sm: use SM_SC_ for SC states

This commit is contained in:
Matthias Ringwald 2016-05-27 12:09:51 +02:00
parent 5a293e6e96
commit c6b7cbd9f9
2 changed files with 52 additions and 52 deletions

View File

@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ static void sm_setup_tk(void){
const stk_generation_method_t (*generation_method)[5] = stk_generation_method;
#ifdef ENABLE_LE_SECURE_CONNECTIONS
// table not define by default
if (setup->sm_use_secure_connections){
generation_method = stk_generation_method_with_secure_connection;
}
@ -1630,7 +1631,7 @@ static void sm_run(void){
return;
#ifdef ENABLE_LE_SECURE_CONNECTIONS
case SM_PH2_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND: {
case SM_SC_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND: {
uint8_t buffer[65];
buffer[0] = SM_CODE_PAIRING_PUBLIC_KEY;
//
@ -1655,9 +1656,9 @@ static void sm_run(void){
case JUST_WORKS:
case NK_BOTH_INPUT:
if (connection->sm_role){
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_CONFIRMATION;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_CONFIRMATION;
} else {
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_RESPONDER_PH2_W4_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
}
break;
case PK_INIT_INPUT:
@ -1670,10 +1671,10 @@ static void sm_run(void){
setup->sm_passkey_bit = 0;
if (connection->sm_role){
// responder
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_W4_CONFIRMATION;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_CONFIRMATION;
} else {
// initiator
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_RESPONDER_PH2_W4_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
}
sm_trigger_user_response(connection);
break;
@ -1686,7 +1687,7 @@ static void sm_run(void){
sm_timeout_reset(connection);
break;
}
case SM_PH2_SEND_CONFIRMATION: {
case SM_SC_SEND_CONFIRMATION: {
uint8_t buffer[17];
buffer[0] = SM_CODE_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
#ifdef USE_MBEDTLS_FOR_ECDH
@ -1706,15 +1707,15 @@ static void sm_run(void){
reverse_128(confirm_value, &buffer[1]);
#endif
if (connection->sm_role){
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM;
} else {
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_W4_CONFIRMATION;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_CONFIRMATION;
}
l2cap_send_connectionless(connection->sm_handle, L2CAP_CID_SECURITY_MANAGER_PROTOCOL, (uint8_t*) buffer, sizeof(buffer));
sm_timeout_reset(connection);
break;
}
case SM_PH2_SEND_PAIRING_RANDOM_SC: {
case SM_SC_SEND_PAIRING_RANDOM: {
uint8_t buffer[17];
buffer[0] = SM_CODE_PAIRING_RANDOM;
reverse_128(setup->sm_local_nonce, &buffer[1]);
@ -1722,15 +1723,15 @@ static void sm_run(void){
if (setup->sm_stk_generation_method != JUST_WORKS && setup->sm_stk_generation_method != NK_BOTH_INPUT && setup->sm_passkey_bit < 20){
if (connection->sm_role){
// responder
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_W4_CONFIRMATION;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_CONFIRMATION;
} else {
// initiator
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM;
}
} else {
if (connection->sm_role){
// responder
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_W4_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
if (setup->sm_stk_generation_method == NK_BOTH_INPUT){
// calc Vb if numeric comparison
// TODO: use AES Engine to calculate g2
@ -1742,14 +1743,14 @@ static void sm_run(void){
}
} else {
// initiator
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM;
}
}
l2cap_send_connectionless(connection->sm_handle, L2CAP_CID_SECURITY_MANAGER_PROTOCOL, (uint8_t*) buffer, sizeof(buffer));
sm_timeout_reset(connection);
break;
}
case SM_PH2_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND: {
case SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND: {
uint8_t buffer[17];
buffer[0] = SM_CODE_PAIRING_DHKEY_CHECK;
@ -1813,9 +1814,9 @@ static void sm_run(void){
#endif
reverse_128(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, &buffer[1]);
if (connection->sm_role){
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_RESPONDER_PH2_W4_LTK_REQUEST_SC;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_LTK_REQUEST_SC;
} else {
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_W4_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
}
l2cap_send_connectionless(connection->sm_handle, L2CAP_CID_SECURITY_MANAGER_PROTOCOL, (uint8_t*) buffer, sizeof(buffer));
sm_timeout_reset(connection);
@ -1831,7 +1832,7 @@ static void sm_run(void){
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_RESPONDER_PH1_W4_PAIRING_CONFIRM;
#ifdef ENABLE_LE_SECURE_CONNECTIONS
if (setup->sm_use_secure_connections){
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_RESPONDER_PH2_W4_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
connection->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
// skip LTK/EDIV for SC
key_distribution_flags &= ~SM_KEYDIST_ENC_KEY;
}
@ -2388,7 +2389,7 @@ static void sm_event_packet_handler (uint8_t packet_type, uint16_t channel, uint
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_CALC_STK;
break;
}
if (sm_conn->sm_engine_state == SM_RESPONDER_PH2_W4_LTK_REQUEST_SC){
if (sm_conn->sm_engine_state == SM_SC_W4_LTK_REQUEST_SC){
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_RESPONDER_PH2_SEND_LTK_REPLY;
break;
}
@ -2622,10 +2623,10 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH1_W4_USER_RESPONSE;
sm_trigger_user_response(sm_conn);
if (setup->sm_user_response == SM_USER_RESPONSE_IDLE){
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
}
} else {
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
}
break;
}
@ -2680,7 +2681,7 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_LE_SECURE_CONNECTIONS
case SM_RESPONDER_PH2_W4_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND:
case SM_SC_W4_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND:
if (packet[0] != SM_CODE_PAIRING_PUBLIC_KEY){
sm_pdu_received_in_wrong_state(sm_conn);
break;
@ -2711,7 +2712,7 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
#endif
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// responder
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
} else {
// initiator
// stk generation method
@ -2719,12 +2720,12 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
switch (setup->sm_stk_generation_method){
case JUST_WORKS:
case NK_BOTH_INPUT:
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_W4_CONFIRMATION;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_CONFIRMATION;
break;
case PK_INIT_INPUT:
case PK_RESP_INPUT:
case OK_BOTH_INPUT:
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_CONFIRMATION;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_CONFIRMATION;
break;
case OOB:
// TODO: implement SC OOB
@ -2733,7 +2734,7 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
}
break;
case SM_PH2_W4_CONFIRMATION:
case SM_SC_W4_CONFIRMATION:
if (packet[0] != SM_CODE_PAIRING_CONFIRM){
sm_pdu_received_in_wrong_state(sm_conn);
break;
@ -2743,14 +2744,14 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// responder
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_CONFIRMATION;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_CONFIRMATION;
} else {
// initiator
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_PAIRING_RANDOM_SC;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_PAIRING_RANDOM;
}
break;
case SM_PH2_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM:
case SM_SC_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM:
if (packet[0] != SM_CODE_PAIRING_RANDOM){
sm_pdu_received_in_wrong_state(sm_conn);
break;
@ -2785,12 +2786,12 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// Responder
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_PAIRING_RANDOM_SC;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_PAIRING_RANDOM;
} else {
// Initiator role
switch (setup->sm_stk_generation_method){
case JUST_WORKS:
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
break;
case NK_BOTH_INPUT: {
@ -2807,9 +2808,9 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
case PK_RESP_INPUT:
case OK_BOTH_INPUT:
if (setup->sm_passkey_bit < 20) {
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_CONFIRMATION;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_CONFIRMATION;
} else {
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
}
break;
case OOB:
@ -2819,7 +2820,7 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
}
break;
case SM_PH2_W4_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND:
case SM_SC_W4_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND:
if (packet[0] != SM_CODE_PAIRING_DHKEY_CHECK){
sm_pdu_received_in_wrong_state(sm_conn);
break;
@ -2860,9 +2861,9 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
// responder
// for numeric comparison, we need to wait for user confirm
if (setup->sm_stk_generation_method == NK_BOTH_INPUT && setup->sm_user_response != SM_USER_RESPONSE_CONFIRM){
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_W4_USER_RESPONSE;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_W4_USER_RESPONSE;
} else {
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
}
} else {
// initiator
@ -3221,14 +3222,14 @@ void sm_just_works_confirm(hci_con_handle_t con_handle){
#ifdef ENABLE_LE_SECURE_CONNECTIONS
if (setup->sm_use_secure_connections){
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND;
}
#endif
}
if (sm_conn->sm_engine_state == SM_PH2_W4_USER_RESPONSE){
if (sm_conn->sm_engine_state == SM_SC_W4_USER_RESPONSE){
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// responder
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_PH2_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
sm_conn->sm_engine_state = SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND;
} else {
// initiator
// TODO handle intiator role

