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Merge pull request #9403 from gilles-peskine-arm/psa-keystore-dynamic-prep-3.6
Backport 3.6: prepare for dynamic key store
This commit is contained in:
commit
3b41e1d2a5
4
ChangeLog.d/dynamic-keystore.txt
Normal file
4
ChangeLog.d/dynamic-keystore.txt
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
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Bugfix
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* Fix interference between PSA volatile keys and built-in keys
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when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled and
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MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT is more than 4096.
|
3
ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_psa_register_se_key.txt
Normal file
3
ChangeLog.d/mbedtls_psa_register_se_key.txt
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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Bugfix
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* Document and enforce the limitation of mbedtls_psa_register_se_key()
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to persistent keys. Resolves #9253.
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@ -32,12 +32,27 @@
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#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
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/* In case AES_C is defined then it is the primary option for backward
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* compatibility purposes. If that's not available, PSA is used instead */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
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#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
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#else
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/* The CTR_DRBG implementation can either directly call the low-level AES
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* module (gated by MBEDTLS_AES_C) or call the PSA API to perform AES
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* operations. Calling the AES module directly is the default, both for
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* maximum backward compatibility and because it's a bit more efficient
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* (less glue code).
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*
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* When MBEDTLS_AES_C is disabled, the CTR_DRBG module calls PSA crypto and
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* thus benefits from the PSA AES accelerator driver.
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* It is technically possible to enable MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
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* to use PSA even when MBEDTLS_AES_C is enabled, but there is very little
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* reason to do so other than testing purposes and this is not officially
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* supported.
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*/
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
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#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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#include "psa/crypto.h"
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#else
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#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
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#endif
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#include "entropy.h"
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@ -157,7 +172,7 @@ extern "C" {
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#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + 1) / 2
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#endif
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context {
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mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id;
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psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
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@ -189,10 +204,10 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context {
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* This is the maximum number of requests
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* that can be made between reseedings. */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
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mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aes_ctx); /*!< The AES context. */
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#else
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_ctx); /*!< The PSA context. */
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#else
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mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aes_ctx); /*!< The AES context. */
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#endif
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/*
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@ -4025,13 +4025,18 @@
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//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
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/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT
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* Restrict the PSA library to supporting a maximum amount of simultaneously
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* loaded keys. A loaded key is a key stored by the PSA Crypto core as a
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* volatile key, or a persistent key which is loaded temporarily by the
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* library as part of a crypto operation in flight.
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*
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* If this option is unset, the library will fall back to a default value of
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* 32 keys.
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* The maximum amount of PSA keys simultaneously in memory. This counts all
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* volatile keys, plus loaded persistent keys.
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*
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* Currently, persistent keys do not need to be loaded all the time while
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* a multipart operation is in progress, only while the operation is being
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* set up. This may change in future versions of the library.
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*
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* Currently, the library traverses of the whole table on each access to a
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* persistent key. Therefore large values may cause poor performance.
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*
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* This option has no effect when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is disabled.
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*/
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//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32
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@ -129,6 +129,9 @@ static psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void);
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*
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* \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
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* \param key The persistent identifier for the key.
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* This can be any value in the range from
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* #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX
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* inclusive.
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*/
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static void psa_set_key_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
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mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
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@ -154,6 +154,14 @@ static inline void psa_clear_key_slot_number(
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* specified in \p attributes.
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*
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* \param[in] attributes The attributes of the existing key.
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* - The lifetime must be a persistent lifetime
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* in a secure element. Volatile lifetimes are
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* not currently supported.
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* - The key identifier must be in the valid
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* range for persistent keys.
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* - The key type and size must be specified and
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* must be consistent with the key material
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* in the secure element.
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*
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* \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
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* The key was successfully registered.
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@ -479,7 +487,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(
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* #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN and #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX and must not intersect
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* with any other set of implementation-chosen key identifiers.
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*
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* This value is part of the library's ABI since changing it would invalidate
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* This value is part of the library's API since changing it would invalidate
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* the values of built-in key identifiers in applications.
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*/
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#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fff0000)
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@ -352,17 +352,19 @@ static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r,
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#endif
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/* Always provide a static assert macro, so it can be used unconditionally.
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* It will expand to nothing on some systems.
