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Add X.509 formatting validation to SECURITY.md
Clarify that strict formatting of X.509 certificates is not checked by Mbed TLS and that it therefore should not be used to construct a CA. Signed-off-by: David Horstmann <david.horstmann@arm.com>
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SECURITY.md
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SECURITY.md
@ -144,3 +144,17 @@ Policy](https://github.com/hacl-star/hacl-star/blob/main/SECURITY.md).)
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The Everest variant is only used when `MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED`
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configuration option is defined. This option is off by default.
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#### Formatting of X.509 certificates and certificate signing requests
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When parsing X.509 certificates and certificate signing requests (CSRs),
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Mbed TLS does not check that they are strictly compliant with X.509 and other
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relevant standards. In the case of signed certificates, the signing party is
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assumed to have performed this validation (and the certificate is trusted to
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be correctly formatted as long as the signature is correct).
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Similarly, CSRs are implicitly trusted by Mbed TLS to be standards-compliant.
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**Warning!** Mbed TLS must not be used to sign untrusted CSRs unless extra
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validation is performed separately to ensure that they are compliant to the
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relevant specifications. This makes Mbed TLS on its own unsuitable use in a
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Certificate Authority (CA).
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