* (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \c curve is not recognized.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \p bits is not
* correct for \p curve.
* \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function
* returns the corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve
* identifier (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if the combination of \c curve
* and \p bits is not supported.
*/
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve,
size_t bits,
int bits_is_sloppy);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family,
size_t bits);
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
/**
* \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier
* associated with the given digest type.
*
* \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE.
*
* \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will
* not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm.
*
* \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is
* supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
*
* \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type,
* regardless of whether it is supported or not.
*/
static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type)
{
return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type;
}
/**
* \brief This function returns the given digest type
* associated with the PSA algorithm identifier.
*
* \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for.
*
* \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is
* supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
*
* \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg,
* regardless of whether it is supported or not.
*/
static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg)
{
return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
/** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format to DER ASN.1 format.
*
* \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits.
* \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format.
* \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. This must be
* PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes.
* \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER
* output. It can overlap with raw buffer.
* \param der_size Size of \p der in bytes. It is enough if \p der_size
* is at least the size of the actual output. (The size
* of the output can vary depending on the presence of
* leading zeros in the data.) You can use
* #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(\p bits) to determine a
* size that is large enough for all signatures for a
* given value of \p bits.
* \param[out] der_len On success it contains the amount of valid data
* (in bytes) written to \p der. It's undefined
* in case of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len,
unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len);
/** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format to raw format.
*
* \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits.
* \param der Buffer that contains the signature in DER format.
* \param der_len Size of \p der in bytes.
* \param[out] raw Buffer that will be filled with the converted raw
* signature. It can overlap with der buffer.
* \param raw_size Size of \p raw in bytes. Must be at least
* 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes.
* \param[out] raw_len On success it is updated with the amount of valid
* data (in bytes) written to \p raw. It's undefined
* in case of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len,
unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */
/**@}*/
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */

9
include/mbedtls/rsa.h
View File

@ -684,6 +684,10 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 decryption
* operation.
*
* \warning When \p ctx->padding is set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15,
* mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() is called, which is an
* inherently dangerous function (CWE-242).
*
* \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be
* as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N (for example,
* 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used) to be able to hold an
@ -720,6 +724,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
* \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
* operation (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-DECRYPT).
*
* \warning This is an inherently dangerous function (CWE-242). Unless
* it is used in a side channel free and safe way (eg.
* implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246),
* the calling code is vulnerable.
*
* \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be
* as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for example,
* 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to hold an

217
include/mbedtls/ssl.h
View File

@ -90,8 +90,18 @@
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x7B00
/** Not possible to read early data */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA -0x7B80
/**
* Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake.
* This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early
* data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API.
* This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(),
* mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if
* early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they
* triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data().
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA -0x7C00
/** Not possible to write early data */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA -0x7C00
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA -0x7C80
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
@ -343,6 +353,26 @@
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000
/*
* Whether early data record should be discarded or not and how.
*
* The client has indicated early data and the server has rejected them.
* The server has then to skip past early data by either:
* - attempting to deprotect received records using the handshake traffic
* key, discarding records which fail deprotection (up to the configured
* max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully,
* it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the
* server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake.
* - skipping all records with an external content type of
* "application_data" (indicating that they are encrypted), up to the
* configured max_early_data_size. This is the expected behavior if the
* server has sent an HelloRetryRequest message. The server ignores
* application data message before 2nd ClientHello.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD 2
/**
* \name SECTION: Module settings
*
@ -447,7 +477,7 @@
/*
* TLS 1.3 signature algorithms
* RFC 8446, Section 4.2.2
* RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3
*/
/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
@ -1188,6 +1218,11 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_session {
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
/*!< RecordSizeLimit received from the peer */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)
uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(record_size_limit);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(exported);
/** TLS version negotiated in the session. Used if and when renegotiating
@ -1639,6 +1674,18 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
*/
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
* Status of the negotiation of the use of early data.
* See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() for more
* information.
*
* Reset to #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT when the context is
* reset.
*/
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_status);
#endif
unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
@ -1755,6 +1802,16 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
* within a single datagram. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/*
* One of:
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD
*/
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(discard_early_data_record);
#endif
/*
* Record layer (outgoing data)
*/
@ -1836,10 +1893,6 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
* and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_status);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
/** Callback to export key block and master secret */
mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_export_keys);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_keys); /*!< context for key export callback */
@ -1988,7 +2041,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport);
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
/**
* \brief Set the early data mode
* Default: disabled on server and client
@ -1996,14 +2049,24 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode);
* \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
* \param early_data_enabled can be:
*
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED: early data functionality is disabled
* This is the default on client and server.
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED:
* Early data functionality is disabled. This is the default on client and
* server.
*
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED: early data functionality is enabled and
* may be negotiated in the handshake. Application using
* early data functionality needs to be aware of the
* lack of replay protection of the early data application
* payloads.
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED:
* Early data functionality is enabled and may be negotiated in the handshake.
* Application using early data functionality needs to be aware that the
* security properties for early data (also refered to as 0-RTT data) are
* weaker than those for other kinds of TLS data. See the documentation of
* mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() and mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() for more
* information.
* When early data functionality is enabled on server and only in that case,
* the call to one of the APIs that trigger or resume an handshake sequence,
* namely mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(),
* mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() may return with the error code
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA indicating that some early data have
* been received. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
* before calling the original function again.
*
* \warning This interface is experimental and may change without notice.
*
@ -2043,7 +2106,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size(
mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
@ -3751,6 +3814,8 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
* used for certificate signature are controlled by the
* verification profile, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile().
*
* \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs().
*
* \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
* (preferred hash first).
*
@ -3775,13 +3840,16 @@ void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/**
* \brief Configure allowed signature algorithms for use in TLS 1.3
* \brief Configure allowed signature algorithms for use in TLS
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
* \param sig_algs List of allowed IANA values for TLS 1.3 signature algorithms,
* terminated by \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE. The list must remain
* available throughout the lifetime of the conf object. Supported
* values are available as \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_XXXX
* terminated by #MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE. The list must remain
* available throughout the lifetime of the conf object.
* - For TLS 1.3, values of \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_XXXX should be
* used.
* - For TLS 1.2, values should be given as
* "(HashAlgorithm << 8) | SignatureAlgorithm".
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const uint16_t *sig_algs);
@ -4723,6 +4791,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use
* and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in
* this case you must stop using the context (see below).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
* defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
* received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
* and may occur only if the early data feature has been
* enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
* documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
* to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
* \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
* the context (see below).
*
@ -4731,7 +4806,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
* you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
* and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
* on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
@ -4800,8 +4876,9 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
*
* \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, you must stop using
* the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it
* or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
* re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
@ -4869,6 +4946,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server
* side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a
* new connection using the same source port. See below.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
* defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
* received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
* and may occur only if the early data feature has been
* enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
* documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
* to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
* \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
* the context (see below).
*
@ -4877,8 +4961,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
* you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
* and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
* on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
@ -4943,6 +5028,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
* operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
* in this case you must call this function again to complete
* the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
* defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
* received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
* and may occur only if the early data feature has been
* enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
* documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
* to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
* \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
* the context (see below).
*
@ -4950,8 +5042,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
* a non-negative value,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
* you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
* and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
* on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
@ -5019,48 +5112,46 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes while performing
* the handshake (early data).
* \brief Read at most 'len' bytes of early data
*
* \note This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_read(). The
* specification of mbedtls_ssl_read() relevant to TLS 1.3
* (thus not the parts specific to (D)TLS 1.2) applies to this
* function and the present documentation is restricted to the
* differences with mbedtls_ssl_read().
* \note This API is server specific.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446.
* IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification:
*
* The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than
* those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically:
* - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted
* solely under keys derived using the offered PSK.
* - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections.
* Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data
* is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data
* does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has
* weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the
* data is authenticated either with TLS client
* authentication or inside the application protocol. The
* same warnings apply to any use of the
* early_exporter_master_secret.
*
* \note This function is used in conjunction with
* mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(),
* mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() to read early
* data when these functions return
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA.
*
* \param ssl SSL context, it must have been initialized and set up.
* \param buf buffer that will hold the data
* \param len maximum number of bytes to read
*
* \return One additional specific return value:
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA.
*
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA is returned when it
* is not possible to read early data for the SSL context
* \p ssl.
*
* It may have been possible and it is not possible
* anymore because the server received the End of Early Data
* message or the maximum number of allowed early data for the
* PSK in use has been reached.
*
* It may never have been possible and will never be possible
* for the SSL context \p ssl because the use of early data
* is disabled for that context or more generally the context
* is not suitably configured to enable early data or the
* client does not use early data or the first call to the
* function was done while the handshake was already too
* advanced to gather and accept early data.
*
* It is not possible to read early data for the SSL context
* \p ssl but this does not preclude for using it with
* mbedtls_ssl_write(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or
* mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
*
* \note When a server wants to retrieve early data, it is expected
* that this function starts the handshake for the SSL context
* \p ssl. But this is not mandatory.
*
* \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA if it is not
* possible to read early data for the SSL context \p ssl. Note
* that this function is intended to be called for an SSL
* context \p ssl only after a call to mbedtls_ssl_handshake(),
* mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or
* mbedtls_ssl_write() for \p ssl that has returned
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len);

139
include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
View File

@ -463,18 +463,6 @@ const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(void);
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string(const char *ciphersuite_name);
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(int ciphersuite_id);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info);
psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info);
#endif
mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info);
#endif
int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info);
int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info);
static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_name(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
{
return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name);
@ -482,133 +470,6 @@ static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_name(const mbedtls_ssl_cip
size_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_cipher_key_bitlen(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
{
switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) {
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
{
switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) {
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
{
switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) {
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
{
switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) {
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
{
switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) {
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
{
switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) {
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
{
switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) {
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature(
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
{
switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) {
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA:
case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

14
include/mbedtls/threading.h
View File

@ -100,6 +100,20 @@ extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex;
extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
/*
* A mutex used to make the PSA subsystem thread safe.
*
* key_slot_mutex protects the registered_readers and
* state variable for all key slots in &global_data.key_slots.
*
* This mutex must be held when any read from or write to a state or
* registered_readers field is performed, i.e. when calling functions:
* psa_key_slot_state_transition(), psa_register_read(), psa_unregister_read(),
* psa_key_slot_has_readers() and psa_wipe_key_slot(). */
extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
#ifdef __cplusplus

197
include/mbedtls/x509.h
View File

@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_list {
mbedtls_x509_san_list;
/** \} name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs */
/** \} addtogroup x509_module */
/**
* \brief Store the certificate DN in printable form into buf;
@ -321,201 +322,7 @@ mbedtls_x509_san_list;
*/
int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn);
/**
* \brief Return the next relative DN in an X509 name.
*
* \note Intended use is to compare function result to dn->next
* in order to detect boundaries of multi-valued RDNs.
*
* \param dn Current node in the X509 name
*
* \return Pointer to the first attribute-value pair of the
* next RDN in sequence, or NULL if end is reached.
*/
static inline mbedtls_x509_name *mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next(
mbedtls_x509_name *dn)
{
while (dn->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged) && dn->next != NULL) {
dn = dn->next;
}
return dn->next;
}
/**
* \brief Store the certificate serial in printable form into buf;
* no more than size characters will be written.
*
* \param buf Buffer to write to
* \param size Maximum size of buffer
* \param serial The X509 serial to represent
*
* \return The length of the string written (not including the
* terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial);
/**
* \brief Compare pair of mbedtls_x509_time.
*
* \param t1 mbedtls_x509_time to compare
* \param t2 mbedtls_x509_time to compare
*
* \return < 0 if t1 is before t2
* 0 if t1 equals t2
* > 0 if t1 is after t2
*/
int mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_time *t1, const mbedtls_x509_time *t2);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
/**
* \brief Fill mbedtls_x509_time with provided mbedtls_time_t.
*
* \param tt mbedtls_time_t to convert
* \param now mbedtls_x509_time to fill with converted mbedtls_time_t
*
* \return \c 0 on success
* \return A non-zero return value on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time_t tt, mbedtls_x509_time *now);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */
/**
* \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time
* and tell if it's in the past.
*
* \note Intended usage is "if( is_past( valid_to ) ) ERROR".
* Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors.
*
* \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check
*
* \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occurred,
* 0 otherwise.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to);
/**
* \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time
* and tell if it's in the future.
*
* \note Intended usage is "if( is_future( valid_from ) ) ERROR".
* Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors.
*
* \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check
*
* \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occurred,
* 0 otherwise.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from);
/**
* \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames
* extension. Please note that this function might allocate
* additional memory for a subject alternative name, thus
* mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name has to be called
* to dispose of this additional memory afterwards.
*
* \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject
* alternative name.
* \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation
* of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_buf.
*
* \note Supported GeneralName types, as defined in RFC 5280:
* "rfc822Name", "dnsName", "directoryName",
* "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name"
* of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108.
*
* \note This function should be called on a single raw data of
* subject alternative name. For example, after successful
* certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the
* \c crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to
* this function.
*
* \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the
* parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the
* lifetime of the certificate.
*
* \return \c 0 on success
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported
* SAN type.
* \return Another negative value for any other failure.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,
mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san);
/**
* \brief Unallocate all data related to subject alternative name
*
* \param san SAN structure - extra memory owned by this structure will be freed
*/
void mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san);
/** \} addtogroup x509_module */
/*
* Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you
* know you do.
*/
int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_name *cur);
int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *alg);
int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT)
int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params(const mbedtls_x509_buf *params,
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md,
int *salt_len);
#endif
int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig);
int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params,
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg,
void **sig_opts);
int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_time *t);
int mbedtls_x509_get_serial(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *serial);
int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag);
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid,
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const void *sig_opts);
#endif
int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name);
int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name);
int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
int critical, const unsigned char *val,
size_t val_len);
int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first);
int mbedtls_x509_write_names(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first);
int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t size,
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg);
int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *ns_cert_type);
int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
unsigned int *key_usage);
int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name);
int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name);
int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size,
const mbedtls_x509_sequence
*subject_alt_name,
const char *prefix);
int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size,
unsigned char ns_cert_type);
int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size,
unsigned int key_usage);
int mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **extensions,
const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list);
/**
* \brief This function parses a CN string as an IP address.
@ -547,4 +354,4 @@ size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst);
}
#endif
#endif /* x509.h */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_H */

