fixed bug #48170 (Vulnerable to TCP RST spoofing) (original patch by Fabian Koch)

This commit is contained in:
goldsimon 2016-06-30 08:50:42 +02:00
parent d31d2ee882
commit e6bc591a1e
2 changed files with 15 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -321,6 +321,9 @@ HISTORY
++ Bugfixes:
2016-06-30: Simon Goldschmidt (original patch by Fabian Koch)
* tcp_in.c: fixed bug #48170 (Vulnerable to TCP RST spoofing)
2016-04-05: Simon Goldschmidt (patch by Philip Gladstone)
* udp.c: patch #8358: allow more combinations of listening PCB for IPv6

View File

@ -706,13 +706,23 @@ tcp_process(struct tcp_pcb *pcb)
if (flags & TCP_RST) {
/* First, determine if the reset is acceptable. */
if (pcb->state == SYN_SENT) {
/* "In the SYN-SENT state (a RST received in response to an initial SYN),
the RST is acceptable if the ACK field acknowledges the SYN." */
if (ackno == pcb->snd_nxt) {
acceptable = 1;
}
} else {
if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt,
pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)) {
/* "In all states except SYN-SENT, all reset (RST) segments are validated
by checking their SEQ-fields." */
if (seqno == pcb->rcv_nxt) {
acceptable = 1;
} else if (TCP_SEQ_BETWEEN(seqno, pcb->rcv_nxt,
pcb->rcv_nxt + pcb->rcv_wnd)) {
/* If the sequence number is inside the window, we only send an ACK
and wait for a re-send with matching sequence number.
This violates RFC 793, but is required to protection against
CVE-2004-0230 (RST spoofing attack). */
tcp_ack_now(pcb);
}
}