removed sm_aes128_key

This commit is contained in:
matthias.ringwald 2014-06-12 13:14:43 +00:00
parent f38c10628c
commit 784e72fdec

View File

@ -217,7 +217,6 @@ static uint8_t sm_pairing_failed_reason = 0;
static timer_source_t sm_timeout;
// data to send to aes128 crypto engine, see sm_aes128_set_key and sm_aes128_set_plaintext
static sm_key_t sm_aes128_key;
static sm_key_t sm_aes128_plaintext;
static uint8_t sm_aes128_active;
@ -393,10 +392,6 @@ static void gap_random_address_update_stop(){
run_loop_remove_timer(&gap_random_address_update_timer);
}
static inline void sm_aes128_set_key(sm_key_t key){
memcpy(sm_aes128_key, key, 16);
}
// asserts: sm_aes128_active == 0, hci_can_send_command == 1
static void sm_aes128_start(sm_key_t key, sm_key_t plaintext){
sm_aes128_active = 1;
@ -957,39 +952,42 @@ static void sm_run(void){
case SM_STATE_PH2_C1_GET_ENC_B:
case SM_STATE_PH2_C1_GET_ENC_D:
// already busy?
if (sm_aes128_active) break;
sm_aes128_start(sm_tk, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_state_responding_next_state();
return;
case SM_STATE_PH3_LTK_GET_ENC:
case SM_STATE_PH4_Y_GET_ENC:
case SM_STATE_PH4_LTK_GET_ENC:
// already busy?
if (sm_aes128_active) break;
sm_aes128_start(sm_aes128_key, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_aes128_start(sm_persistent_er, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_state_responding_next_state();
return;
case SM_STATE_PH2_C1_GET_ENC_C:
// already busy?
if (sm_aes128_active) break;
// calculate m_confirm using aes128 engine - step 1
sm_aes128_set_key(sm_tk);
sm_c1_t1(sm_m_random, sm_m_preq, sm_s_pres, sm_m_addr_type, sm_s_addr_type, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_aes128_start(sm_aes128_key, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_aes128_start(sm_tk, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_state_responding_next_state();
break;
case SM_STATE_PH2_C1_GET_ENC_A:
// already busy?
if (sm_aes128_active) break;
// calculate s_confirm using aes128 engine - step 1
sm_aes128_set_key(sm_tk);
sm_c1_t1(sm_s_random, sm_m_preq, sm_s_pres, sm_m_addr_type, sm_s_addr_type, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_aes128_start(sm_aes128_key, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_aes128_start(sm_tk, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_state_responding_next_state();
break;
case SM_STATE_PH2_CALC_STK:
// already busy?
if (sm_aes128_active) break;
// calculate STK
sm_aes128_set_key(sm_tk);
sm_s1_r_prime(sm_s_random, sm_m_random, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_aes128_start(sm_aes128_key, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_aes128_start(sm_tk, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_state_responding_next_state();
break;
case SM_STATE_PH3_Y_GET_ENC:
@ -997,9 +995,8 @@ static void sm_run(void){
if (sm_aes128_active) break;
// PH3B2 - calculate Y from - enc
// Y = dm(DHK, Rand)
sm_aes128_set_key(sm_persistent_dhk);
sm_dm_r_prime(sm_s_rand, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_aes128_start(sm_aes128_key, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_aes128_start(sm_persistent_dhk, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_state_responding_next_state();
return;
case SM_STATE_PH2_C1_SEND_PAIRING_CONFIRM: {
@ -1025,6 +1022,15 @@ static void sm_run(void){
sm_state_responding = SM_STATE_IDLE;
return;
}
case SM_STATE_PH4_Y_GET_ENC:
// already busy?
if (sm_aes128_active) break;
log_info("LTK Request: recalculating with ediv 0x%04x", sm_s_ediv);
// Y = dm(DHK, Rand)
sm_dm_r_prime(sm_s_rand, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_aes128_start(sm_persistent_dhk, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_state_responding_next_state();
return;
case SM_STATE_DISTRIBUTE_KEYS:
if (sm_key_distribution_send_set & SM_KEYDIST_FLAG_ENCRYPTION_INFORMATION){
@ -1090,6 +1096,9 @@ static void sm_run(void){
// note: aes engine is ready as we just got the aes result, also, sm_aes128_plaintext and sm_aes128_key can be set again
static void sm_handle_encryption_result(uint8_t * data){
sm_aes128_active = 0;
if (sm_central_ah_calculation_active){
sm_central_ah_calculation_active = 0;
// compare calulated address against connecting device
@ -1157,7 +1166,6 @@ static void sm_handle_encryption_result(uint8_t * data){
case SM_STATE_PH2_C1_W4_ENC_A:
case SM_STATE_PH2_C1_W4_ENC_C:
{
sm_aes128_set_key(sm_tk);
sm_key_t t2;
swap128(data, t2);
sm_c1_t3(t2, sm_m_address, sm_s_address, sm_aes128_plaintext);
@ -1199,7 +1207,6 @@ static void sm_handle_encryption_result(uint8_t * data){
print_hex16("ediv", sm_s_ediv);
// PH3B4 - calculate LTK - enc
// LTK = d1(ER, DIV, 0))
sm_aes128_set_key(sm_persistent_er);
sm_d1_d_prime(sm_s_div, 0, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_state_responding = SM_STATE_PH3_LTK_GET_ENC;
return;
@ -1214,7 +1221,6 @@ static void sm_handle_encryption_result(uint8_t * data){
print_hex16("ediv", sm_s_ediv);
// PH3B4 - calculate LTK - enc
// LTK = d1(ER, DIV, 0))
sm_aes128_set_key(sm_persistent_er);
sm_d1_d_prime(sm_s_div, 0, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_state_responding = SM_STATE_PH4_LTK_GET_ENC;
return;
@ -1388,22 +1394,7 @@ static void sm_event_packet_handler (uint8_t packet_type, uint16_t channel, uint
// no db for authenticated flag hack: flag is stored in bit 4 of LSB
sm_connection_authenticated = (sm_s_rand[7] & 0x10) >> 4;
log_info("LTK Request: recalculating with ediv 0x%04x", sm_s_ediv);
// dhk = d1(IR, 3, 0) - enc
// y = dm(dhk, rand) - enc
// div = y xor ediv
// ltk = d1(ER, div, 0) - enc
// SM_AES128_PLAINTEXT_USED_WIHTOUT_CHECK
// Y = dm(DHK, Rand)
sm_aes128_set_key(sm_persistent_dhk);
sm_dm_r_prime(sm_s_rand, sm_aes128_plaintext);
sm_state_responding = SM_STATE_PH4_Y_GET_ENC;
// sm_s_div = sm_div(sm_persistent_dhk, sm_s_rand, sm_s_ediv);
// sm_s_ltk(sm_persistent_er, sm_s_div, sm_s_ltk);
break;
default:
@ -1428,7 +1419,6 @@ static void sm_event_packet_handler (uint8_t packet_type, uint16_t channel, uint
case HCI_EVENT_COMMAND_COMPLETE:
if (COMMAND_COMPLETE_EVENT(packet, hci_le_encrypt)){
sm_aes128_active = 0;
sm_handle_encryption_result(&packet[6]);
break;
}