4
include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h
View File

@ -25,8 +25,12 @@
#include <psa/crypto_driver_common.h>
#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
#endif
#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
/*

6
include/psa/crypto_config.h
View File

@ -109,6 +109,12 @@
#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1
#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 1
#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD 1
#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH 1

8
include/psa/crypto_extra.h
View File

@ -1828,8 +1828,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t *operation);
/** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE operation object of type
* psa_pake_operation_t.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
#else
#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP, \
{ 0 }, { { 0 } } }
#endif
struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s {
psa_algorithm_t algorithm;
@ -1957,6 +1961,9 @@ struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s {
((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST ? 2 : 1))
struct psa_pake_operation_s {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
#else
/** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
* operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
* drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
@ -1982,6 +1989,7 @@ struct psa_pake_operation_s {
psa_driver_pake_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs);
} MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data);
#endif
};
static inline struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void)

10
include/psa/crypto_platform.h
View File

@ -89,4 +89,14 @@ typedef struct {
} mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
/** The type of the client handle used in context structures
*
* When a client view of the multipart context structures is required,
* this handle is used to keep a mapping with the service side of the
* context which contains the actual data.
*/
typedef uint32_t mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t;
#endif
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */

16
include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
View File

@ -224,10 +224,20 @@
#endif
/* The maximum size of an DH key on this implementation, in bits.
*
* Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different
* operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */
* This is a vendor-specific macro.*/
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192)
#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 8192u
#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144)
#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 6144u
#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096)
#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096u
#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072)
#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 3072u
#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048)
#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 2048u
#else
#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 0u
#endif
/* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits.
* This is a vendor-specific macro. */

87
include/psa/crypto_struct.h
View File

@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ extern "C" {
#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h"
struct psa_hash_operation_s {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
#else
/** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
* operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
* drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
@ -76,9 +79,13 @@ struct psa_hash_operation_s {
* any driver (i.e. the driver context is not active, in use). */
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
psa_driver_hash_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
#endif
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
#else
#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } }
#endif
static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init(void)
{
const struct psa_hash_operation_s v = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
@ -86,6 +93,9 @@ static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init(void)
}
struct psa_cipher_operation_s {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
#else
/** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
* operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
* drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
@ -100,9 +110,14 @@ struct psa_cipher_operation_s {
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(default_iv_length);
psa_driver_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
#endif
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
#else
#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
#endif
static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init(void)
{
const struct psa_cipher_operation_s v = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
@ -114,6 +129,9 @@ static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init(void)
#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h"
struct psa_mac_operation_s {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
#else
/** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
* operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
* drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
@ -124,9 +142,14 @@ struct psa_mac_operation_s {
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac_size);
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_sign) : 1;
psa_driver_mac_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
#endif
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
#else
#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
#endif
static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init(void)
{
const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
@ -134,7 +157,9 @@ static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init(void)
}
struct psa_aead_operation_s {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
#else
/** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
* operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
* drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
@ -156,9 +181,14 @@ struct psa_aead_operation_s {
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_encrypt) : 1;
psa_driver_aead_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
#endif
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
#else
#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
#endif
static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init(void)
{
const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
@ -170,14 +200,22 @@ static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init(void)
#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h"
struct psa_key_derivation_s {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
#else
psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(can_output_key) : 1;
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(capacity);
psa_driver_key_derivation_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
#endif
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
#else
/* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */
#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
#endif
static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init(
void)
{
@ -239,18 +277,28 @@ typedef struct {
psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type);
psa_key_bits_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits);
psa_key_lifetime_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime);
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
psa_key_policy_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy);
psa_key_attributes_flag_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags);
/* This type has a different layout in the client view wrt the
* service view of the key id, i.e. in service view usually is
* expected to have MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined
* thus adding an owner field to the standard psa_key_id_t. For
* implementations with client/service separation, this means the
* object will be marshalled through a transport channel and
* interpreted differently at each side of the transport. Placing
* it at the end of structures allows to interpret the structure
* at the client without reorganizing the memory layout of the
* struct
*/
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
} psa_core_key_attributes_t;
#define PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, 0, \
PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, \
MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, \
PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, 0 }
PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, 0, \
MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT }
struct psa_key_attributes_s {
psa_core_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
psa_key_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
@ -268,12 +316,19 @@ struct psa_key_attributes_s {
*/
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters);
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters_size);
/* With client/service separation, struct psa_key_attributes_s is
* marshalled through a transport channel between the client and
* service side implementation of the PSA Crypto APIs, thus having
* the mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id as the last field of this structure
* allows for a more efficient marshalling/unmarshalling of parameters
*/
psa_core_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core);
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, 0, NULL, 0 }
#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { 0, NULL, 0, PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT }
#else
#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, NULL, 0 }
#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { NULL, 0, PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT }
#endif
static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init(void)
@ -417,6 +472,9 @@ static inline size_t psa_get_key_bits(
* \brief The context for PSA interruptible hash signing.
*/
struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
#else
/** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
* operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
* drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
@ -430,9 +488,14 @@ struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s {
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(error_occurred) : 1;
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops);
#endif
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#define PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
#else
#define PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 }, 0, 0 }
#endif
static inline struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s
psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void)
@ -447,6 +510,9 @@ psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void)
* \brief The context for PSA interruptible hash verification.
*/
struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
#else
/** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
* operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
* drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
@ -460,9 +526,14 @@ struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s {
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(error_occurred) : 1;
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops);
#endif
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#define PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
#else
#define PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 }, 0, 0 }
#endif
static inline struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s
psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void)

31
include/psa/crypto_values.h
View File

@ -279,6 +279,11 @@
* to read from a resource. */
#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143)
/** This can be returned if a function can no longer operate correctly.
* For example, if an essential initialization operation failed or
* a mutex operation failed. */
#define PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-144)
/** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`.
*/
#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136)
@ -594,19 +599,23 @@
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note For secp224k1, the bit-size is 225 (size of a private value).
*
* \note Mbed TLS only supports secp192k1 and secp256k1.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17)
/** SEC random curves over prime fields.
*
* This family comprises the following curves:
* secp192k1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1.
* secp192r1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1.
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12)
/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete) */
/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete, not supported in Mbed TLS) */
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b)
/** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields.
@ -616,6 +625,8 @@
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27)
@ -626,6 +637,8 @@
* They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22)
@ -636,6 +649,8 @@
* It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
* _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
* https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b)
@ -645,6 +660,9 @@
* brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1,
* brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1.
* It is defined in RFC 5639.
*
* \note Mbed TLS only supports the 256-bit, 384-bit and 512-bit curves
* in this family.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30)
@ -673,6 +691,8 @@
* - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent
* to Curve448.
* Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
*
* \note Mbed TLS does not support Edwards curves yet.
*/
#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42)
@ -1736,6 +1756,13 @@
0)
/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption.
*
* \warning Calling psa_asymmetric_decrypt() with this algorithm as a
* parameter is considered an inherently dangerous function
* (CWE-242). Unless it is used in a side channel free and safe
* way (eg. implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of
* RFC 5246), the calling code is vulnerable.
*
*/
#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000200)

8
library/CMakeLists.txt
View File

@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ if(HAIKU)
endif(HAIKU)
if(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD)
set(libs ${libs} pthread)
set(libs ${libs} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT})
endif()
if(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE)
@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.1 SOVERSION 15)
set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.2 SOVERSION 15)
target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
if(TARGET ${everest_target})
@ -309,11 +309,11 @@ if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
endif()
add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509})
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.1 SOVERSION 6)
set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.2 SOVERSION 6)
target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target})
add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls})
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.1 SOVERSION 20)
set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.2 SOVERSION 20)
target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target})
endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)

35
library/aes.c
View File

@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#endif
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "ctr.h"
/*
* This is a convenience shorthand macro to check if we need reverse S-box and
@ -1441,36 +1442,38 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *input,
unsigned char *output)
{
int c, i;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
n = *nc_off;
size_t offset = *nc_off;
if (n > 0x0F) {
if (offset > 0x0F) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
while (length--) {
if (n == 0) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < length;) {
size_t n = 16;
if (offset == 0) {
ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block);
if (ret != 0) {
goto exit;
}
for (i = 16; i > 0; i--) {
if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) {
break;
}
}
mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(nonce_counter);
} else {
n -= offset;
}
c = *input++;
*output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]);
n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
if (n > (length - i)) {
n = (length - i);
}
mbedtls_xor(&output[i], &input[i], &stream_block[offset], n);
// offset might be non-zero for the last block, but in that case, we don't use it again
offset = 0;
i += n;
}
*nc_off = n;
// capture offset for future resumption
*nc_off = (*nc_off + length) % 16;
ret = 0;
exit:

157
library/alignment.h
View File

@ -37,6 +37,69 @@
#define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
#endif
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) \
|| defined(__ICCRX__) || defined(__ICCRL78__) || defined(__ICCRISCV__))
#pragma language=save
#pragma language=extended
#define MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA
/* IAR recommend this technique for accessing unaligned data in
* https://www.iar.com/knowledge/support/technical-notes/compiler/accessing-unaligned-data
* This results in a single load / store instruction (if unaligned access is supported).
* According to that document, this is only supported on certain architectures.
*/
#define UINT_UNALIGNED
typedef uint16_t __packed mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t;
typedef uint32_t __packed mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t;
typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t;
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 40504) && \
((MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 60300) || (!defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)))
/*
* gcc may generate a branch to memcpy for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than
* generating some LDR or LDRB instructions (similar for stores).
*
* This is architecture dependent: x86-64 seems fine even with old gcc; 32-bit Arm
* is affected. To keep it simple, we enable for all architectures.
*
* For versions of gcc < 5.4.0 this issue always happens.
* For gcc < 6.3.0, this issue happens at -O0
* For all versions, this issue happens iff unaligned access is not supported.
*
* For gcc 4.x, this implementation will generate byte-by-byte loads even if unaligned access is
* supported, which is correct but not optimal.
*
* For performance (and code size, in some cases), we want to avoid the branch and just generate
* some inline load/store instructions since the access is small and constant-size.
*
* The manual states:
* "The packed attribute specifies that a variable or structure field should have the smallest
* possible alignment—one byte for a variable"
* https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.5.4/gcc/Variable-Attributes.html
*
* Previous implementations used __attribute__((__aligned__(1)), but had issues with a gcc bug:
* https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94662
*
* Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 13.2.0
* We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested.
*/
#define UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT
typedef struct {
uint16_t x;
} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t;
typedef struct {
uint32_t x;
} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t;
typedef struct {
uint64_t x;
} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t;
#endif
/*
* We try to force mbedtls_(get|put)_unaligned_uintXX to be always inline, because this results
* in code that is both smaller and faster. IAR and gcc both benefit from this when optimising
* for size.
*/
/**
* Read the unsigned 16 bits integer from the given address, which need not
* be aligned.
@ -44,10 +107,23 @@
* \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data
* \return Data at the given address
*/
inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p)
{
uint16_t r;
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p;
r = *p16;
#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p;
r = p16->x;
#else
memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r));
#endif
return r;
}
@ -58,9 +134,22 @@ inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p)
* \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data
* \param x data to write
*/
inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x)
{
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p;
*p16 = x;
#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p;
p16->x = x;
#else
memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x));
#endif
}
/**
@ -70,10 +159,23 @@ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x)
* \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data
* \return Data at the given address
*/
inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p)
{
uint32_t r;
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p;
r = *p32;
#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p;
r = p32->x;
#else
memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r));
#endif
return r;
}
@ -84,9 +186,22 @@ inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p)
* \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data
* \param x data to write
*/
inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x)
{
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p;
*p32 = x;
#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p;
p32->x = x;
#else
memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x));
#endif
}
/**
@ -96,10 +211,23 @@ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x)
* \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data
* \return Data at the given address
*/
inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p)
{
uint64_t r;
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p;
r = *p64;
#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p;
r = p64->x;
#else
memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r));
#endif
return r;
}
@ -110,11 +238,28 @@ inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p)
* \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data
* \param x data to write
*/
inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x)
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x)
{
#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p;
*p64 = x;
#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p;
p64->x = x;
#else
memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x));
#endif
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA)
#pragma language=restore
#endif
/** Byte Reading Macros
*
* Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th