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* Can be used outside functions (but don't add a trailing ';' in that case:
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* the semicolon is included here to avoid triggering -Wextra-semi when
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* MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT() expands to nothing).
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* Can't use the C11-style `defined(static_assert)` on FreeBSD, since it
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* It does nothing on systems where we don't know how to define a static assert.
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*/
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/* Can't use the C11-style `defined(static_assert)` on FreeBSD, since it
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* defines static_assert even with -std=c99, but then complains about it.
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*/
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#if defined(static_assert) && !defined(__FreeBSD__)
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#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg) static_assert(expr, msg);
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#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg) static_assert(expr, msg)
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#else
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#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg)
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/* Make sure `MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg);` is valid both inside and
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* outside a function. We choose a struct declaration, which can be repeated
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* any number of times and does not need a matching definition. */
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#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg) \
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struct ISO_C_does_not_allow_extra_semicolon_outside_of_a_function
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#endif
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#if defined(__has_builtin)
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@ -26,13 +26,13 @@
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#endif
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/* Using error translation functions from PSA to MbedTLS */
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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#include "psa_util_internal.h"
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#endif
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#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
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#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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static psa_status_t ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx,
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unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
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{
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@ -73,11 +73,11 @@ static void ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx)
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void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx)
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{
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context));
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
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mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->aes_ctx);
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#else
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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ctx->psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
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ctx->psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
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#else
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mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->aes_ctx);
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#endif
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/* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly.
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* See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */
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@ -102,10 +102,10 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx)
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mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex);
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}
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
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mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->aes_ctx);
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#else
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx);
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#else
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mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->aes_ctx);
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#endif
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context));
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ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
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@ -168,15 +168,15 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
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unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
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unsigned char *p, *iv;
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int ret = 0;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
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mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx;
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#else
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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psa_status_t status;
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size_t tmp_len;
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mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context psa_ctx;
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psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
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psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
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#else
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mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx;
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#endif
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int i, j;
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@ -209,19 +209,19 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
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key[i] = i;
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}
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|
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
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||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, key, sizeof(key));
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if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
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ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
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goto exit;
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||||
}
|
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#else
|
||||
mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, key,
|
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MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
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||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
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status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, key, sizeof(key));
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@ -238,18 +238,18 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
|
||||
use_len -= (use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) ?
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len;
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
|
||||
chain, chain)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE,
|
||||
chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
|
||||
chain, chain)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -264,12 +264,7 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Do final encryption with reduced data
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, tmp,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
|
||||
@ -277,32 +272,37 @@ static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
|
||||
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, tmp,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE;
|
||||
p = output;
|
||||
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) {
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
|
||||
iv, iv)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE,
|
||||
iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
|
||||
iv, iv)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
memcpy(p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE);
|
||||
p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
exit:
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
|
||||
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes_ctx);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
mbedtls_aes_free(&aes_ctx);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* tidy up the stack
|
||||
@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
|
||||
unsigned char *p = tmp;
|
||||
int j;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
size_t tmp_len;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@ -352,18 +352,18 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Crypt counter block
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
|
||||
ctx->counter, p)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter),
|
||||
p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
|
||||
ctx->counter, p)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
|
||||
@ -374,12 +374,7 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Update key and counter
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, tmp,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
|
||||
@ -387,6 +382,11 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
|
||||
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, tmp,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
memcpy(ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE);
|
||||
@ -564,12 +564,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
|
||||
good_nonce_len(ctx->entropy_len));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Initialize with an empty key. */
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, key,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
|
||||
status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
|
||||
@ -577,6 +572,11 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
|
||||
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
|
||||
return status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, key,
|
||||
MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Do the initial seeding. */
|
||||
@ -655,12 +655,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Crypt counter block
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
|
||||
ctx->counter, locals.tmp)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
size_t tmp_len;
|
||||
|
||||
@ -670,6 +665,11 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
|
||||
ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
|
||||
ctx->counter, locals.tmp)) != 0) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
use_len = (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE)
|
||||
|
@ -2149,6 +2149,14 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key(
|
||||
return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Not usable with volatile keys, even with an appropriate location,
|
||||
* due to the API design.
