diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c
index 2b9c8a29ff..cf4cc23cd3 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto.c
@@ -1535,6 +1535,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* Reject a zero-length output buffer now, since this can never be a
      * valid key representation. This way we know that data must be a valid
@@ -1560,7 +1561,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
     status = psa_driver_wrapper_export_public_key(
@@ -2509,6 +2510,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
     if (operation->id != 0) {
@@ -2525,7 +2527,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -2695,6 +2697,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
     uint8_t operation_mac_size = 0;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
         key,
@@ -2705,7 +2708,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_mac_compute_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -2831,6 +2834,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     *signature_length = 0;
 
@@ -2862,7 +2866,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_sign_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3165,6 +3169,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     (void) input;
     (void) input_length;
@@ -3189,7 +3194,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3216,6 +3221,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     (void) input;
     (void) input_length;
@@ -3239,7 +3245,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -3313,6 +3319,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_start(
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* Check that start has not been previously called, or operation has not
      * previously errored. */
@@ -3339,7 +3346,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_start(
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4020,6 +4027,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
     psa_key_usage_t usage = (cipher_operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT ?
                              PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT :
                              PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT);
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     /* A context must be freshly initialized before it can be set up. */
     if (operation->id != 0) {
@@ -4049,7 +4057,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_cipher_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
     }
     operation->default_iv_length = PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(slot->attr.type, alg);
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4275,6 +4283,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
     uint8_t local_iv[PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE];
     size_t default_iv_length = 0;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -4288,7 +4297,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4345,6 +4354,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -4358,7 +4368,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -4612,6 +4622,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
     psa_key_usage_t key_usage = 0;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     status = psa_aead_check_algorithm(alg);
     if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
@@ -4641,7 +4652,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -5793,6 +5804,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper(
     mbedtls_mpi diff_N_2;
     int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    size_t m;
+    size_t m_bytes;
 
     mbedtls_mpi_init(&k);
     mbedtls_mpi_init(&diff_N_2);
@@ -5814,9 +5827,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper(
 
     /* N is the boundary of the private key domain (ecp_group.N). */
     /* Let m be the bit size of N. */
-    size_t m = ecp_group.nbits;
+    m = ecp_group.nbits;
 
-    size_t m_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(m);
+    m_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(m);
 
     /* Calculate N - 2 - it will be needed later. */
     MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&diff_N_2, &ecp_group.N, 2));
@@ -5959,6 +5972,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_key_internal(
     size_t bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits);
     size_t storage_size = bytes;
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
 
     if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(slot->attr.type)) {
         return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -6013,7 +6027,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_key_internal(
     }
 
     slot->attr.bits = (psa_key_bits_t) bits;
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
@@ -7114,6 +7128,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg,
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    size_t expected_length;
 
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -7133,7 +7148,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg,
      * PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() is exact so the point is moot.
      * If FFDH is implemented, PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE() can easily
      * be exact for it as well. */
-    size_t expected_length =
+    expected_length =
         PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(slot->attr.type, slot->attr.bits);
     if (output_size < expected_length) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
@@ -7789,6 +7804,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key(
     psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
     psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
+    psa_key_type_t type;
 
     if (operation->stage != PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS) {
         status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE;
@@ -7802,11 +7819,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key(
         goto exit;
     }
 
-    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
+    attributes = (psa_key_attributes_t) {
         .core = slot->attr
     };
 
-    psa_key_type_t type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
+    type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
 
     if (type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD &&
         type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH) {