46
library/aria.c
View File

@ -25,12 +25,6 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
/* Parameter validation macros */
#define ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA)
#define ARIA_VALIDATE(cond) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond)
/*
* modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( B A D C ), i.e. swap pairs of bytes
*
@ -363,8 +357,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
int i;
uint32_t w[4][4], *w2;
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL);
if (keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -418,8 +410,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits)
{
int i, j, k, ret;
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL);
ret = mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(ctx, key, keybits);
if (ret != 0) {
@ -455,9 +445,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
int i;
uint32_t a, b, c, d;
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL);
a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 0);
b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 4);
@ -505,7 +492,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
/* Initialize context */
void mbedtls_aria_init(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx)
{
ARIA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_aria_context));
}
@ -532,12 +518,9 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
{
unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE];
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT ||
mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL);
if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
if (length % MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
@ -588,19 +571,14 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
unsigned char c;
size_t n;
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT ||
mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL);
if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
n = *iv_off;
/* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited
* buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this
* outside of parameter validation. */
* buffer overflow. */
if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@ -650,17 +628,9 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
int c, i;
size_t n;
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(nonce_counter != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(stream_block != NULL);
ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(nc_off != NULL);
n = *nc_off;
/* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited
* buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this
* outside of parameter validation. */
* buffer overflow. */
if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}

5
library/asn1parse.c
View File

@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p,
return mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, len);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(unsigned char **p,

5
library/asn1write.c
View File

@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, unsign
return 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C)
static int mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(unsigned char **p,

95
library/bignum.c
View File

@ -37,11 +37,6 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA)
#define MPI_VALIDATE(cond) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond)
/*
* Compare signed values in constant time
*/
@ -51,10 +46,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X,
{
mbedtls_ct_condition_t different_sign, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative, result;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(ret != NULL);
if (X->n != Y->n) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@ -115,8 +106,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X,
unsigned char assign)
{
int ret = 0;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL);
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n));
@ -149,8 +138,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X,
{
int ret = 0;
int s;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL);
if (X == Y) {
return 0;
@ -179,8 +166,6 @@ cleanup:
*/
void mbedtls_mpi_init(mbedtls_mpi *X)
{
MPI_VALIDATE(X != NULL);
X->s = 1;
X->n = 0;
X->p = NULL;
@ -210,7 +195,6 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_free(mbedtls_mpi *X)
int mbedtls_mpi_grow(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs)
{
mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
@ -243,7 +227,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs)
{
mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
size_t i;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
@ -312,8 +295,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_copy(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y)
{
int ret = 0;
size_t i;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL);
if (X == Y) {
return 0;
@ -355,8 +336,6 @@ cleanup:
void mbedtls_mpi_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y)
{
mbedtls_mpi T;
MPI_VALIDATE(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE(Y != NULL);
memcpy(&T, X, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
memcpy(X, Y, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
@ -385,7 +364,6 @@ static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sint_abs(mbedtls_mpi_sint z)
int mbedtls_mpi_lset(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, 1));
memset(X->p, 0, X->n * ciL);
@ -403,8 +381,6 @@ cleanup:
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos)
{
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
if (X->n * biL <= pos) {
return 0;
}
@ -420,7 +396,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val)
int ret = 0;
size_t off = pos / biL;
size_t idx = pos % biL;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
if (val != 0 && val != 1) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -448,7 +423,6 @@ cleanup:
size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb(const mbedtls_mpi *X)
{
size_t i;
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL, 0);
#if defined(__has_builtin)
#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctz)
@ -530,8 +504,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s)
int sign = 1;
mbedtls_mpi_uint d;
mbedtls_mpi T;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL);
if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -634,9 +606,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix,
size_t n;
char *p;
mbedtls_mpi T;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL);
if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -726,9 +695,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin)
*/
char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE];
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(fin != NULL);
if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@ -772,7 +738,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_file(const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE
* newline characters and '\0'
*/
char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE];
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -844,9 +809,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL);
/* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs));
@ -887,7 +849,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t i;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) + count;
@ -908,7 +869,6 @@ cleanup:
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count)
{
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
if (X->n != 0) {
mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(X->p, X->n, count);
}
@ -921,8 +881,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count)
int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y)
{
size_t i, j;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL);
for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) {
if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) {
@ -964,8 +922,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y)
int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y)
{
size_t i, j;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL);
for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) {
if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) {
@ -1016,7 +972,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z)
{
mbedtls_mpi Y;
mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1];
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
*p = mpi_sint_abs(z);
Y.s = TO_SIGN(z);
@ -1035,9 +990,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi
size_t j;
mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
mbedtls_mpi_uint c;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL);
if (X == B) {
const mbedtls_mpi *T = A; A = X; B = T;
@ -1098,9 +1050,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t n;
mbedtls_mpi_uint carry;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL);
for (n = B->n; n > 0; n--) {
if (B->p[n - 1] != 0) {
@ -1152,9 +1101,6 @@ static int add_sub_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X,
int flip_B)
{
int ret, s;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL);
s = A->s;
if (A->s * B->s * flip_B < 0) {
@ -1203,8 +1149,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b
{
mbedtls_mpi B;
mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1];
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b);
B.s = TO_SIGN(b);
@ -1221,8 +1165,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b
{
mbedtls_mpi B;
mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1];
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b);
B.s = TO_SIGN(b);
@ -1241,9 +1183,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi
size_t i, j;
mbedtls_mpi TA, TB;
int result_is_zero = 0;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB);
@ -1300,9 +1239,6 @@ cleanup:
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b)
{
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
size_t n = A->n;
while (n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0) {
--n;
@ -1448,8 +1384,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
size_t i, n, t, k;
mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2;
mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3];
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL);
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO;
@ -1572,7 +1506,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R,
{
mbedtls_mpi B;
mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1];
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b);
B.s = TO_SIGN(b);
@ -1588,9 +1521,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R,
int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL);
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) < 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE;
@ -1618,8 +1548,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_s
{
size_t i;
mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
if (b == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO;
@ -1763,11 +1691,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[(size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE], WW, Apos;
int neg;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(E != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(N != NULL);
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 || (N->p[0] & 1) == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@ -2054,10 +1977,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B)
size_t lz, lzt;
mbedtls_mpi TA, TB;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(G != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB);
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TA, A));
@ -2168,9 +2087,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(size);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL);
/* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs));
if (size == 0) {
@ -2214,9 +2130,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(N != NULL);
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 1) <= 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -2372,9 +2285,6 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds,
size_t i, j, k, s;
mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&W); mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); mbedtls_mpi_init(&A);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR);
@ -2462,8 +2372,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
mbedtls_mpi XX;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL);
XX.s = 1;
XX.n = X->n;
@ -2513,9 +2421,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags,
mbedtls_mpi_uint r;
mbedtls_mpi Y;
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL);
MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL);
if (nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}

101
library/block_cipher.c
View File

@ -11,12 +11,52 @@
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#endif
#include "block_cipher_internal.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
static psa_key_type_t psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t cipher_id)
{
switch (cipher_id) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
return PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
return PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA;
#endif
default:
return PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
}
}
static int mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status)
{
return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_cipher_errors,
psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */
void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) {
psa_destroy_key(ctx->psa_key_id);
return;
}
#endif
switch (ctx->id) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
@ -42,26 +82,39 @@ void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx)
int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id)
{
switch (cipher_id) {
ctx->id = (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES :
(cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA :
(cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA :
MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
psa_key_type_t psa_key_type = psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id);
if (psa_key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE &&
psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)) {
ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA;
return 0;
}
ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY;
#endif
switch (ctx->id) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES:
ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES;
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->ctx.aes);
return 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA;
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
mbedtls_aria_init(&ctx->ctx.aria);
return 0;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA;
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
mbedtls_camellia_init(&ctx->ctx.camellia);
return 0;
#endif
default:
ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE;
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
}
@ -70,6 +123,26 @@ int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *key,
unsigned key_bitlen)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) {
psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_status_t status;
psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id));
psa_set_key_bits(&key_attr, key_bitlen);
psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING);
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT);
status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bitlen), &ctx->psa_key_id);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status);
}
psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */
switch (ctx->id) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
@ -92,6 +165,20 @@ int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char input[16],
unsigned char output[16])
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) {
psa_status_t status;
size_t olen;
status = psa_cipher_encrypt(ctx->psa_key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING,
input, 16, output, 16, &olen);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status);
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */
switch (ctx->id) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:

68
library/ccm.c
View File

@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
#include "block_cipher_internal.h"
#endif
@ -56,7 +56,17 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
#else
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits,
@ -79,16 +89,6 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
#else
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
#endif
return ret;
@ -102,10 +102,10 @@ void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
if (ctx == NULL) {
return;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
#else
mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
#endif
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context));
}
@ -128,11 +128,11 @@ static int mbedtls_ccm_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char tmp_buf[16] = { 0 };
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, tmp_buf);
#else
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, 16, tmp_buf, &olen);
#else
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, tmp_buf);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
size_t len_left;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
size_t olen;
#endif
@ -206,10 +206,10 @@ static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
}
/* Start CBC-MAC with first block*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
#else
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t use_len, offset;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
size_t olen;
#endif
@ -334,10 +334,10 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
add += use_len;
if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->add_len) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
#else
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char i;
size_t use_len, offset;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
size_t olen;
#endif
@ -403,10 +403,10 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, input, use_len);
if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
#else
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
@ -438,10 +438,10 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
memcpy(output, local_output, use_len);
if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
#else
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
/*
* Examples 1 to 3 from SP800-38C Appendix C
*/

16
library/cipher_wrap.c
View File

@ -114,7 +114,9 @@ enum mbedtls_cipher_base_index {
MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_PREVENT_EMPTY_ENUM
};
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C))
/* shared by all GCM ciphers */
static void *gcm_ctx_alloc(void)
{
@ -134,7 +136,9 @@ static void gcm_ctx_free(void *ctx)
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C))
/* shared by all CCM ciphers */
static void *ccm_ctx_alloc(void)
{
@ -562,14 +566,14 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_xts_info = {
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
static int gcm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_bitlen)
{
return mbedtls_gcm_setkey((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
key, key_bitlen);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aes_info = {
@ -646,14 +650,14 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_gcm_info = {
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
static int ccm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
unsigned int key_bitlen)
{
return mbedtls_ccm_setkey((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
key, key_bitlen);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aes_info = {

