sm: prepare dhkey check to use AES CMAC Engine

This commit is contained in:
Matthias Ringwald 2016-05-27 21:06:16 +02:00
parent e083ca230a
commit dc30084780
2 changed files with 117 additions and 74 deletions

View File

@ -655,31 +655,6 @@ static void f5(sm_key256_t res, const sm_key256_t w, const sm_key_t n1, const sm
// hexdump2(res+16, 16);
}
// f6(W, N1, N2, R, IOcap, A1, A2) = AES-CMACW (N1 || N2 || R || IOcap || A1 || A2
// - W is 128 bits
// - N1 is 128 bits
// - N2 is 128 bits
// - R is 128 bits
// - IOcap is 24 bits
// - A1 is 56 bits
// - A2 is 56 bits
static void f6(sm_key_t res, const sm_key_t w, const sm_key_t n1, const sm_key_t n2, const sm_key_t r, const sm_key24_t io_cap, const sm_key56_t a1, const sm_key56_t a2){
uint8_t buffer[65];
memcpy(buffer, n1, 16);
memcpy(buffer+16, n2, 16);
memcpy(buffer+32, r, 16);
memcpy(buffer+48, io_cap, 3);
memcpy(buffer+51, a1, 7);
memcpy(buffer+58, a2, 7);
log_info("f6 key");
log_info_hexdump(w, 16);
log_info("f6 message");
log_info_hexdump(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
aes_cmac(res, w, buffer,sizeof(buffer));
log_info("f6 result");
log_info_hexdump(res, 16);
}
// g2(U, V, X, Y) = AES-CMACX(U || V || Y) mod 2^32
// - U is 256 bits
// - V is 256 bits
@ -1363,6 +1338,8 @@ static inline void sm_pdu_received_in_wrong_state(sm_connection_t * sm_conn){
#ifdef ENABLE_LE_SECURE_CONNECTIONS
static void sm_sc_prepare_dhkey_check(sm_connection_t * sm_conn);
static void sm_sc_state_after_receiving_random(sm_connection_t * sm_conn){
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// Responder
@ -1371,7 +1348,7 @@ static void sm_sc_state_after_receiving_random(sm_connection_t * sm_conn){
// Initiator role
switch (setup->sm_stk_generation_method){
case JUST_WORKS:
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
sm_sc_prepare_dhkey_check(sm_conn);
break;
case NK_BOTH_INPUT: {
@ -1390,7 +1367,7 @@ static void sm_sc_state_after_receiving_random(sm_connection_t * sm_conn){
if (setup->sm_passkey_bit < 20) {
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W2_CMAC_FOR_CONFIRMATION;
} else {
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
sm_sc_prepare_dhkey_check(sm_conn);
}
break;
case OOB:
@ -1431,6 +1408,7 @@ static void sm_sc_cmac_done(uint8_t * hash){
}
static void f4_engine(sm_connection_t * sm_conn, const sm_key256_t u, const sm_key256_t v, const sm_key_t x, uint8_t z){
const uint16_t message_len = 65;
sm_cmac_connection = sm_conn;
memcpy(sm_cmac_sc_buffer, u, 32);
memcpy(sm_cmac_sc_buffer+32, v, 32);
@ -1438,10 +1416,52 @@ static void f4_engine(sm_connection_t * sm_conn, const sm_key256_t u, const sm_k
log_info("f4 key");
log_info_hexdump(x, 16);
log_info("f4 message");
log_info_hexdump(sm_cmac_sc_buffer, 65);
sm_cmac_general_start(x, 65, &sm_sc_cmac_get_byte, &sm_sc_cmac_done);
log_info_hexdump(sm_cmac_sc_buffer, message_len);
sm_cmac_general_start(x, message_len, &sm_sc_cmac_get_byte, &sm_sc_cmac_done);
}
// f6(W, N1, N2, R, IOcap, A1, A2) = AES-CMACW (N1 || N2 || R || IOcap || A1 || A2
// - W is 128 bits
// - N1 is 128 bits
// - N2 is 128 bits
// - R is 128 bits
// - IOcap is 24 bits
// - A1 is 56 bits
// - A2 is 56 bits
static void f6(sm_key_t res, const sm_key_t w, const sm_key_t n1, const sm_key_t n2, const sm_key_t r, const sm_key24_t io_cap, const sm_key56_t a1, const sm_key56_t a2){
uint8_t buffer[65];
memcpy(buffer, n1, 16);
memcpy(buffer+16, n2, 16);
memcpy(buffer+32, r, 16);
memcpy(buffer+48, io_cap, 3);
memcpy(buffer+51, a1, 7);
memcpy(buffer+58, a2, 7);
log_info("f6 key");
log_info_hexdump(w, 16);
log_info("f6 message");
log_info_hexdump(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