|
||||
* https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9253
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(psa_get_key_lifetime(attributes))) {
|
||||
return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_start_key_creation(PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER, attributes,
|
||||
&slot, &driver);
|
||||
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
|
||||
|
@ -27,6 +27,37 @@
|
||||
#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* Make sure we have distinct ranges of key identifiers for distinct
|
||||
* purposes. */
|
||||
MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN < PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX,
|
||||
"Empty user key ID range");
|
||||
MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN < PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX,
|
||||
"Empty vendor key ID range");
|
||||
MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX,
|
||||
"Empty builtin key ID range");
|
||||
MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN < PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX,
|
||||
"Empty volatile key ID range");
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX < PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ||
|
||||
PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX < PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN,
|
||||
"Overlap between user key IDs and vendor key IDs");
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN &&
|
||||
MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX <= PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX,
|
||||
"Builtin key identifiers are not in the vendor range");
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN <= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN &&
|
||||
PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX <= PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX,
|
||||
"Volatile key identifiers are not in the vendor range");
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX < PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN,
|
||||
"Overlap between builtin key IDs and volatile key IDs");
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT];
|
||||
uint8_t key_slots_initialized;
|
||||
@ -34,6 +65,10 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
|
||||
static psa_global_data_t global_data;
|
||||
|
||||
MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(ARRAY_LENGTH(global_data.key_slots) <=
|
||||
PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX - PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + 1,
|
||||
"The key slot array is larger than the volatile key ID range");
|
||||
|
||||
static uint8_t psa_get_key_slots_initialized(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint8_t initialized;
|
||||
|
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
/** Range of volatile key identifiers.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The last #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT identifiers of the implementation
|
||||
* The first #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT identifiers of the implementation
|
||||
* range of key identifiers are reserved for volatile key identifiers.
|
||||
* A volatile key identifier is equal to #PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN plus the
|
||||
* index of the key slot containing the volatile key definition.
|
||||
@ -23,12 +23,12 @@
|
||||
|
||||
/** The minimum value for a volatile key identifier.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN (PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX - \
|
||||
MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT + 1)
|
||||
#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN
|
||||
|
||||
/** The maximum value for a volatile key identifier.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX
|
||||
#define PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX \
|
||||
(PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT - 1)
|
||||
|
||||
/** Test whether a key identifier is a volatile key identifier.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
|
||||
#include <psa/crypto.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#include <mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
|
||||
/** Initialize the PSA Crypto subsystem. */
|
||||
#define PSA_INIT() PSA_ASSERT(psa_crypto_init())
|
||||
@ -430,12 +432,32 @@ uint64_t mbedtls_test_parse_binary_string(data_t *bin_string);
|
||||
* This is like #PSA_DONE except it does nothing under the same conditions as
|
||||
* #AES_PSA_INIT.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
|
||||
#define AES_PSA_INIT() ((void) 0)
|
||||
#define AES_PSA_DONE() ((void) 0)
|
||||
#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
#define AES_PSA_INIT() PSA_INIT()
|
||||
#define AES_PSA_DONE() PSA_DONE()
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
|
||||
#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
||||
#define AES_PSA_INIT() ((void) 0)
|
||||
#define AES_PSA_DONE() ((void) 0)
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
||||
|
||||
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) && \
|
||||
defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \
|
||||
defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
||||
/* When AES_C is not defined and PSA does not have an external RNG,
|
||||
* then CTR_DRBG uses PSA to perform AES-ECB. In this scenario 1 key
|
||||
* slot is used internally from PSA to hold the AES key and it should
|
||||
* not be taken into account when evaluating remaining open slots. */
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_INTERNAL_KEYS_FOR_DRBG 1
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_INTERNAL_KEYS_FOR_DRBG 0
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/** The number of volatile keys that PSA crypto uses internally.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* We expect that many volatile keys to be in use after a successful
|
||||
* psa_crypto_init().