View File

@ -249,16 +249,6 @@ typedef enum {
SM_PH2_W4_CONNECTION_ENCRYPTED,
// LE Secure Connections
SM_PH2_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND,
SM_PH2_SEND_CONFIRMATION,
SM_PH2_SEND_PAIRING_RANDOM_SC,
SM_PH2_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND,
SM_PH2_W4_CONFIRMATION,
SM_PH2_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM,
SM_PH2_W4_USER_RESPONSE,
SM_PH2_W4_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND,
// Phase 3: Transport Specific Key Distribution
// calculate DHK, Y, EDIV, and LTK
SM_PH3_GET_RANDOM,
@ -290,9 +280,6 @@ typedef enum {
SM_RESPONDER_PH2_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM,
SM_RESPONDER_PH2_W4_LTK_REQUEST,
SM_RESPONDER_PH2_SEND_LTK_REPLY,
// LE Secure Connection
SM_RESPONDER_PH2_W4_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND,
SM_RESPONDER_PH2_W4_LTK_REQUEST_SC,
// Phase 4: re-establish previously distributed LTK
// state == 46
@ -314,7 +301,19 @@ typedef enum {
SM_INITIATOR_PH2_W4_PAIRING_CONFIRM,
SM_INITIATOR_PH2_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM,
SM_INITIATOR_PH3_SEND_START_ENCRYPTION,
//
// LE Secure Connections
SM_SC_SEND_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND,
SM_SC_W4_PUBLIC_KEY_COMMAND,
SM_SC_SEND_CONFIRMATION,
SM_SC_W4_CONFIRMATION,
SM_SC_SEND_PAIRING_RANDOM,
SM_SC_W4_PAIRING_RANDOM,
SM_SC_SEND_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND,
SM_SC_W4_DHKEY_CHECK_COMMAND,
SM_SC_W4_USER_RESPONSE,
SM_SC_W4_LTK_REQUEST_SC,
} security_manager_state_t;
typedef enum {