78
library/common.h
View File

@ -27,15 +27,6 @@
#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS
#endif
#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \
&& !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER)
/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */
#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC
#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \
(__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__)
#endif
/** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests.
*
* If a function is only used inside its own source file and should be
@ -167,6 +158,12 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const(
return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n;
}
/* Always inline mbedtls_xor() for similar reasons as mbedtls_xor_no_simd(). */
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
/**
* Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that
* r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n
@ -177,8 +174,19 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const(
* \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
* \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
* \param n Number of bytes to process.
*
* \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or
* mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent).
* If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in
* AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar
* registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where
* the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster.
* For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same.
*/
inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned char *b, size_t n)
static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r,
const unsigned char *a,
const unsigned char *b,
size_t n)
{
size_t i = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
@ -191,17 +199,36 @@ inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned
uint8x16_t x = veorq_u8(v1, v2);
vst1q_u8(r + i, x);
}
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
/* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case
* where n is a constant multiple of 16.
* For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time
* constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */
if (n % 16 == 0) {
return;
}
#endif
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64)
/* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */
for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) {
uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i);
mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x);
}
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
if (n % 8 == 0) {
return;
}
#endif
#else
for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) {
uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i);
mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x);
}
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
if (n % 4 == 0) {
return;
}
#endif
#endif
#endif
for (; i < n; i++) {
@ -209,11 +236,18 @@ inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned
}
}
/* Always inline mbedtls_xor_no_simd() as we see significant perf regressions when it does not get
* inlined (e.g., observed about 3x perf difference in gcm_mult_largetable with gcc 7 - 12) */
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
#pragma inline = forced
#elif defined(__GNUC__)
__attribute__((always_inline))
#endif
/**
* Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that
* r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n
*
* In some situations, this can perform better than mbedtls_xor (e.g., it's about 5%
* In some situations, this can perform better than mbedtls_xor() (e.g., it's about 5%
* better in AES-CBC).
*
* \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r
@ -222,6 +256,14 @@ inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned
* \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
* \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
* \param n Number of bytes to process.
*
* \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or
* mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent).
* If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in
* AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar
* registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where
* the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster.
* For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same.
*/
static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r,
const unsigned char *a,
@ -236,11 +278,25 @@ static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r,
uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i);
mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x);
}
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
/* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case
* where n is a constant multiple of 8.
* For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time
* constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */
if (n % 8 == 0) {
return;
}
#endif
#else
for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) {
uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i);
mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x);
}
#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
if (n % 4 == 0) {
return;
}
#endif
#endif
#endif
for (; i < n; i++) {

35
library/ctr.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
/**
* \file ctr.h
*
* \brief This file contains common functionality for counter algorithms.
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_H
#define MBEDTLS_CTR_H
#include "common.h"
/**
* \brief Increment a big-endian 16-byte value.
* This is quite performance-sensitive for AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG.
*
* \param n A 16-byte value to be incremented.
*/
static inline void mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(uint8_t n[16])
{
// The 32-bit version seems to perform about the same as a 64-bit version
// on 64-bit architectures, so no need to define a 64-bit version.
for (int i = 3;; i--) {
uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(n, i << 2);
x += 1;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, n, i << 2);
if (x != 0 || i == 0) {
break;
}
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_H */

45
library/ctr_drbg.c
View File

@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
#include "ctr.h"
#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
@ -333,7 +334,7 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
{
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
unsigned char *p = tmp;
int i, j;
int j;
int ret = 0;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
psa_status_t status;
@ -346,11 +347,7 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
/*
* Increase counter
*/
for (i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) {
if (++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0) {
break;
}
}
mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter);
/*
* Crypt counter block
@ -372,9 +369,7 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
}
for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++) {
tmp[i] ^= data[i];
}
mbedtls_xor(tmp, tmp, data, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
/*
* Update key and counter
@ -617,10 +612,11 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
{
int ret = 0;
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng;
unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
unsigned char *p = output;
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
int i;
struct {
unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
} locals;
size_t use_len;
if (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) {
@ -631,7 +627,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
}
memset(add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
memset(locals.add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
if (ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ||
ctx->prediction_resistance) {
@ -642,30 +638,26 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
}
if (add_len > 0) {
if ((ret = block_cipher_df(add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) {
if ((ret = block_cipher_df(locals.add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) {
if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
}
while (output_len > 0) {
/*
* Increase counter
* Increase counter (treat it as a 128-bit big-endian integer).
*/
for (i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) {
if (++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0) {
break;
}
}
mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter);
/*
* Crypt counter block
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
ctx->counter, tmp)) != 0) {
ctx->counter, locals.tmp)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
#else
@ -673,7 +665,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
size_t tmp_len;
status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter),
tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
locals.tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
goto exit;
@ -685,20 +677,19 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
/*
* Copy random block to destination
*/
memcpy(p, tmp, use_len);
memcpy(p, locals.tmp, use_len);
p += use_len;
output_len -= use_len;
}
if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) {
if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) {
goto exit;
}
ctx->reseed_counter++;
exit:
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(add_input, sizeof(add_input));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&locals, sizeof(locals));
return ret;
}

2
library/debug.c
View File

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "debug_internal.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include <stdarg.h>

172
library/debug_internal.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
/**
* \file debug_internal.h
*
* \brief Internal part of the public "debug.h".
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H
#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
/**
* \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used
* through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl
* context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the message has occurred in
* \param line line number the message has occurred at
* \param format format specifier, in printf format
* \param ... variables used by the format specifier
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *format, ...) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6);
/**
* \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This
* function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro,
* which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param text the name of the function that returned the error
* \param ret the return code value
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *text, int ret);
/**
* \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function
* is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro,
* which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the
* variable or buffer name
* \param buf the buffer to be outputted
* \param len length of the buffer
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line, const char *text,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
/**
* \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always
* used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the
* ssl context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the
* variable name
* \param X the MPI variable
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
/**
* \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always
* used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the
* ssl context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the
* variable name
* \param X the ECP point
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
/**
* \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This
* function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro,
* which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param text a name or label for the certificate being output
* \param crt X.509 certificate structure
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
#endif
/* Note: the MBEDTLS_ECDH_C guard here is mandatory because this debug function
only works for the built-in implementation. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z,
} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr;
/**
* \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug
* output. This function is always used through the
* MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file
* and line number parameters.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level error level of the debug message
* \param file file the error has occurred in
* \param line line number the error has occurred in
* \param ecdh the ECDH context
* \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output
*
* \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
* library only.
*/
void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
const char *file, int line,
const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh,
mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED &&
MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H */

51
library/ecp.c
View File

@ -3198,6 +3198,25 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id,
mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
/* Group not set yet */
if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
} else if (key->grp.id != grp_id) {
/* Group mismatch */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
return mbedtls_ecp_copy(&key->Q, Q);
}
#define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32
#define ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE 56
/*
@ -3314,6 +3333,18 @@ cleanup:
return ret;
}
/*
* Write a public key.
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int format, size_t *olen,
unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
return mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&key->grp, &key->Q,
format, olen, buf, buflen);
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
/*
* Check a public-private key pair
@ -3355,8 +3386,22 @@ cleanup:
return ret;
}
int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng)
{
return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&key->grp, &key->Q, &key->d, &key->grp.G,
f_rng, p_rng);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key)
{
return key->grp.id;
}
/*
* Export generic key-pair parameters.
*/
@ -3365,15 +3410,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_export(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(grp, &key->grp)) != 0) {
if (grp != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(grp, &key->grp)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(d, &key->d)) != 0) {
if (d != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(d, &key->d)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(Q, &key->Q)) != 0) {
if (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(Q, &key->Q)) != 0) {
return ret;
}

21
library/ecp_curves.c
View File

@ -23,12 +23,6 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT)
/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */
#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA)
#define ECP_VALIDATE(cond) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond)
#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) }
#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \
@ -52,7 +46,7 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */
#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP
static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 };
static const mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 };
#endif
/*
@ -4511,7 +4505,7 @@ static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X)
{
X->s = 1;
X->n = 1;
X->p = mpi_one;
X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mpi_one; /* X->p will not be modified so the cast is safe */
}
/*
@ -4722,7 +4716,6 @@ cleanup:
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id)
{
ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL);
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp);
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp);
@ -5318,7 +5311,7 @@ cleanup:
*/
#define P_KOBLITZ_MAX (256 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Max limbs in P
#define P_KOBLITZ_R (8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Limbs in R
static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs,
static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs,
size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
@ -5332,7 +5325,7 @@ static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p
/* Init R */
R.s = 1;
R.p = Rp;
R.p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) Rp; /* R.p will not be modified so the cast is safe */
R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R;
/* Common setup for M */
@ -5403,7 +5396,7 @@ cleanup:
*/
static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
{
static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00)
};
@ -5420,7 +5413,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
*/
static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
{
static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00)
};
@ -5442,7 +5435,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
*/
static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
{
static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00)
};

7
library/ecp_curves_new.c
View File

@ -28,12 +28,6 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT)
/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */
#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA)
#define ECP_VALIDATE(cond) \
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond)
#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) }
#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \
@ -4764,7 +4758,6 @@ cleanup:
*/
int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id)
{
ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL);
mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp);
mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp);

4
library/entropy_poll.c
View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__midipix__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
/* Ensure that syscall() is available even when compiling with -std=c99 */
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif
@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \
!defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \
!defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__)
!defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) && !defined(__MVS__)
#error \
"Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in mbedtls_config.h"
#endif

76
library/gcm.c
View File

@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
#include "block_cipher_internal.h"
#endif
@ -66,11 +66,11 @@ static int gcm_gen_table(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx)
memset(h, 0, 16);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, h, h);
#else
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen);
#else
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, h, h);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
@ -139,7 +139,17 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
#else
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits,
@ -162,16 +172,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
#else
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
#endif
if ((ret = gcm_gen_table(ctx)) != 0) {
@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *p;
size_t use_len;
uint64_t iv_bits;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
size_t olen = 0;
#endif
@ -320,10 +320,10 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, &olen);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->base_ectr);
#else
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, &olen);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
@ -354,9 +354,17 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t use_len, offset;
uint64_t new_add_len;
/* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */
if ((uint64_t) add_len >> 61 != 0) {
/* AD is limited to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes
* Also check for possible overflow */
#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
if (add_len > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
#endif
new_add_len = ctx->add_len + (uint64_t) add_len;
if (new_add_len < ctx->add_len || new_add_len >> 61 != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
}
@ -401,12 +409,9 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
/* Increment the counter. */
static void gcm_incr(unsigned char y[16])
{
size_t i;
for (i = 16; i > 12; i--) {
if (++y[i - 1] != 0) {
break;
}
}
uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(y, 12);
x++;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, y, 12);
}
/* Calculate and apply the encryption mask. Process use_len bytes of data,
@ -419,11 +424,11 @@ static int gcm_mask(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ectr);
#else
size_t olen = 0;
ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, &olen);
#else
ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ectr);
#endif
if (ret != 0) {
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ectr, 16);
@ -542,6 +547,9 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
(void) output_size;
*output_length = 0;
/* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes
* and AD length is restricted to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes so neither of
* the two multiplications would overflow. */
orig_len = ctx->len * 8;
orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8;
@ -649,17 +657,17 @@ void mbedtls_gcm_free(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx)
if (ctx == NULL) {
return;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
#else
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
#else
mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
#endif
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context));
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
/*
* AES-GCM test vectors from:
*

37
library/md_psa.h
View File

@ -15,43 +15,6 @@
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "psa/crypto.h"
/**
* \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier
* associated with the given digest type.
*
* \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE.
*
* \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will
* not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm.
*
* \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is
* supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
*
* \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type,
* regardless of whether it is supported or not.
*/
static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type)
{
return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type;
}
/**
* \brief This function returns the given digest type
* associated with the PSA algorithm identifier.
*
* \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for.
*
* \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is
* supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
*
* \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg,
* regardless of whether it is supported or not.
*/
static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg)
{
return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK);
}
/** Convert PSA status to MD error code.
*
* \param status PSA status.