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#define MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_INTERNAL_KEYS \
|
||||
MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_INTERNAL_KEYS_FOR_DRBG
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_HELPERS_H */
|
||||
|
@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
|
||||
#include <psa_crypto_slot_management.h>
|
||||
#include <test/psa_crypto_helpers.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
|
||||
#include <mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
|
||||
|
||||
#include <psa/crypto.h>
|
||||
@ -70,20 +74,14 @@ const char *mbedtls_test_helper_is_psa_leaking(void)
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_psa_get_stats(&stats);
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && \
|
||||
!defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
|
||||
/* When AES_C is not defined and PSA does not have an external RNG,
|
||||
* then CTR_DRBG uses PSA to perform AES-ECB. In this scenario 1 key
|
||||
* slot is used internally from PSA to hold the AES key and it should
|
||||
* not be taken into account when evaluating remaining open slots. */
|
||||
if (stats.volatile_slots > 1) {
|
||||
/* Some volatile slots may be used for internal purposes. Generally
|
||||
* we'll have exactly MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_INTERNAL_KEYS at this point,
|
||||
* but in some cases we might have less, e.g. if a code path calls
|
||||
* PSA_DONE more than once, or if there has only been a partial or
|
||||
* failed initialization. */
|
||||
if (stats.volatile_slots > MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_INTERNAL_KEYS) {
|
||||
return "A volatile slot has not been closed properly.";
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if (stats.volatile_slots != 0) {
|
||||
return "A volatile slot has not been closed properly.";
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
if (stats.persistent_slots != 0) {
|
||||
return "A persistent slot has not been closed properly.";
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Built-in key range
|
||||
builtin_key_id_stability:
|
||||
|
||||
sign_hash transparent driver: in driver ECDSA SECP256R1 SHA-256
|
||||
depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256
|
||||
sign_hash:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ):PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ):PSA_SUCCESS:"ab45435712649cb30bbddac49197eebf2740ffc7f874d9244c3460f54f322d3a":"9ac4335b469bbd791439248504dd0d49c71349a295fee5a1c68507f45a9e1c7b":"6a3399f69421ffe1490377adf2ea1f117d81a63cf5bf22e918d51175eb259151ce95d7c26cc04e25503e2f7a1ec3573e3c2412534bb4a19b3a7811742f49f50f":0:PSA_SUCCESS
|
||||
|
@ -489,6 +489,21 @@ exit:
|
||||
* END_DEPENDENCIES
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/* BEGIN_CASE */
|
||||
void builtin_key_id_stability()
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* If the range of built-in keys is reduced, it's an API break, since
|
||||
* it breaks user code that hard-codes the key id of built-in keys.
|
||||
* It's ok to expand this range, but not to shrink it. That is, you
|
||||
* may make the MIN smaller or the MAX larger at any time, but
|
||||
* making the MIN larger or the MAX smaller can only be done in
|
||||
* a new major version of the library.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN, 0x7fff0000);
|
||||
TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX, 0x7fffefff);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* END_CASE */
|
||||
|
||||
/* BEGIN_CASE */
|
||||
void sign_hash(int key_type_arg,
|
||||
int alg_arg,
|
||||
|
@ -8,6 +8,23 @@
|
||||
#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
|
||||
#include "entropy_poll.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static int check_stats(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
mbedtls_psa_stats_t stats;
|
||||
mbedtls_psa_get_stats(&stats);
|
||||
|
||||
TEST_EQUAL(stats.volatile_slots, MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_INTERNAL_KEYS);
|
||||
TEST_EQUAL(stats.persistent_slots, 0);
|
||||
TEST_EQUAL(stats.external_slots, 0);
|
||||
TEST_EQUAL(stats.half_filled_slots, 0);
|
||||
TEST_EQUAL(stats.locked_slots, 0);
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
exit:
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#define ENTROPY_MIN_NV_SEED_SIZE \
|
||||
MAX(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -187,12 +204,23 @@ void init_deinit(int count)
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
|
||||
mbedtls_test_set_step(2 * i);
|
||||
status = psa_crypto_init();
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(status);
|
||||
if (!check_stats()) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_test_set_step(2 * i);
|
||||
status = psa_crypto_init();
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(status);
|
||||
if (!check_stats()) {
|
||||
goto exit;
|
||||
}
|
||||
PSA_DONE();
|
||||
}
|
||||
exit:
|
||||
PSA_DONE();
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* END_CASE */
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -148,7 +148,16 @@ generate_key_smoke:PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC:256:PSA_ALG_HMAC( PSA_ALG_SHA_256 )
|
||||
Key registration: smoke test
|
||||
register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:1:1:PSA_SUCCESS
|
||||
|
||||
Key registration: invalid lifetime (volatile internal storage)
|
||||
Key registration: invalid lifetime (volatile, in SE, id=0)
|
||||
register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_VOLATILE_LIFETIME:7:0:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
|
||||
|
||||
Key registration: invalid lifetime (volatile, in SE, id=1)
