tls13: Remove unnecessary cast from size_t to uint32_t

Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ronald Cron 2024-03-05 10:54:33 +01:00
parent e93cd1b580
commit 2e7dfd5181

View File

@ -1459,8 +1459,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t early_data_len)
{
uint32_t uint32_early_data_len = (uint32_t) early_data_len;
/*
* This function should be called only while an handshake is in progress
* and thus a session under negotiation. Add a sanity check to detect a
@ -1475,13 +1473,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data
* SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert.
*/
if (uint32_early_data_len >
if (early_data_len >
(ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size -
ssl->total_early_data_size)) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
2, ("EarlyData: Too much early data received, %u > %u",
ssl->total_early_data_size + uint32_early_data_len,
2, ("EarlyData: Too much early data received, %u + %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " > %u",
ssl->total_early_data_size, early_data_len,
ssl->session_negotiate->max_early_data_size));
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(
@ -1490,7 +1488,13 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
}
ssl->total_early_data_size += uint32_early_data_len;
/*
* The check just above implies that early_data_len is lower than
* UINT32_MAX thus its cast to an uint32_t below is safe. We need it
* to appease some compilers.
*/
ssl->total_early_data_size += (uint32_t) early_data_len;
return 0;
}