aes_cmac(res, w, buffer,sizeof(buffer));
log_info("f6 result");
log_info_hexdump(res, 16);
}
#if 0
static void f6_engine(sm_key_t res, const sm_key_t w, const sm_key_t n1, const sm_key_t n2, const sm_key_t r, const sm_key24_t io_cap, const sm_key56_t a1, const sm_key56_t a2){
const uint16_t message_len = 65;
memcpy(sm_cmac_sc_buffer, n1, 16);
memcpy(sm_cmac_sc_buffer+16, n2, 16);
memcpy(sm_cmac_sc_buffer+32, r, 16);
memcpy(sm_cmac_sc_buffer+48, io_cap, 3);
memcpy(sm_cmac_sc_buffer+51, a1, 7);
memcpy(sm_cmac_sc_buffer+58, a2, 7);
log_info("f6 key");
log_info_hexdump(w, 16);
log_info("f6 message");
log_info_hexdump(sm_cmac_sc_buffer, message_len);
sm_cmac_general_start(w, 65, &sm_sc_cmac_get_byte, &sm_sc_cmac_done);
}
#endif
static void sm_sc_calculate_local_confirm(sm_connection_t * sm_conn){
uint8_t z = 0;
if (setup->sm_stk_generation_method != JUST_WORKS && setup->sm_stk_generation_method != NK_BOTH_INPUT){
@ -1492,6 +1512,63 @@ static void sm_sc_calculate_dhkey(sm_key256_t dhkey){
log_info_hexdump(dhkey, 32);
}
static void sm_sc_calculate_f5_for_dhkey_check(sm_connection_t * sm_conn){
// calculate DHKEY
sm_key256_t dhkey;
sm_sc_calculate_dhkey(dhkey);
// calculate LTK + MacKey
sm_key256_t ltk_mackey;
sm_key56_t bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave;
bd_addr_master[0] = setup->sm_m_addr_type;
bd_addr_slave[0] = setup->sm_s_addr_type;
memcpy(&bd_addr_master[1], setup->sm_m_address, 6);
memcpy(&bd_addr_slave[1], setup->sm_s_address, 6);
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// responder
f5(ltk_mackey, dhkey, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_local_nonce, bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave);
} else {
// initiator
f5(ltk_mackey, dhkey, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_peer_nonce, bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave);
}
// store LTK
memcpy(setup->sm_ltk, &ltk_mackey[16], 16);
// store macckey
memcpy(setup->sm_mackey, &ltk_mackey[0], 16);
}
static void sm_sc_calculate_f6_for_dhkey_check(sm_connection_t * sm_conn){
// calculate DHKCheck
sm_key56_t bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave;
bd_addr_master[0] = setup->sm_m_addr_type;
bd_addr_slave[0] = setup->sm_s_addr_type;
memcpy(&bd_addr_master[1], setup->sm_m_address, 6);
memcpy(&bd_addr_slave[1], setup->sm_s_address, 6);
uint8_t iocap_a[3];
iocap_a[0] = sm_pairing_packet_get_auth_req(setup->sm_m_preq);
iocap_a[1] = sm_pairing_packet_get_oob_data_flag(setup->sm_m_preq);
iocap_a[2] = sm_pairing_packet_get_io_capability(setup->sm_m_preq);
uint8_t iocap_b[3];
iocap_b[0] = sm_pairing_packet_get_auth_req(setup->sm_s_pres);
iocap_b[1] = sm_pairing_packet_get_oob_data_flag(setup->sm_s_pres);
iocap_b[2] = sm_pairing_packet_get_io_capability(setup->sm_s_pres);
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// responder
f6(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, setup->sm_mackey, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_ra, iocap_b, bd_addr_slave, bd_addr_master);
} else {
// initiator
f6(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, setup->sm_mackey, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_rb, iocap_a, bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave);
}
}
static void sm_sc_prepare_dhkey_check(sm_connection_t * sm_conn){
sm_sc_calculate_f5_for_dhkey_check(sm_conn);
sm_sc_calculate_f6_for_dhkey_check(sm_conn);
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
}
#endif
static void sm_run(void){
@ -1769,6 +1846,12 @@ static void sm_run(void){
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_CMAC_FOR_CHECK_CONFIRMATION;