|
||||
register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_VOLATILE_LIFETIME:7:1:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
|
||||
|
||||
Key registration: invalid lifetime (volatile, internal, id=0)
|
||||
register_key_smoke_test:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:7:0:0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
|
||||
|
||||
Key registration: invalid lifetime (volatile, internal, id=1)
|
||||
register_key_smoke_test:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE:7:1:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
|
||||
|
||||
Key registration: invalid lifetime (internal storage)
|
||||
@ -169,8 +178,8 @@ register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX+1:-1
|
||||
Key registration: key id min vendor
|
||||
register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
|
||||
|
||||
Key registration: key id max vendor except volatile
|
||||
register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN-1:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
|
||||
Key registration: key id max vendor
|
||||
register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
|
||||
|
||||
Key registration: key id min volatile
|
||||
register_key_smoke_test:TEST_SE_PERSISTENT_LIFETIME:7:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
|
||||
|
@ -122,7 +122,18 @@ open_fail:PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX + 1:PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
|
||||
|
||||
Open failure: invalid identifier (implementation range)
|
||||
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
|
||||
open_fail:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX + 1:PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
|
||||
# We need to avoid existing volatile key IDs. Normally there aren't any
|
||||
# existing volatile keys because the test case doesn't create any, but
|
||||
# in some configurations, the implementation or a driver creates a
|
||||
# volatile key during initialization for its own use. At the time of
|
||||
# writing, this happens in builds where AES uses a PSA driver and the
|
||||
# PSA RNG uses AES-CTR_DRBG through the PSA AES.
|
||||
# Pick a key id that's in the middle of the volatile key ID range.
|
||||
# That works out both when MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_DYNAMIC is enabled and
|
||||
# volatile key IDs are assigned starting with the lowest value, and when
|
||||
# MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_DYNAMIC is disabled and volatile key IDs are assigned
|
||||
# starting with the highest values.
|
||||
open_fail:(PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX) / 2:PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
|
||||
|
||||
Open failure: non-existent identifier
|
||||
depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
|
||||
@ -214,8 +225,20 @@ invalid_handle:INVALID_HANDLE_CLOSED:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
|
||||
invalid handle: huge
|
||||
invalid_handle:INVALID_HANDLE_HUGE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
|
||||
|
||||
Open many transient keys
|
||||
many_transient_keys:42
|
||||
Key slot count: maximum
|
||||
many_transient_keys:MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT - MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_INTERNAL_KEYS
|
||||
|
||||
Key slot count: try to overfill, destroy first
|
||||
fill_key_store:0
|
||||
|
||||
Key slot count: try to overfill, destroy second
|
||||
fill_key_store:1
|
||||
|
||||
Key slot count: try to overfill, destroy next-to-last
|
||||
fill_key_store:-2
|
||||
|
||||
Key slot count: try to overfill, destroy last
|
||||
fill_key_store:-1
|
||||
|
||||
# Eviction from a key slot to be able to import a new persistent key.
|
||||
Key slot eviction to import a new persistent key
|
||||
|
@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ exit:
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Currently, there is always a maximum number of volatile keys that can
|
||||
* realistically be reached in tests. When we add configurations where this
|
||||
* is not true, undefine the macro in such configurations. */
|
||||
#define MAX_VOLATILE_KEYS MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT
|
||||
|
||||
/* END_HEADER */
|
||||
|
||||
/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
|
||||
@ -813,21 +818,19 @@ void many_transient_keys(int max_keys_arg)
|
||||
psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < max_keys; i++) {
|
||||
mbedtls_test_set_step(i);
|
||||
status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
|
||||
(uint8_t *) &i, sizeof(i),
|
||||
&keys[i]);
|
||||
if (status == PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY) {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(status);
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT(!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(keys[i]));
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT(!mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(keys[i], keys[j]));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
max_keys = i;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 1; i < max_keys; i++) {
|
||||
mbedtls_test_set_step(i);
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(psa_close_key(keys[i - 1]));
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(psa_export_key(keys[i],
|
||||
exported, sizeof(exported),
|
||||
@ -843,6 +846,112 @@ exit:
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* END_CASE */
|
||||
|
||||
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MAX_VOLATILE_KEYS */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* 1. Fill the key store with volatile keys.