207
library/pk.c
View File

@ -29,9 +29,9 @@
#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#include "md_psa.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#endif
#include <limits.h>
@ -378,6 +378,209 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
static psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm_for_rsa(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
int want_crypt)
{
if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
if (want_crypt) {
mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa);
return PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type));
} else {
return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH);
}
} else {
if (want_crypt) {
return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT;
} else {
return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH);
}
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
psa_key_usage_t usage,
psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
{
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk);
psa_key_usage_t more_usage = usage;
if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) {
more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE;
} else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) {
more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH;
} else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) {
more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT;
}
more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY;
int want_private = !(usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ||
usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ||
usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT);
switch (pk_type) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:
{
int want_crypt = 0; /* 0: sign/verify; 1: encrypt/decrypt */
switch (usage) {
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:
/* Nothing to do. */
break;
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:
want_crypt = 1;
break;
default:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
/* Detect the presence of a private key in a way that works both
* in CRT and non-CRT configurations. */
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk);
int has_private = (mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa) == 0);
if (want_private && !has_private) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ?
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR :
PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY));
psa_set_key_bits(attributes, mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk));
psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes,
psa_algorithm_for_rsa(rsa, want_crypt));
break;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
{
int sign_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH);
int derive_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
psa_ecc_family_t family = pk->ec_family;
size_t bits = pk->ec_bits;
int has_private = 0;
if (pk->priv_id != MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT) {
has_private = 1;
}
#else
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk);
int has_private = (ec->d.n != 0);
size_t bits = 0;
psa_ecc_family_t family =
mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, &bits);
#endif
psa_algorithm_t alg = 0;
switch (usage) {
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:
if (!sign_ok) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH);
#else
alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH);
#endif
break;
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:
alg = PSA_ALG_ECDH;
if (!derive_ok) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
break;
default:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
if (want_private && !has_private) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ?
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family) :
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family)));
psa_set_key_bits(attributes, bits);
psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, alg);
break;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE:
{
psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes);
switch (usage) {
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:
if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type) ||
old_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
break;
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:
if (old_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
break;
case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:
if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type))) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
break;
default:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
psa_key_type_t new_type = old_type;
/* Opaque keys are always key pairs, so we don't need a check
* on the input if the required usage is private. We just need
* to adjust the type correctly if the required usage is public. */
if (!want_private) {
new_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(new_type);
}
more_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&old_attributes);
if ((usage & more_usage) == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
psa_set_key_type(attributes, new_type);
psa_set_key_bits(attributes, psa_get_key_bits(&old_attributes));
psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, psa_get_key_algorithm(&old_attributes));
break;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
default:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
psa_set_key_usage_flags(attributes, more_usage);
psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(attributes, PSA_ALG_NONE);
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
/*
* Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify
*/

8
library/pk_internal.h
View File

@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_c
}
opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs);
curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(opaque_key_type);
id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs), 0);
id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs));
psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs);
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits, 0);
id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits);
#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
id = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
@ -144,4 +144,8 @@ MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n);
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H */

212
library/pk_wrap.c
View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#include "pk_wrap.h"
#include "pk_internal.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "md_psa.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
@ -29,9 +29,11 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
#include "pkwrite.h"
#include "rsa_internal.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
@ -69,9 +71,9 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_status_t status;
mbedtls_pk_context key;
int key_len;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES];
unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf);
psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md =
PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg));
size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
@ -86,11 +88,7 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
}
/* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() expects a full PK context;
* re-construct one to make it happy */
key.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info;
key.pk_ctx = rsa;
key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(&key, buf, sizeof(buf));
key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p);
if (key_len <= 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@ -172,14 +170,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t alg,
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_status_t status;
mbedtls_pk_context key;
int key_len;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES);
if (buf == NULL) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED;
}
mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_rsa_info;
p = buf + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES;
*sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa_ctx);
if (sig_size < *sig_len) {
@ -187,11 +186,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t alg,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
/* mbedtls_pk_write_key_der() expects a full PK context;
* re-construct one to make it happy */
key.pk_info = &pk_info;
key.pk_ctx = rsa_ctx;
key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(&key, buf, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES);
key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa_ctx, buf, &p);
if (key_len <= 0) {
mbedtls_free(buf);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -282,9 +277,9 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_status_t status;
mbedtls_pk_context key;
int key_len;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES];
unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf);
((void) f_rng);
((void) p_rng);
@ -299,11 +294,7 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
/* mbedtls_pk_write_key_der() expects a full PK context;
* re-construct one to make it happy */
key.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info;
key.pk_ctx = rsa;
key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(&key, buf, sizeof(buf));
key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, buf, &p);
if (key_len <= 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@ -368,9 +359,9 @@ static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_status_t status;
mbedtls_pk_context key;
int key_len;
unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES];
unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf);
((void) f_rng);
((void) p_rng);
@ -385,11 +376,7 @@ static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
}
/* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() expects a full PK context;
* re-construct one to make it happy */
key.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info;
key.pk_ctx = rsa;
key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(&key, buf, sizeof(buf));
key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p);
if (key_len <= 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
@ -536,66 +523,6 @@ static size_t eckey_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/*
* An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of
* those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA.
*/
static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int(unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *to, size_t to_len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t unpadded_len, padding_len;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(from, end, &unpadded_len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
while (unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00) {
(*from)++;
unpadded_len--;
}
if (unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
}
padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len;
memset(to, 0x00, padding_len);
memcpy(to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len);
(*from) += unpadded_len;
return 0;
}
/*
* Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers
* to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least
* twice as big as int_size.
*/
static int extract_ecdsa_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t tmp_size;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &tmp_size,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
/* Extract r */
if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig, int_size)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
/* Extract s */
if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig + int_size, int_size)) != 0) {
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
/* Common helper for ECDSA verify using PSA functions. */
static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t curve_bits,
@ -607,6 +534,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY;
size_t signature_len = PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits);
size_t converted_sig_len;
unsigned char extracted_sig[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char *p;
psa_status_t status;
@ -631,11 +559,14 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
}
p = (unsigned char *) sig;
/* extract_ecdsa_sig's last parameter is the size
* of each integer to be parsed, so it's actually half
* the size of the signature. */
if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig(&p, sig + sig_len, extracted_sig,
signature_len/2)) != 0) {
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(curve_bits, p, sig_len, extracted_sig,
sizeof(extracted_sig), &converted_sig_len);
if (ret != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
if (converted_sig_len != signature_len) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
@ -646,10 +577,6 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
goto cleanup;
}
if (p != sig + sig_len) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
ret = 0;
cleanup:
@ -751,90 +678,6 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/*
* Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer
* to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer.
* See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi().
*
* p: pointer to the end of the output buffer
* start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end
* n_len: length of the mpi to read from start
*/
static int asn1_write_mpibuf(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
size_t n_len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
if ((size_t) (*p - start) < n_len) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
}
len = n_len;
*p -= len;
memmove(*p, start, len);
/* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s.
* Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect
* that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */
while (len > 0 && **p == 0x00) {
++(*p);
--len;
}
/* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */
if (len == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
}
/* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0.
* Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */
if (**p & 0x80) {
if (*p - start < 1) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
}
*--(*p) = 0x00;
len += 1;
}
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len));
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER));
return (int) len;
}
/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence.
* See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of
* MPIs, and in-place.
*
* [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding
* [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding
* [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer
*/
static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
size_t buf_len)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2;
unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len;
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig + rs_len, rs_len));
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig, rs_len));
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, sig, len));
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, sig,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE));
memmove(sig, p, len);
*sig_len = len;
return 0;
}
/* Common helper for ECDSA sign using PSA functions.
* Instead of extracting key's properties in order to check which kind of ECDSA
* signature it supports, we try both deterministic and non-deterministic.
@ -845,6 +688,15 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t status;
psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
size_t key_bits = 0;
status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
}
key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr);
psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
status = psa_sign_hash(key_id,
PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)),
@ -863,7 +715,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
}
done:
ret = pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(sig, sig_len, sig_size);
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, sig, *sig_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len);
return ret;
}

2
library/pkcs7.c
View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C)
#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h"
#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
#include "x509_internal.h"
#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"

281
library/pkparse.c
View File

@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
/* Key types */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
#include "rsa_internal.h"
#endif
/* Extended formats */
@ -250,7 +251,7 @@ static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id;
int ret;
ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits, 0);
ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits);
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp_key);
ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp_key.grp), ecp_group_id);
@ -757,68 +758,6 @@ static int pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
/*
* RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
* modulus INTEGER, -- n
* publicExponent INTEGER -- e
* }
*/
static int pk_get_rsapubkey(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret);
}
if (*p + len != end) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
/* Import N */
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret);
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY;
}
*p += len;
/* Import E */
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret);
}
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
NULL, 0, *p, len)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY;
}
*p += len;
if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 ||
mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY;
}
if (*p != end) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
/* Get a PK algorithm identifier
*
* AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
@ -911,7 +850,17 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) {
ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(p, end, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk));
ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), *p, (size_t) (end - *p));
if (ret == 0) {
/* On success all the input has been consumed by the parsing function. */
*p += end - *p;
} else if ((ret <= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA) &&
(ret >= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL)) {
/* In case of ASN1 error codes add MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY. */
ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret);
} else {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY;
}
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
@ -944,195 +893,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
return ret;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
/*
* Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero.
*
* The value zero is:
* - never a valid value for an RSA parameter
* - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete().
*
* Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to
* rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early.
*/
static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_mpi *X)
{
int ret;
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key
*/
static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
const unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen)
{
int ret, version;
size_t len;
unsigned char *p, *end;
mbedtls_mpi T;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
p = (unsigned char *) key;
end = p + keylen;
/*
* This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1)
*
* RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
* version Version,
* modulus INTEGER, -- n
* publicExponent INTEGER, -- e
* privateExponent INTEGER, -- d
* prime1 INTEGER, -- p
* prime2 INTEGER, -- q
* exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1)
* exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1)
* coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p
* otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL
* }
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
end = p + len;
if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
}
if (version != 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION;
}
/* Import N */
if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* Import E */
if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, &T)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* Import D */
if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&T, NULL)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* Import P */
if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL,
NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* Import Q */
if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T,
NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
/*
* The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in
* that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by
* parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid
* recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading
* RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which
* can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q
* are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a
* description of one such attack.
*/
/* Import DP */
if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* Import DQ */
if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
/* Import QP */
if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
#else
/* Verify existence of the CRT params */
if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
#endif
/* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default
* implementation but is still called:
* - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to
* pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors)
* - as is also sanity-checks the key
*
* Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with
* mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example.
*/
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) {
goto cleanup;
}
if (p != end) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
}
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
if (ret != 0) {
/* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */
if ((ret & 0xff80) == 0) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
} else {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa);
}
return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
/*
* Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key
@ -1348,7 +1108,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) {
if ((ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) {
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) {
mbedtls_pk_free(pk);
return ret;
}
@ -1538,8 +1298,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
if (ret == 0) {
pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA);
if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0 ||
(ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk),
pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) {
(ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk),
pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) {
mbedtls_pk_free(pk);
}
@ -1679,7 +1439,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA);
if (mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info) == 0 &&
pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) {
mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) {
return 0;
}
@ -1754,7 +1514,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
return ret;
}
if ((ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(&p, p + pem.buflen, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx))) != 0) {
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), p, pem.buflen)) != 0) {
mbedtls_pk_free(ctx);
}
@ -1801,13 +1561,12 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
}
p = (unsigned char *) key;
ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(&p, p + keylen, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx));
ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), p, keylen);
if (ret == 0) {
return ret;
}
mbedtls_pk_free(ctx);
if (ret != (MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY,
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG))) {
if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
return ret;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */

143
library/pkwrite.c
View File

@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
#include "rsa_internal.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "psa/crypto.h"
@ -56,60 +59,13 @@
* Internal functions for RSA keys.
******************************************************************************/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
/*
* RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
* modulus INTEGER, -- n
* publicExponent INTEGER -- e
* }
*/
static int pk_write_rsa_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len = 0;
mbedtls_mpi T;
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
/* Export E */
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) {
goto end_of_export;
}
len += ret;
/* Export N */
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) {
goto end_of_export;
}
len += ret;
end_of_export:
mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len));
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE));
return (int) len;
}
static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf,
const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
{
size_t len = 0;
int ret;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) {
uint8_t tmp[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE];
size_t tmp_len = 0;
size_t len = 0, tmp_len = 0;
if (psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &tmp_len) != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
@ -118,94 +74,11 @@ static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf,
memcpy(*p, tmp, tmp_len);
len += tmp_len;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
{
mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */
mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk);
/*
* Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies.
*/
mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
/* Export QP */
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) {
goto end_of_export;
}
len += ret;
/* Export DQ */
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) {
goto end_of_export;
}
len += ret;
/* Export DP */
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) {
goto end_of_export;
}
len += ret;
/* Export Q */
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL,
&T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) {
goto end_of_export;
}
len += ret;
/* Export P */
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T,
NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) {
goto end_of_export;
}
len += ret;
/* Export D */
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL,
NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) {
goto end_of_export;
}
len += ret;
/* Export E */
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) {
goto end_of_export;
}
len += ret;
/* Export N */
if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) {
goto end_of_export;
}
len += ret;
end_of_export:
mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, buf, 0));
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len));
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p,
buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE));
return (int) len;
}
return (int) len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
return mbedtls_rsa_write_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), buf, p);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
@ -543,7 +416,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) {
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_rsa_pubkey(p, start, key));
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key), start, p));
} else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)

