sm: validate peer DHKey Check value

This commit is contained in:
Matthias Ringwald 2016-05-26 17:36:34 +02:00
parent 6f52a19684
commit a9f2976821
2 changed files with 38 additions and 5 deletions

View File

@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ typedef struct sm_setup_context {
sm_key_t sm_local_dhkey_check;
sm_key_t sm_ra;
sm_key_t sm_rb;
sm_key_t sm_mackey;
uint8_t sm_passkey_bit;
#endif
@ -680,6 +681,8 @@ static void f6(sm_key_t res, const sm_key_t w, const sm_key_t n1, const sm_key_t
log_info("f6 message");
log_info_hexdump(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
aes_cmac(res, w, buffer,sizeof(buffer));
log_info("f6 result");
log_info_hexdump(res, 16);
}
// g2(U, V, X, Y) = AES-CMACX(U || V || Y) mod 2^32
@ -1788,8 +1791,7 @@ static void sm_run(void){
memcpy(setup->sm_ltk, &ltk_mackey[16], 16);
// calc DHKCheck
sm_key_t mackey;
memcpy(mackey, &ltk_mackey[0], 16);
memcpy(setup->sm_mackey, &ltk_mackey[0], 16);
// TODO: checks
@ -1803,10 +1805,10 @@ static void sm_run(void){
iocap_b[2] = sm_pairing_packet_get_io_capability(setup->sm_s_pres);
if (connection->sm_role){
// responder
f6(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, mackey, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_ra, iocap_b, bd_addr_slave, bd_addr_master);
f6(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, setup->sm_mackey, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_ra, iocap_b, bd_addr_slave, bd_addr_master);
} else {
// initiator
f6(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, mackey, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_rb, iocap_a, bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave);
f6(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, setup->sm_mackey, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_rb, iocap_a, bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave);
}
#endif
reverse_128(setup->sm_local_dhkey_check, &buffer[1]);
@ -2821,7 +2823,34 @@ static void sm_pdu_handler(uint8_t packet_type, hci_con_handle_t con_handle, uin
// store DHKey Check
reverse_128(&packet[01], setup->sm_peer_dhkey_check);
// TODO: validate DHKey Check value
// validate E = f6()
sm_key56_t bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave;
bd_addr_master[0] = setup->sm_m_addr_type;
bd_addr_slave[0] = setup->sm_s_addr_type;
memcpy(&bd_addr_master[1], setup->sm_m_address, 6);
memcpy(&bd_addr_slave[1], setup->sm_s_address, 6);
uint8_t iocap_a[3];
iocap_a[0] = sm_pairing_packet_get_auth_req(setup->sm_m_preq);
iocap_a[1] = sm_pairing_packet_get_oob_data_flag(setup->sm_m_preq);
iocap_a[2] = sm_pairing_packet_get_io_capability(setup->sm_m_preq);
uint8_t iocap_b[3];
iocap_b[0] = sm_pairing_packet_get_auth_req(setup->sm_s_pres);
iocap_b[1] = sm_pairing_packet_get_oob_data_flag(setup->sm_s_pres);
iocap_b[2] = sm_pairing_packet_get_io_capability(setup->sm_s_pres);
sm_key_t peer_dhkey_check;
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// responder
f6(peer_dhkey_check, setup->sm_mackey, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_rb, iocap_a, bd_addr_master, bd_addr_slave);
} else {
// initiator
f6(peer_dhkey_check, setup->sm_mackey, setup->sm_peer_nonce, setup->sm_local_nonce, setup->sm_ra, iocap_b, bd_addr_slave, bd_addr_master);
}
if (0 != memcmp(setup->sm_peer_dhkey_check, peer_dhkey_check, 16) ){
sm_pairing_error(sm_conn, SM_REASON_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED);
break;
}
if (sm_conn->sm_role){
// responder

View File

@ -1002,6 +1002,10 @@ typedef enum {
#define SM_REASON_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED 0x07
#define SM_REASON_UNSPECIFIED_REASON 0x08
#define SM_REASON_REPEATED_ATTEMPTS 0x09
#define SM_REASON_INVALID_PARAMETERS 0x0a
#define SM_REASON_DHKEY_CHECK_FAILED 0x0b
#define SM_REASON_NUMERIC_COMPARISON_FAILED 0x0c
// also, invalid parameters
// and reserved