From c720adad4be4441c58763cf6d3a9fd4038e44f14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Micdu70 Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2020 08:14:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Update README.md (#74) typo --- README.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index b1c8ef7..05cbaac 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ You can enter the fingerprint manually in the `Edit device fingerprint` menu in ## Force BASIC key attestation If the SafteyNet check in the Magisk Manager fails CTS and shows "evalType HARDWARE" you'll need to use this feature. See here for details on hardware based key attestation for detecting the bootloader state: https://www.didgeridoohan.com/magisk/MagiskHide#hn_Unlocked_bootloader_3 -This feature has nothing to do with the device fingerprint, but uses the included fingerprints list to find the necessary value to use for the `ro.product.modle` prop. +This feature has nothing to do with the device fingerprint, but uses the included fingerprints list to find the necessary value to use for the `ro.product.model` prop. As long as Google doesn't roll out hardware based key attestation universally, it seems like we can fool SafetyNet into using the basic attestation by changing the `ro.product.model` prop (to pass the CTS profile check even with an unlocked bootloader). The module scripts will also alter partition specific props (odm, product, system, vendor and system_ext) to match, if they are available. Thank you to @Displax over at XDA for finding this: https://forum.xda-developers.com/showpost.php?p=83028387&postcount=40658