34
library/platform_util.c
View File

@ -93,8 +93,6 @@ static void *(*const volatile memset_func)(void *, int, size_t) = memset;
void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len)
{
MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(len == 0 || buf != NULL);
if (len > 0) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO)
explicit_bzero(buf, len);
@ -151,10 +149,10 @@ void mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(void *buf, size_t len)
#include <time.h>
#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \
defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \
defined(__MACH__)))
defined(__MACH__)) || defined__midipix__)
#include <unistd.h>
#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ ||
* (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */
* (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __midipix__) */
#if !((defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L) || \
(defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS) && \
@ -217,35 +215,15 @@ struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(const mbedtls_time_t *tt,
void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *, int, const char *);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
/*
* Provide external definitions of some inline functions so that the compiler
* has the option to not inline them
*/
extern inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r,
const unsigned char *a,
const unsigned char *b,
size_t n);
extern inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p);
extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x);
extern inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p);
extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x);
extern inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p);
extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT)
#include <time.h>
#if !defined(_WIN32) && \
(defined(unix) || defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || \
(defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) || defined(__HAIKU__))
(defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) || defined(__HAIKU__) || defined(__midipix__))
#include <unistd.h>
#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __HAIKU__) */
#endif \
/* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __HAIKU__ || __midipix__) */
#if (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 199309L) || defined(__HAIKU__)
mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void)
{
@ -253,7 +231,7 @@ mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void)
struct timespec tv;
mbedtls_ms_time_t current_ms;
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)
#if defined(__linux__) && defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || defined(__midipix__)
ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &tv);
#else
ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tv);

331
library/psa_crypto.c
View File

@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
#include "md_psa.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \
@ -115,17 +115,44 @@ int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg)
(void) hash_alg;
return global_data.drivers_initialized;
}
int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg)
{
(void) key_type;
(void) cipher_alg;
return global_data.drivers_initialized;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
static int psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(size_t bits)
{
if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072 && bits != 4096 &&
bits != 6144 && bits != 8192) {
return 0;
switch (bits) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048)
case 2048:
return 1;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072)
case 3072:
return 1;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096)
case 4096:
return 1;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144)
case 6144:
return 1;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192)
case 8192:
return 1;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */
default:
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT ||
MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY ||
@ -568,7 +595,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot(
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)
if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) {
if (psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length)) == 0) {
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key(attributes,
data, data_length,
@ -881,8 +908,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy(
* In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key
* into a key slot if not already done.
*
* On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of
* the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
* On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading.
* It is the responsibility of the caller to call psa_unregister_read(slot)
* when they have finished reading the contents of the slot.
*/
static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
@ -926,7 +954,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
error:
*p_slot = NULL;
psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
psa_unregister_read(slot);
return status;
}
@ -941,8 +969,9 @@ error:
* psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() when there is no opaque key support
* for a cryptographic operation.
*
* On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the
* caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
* On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading.
* It is the responsibility of the caller to call psa_unregister_read(slot)
* when they have finished reading the contents of the slot.
*/
static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy(
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
@ -957,7 +986,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy(
}
if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external((*p_slot)->attr.lifetime)) {
psa_unlock_key_slot(*p_slot);
psa_unregister_read(*p_slot);
*p_slot = NULL;
return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
@ -985,15 +1014,41 @@ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
/*
* As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors,
* do our best to report an unexpected lock counter. Assert with
* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the lock counter is equal to one:
* do our best to report an unexpected amount of registered readers or
* an unexpected state.
* Assert with MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the slot is valid for
* wiping.
* if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and the
* function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the
* execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails.
*/
if (slot->lock_count != 1) {
MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->lock_count == 1);
status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
switch (slot->state) {
case PSA_SLOT_FULL:
/* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the
* caller is the last reader. */
case PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION:
/* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the
* caller is the last reader. */
if (slot->registered_readers != 1) {
MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 1);
status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
break;
case PSA_SLOT_FILLING:
/* In this state registered_readers must be 0. */
if (slot->registered_readers != 0) {
MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 0);
status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
break;
case PSA_SLOT_EMPTY:
/* The slot is already empty, it cannot be wiped. */
MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->state != PSA_SLOT_EMPTY);
status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
break;
default:
/* The slot's state is invalid. */
status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
/* Multipart operations may still be using the key. This is safe
@ -1003,7 +1058,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
* key material can linger until all operations are completed. */
/* At this point, key material and other type-specific content has
* been wiped. Clear remaining metadata. We can call memset and not
* zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. */
* zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive.
* This memset also sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. */
memset(slot, 0, sizeof(*slot));
return status;
}
@ -1022,28 +1078,26 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
}
/*
* Get the description of the key in a key slot. In case of a persistent
* key, this will load the key description from persistent memory if not
* done yet. We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if
* Get the description of the key in a key slot, and register to read it.
* In the case of a persistent key, this will load the key description
* from persistent memory if not done yet.
* We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if
* the key is operated by an SE or not and this information is needed by
* the current implementation.
*/
* the current implementation. */
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(key, &slot);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return status;
}
/*
* If the key slot containing the key description is under access by the
* library (apart from the present access), the key cannot be destroyed
* yet. For the time being, just return in error. Eventually (to be
* implemented), the key should be destroyed when all accesses have
* stopped.
*/
if (slot->lock_count > 1) {
psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
}
/* Set the key slot containing the key description's state to
* PENDING_DELETION. This stops new operations from registering
* to read the slot. Current readers can safely continue to access
* the key within the slot; the last registered reader will
* automatically wipe the slot when they call psa_unregister_read().
* If the key is persistent, we can now delete the copy of the key
* from memory. If the key is opaque, we require the driver to
* deal with the deletion. */
slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION;
if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(slot->attr.lifetime)) {
/* Refuse the destruction of a read-only key (which may or may not work
@ -1091,6 +1145,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C)
if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) {
/* Destroy the copy of the persistent key from storage.
* The slot will still hold a copy of the key until the last reader
* unregisters. */
status = psa_destroy_persistent_key(slot->attr.id);
if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
overall_status = status;
@ -1117,8 +1174,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
exit:
status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
/* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from wiping over a storage error */
/* Unregister from reading the slot. If we are the last active reader
* then this will wipe the slot. */
status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
/* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from unregistering over
* a storage error. */
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
overall_status = status;
}
@ -1243,7 +1303,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_reset_key_attributes(attributes);
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -1339,7 +1399,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
data, data_size, data_length);
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -1453,7 +1513,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
data, data_size, data_length);
exit:
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -1570,8 +1630,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes(
* In case of failure at any step, stop the sequence and call
* psa_fail_key_creation().
*
* On success, the key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the caller
* to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
* On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING.
* It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to
* PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished.
*
* \param method An identification of the calling function.
* \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key.
@ -1602,7 +1663,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation(
return status;
}
status = psa_get_empty_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot);
status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return status;
}
@ -1628,7 +1689,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation(
/* Erase external-only flags from the internal copy. To access
* external-only flags, query `attributes`. Thanks to the check
* in psa_validate_key_attributes(), this leaves the dual-use
* flags and any internal flag that psa_get_empty_key_slot()
* flags and any internal flag that psa_reserve_free_key_slot()
* may have set. */
slot->attr.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY;
@ -1680,8 +1741,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation(
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
@ -1693,9 +1752,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation(
* See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use
* of this function.
*
* If the finalization succeeds, the function unlocks the key slot (it was
* locked by psa_start_key_creation()) and the key slot cannot be accessed
* anymore as part of the key creation process.
* If the finalization succeeds, the function sets the key slot's state to
* PSA_SLOT_FULL, and the key slot can no longer be accessed as part of the
* key creation process.
*
* \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material.
* \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key,
@ -1771,7 +1830,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation(
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
*key = slot->attr.id;
status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
*key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
}
@ -1786,7 +1846,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation(
* or after psa_finish_key_creation() fails. In other circumstances, this
* function may not clean up persistent storage.
* See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use
* of this function.
* of this function. Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY.
*
* \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material.
* \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key,
@ -2125,7 +2185,7 @@ exit:
psa_fail_key_creation(target_slot, driver);
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(source_slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(source_slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -2446,7 +2506,7 @@ exit:
psa_mac_abort(operation);
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -2632,7 +2692,7 @@ exit:
psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(mac, status, mac_size, *mac_length);
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -2776,7 +2836,7 @@ exit:
psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size,
*signature_length);
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -2824,7 +2884,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
signature, signature_length);
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
@ -3071,7 +3131,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy(
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return status;
@ -3091,7 +3151,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length,
output, output_size, output_length);
exit:
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -3123,7 +3183,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy(
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return status;
@ -3143,7 +3203,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
output, output_size, output_length);
exit:
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -3252,7 +3312,7 @@ exit:
psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation);
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
if (unlock_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
operation->error_occurred = 1;
@ -3397,7 +3457,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_start(
psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation);
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
if (unlock_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
operation->error_occurred = 1;
@ -3969,7 +4029,7 @@ exit:
psa_cipher_abort(operation);
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -4214,7 +4274,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
output_size - default_iv_length, output_length);
exit:
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
status = unlock_status;
}
@ -4275,7 +4335,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
output, output_size, output_length);
exit:
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
status = unlock_status;
}
@ -4401,7 +4461,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
}
exit:
psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
psa_unregister_read(slot);
return status;
}
@ -4456,7 +4516,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
}
exit:
psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
psa_unregister_read(slot);
return status;
}
@ -4568,7 +4628,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
operation->key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
exit:
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
status = unlock_status;
@ -5699,7 +5759,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper(
psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(
slot->attr.type);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id =
mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(curve, bits, 0);
mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, bits);
if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
@ -6054,6 +6114,91 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hash_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg)
return status;
}
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity(
psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg)
{
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS)
if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) {
operation->capacity = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128)
if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) {
#if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX)
operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * (size_t) PSA_MAC_LENGTH(
PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES,
128U,
PSA_ALG_CMAC);
#else
operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX;
#endif
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */
/* After this point, if kdf_alg is not valid then value of hash_alg may be
* invalid or meaningless but it does not affect this function */
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(kdf_alg);
size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
if (hash_size == 0) {
return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise
* we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially
* risk-prone. */
psa_status_t status = psa_hash_try_support(hash_alg);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return status;
}
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF)
if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) {
operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size;
} else
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) {
operation->capacity = hash_size;
} else
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) {
operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size;
} else
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF)
if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) &&
(hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) {
operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX;
} else
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg) &&
(hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) {
/* Master Secret is always 48 bytes
* https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246.html#section-8.1 */
operation->capacity = 48U;
} else
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC)
if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) {
#if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX)
operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * hash_size;
#else
operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX;
#endif
} else
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */
{
(void) hash_size;
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
return status;
}
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(
psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg)
@ -6067,43 +6212,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(
return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* All currently supported key derivation algorithms (apart from
* ecjpake to pms and pbkdf2_aes_cmac_128) are based on a hash algorithm. */
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg);
size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg);
if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) {
hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
} else if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) {
hash_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC);
} else {
if (hash_size == 0) {
return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
/* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise
* we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially
* risk-prone. */
psa_status_t status = psa_hash_try_support(hash_alg);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return status;
}
}
if ((PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) ||
PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) &&
!(hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) {
return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS)
if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg) ||
(kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS)) {
operation->capacity = hash_size;
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT ||
MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */
operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
psa_status_t status = psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity(operation,
kdf_alg);
return status;
}
static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg)
@ -6891,7 +7002,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key(
slot->key.data,
slot->key.bytes);
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -7048,7 +7159,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *op
}
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -7109,7 +7220,7 @@ exit:
*output_length = output_size;
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}
@ -7783,7 +7894,7 @@ exit:
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
psa_pake_abort(operation);
}
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot);
return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status;
}

