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sm: update existing le device db entry, fix use of ediv/rand/ltk of bonded connections

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This commit is contained in:
Matthias Ringwald 2015-08-05 15:48:53 +02:00
parent fbf1e48df0
commit e8d5dc2445
1 changed files with 42 additions and 19 deletions
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61
ble/sm.c
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@ -123,7 +123,6 @@ static uint8_t sm_min_encryption_key_size;
static uint8_t sm_auth_req = 0;
static uint8_t sm_io_capabilities = IO_CAPABILITY_NO_INPUT_NO_OUTPUT;
static uint8_t sm_slave_request_security;
static uint8_t sm_authenticate_outgoing_connections = 0; // might go a934way
// Security Manager Master Keys, please use sm_set_er(er) and sm_set_ir(ir) with your own 128 bit random values
static sm_key_t sm_persistent_er;
@ -910,11 +909,15 @@ static void sm_address_resolution_handle_event(address_resolution_event_t event)
sm_connection = (sm_connection_t *) context;
switch (event){
case ADDRESS_RESOLUTION_SUCEEDED:
// re-use stored LTK/EDIV/RAND if requested & we're master
// TODO: replace global with flag in sm_connection_t
if (sm_authenticate_outgoing_connections && sm_connection->sm_role == 0){
sm_connection->sm_engine_state = SM_INITIATOR_PH0_HAS_LTK;
log_info("sm: Setting up previous ltk/ediv/rand");
// use stored LTK/EDIV/RAND if we're master and have a valid ediv/random/ltk combination
sm_connection->sm_le_db_index = matched_device_id;
if (sm_connection->sm_role == 0){
uint16_t ediv;
le_device_db_encryption_get(sm_connection->sm_le_db_index, &ediv, NULL, NULL);
if (ediv){
log_info("sm: Setting up previous ltk/ediv/rand for device index %u", sm_connection->sm_le_db_index);
sm_connection->sm_engine_state = SM_INITIATOR_PH0_HAS_LTK;
}
}
break;
case ADDRESS_RESOLUTION_FAILED:
@ -1171,10 +1174,11 @@ static void sm_run(void){
sm_key_t plaintext;
log_info("sm_run: state %u", connection->sm_engine_state);
// responding state
switch (connection->sm_engine_state){
// general
case SM_GENERAL_SEND_PAIRING_FAILED: {
uint8_t buffer[2];
@ -1191,7 +1195,10 @@ static void sm_run(void){
sm_key_t peer_ltk_flipped;
swap128(setup->sm_peer_ltk, peer_ltk_flipped);
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_INITIATOR_PH0_W4_CONNECTION_ENCRYPTED;
hci_send_cmd(&hci_le_start_encryption, connection->sm_handle, setup->sm_peer_rand, setup->sm_peer_ediv, peer_ltk_flipped);
log_info("sm: hci_le_start_encryption ediv 0x%04x", setup->sm_peer_ediv);
uint32_t rand_high = READ_NET_32(setup->sm_peer_rand, 0);
uint32_t rand_low = READ_NET_32(setup->sm_peer_rand, 4);
hci_send_cmd(&hci_le_start_encryption, connection->sm_handle,rand_low, rand_high, setup->sm_peer_ediv, peer_ltk_flipped);
return;
}
@ -1766,6 +1773,7 @@ static void sm_event_packet_handler (uint8_t packet_type, uint16_t channel, uint
sm_conn->sm_connection_encrypted = packet[5];
log_info("Encryption state change: %u, key size %u", sm_conn->sm_connection_encrypted,
sm_conn->sm_actual_encryption_key_size);
log_info("event handler, state %u", sm_conn->sm_engine_state);
if (!sm_conn->sm_connection_encrypted) break;
// continue if part of initial pairing
switch (sm_conn->sm_engine_state){
@ -1775,8 +1783,10 @@ static void sm_event_packet_handler (uint8_t packet_type, uint16_t channel, uint
break;
case SM_PH2_W4_CONNECTION_ENCRYPTED:
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// slave
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH3_GET_RANDOM;
} else {
// master
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH3_RECEIVE_KEYS;
}
break;
@ -2018,24 +2028,41 @@ static void sm_packet_handler(uint8_t packet_type, uint16_t handle, uint8_t *pac
// done with key distribution?
if (sm_key_distribution_all_received(sm_conn)){
// store, if: it's a public address, or, we got an IRK
if (setup->sm_peer_addr_type == 0 || (setup->sm_key_distribution_received_set & SM_KEYDIST_FLAG_IDENTITY_INFORMATION)) {
sm_conn->sm_le_db_index = le_device_db_add(setup->sm_peer_addr_type, setup->sm_peer_address, setup->sm_peer_irk);
}
sm_conn->sm_le_db_index = -1;
if (setup->sm_key_distribution_received_set & SM_KEYDIST_FLAG_IDENTITY_INFORMATION){
// lookup device based on IRK
int i;
for (i=0; i < le_device_db_count(); i++){
sm_key_t irk;
bd_addr_t address;
int address_type;
le_device_db_info(i, &address_type, address, irk);
if (memcmp(irk, setup->sm_peer_irk, 16) == 0){
log_info("sm: device found for IRK, updating");
sm_conn->sm_le_db_index = i;
break;
}
}
// if not found, add to db
if (sm_conn->sm_le_db_index < 0) {
sm_conn->sm_le_db_index = le_device_db_add(setup->sm_peer_addr_type, setup->sm_peer_address, setup->sm_peer_irk);
}
}
if (sm_conn->sm_le_db_index >= 0){
le_device_db_local_counter_set(sm_conn->sm_le_db_index, 0);
// store CSRK
if (setup->sm_key_distribution_received_set & SM_KEYDIST_FLAG_SIGNING_IDENTIFICATION){
log_info("sm: set csrk");
le_device_db_csrk_set(sm_conn->sm_le_db_index, setup->sm_peer_csrk);
le_device_db_remote_counter_set(sm_conn->sm_le_db_index, 0);
}
// store encryption information as Central
if (sm_conn->sm_role == 0
&& setup->sm_key_distribution_received_set & SM_KEYDIST_FLAG_ENCRYPTION_INFORMATION
// store encryption information
if (setup->sm_key_distribution_received_set & SM_KEYDIST_FLAG_ENCRYPTION_INFORMATION
&& setup->sm_key_distribution_received_set & SM_KEYDIST_FLAG_MASTER_IDENTIFICATION){
log_info("sm: set encryption information");
le_device_db_encryption_set(sm_conn->sm_le_db_index, setup->sm_peer_ediv, setup->sm_peer_rand, setup->sm_peer_ltk);
}
}
@ -2200,10 +2227,6 @@ void sm_request_authorization(uint8_t addr_type, bd_addr_t address){
sm_conn->sm_connection_authorization_state = AUTHORIZATION_PENDING;
sm_notify_client(SM_AUTHORIZATION_REQUEST, sm_conn->sm_peer_addr_type, sm_conn->sm_peer_address, 0, 0);
} else {
// HACK
sm_authenticate_outgoing_connections = 1;
// used as a trigger to start central/master/initiator security procedures
if (sm_conn->sm_engine_state == SM_INITIATOR_CONNECTED){
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_INITIATOR_PH1_W2_SEND_PAIRING_REQUEST;