sm_sc_calculate_remote_confirm(connection);
break;
case SM_SC_W2_CALCULATE_F6_FOR_DHKEY_CHECK:
if (!sm_cmac_ready()) break;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_CALCULATE_F6_FOR_DHKEY_CHECK;
sm_sc_calculate_f6_for_dhkey_check(connection);
break;
#endif
// initiator side
case SM_INITIATOR_PH0_SEND_START_ENCRYPTION: {
@ -1900,52 +1983,10 @@ static void sm_run(void){
break;
}
case SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND: {
// calculate DHKEY
sm_key256_t dhkey;
sm_sc_calculate_dhkey(dhkey);
// calculate LTK + MacKey
sm_key256_t ltk_mackey;
sm_key56_t bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave;
bd_addr_master[0] = setup->sm_m_addr_type;
bd_addr_slave[0] = setup->sm_s_addr_type;
memcpy(&bd_addr_master[1], setup->sm_m_address, 6);
memcpy(&bd_addr_slave[1], setup->sm_s_address, 6);
if (connection->sm_role){
// responder
f5(ltk_mackey, dhkey, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_local_nonce, bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave);
} else {
// initiator
f5(ltk_mackey, dhkey, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_peer_nonce, bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave);
}
// store LTK
memcpy(setup->sm_ltk, &ltk_mackey[16], 16);
// calc DHKCheck
memcpy(setup->sm_mackey, &ltk_mackey[0], 16);
// TODO: checks
uint8_t iocap_a[3];
iocap_a[0] = sm_pairing_packet_get_auth_req(setup->sm_m_preq);
iocap_a[1] = sm_pairing_packet_get_oob_data_flag(setup->sm_m_preq);
iocap_a[2] = sm_pairing_packet_get_io_capability(setup->sm_m_preq);
uint8_t iocap_b[3];
iocap_b[0] = sm_pairing_packet_get_auth_req(setup->sm_s_pres);
iocap_b[1] = sm_pairing_packet_get_oob_data_flag(setup->sm_s_pres);
iocap_b[2] = sm_pairing_packet_get_io_capability(setup->sm_s_pres);
if (connection->sm_role){
// responder
f6(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, setup->sm_mackey, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_ra, iocap_b, bd_addr_slave, bd_addr_master);
} else {
// initiator
f6(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, setup->sm_mackey, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_rb, iocap_a, bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave);
}
uint8_t buffer[17];
buffer[0] = SM_CODE_PAIRING_DHKEY_CHECK;
reverse_128(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, &buffer[1]);
if (connection->sm_role){
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_LTK_REQUEST_SC;
} else {
@ -2948,7 +2989,7 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
if (setup->sm_stk_generation_method == NK_BOTH_INPUT && setup->sm_user_response != SM_USER_RESPONSE_CONFIRM){
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_USER_RESPONSE;
} else {
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
sm_sc_prepare_dhkey_check(sm_conn);
}
} else {
// initiator
@ -3314,7 +3355,7 @@ void sm_just_works_confirm(hci_con_handle_t con_handle){
if (sm_conn->sm_engine_state == SM_SC_W4_USER_RESPONSE){
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// responder
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
sm_sc_prepare_dhkey_check(sm_conn);
} else {
// initiator
// TODO handle intiator role

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@ -313,6 +313,8 @@ typedef enum {
SM_SC_W4_CONFIRMATION,
SM_SC_SEND_PAIRING_RANDOM,
SM_SC_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM,
SM_SC_W2_CALCULATE_F6_FOR_DHKEY_CHECK,
SM_SC_W4_CALCULATE_F6_FOR_DHKEY_CHECK,
SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND,
SM_SC_W4_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND,
SM_SC_W4_USER_RESPONSE,