145
library/psa_crypto_core.h
View File

@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
#endif
/**
* Tell if PSA is ready for this hash.
@ -33,10 +36,24 @@
*/
int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg);
/**
* Tell if PSA is ready for this cipher.
*
* \note For now, only checks the state of the driver subsystem,
* not the algorithm. Might do more in the future.
*
* \param cipher_alg The cipher algorithm (ignored for now).
*
* \return 1 if the driver subsytem is ready, 0 otherwise.
*/
int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg);
typedef enum {
PSA_SLOT_EMPTY = 0,
PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED,
} psa_key_slot_status_t;
PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL,
PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION,
} psa_key_slot_state_t;
/** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material
* and metadata for one key.
@ -44,18 +61,37 @@ typedef enum {
typedef struct {
psa_core_key_attributes_t attr;
psa_key_slot_status_t status;
/*
* The current state of the key slot, as described in
* docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety/psa-thread-safety.md.
*
* Library functions can modify the state of a key slot by calling
* psa_key_slot_state_transition.
*
* The state variable is used to help determine whether library functions
* which operate on the slot succeed. For example, psa_finish_key_creation,
* which transfers the state of a slot from PSA_SLOT_FILLING to
* PSA_SLOT_FULL, must fail with error code PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* if the state of the slot is not PSA_SLOT_FILLING.
*
* Library functions which traverse the array of key slots only consider
* slots that are in a suitable state for the function.
* For example, psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory, which finds a slot
* containing a given key ID, will only check slots whose state variable is
* PSA_SLOT_FULL. */
psa_key_slot_state_t state;
/*
* Number of locks on the key slot held by the library.
* Number of functions registered as reading the material in the key slot.
*
* This counter is incremented by one each time a library function
* retrieves through one of the dedicated internal API a pointer to the
* key slot.
* Library functions must not write directly to registered_readers
*
* This counter is decremented by one each time a library function stops
* accessing the key slot and states it by calling the
* psa_unlock_key_slot() API.
* A function must call psa_register_read(slot) before reading the current
* contents of the slot for an operation.
* They then must call psa_unregister_read(slot) once they have finished
* reading the current contents of the slot.
* A function must call psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot) to check if
* the slot is in use for reading.
*
* This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while the library
* may access it. For example, such control is needed in the following
@ -66,10 +102,9 @@ typedef struct {
* the library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load the
* persistent key.
* . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread asks to close
* or purge or destroy a key while it is in used by the library through
* another thread.
*/
size_t lock_count;
* or purge or destroy a key while it is in use by the library through
* another thread. */
size_t registered_readers;
/* Dynamically allocated key data buffer.
* Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */
@ -79,36 +114,65 @@ typedef struct {
} key;
} psa_key_slot_t;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
/** Perform a mutex operation and return immediately upon failure.
*
* Returns PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if the operation fails
* and status was PSA_SUCCESS.
*
* Assumptions:
* psa_status_t status exists.
* f is a mutex operation which returns 0 upon success.
*/
#define PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(f) \
do \
{ \
if ((f) != 0) { \
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \
return PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \
} \
return status; \
} \
} while (0);
/** Perform a mutex operation and goto exit on failure.
*
* Sets status to PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if status was PSA_SUCCESS.
*
* Assumptions:
* psa_status_t status exists.
* Label exit: exists.
* f is a mutex operation which returns 0 upon success.
*/
#define PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(f) \
do \
{ \
if ((f) != 0) { \
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \
status = PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \
} \
goto exit; \
} \
} while (0);
#endif
/* A mask of key attribute flags used only internally.
* Currently there aren't any. */
#define PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY ( \
0)
/** Test whether a key slot is occupied.
*
* A key slot is occupied iff the key type is nonzero. This works because
* no valid key can have 0 as its key type.
/** Test whether a key slot has any registered readers.
* If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
* global key slot mutex.
*
* \param[in] slot The key slot to test.
*
* \return 1 if the slot is occupied, 0 otherwise.
* \return 1 if the slot has any registered readers, 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline int psa_is_key_slot_occupied(const psa_key_slot_t *slot)
static inline int psa_key_slot_has_readers(const psa_key_slot_t *slot)
{
return slot->status == PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED;
}
/** Test whether a key slot is locked.
*
* A key slot is locked iff its lock counter is strictly greater than 0.
*
* \param[in] slot The key slot to test.
*
* \return 1 if the slot is locked, 0 otherwise.
*/
static inline int psa_is_key_slot_locked(const psa_key_slot_t *slot)
{
return slot->lock_count > 0;
return slot->registered_readers > 0;
}
/** Retrieve flags from psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags.
@ -178,13 +242,20 @@ static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number(
/** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy.
*
* Persistent storage is not affected.
* Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY.
* If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
* global key slot mutex.
*
* \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* Success. This includes the case of a key slot that was
* already fully wiped.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
* The slot has been successfully wiped.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* The slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FULL or PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, and
* the amount of registered readers was not equal to 1. Or,
* the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. Or,
* the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FILLING, and the amount
* of registered readers was not equal to 0.
*/
psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot);

74
library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
#include "psa_crypto_ecp.h"
#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h"
#include "md_psa.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -32,6 +32,61 @@
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH)
/* Helper function to verify if the provided EC's family and key bit size are valid.
*
* Note: "bits" parameter is used both as input and output and it might be updated
* in case provided input value is not multiple of 8 ("sloppy" bits).
*/
static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t *bits)
{
switch (family) {
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:
switch (*bits) {
case 192:
case 224:
case 256:
case 384:
case 521:
return PSA_SUCCESS;
case 528:
*bits = 521;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:
switch (*bits) {
case 256:
case 384:
case 512:
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:
switch (*bits) {
case 448:
case 255:
return PSA_SUCCESS;
case 256:
*bits = 255;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
break;
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:
switch (*bits) {
case 192:
/* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */
case 256:
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
break;
}
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
psa_key_type_t type, size_t curve_bits,
const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length,
@ -82,16 +137,15 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation(
}
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ecp);
status = check_ecc_parameters(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), &curve_bits);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto exit;
}
/* Load the group. */
grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type),
curve_bits, !explicit_bits);
grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type),
curve_bits);
if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
/* We can't distinguish between a nonsensical family/size combination
* (which would warrant PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT) and a
* well-regarded curve that Mbed TLS just doesn't know about (which
* would warrant PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED). For uniformity with how
* curves that Mbed TLS knows about but for which support is disabled
* at build time, return NOT_SUPPORTED. */
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto exit;
}
@ -285,7 +339,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key(
psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(
attributes->core.type);
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id =
mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(curve, attributes->core.bits, 0);
mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, attributes->core.bits);
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info =
mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id);

42
library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c
View File

@ -10,6 +10,12 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
/* This header is only needed because it defines
* MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHEXXXX_[P|G]_BIN symbols that are used in
* mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(). Apart from that, this module
* only uses bignum functions for arithmetic. */
#include <mbedtls/dhm.h>
#include <psa/crypto.h>
#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
#include "psa_crypto_ffdh.h"
@ -35,58 +41,78 @@ static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(size_t key_size,
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048)
static const unsigned char dhm_P_2048[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_P_BIN;
static const unsigned char dhm_P_3072[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN;
static const unsigned char dhm_P_4096[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN;
static const unsigned char dhm_P_6144[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN;
static const unsigned char dhm_P_8192[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN;
static const unsigned char dhm_G_2048[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_G_BIN;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072)
static const unsigned char dhm_P_3072[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN;
static const unsigned char dhm_G_3072[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_G_BIN;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096)
static const unsigned char dhm_P_4096[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN;
static const unsigned char dhm_G_4096[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_G_BIN;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144)
static const unsigned char dhm_P_6144[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN;
static const unsigned char dhm_G_6144[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_G_BIN;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192)
static const unsigned char dhm_P_8192[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN;
static const unsigned char dhm_G_8192[] =
MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_G_BIN;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */
switch (key_size) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048)
case sizeof(dhm_P_2048):
dhm_P = dhm_P_2048;
dhm_G = dhm_G_2048;
dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_2048);
dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_2048);
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072)
case sizeof(dhm_P_3072):
dhm_P = dhm_P_3072;
dhm_G = dhm_G_3072;
dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_3072);
dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_3072);
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096)
case sizeof(dhm_P_4096):
dhm_P = dhm_P_4096;
dhm_G = dhm_G_4096;
dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_4096);
dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_4096);
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144)
case sizeof(dhm_P_6144):
dhm_P = dhm_P_6144;
dhm_G = dhm_G_6144;
dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_6144);
dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_6144);
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192)
case sizeof(dhm_P_8192):
dhm_P = dhm_P_8192;
dhm_G = dhm_G_8192;
dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_8192);
dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_8192);
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */
default:
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}

1
library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h
View File

@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
#define PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H
#include <psa/crypto.h>
#include <mbedtls/dhm.h>
/** Perform a key agreement and return the FFDH shared secret.
*

48
library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
#include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h"
#include "psa_crypto_rsa.h"
#include "psa_crypto_hash.h"
#include "md_psa.h"
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -24,8 +24,7 @@
#include <mbedtls/rsa.h>
#include <mbedtls/error.h>
#include <mbedtls/pk.h>
#include "pk_wrap.h"
#include "rsa_internal.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \
@ -62,50 +61,38 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation(
mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa)
{
psa_status_t status;
mbedtls_pk_context ctx;
size_t bits;
mbedtls_pk_init(&ctx);
*p_rsa = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context));
if (*p_rsa == NULL) {
return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
}
mbedtls_rsa_init(*p_rsa);
/* Parse the data. */
if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) {
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
mbedtls_pk_parse_key(&ctx, data, data_length, NULL, 0,
mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE));
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(*p_rsa, data, data_length));
} else {
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(
mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(&ctx, data, data_length));
status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(*p_rsa, data, data_length));
}
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto exit;
}
/* We have something that the pkparse module recognizes. If it is a
* valid RSA key, store it. */
if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) {
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto exit;
}
/* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8. Mbed TLS
* supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well. For example,
* mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in bytes, not in bits. */
bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx)));
bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(*p_rsa));
if (bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) {
status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
goto exit;
}
status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned(mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx));
status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned(*p_rsa);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto exit;
}
/* Copy out the pointer to the RSA context, and reset the PK context
* such that pk_free doesn't free the RSA context we just grabbed. */
*p_rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx);
ctx.pk_info = NULL;
exit:
mbedtls_pk_free(&ctx);
return status;
}
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) ||
@ -168,20 +155,15 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(psa_key_type_t type,
size_t *data_length)
{
int ret;
mbedtls_pk_context pk;
uint8_t *pos = data + data_size;
mbedtls_pk_init(&pk);
pk.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info;
pk.pk_ctx = rsa;
uint8_t *end = data + data_size;
/* PSA Crypto API defines the format of an RSA key as a DER-encoded
* representation of the non-encrypted PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey for a
* private key and of the RFC3279 RSAPublicKey for a public key. */
if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) {
ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(&pk, data, data_size);
ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, data, &end);
} else {
ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&pos, data, &pk);
ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, data, &end);
}
if (ret < 0) {

