mirror/mbedtls
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git synced 2025-03-23 16:20:49 +00:00
Code Issues Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Remove NULL pointer validation in gcm.c

Browse Source 
Signed-off-by: Tuvshinzaya Erdenekhuu <tuvshinzaya.erdenekhuu@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Tuvshinzaya Erdenekhuu 2022-08-05 15:31:57 +01:00
parent 6c68927948
commit 505ce0b37e
1 changed files with 0 additions and 30 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

30
library/gcm.c
View File

@ -63,7 +63,6 @@
*/
void mbedtls_gcm_init( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx )
{
GCM_VALIDATE( ctx != NULL );
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_gcm_context ) );
}
@ -143,8 +142,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_setkey( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( key != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( keybits == 128 || keybits == 192 || keybits == 256 );
cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values( cipher, keybits,
@ -256,9 +253,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_starts( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
size_t use_len, olen = 0;
uint64_t iv_bits;
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
/* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */
/* IV is not allowed to be zero length */
if( iv_len == 0 || (uint64_t) iv_len >> 61 != 0 )
@ -334,8 +328,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *p;
size_t use_len, i, offset;
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
/* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */
if( (uint64_t) add_len >> 61 != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
@ -434,7 +426,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
if( output_size < input_length )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( output_length != NULL );
*output_length = input_length;
/* Exit early if input_length==0 so that we don't do any pointer arithmetic
@ -444,10 +435,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
if( input_length == 0 )
return( 0 );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( input != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( output != NULL );
if( output > input && (size_t) ( output - input ) < input_length )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT );
@ -519,9 +506,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_finish( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
uint64_t orig_len;
uint64_t orig_add_len;
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL );
/* We never pass any output in finish(). The output parameter exists only
* for the sake of alternative implementations. */
(void) output;
@ -580,13 +564,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t olen;
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts( ctx, mode, iv, iv_len ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
@ -619,13 +596,6 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt( mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
size_t i;
int diff;
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( ctx != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( iv != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( add_len == 0 || add != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( tag != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || input != NULL );
GCM_VALIDATE_RET( length == 0 || output != NULL );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag( ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length,
iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
input, output, tag_len, check_tag ) ) != 0 )