|
||||
* 2. Check that attempting to create another volatile key fails without
|
||||
* corrupting the key store.
|
||||
* 3. Destroy the key specified by key_to_destroy. This is the number of the
|
||||
* key in creation order (e.g. 0 means the first key that was created).
|
||||
* It can also be a negative value to count in reverse order (e.g.
|
||||
* -1 means to destroy the last key that was created).
|
||||
* 4. Check that creating another volatile key succeeds.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void fill_key_store(int key_to_destroy_arg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *keys = NULL;
|
||||
size_t max_keys = MAX_VOLATILE_KEYS;
|
||||
size_t i, j;
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
|
||||
uint8_t exported[sizeof(size_t)];
|
||||
size_t exported_length;
|
||||
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(psa_crypto_init());
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_psa_stats_t stats;
|
||||
mbedtls_psa_get_stats(&stats);
|
||||
/* Account for any system-created volatile key, e.g. for the RNG. */
|
||||
max_keys -= stats.volatile_slots;
|
||||
TEST_CALLOC(keys, max_keys + 1);
|
||||
|
||||
psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT);
|
||||
psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, 0);
|
||||
psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Fill the key store. */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < max_keys; i++) {
|
||||
mbedtls_test_set_step(i);
|
||||
status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
|
||||
(uint8_t *) &i, sizeof(i),
|
||||
&keys[i]);
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(status);
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT(!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(keys[i]));
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT(!mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(keys[i], keys[j]));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Attempt to overfill. */
|
||||
mbedtls_test_set_step(max_keys);
|
||||
status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
|
||||
(uint8_t *) &max_keys, sizeof(max_keys),
|
||||
&keys[max_keys]);
|
||||
TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY);
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(keys[max_keys]));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check that the keys are not corrupted. */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < max_keys; i++) {
|
||||
mbedtls_test_set_step(i);
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(psa_export_key(keys[i],
|
||||
exported, sizeof(exported),
|
||||
&exported_length));
|
||||
TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(exported, exported_length,
|
||||
(uint8_t *) &i, sizeof(i));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Destroy one key and try again. */
|
||||
size_t key_to_destroy = (key_to_destroy_arg >= 0 ?
|
||||
(size_t) key_to_destroy_arg :
|
||||
max_keys + key_to_destroy_arg);
|
||||
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t reused_id = keys[key_to_destroy];
|
||||
const uint8_t replacement_value[1] = { 0x64 };
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(psa_destroy_key(keys[key_to_destroy]));
|
||||
keys[key_to_destroy] = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
||||
status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
|
||||
replacement_value, sizeof(replacement_value),
|
||||
&keys[key_to_destroy]);
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(status);
|
||||
/* Since the key store was full except for one key, the new key must be
|
||||
* in the same slot in the key store as the destroyed key.
|
||||
* Since volatile keys IDs are assigned based on which slot contains
|
||||
* the key, the new key should have the same ID as the destroyed key.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(reused_id, keys[key_to_destroy]));
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check that the keys are not corrupted and destroy them. */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < max_keys; i++) {
|
||||
mbedtls_test_set_step(i);
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(psa_export_key(keys[i],
|
||||
exported, sizeof(exported),
|
||||
&exported_length));
|
||||
if (i == key_to_destroy) {
|
||||
TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(exported, exported_length,
|
||||
replacement_value, sizeof(replacement_value));
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(exported, exported_length,
|
||||
(uint8_t *) &i, sizeof(i));
|
||||
}
|
||||
PSA_ASSERT(psa_destroy_key(keys[i]));
|
||||
keys[i] = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
exit:
|
||||
PSA_DONE();
|
||||
mbedtls_free(keys);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* END_CASE */
|
||||
|
||||
/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C */
|
||||
void key_slot_eviction_to_import_new_key(int lifetime_arg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user