100
library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
View File

@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
#endif
typedef struct {
psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT];
@ -108,7 +111,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(
for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id)) {
/* Only consider slots which are in a full state. */
if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) &&
(mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id))) {
break;
}
}
@ -117,7 +122,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(
}
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
status = psa_lock_key_slot(slot);
status = psa_register_read(slot);
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
*p_slot = slot;
}
@ -141,36 +146,38 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void)
for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
slot->lock_count = 1;
slot->registered_readers = 1;
slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION;
(void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
}
global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0;
}
psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot)
psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot)
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t slot_idx;
psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unlocked_persistent_key_slot;
psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unused_persistent_key_slot;
if (!global_data.key_slots_initialized) {
status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
goto error;
}
selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot = NULL;
selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot = NULL;
for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
if (!psa_is_key_slot_occupied(slot)) {
if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) {
selected_slot = slot;
break;
}
if ((unlocked_persistent_key_slot == NULL) &&
(!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) &&
(!psa_is_key_slot_locked(slot))) {
unlocked_persistent_key_slot = slot;
if ((unused_persistent_key_slot == NULL) &&
(slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) &&
(!psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) &&
(!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime))) {
unused_persistent_key_slot = slot;
}
}
@ -182,14 +189,18 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
* storage.
*/
if ((selected_slot == NULL) &&
(unlocked_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) {
selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot;
selected_slot->lock_count = 1;
psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot);
(unused_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) {
selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot;
psa_register_read(selected_slot);
status = psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto error;
}
}
if (selected_slot != NULL) {
status = psa_lock_key_slot(selected_slot);
status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(selected_slot, PSA_SLOT_EMPTY,
PSA_SLOT_FILLING);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
goto error;
}
@ -239,7 +250,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
slot, data->slot_number, sizeof(data->slot_number));
if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED;
status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL);
}
goto exit;
}
@ -250,7 +262,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
goto exit;
}
slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED;
status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL);
exit:
psa_free_persistent_key_data(key_data, key_data_length);
@ -324,8 +337,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
/* Copy actual key length and core attributes into the slot on success */
slot->key.bytes = key_buffer_length;
slot->attr = attributes.core;
slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED;
status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL);
exit:
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot);
@ -358,7 +372,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS)
psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id;
status = psa_get_empty_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot);
status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return status;
}
@ -380,12 +394,17 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
psa_wipe_key_slot(*p_slot);
if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) {
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE;
}
} else {
/* Add implicit usage flags. */
psa_extend_key_usage_flags(&(*p_slot)->attr.policy.usage);
psa_key_slot_state_transition((*p_slot), PSA_SLOT_FILLING,
PSA_SLOT_FULL);
status = psa_register_read(*p_slot);
}
return status;
@ -394,26 +413,37 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
}
psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
{
if (slot == NULL) {
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) &&
(slot->state != PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION)) {
return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
if (slot->lock_count > 0) {
slot->lock_count--;
/* If we are the last reader and the slot is marked for deletion,
* we must wipe the slot here. */
if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) &&
(slot->registered_readers == 1)) {
return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
}
if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) {
slot->registered_readers--;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
/*
* As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors,
* do our best to report if the lock counter is equal to zero. Assert with
* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the lock counter is strictly greater
* than zero: if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and
* do our best to report if there are no registered readers. Assert with
* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that there are registered readers:
* if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and
* the function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the
* execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails.
*/
MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->lock_count > 0);
MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot));
return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
@ -480,7 +510,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle)
*handle = key;
return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
return psa_unregister_read(slot);
#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
(void) key;
@ -506,10 +536,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle)
return status;
}
if (slot->lock_count <= 1) {
if (slot->registered_readers == 1) {
return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
} else {
return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
return psa_unregister_read(slot);
}
}
@ -524,10 +554,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
}
if ((!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) &&
(slot->lock_count <= 1)) {
(slot->registered_readers == 1)) {
return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot);
} else {
return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot);
return psa_unregister_read(slot);
}
}
@ -539,10 +569,10 @@ void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats)
for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) {
const psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx];
if (psa_is_key_slot_locked(slot)) {
if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) {
++stats->locked_slots;
}
if (!psa_is_key_slot_occupied(slot)) {
if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) {
++stats->empty_slots;
continue;
}

98
library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h
View File

@ -54,8 +54,9 @@ static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile(psa_key_id_t key_id)
* In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key
* into a key slot if not already done.
*
* On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of
* the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore.
* On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading.
* It is the responsibility of the caller to call psa_unregister_read(slot)
* when they have finished reading the contents of the slot.
*
* \param key Key identifier to query.
* \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the
@ -95,50 +96,92 @@ psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void);
* This does not affect persistent storage. */
void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void);
/** Find a free key slot.
/** Find a free key slot and reserve it to be filled with a key.
*
* This function returns a key slot that is available for use and is in its
* ground state (all-bits-zero). On success, the key slot is locked. It is
* the responsibility of the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not
* access it anymore.
* This function finds a key slot that is free,
* sets its state to PSA_SLOT_FILLING and then returns the slot.
*
* On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING.
* It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to
* PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished.
*
* \param[out] volatile_key_id On success, volatile key identifier
* associated to the returned slot.
* \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the slot.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
* There were no free key slots.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* This function attempted to operate on a key slot which was in an
* unexpected state.
*/
psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot);
psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id,
psa_key_slot_t **p_slot);
/** Lock a key slot.
/** Change the state of a key slot.
*
* This function increments the key slot lock counter by one.
* This function changes the state of the key slot from expected_state to
* new state. If the state of the slot was not expected_state, the state is
* unchanged.
*
* If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
* global key slot mutex.
*
* \param[in] slot The key slot.
* \param[in] expected_state The current state of the slot.
* \param[in] new_state The new state of the slot.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
The key slot's state variable is new_state.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* The slot's state was not expected_state.
*/
static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition(
psa_key_slot_t *slot, psa_key_slot_state_t expected_state,
psa_key_slot_state_t new_state)
{
if (slot->state != expected_state) {
return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
slot->state = new_state;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
/** Register as a reader of a key slot.
*
* This function increments the key slot registered reader counter by one.
* If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
* global key slot mutex.
*
* \param[in] slot The key slot.
*
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
The key slot lock counter was incremented.
The key slot registered reader counter was incremented.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* The lock counter already reached its maximum value and was not
* increased.
* The reader counter already reached its maximum value and was not
* increased, or the slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_FULL.
*/
static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
{
if (slot->lock_count >= SIZE_MAX) {
if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) ||
(slot->registered_readers >= SIZE_MAX)) {
return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
}
slot->lock_count++;
slot->registered_readers++;
return PSA_SUCCESS;
}
/** Unlock a key slot.
/** Unregister from reading a key slot.
*
* This function decrements the key slot lock counter by one.
* This function decrements the key slot registered reader counter by one.
* If the state of the slot is PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION,
* and there is only one registered reader (the caller),
* this function will call psa_wipe_key_slot().
* If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the
* global key slot mutex.
*
* \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot
* a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns
@ -146,13 +189,16 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
*
* \param[in] slot The key slot.
* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
* \p slot is NULL or the key slot lock counter has been
* decremented successfully.
* \p slot is NULL or the key slot reader counter has been
* decremented (and potentially wiped) successfully.
* \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
* The lock counter was equal to 0.
*
* The slot's state was neither PSA_SLOT_FULL nor
* PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION.
* Or a wipe was attempted and the slot's state was not
* PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION.
* Or registered_readers was equal to 0.
*/
psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot);
psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot);
/** Test whether a lifetime designates a key in an external cryptoprocessor.
*

290
library/psa_util.c
View File

@ -8,14 +8,20 @@
#include "common.h"
/* This is needed for MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX macros */
#include <mbedtls/error.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C)
#include <mbedtls/asn1write.h>
#include <psa/crypto_sizes.h>
#endif
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
#include <psa/crypto.h>
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
/* The following includes are needed for MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX macros */
#include <mbedtls/error.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT)
#include <mbedtls/md.h>
#endif
@ -37,6 +43,9 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
#include <mbedtls/pk.h>
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
#include <mbedtls/cipher.h>
#endif
/* PSA_SUCCESS is kept at the top of each error table since
* it's the most common status when everything functions properly. */
@ -49,6 +58,17 @@ const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_md_errors[] =
{ PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED }
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_cipher_errors[] =
{
{ PSA_SUCCESS, 0 },
{ PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE },
{ PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA },
{ PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED }
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C)
const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[] =
{
@ -57,6 +77,7 @@ const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_lms_errors[] =
{ PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA }
};
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3))
const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_ssl_errors[] =
@ -217,9 +238,7 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid,
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:
*bits = 224;
return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1;
/* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1)
case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:
@ -237,11 +256,10 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid,
}
}
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve,
size_t bits,
int bits_is_sloppy)
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family,
size_t bits)
{
switch (curve) {
switch (family) {
case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:
switch (bits) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192)
@ -263,11 +281,6 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve,
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
case 521:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1;
case 528:
if (bits_is_sloppy) {
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1;
}
break;
#endif
}
break;
@ -294,11 +307,6 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve,
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)
case 255:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519;
case 256:
if (bits_is_sloppy) {
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519;
}
break;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)
case 448:
@ -314,8 +322,7 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve,
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224)
case 224:
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1;
/* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256)
case 256:
@ -325,9 +332,244 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve,
break;
}
(void) bits_is_sloppy;
return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
}
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
/**
* \brief Convert a single raw coordinate to DER ASN.1 format. The output der
* buffer is filled backward (i.e. starting from its end).
*
* \param raw_buf Buffer containing the raw coordinate to be
* converted.
* \param raw_len Length of raw_buf in bytes. This must be > 0.
* \param der_buf_start Pointer to the beginning of the buffer which
* will be filled with the DER converted data.
* \param der_buf_end End of the buffer used to store the DER output.
*
* \return On success, the amount of data (in bytes) written to
* the DER buffer.
* \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if the provided der
* buffer is too small to contain all the converted data.
* \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the input raw
* coordinate is null (i.e. all zeros).
*
* \warning Raw and der buffer must not be overlapping.
*/
static int convert_raw_to_der_single_int(const unsigned char *raw_buf, size_t raw_len,
unsigned char *der_buf_start,
unsigned char *der_buf_end)
{
unsigned char *p = der_buf_end;
int len;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s.
* Provided input MPIs should not be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still
* detect that and return error in case. */
while (*raw_buf == 0x00) {
++raw_buf;
--raw_len;
if (raw_len == 0) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
}
}
len = (int) raw_len;
/* Copy the raw coordinate to the end of der_buf. */
if ((p - der_buf_start) < len) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
}
p -= len;
memcpy(p, raw_buf, len);
/* If MSb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. */
if (*p & 0x80) {
if ((p - der_buf_start) < 1) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
}
--p;
*p = 0x00;
++len;
}
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, der_buf_start, len));
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, der_buf_start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER));
return len;
}
int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len,
unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len)
{
unsigned char r[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)];
unsigned char s[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)];
const size_t coordinate_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits);
size_t len = 0;
unsigned char *p = der + der_size;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if (raw_len != (2 * coordinate_len)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
}
/* Since raw and der buffers might overlap, dump r and s before starting
* the conversion. */
memcpy(r, raw, coordinate_len);
memcpy(s, raw + coordinate_len, coordinate_len);
/* der buffer will initially be written starting from its end so we pick s
* first and then r. */
ret = convert_raw_to_der_single_int(s, coordinate_len, der, p);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
p -= ret;
len += ret;
ret = convert_raw_to_der_single_int(r, coordinate_len, der, p);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
p -= ret;
len += ret;
/* Add ASN.1 header (len + tag). */
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, der, len));
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, der,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE));
/* memmove the content of der buffer to its beginnig. */
memmove(der, p, len);
*der_len = len;
return 0;
}
/**
* \brief Convert a single integer from ASN.1 DER format to raw.
*
* \param der Buffer containing the DER integer value to be
* converted.
* \param der_len Length of the der buffer in bytes.
* \param raw Output buffer that will be filled with the
* converted data. This should be at least
* coordinate_size bytes and it must be zeroed before
* calling this function.
* \param coordinate_size Size (in bytes) of a single coordinate in raw
* format.
*
* \return On success, the amount of DER data parsed from the
* provided der buffer.
* \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the integer tag
* is missing in the der buffer.
* \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the integer
* is null (i.e. all zeros) or if the output raw buffer
* is too small to contain the converted raw value.
*
* \warning Der and raw buffers must not be overlapping.
*/
static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len,
unsigned char *raw, size_t coordinate_size)
{
unsigned char *p = der;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t unpadded_len, padding_len = 0;
/* Get the length of ASN.1 element (i.e. the integer we need to parse). */
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + der_len, &unpadded_len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
/* It's invalid to have:
* - unpadded_len == 0.
* - MSb set without a leading 0x00 (leading 0x00 is checked below). */
if (((unpadded_len == 0) || (*p & 0x80) != 0)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
}
/* Skip possible leading zero */
if (*p == 0x00) {
p++;
unpadded_len--;
/* It is not allowed to have more than 1 leading zero.
* Ignore the case in which unpadded_len = 0 because that's a 0 encoded
* in ASN.1 format (i.e. 020100). */
if ((unpadded_len > 0) && (*p == 0x00)) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
}
}
if (unpadded_len > coordinate_size) {
/* Parsed number is longer than the maximum expected value. */
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
}
padding_len = coordinate_size - unpadded_len;
/* raw buffer was already zeroed by the calling function so zero-padding
* operation is skipped here. */
memcpy(raw + padding_len, p, unpadded_len);
p += unpadded_len;
return (int) (p - der);
}
int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len,
unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len)
{
unsigned char raw_tmp[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) der;
size_t data_len;
size_t coordinate_size = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits);
int ret;
/* The output raw buffer should be at least twice the size of a raw
* coordinate in order to store r and s. */
if (raw_size < coordinate_size * 2) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
}
/* Check that the provided input DER buffer has the right header. */
ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, der + der_len, &data_len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
if (ret != 0) {
return ret;
}
memset(raw_tmp, 0, 2 * coordinate_size);
/* Extract r */
ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp, coordinate_size);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
p += ret;
data_len -= ret;
/* Extract s */
ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp + coordinate_size,
coordinate_size);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
p += ret;
data_len -= ret;
/* Check that we consumed all the input der data. */
if ((size_t) (p - der) != der_len) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
}
memcpy(raw, raw_tmp, 2 * coordinate_size);
*raw_len = 2 * coordinate_size;
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */

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