Combine the alert check of selected_id and ciphercuite

Signed-off-by: Xiaokang Qian <xiaokang.qian@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Xiaokang Qian 2023-02-06 10:44:17 +00:00
parent 934ce6f6a9
commit 02f5e14073

View File

@ -1909,30 +1909,25 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
goto cleanup;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions &
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) &&
ssl->handshake->selected_identity != 0) {
if (handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) &&
(handshake->selected_identity != 0 ||
handshake->ciphersuite_info->id !=
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite)) {
/* RFC8446 4.2.11
* If the server supplies an "early_data" extension, the
* client MUST verify that the server's selected_identity
* is 0. If any other value is returned, the client MUST
* abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
*
* Clients MUST verify that the server selected a cipher suite
* indicating a Hash associated with the PSK, If this value are
* not consistent, the client MUST abort the handshake with an
* "illegal_parameter" alert.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions &
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) &&
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id !=
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite) {
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(
1, ("Invalid ciphersuite for session ticket psk."));
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
}
#endif
if (!mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_check_kex_modes(ssl, handshake->key_exchange_mode)) {